ANALYSIS – Competition, Development and the Emergence of the « Global South » at UNCTAD: Geopolitical lesson (1980-2025)
By François Souty, PhD, was Coordinator of the Competition Committee of OECD countries at UNCTAD constantly re-elected by the presidents and chief executive officers of the member competition authorities from 1996 to 2018. He teaches geopolitics, geopolitics of water and competition law at Excelia Business School La Rochelle and Paris-Cachan and the Faculty of Law of the University of Nantes.
Competition law and policy have gradually become central elements of global economic governance, reflecting the transformation of national markets, the globalization of trade and investment, and the growing recognition that « market power » [1] can undermine development goals as much as it can distort efficiency. In this changing landscape, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) through its dedicated body to competition an intergovernmental group of experts, has played a distinctive and enduring role. Unlike other international competition-oriented fora, UNCTAD has almost always presented competition policy as an instrument of development, equity and structural transformation, rather than as a purely technocratic mechanism for correcting market failures and mere economic efficiency.
However, the international architecture of cooperation in the field of competition is currently undergoing a phase of more ambivalent reshuffling that it would be pointless to deny. The increasing integration of sectoral objectives – whether specific digital regulations, strategic industrial policies or environmental requirements – tends to redefine the priorities of global economic governance. While these developments may reflect legitimate imperatives of sustainability or resilience, they also raise the question of how they relate to the fundamental principles of free competition and competitive neutrality. In some cases, the imposition or normative dissemination of ambitious environmental standards, sometimes designed in advanced economies, may be perceived by developing countries as an additional constraint likely to affect their industrial trajectories and competitiveness. The debates surrounding the last Conference of the Parties held in Brazil at the end of 2025 illustrated these tensions, with several delegations from the « Global South »[2] expressing reservations about the economic and trade implications of some climate commitments.[3] This article details the evolution of the UNCTAD mandate on competition, examines its normative contributions, and situates its work in the broader ecosystem of international competition governance.
These dynamics do not mean the abandonment of international cooperation in the field of competition, but they profoundly complicate its political economy. The architecture initially built around a gradual convergence towards common procedural and analytical standards is now crossed by potentially competing objectives: ecological transition, industrial sovereignty, economic security, strategic autonomy. The central question then becomes whether competition policy remains a structuring framework for global economic governance or whether it tends to be subordinated to sectoral objectives whose overall coherence remains uncertain.
It is in this context that the analysis of UNCTAD’s role is of particular importance. Far from being limited to a technical forum, its Intergovernmental Group of Experts on competition (known as the « IGE Competition ») provides a place where these tensions can be discussed from an explicitly developmental perspective.[4]
This study is divided into five parts. The first examines the founding texts and early evolution of the IGE, focusing on the adoption and interpretation of the United Nations as a whole. The second explores the consolidation of the IGE’s activities in the 1990s and early 2000s, when competition law was rapidly spreading in developing economies. The third analyses the substantial deepening of the IGE’s agenda and its interaction with other international forums. The fourth section compares UNCTAD’s IGE, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Committee on Competition and the International Competition Network, highlighting differences in mandate, governance and normative orientation. The fifth and final part addresses the contemporary phase of the IGE’s work, with a focus on the role of emerging powers, digital markets and development-oriented competition policies in the 2020s. The conclusion reflects on the enduring relevance of the IGE and future challenges in an increasingly multipolar and strategically fragmented global economy.
By adopting a long-term and analytically integrated perspective, this article aims at demonstrating that UNCTAD’s IGE is not only a technical forum, but a central place for contribution and normative proposals and even institutional innovation in global competition law, which ends up reorienting the competition standards created in the twentieth century exclusively built on an American-European matrix, typically Transatlantic. The experience of the IGE sheds light on both the possibilities and the limits of building a truly development-sensitive framework to govern market power in a global economy now traversed by environmental, geopolitical and industrial imperatives that are sometimes difficult to reconcile.[5]
I – Foundations and first evolution of UNCTAD’s IGE (1970s–1980s)
The creation and subsequent evolution of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices — later renamed the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition (IGE Competition) — must be understood in this broader intellectual and institutional context experienced by the author himself.[6]
1. Intellectual and political context
Since its inception in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IGE has been designed as a forum for States, particularly developing countries, to express concerns about market concentration, the power of transnational corporations and restrictive business practices beyond effective national control, especially at a time when few functioning national competition laws existed.[7] The adoption of the United Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (the « Set « ) in 1980 formed the normative basis for this regular periodic working group, integrating competition policy within a framework explicitly attentive to development needs, sovereignty and distributive justice. but also from an essentially European original matrix, which has endured quite widely.[8]
Over the following decades, the IGE evolved in response to profound changes in the global economy. The liberalization of trade and investment regimes, the rise of global value chains, the digitalization of markets, and the rise of multinational enterprises have all reshaped the challenges faced by competition authorities around the world.[9] During these transformations, UNCTAD’s work on competition has retained a distinctive focus: emphasis has been placed on flexibility, policy space and the diversity of institutional capacities among States, while often and to a greater or lesser extent incorporating the imposition of uniform enforcement models from advanced economies.[10] But resistance to this imposition has also increased significantly since the 2010s.
This approach has therefore logically differentiated UNCTAD from the other two international competition forums, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and, later, the International Competition Network (ICN), created in 2001 at the initiative of the United States. Indeed, the CCM was created with a strong American inspiration supported by the ICPAC Report published in June 2000[11]: the idea was to force the Europeans to put an end to the WTO Working Group, which they had initiated, a group responsible for studying the interrelations between international trade and competition policy, the idea of the Europeans at that time being to put an end to the extraterritorial application of antitrust law unilaterally. This group was active between 1996 and 2004. At its inception, the ICN reflected the very strong American reluctance to integrate international trade standards, which could be then established at the WTO, into the matrix constituted by antitrust law. However, the ICN has also slightly reduced the propensity for unilateral extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust law by bringing closer opportunities for direct exchanges between competition officials on both sides of the Atlantic and in Asia. This WTO working group was set up by the Singapore Conference, at the insistence of the EU on the basis of the report by former Vice-President of the EU Commission and ex-Commissioner for Competition, Karel Van Miert.[12] Although these bodies have contributed significantly to technical convergence and cooperation among established competition authorities, UNCTAD’s IGE has remained more broadly inclusive, intergovernmental and development-oriented.[13] Its mandate went beyond, and continues to go beyond, the techniques of applying the subject matter of competition law alone, to encompass issues such as state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights, industrial policy, consumer protection and the interface between competition law and broader economic strategies favouring certain companies (financial markets, health sectors, educational institutions, etc.).[14]
Researchers have repeatedly emphasized this distinctive role. New York’s Eleanor Fox noted that UNCTAD provides a forum where » competition policy is not detached from the realities of development, but integrated into them. »[15] Bill Kovacic, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and professor at George Washington University, also observed that UNCTAD’s work has reflected a » pluralistic model of global competition governance , » one that takes into account institutional diversity and power asymmetries.[16] For our part, we have argued – in our writings providing regular analytical reporting since the late 1990s – that UNCTAD has gradually built a normative space in which developing and emerging economies can influence the global competition agenda rather than simply adapt to it.[17]
The IGE also functioned as a laboratory for policy learning and institutional capacity building. Through voluntary peer reviews, technical assistance programmes and thematic debates, UNCTAD supported the establishment and consolidation of competition regimes in dozens of developing and transition economies.[18] These activities have not only strengthened national enforcement capacities, but have also contributed to the gradual formation of a shared, albeit not uniform, understanding of the principles of competition adapted to different stages of development.
In recent years, the relevance of this model has arguably increased rather than decreased. The rise of digital platforms, the resurgence of industrial policy, and the growing economic weight of emerging powers have reopened fundamental questions about market power, state intervention, and global economic governance.[19] In this context, the IGE has become an increasingly important forum for articulating alternative perspectives on competition policy, particularly those emanating from China, India, South Africa, and other emerging economies.[20]
The origins of the IGE Competition are inextricably linked to the broader debates on economic sovereignty, development and regulation of multinational enterprises that shaped the international economic order of the 1970s.
During this period, developing countries have increasingly expressed concern that the Restrictive Business Practices (RBPs) of powerful firms—often operating across borders—are undermining their industrialization strategies, distorting domestic markets, and weakening the expected gains from trade liberalization. These concerns have been strongly expressed in UNCTAD, which has become a central forum for promoting a development-oriented critique of the current international economic system.[21]
The push for international rules on restrictive business practices must be understood in the context of the New International Economic Order (NIO). Developing countries argued that existing antitrust regimes in advanced economies were insufficient to address the conduct of multinational enterprises in host States and did not take into account the structural asymmetries between developed and developing economies.[22] UNCTAD’s early work reflected the conviction that competition policy could not be separated from issues of development, industrial policy and the control of strategic sectors.[23]
This perspective diverged sharply from the more efficiency-oriented antitrust paradigms that prevailed in the United States and Europe at the time. On the contrary, UNCTAD has focused on market access (a central concept of international trade policy), fairness and the prevention of abuses of economic power that can entrench dependence and underdevelopment.[24] These early discussions established a normative grammar that would continue to distinguish UNCTAD’s competitive work from other international initiatives.
2. From the UN « Set » to the « IGE »: normative foundations
The culmination of these efforts was the adoption in 1980 of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules of Equity for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (« United Nations Set »). [25] Adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly, the « Set » was the first — and remains the only — global intergovernmental instrument officially agreed by the community of nations in the field of competition policy. Its language carefully balanced competing and differentiated objectives according to the interests of formerly developed, developing or newly developed states: promoting competition, protecting consumer welfare, preserving national policy space and supporting economic development.
Crucially, the UN Set has avoided imposing binding obligations or uniform models of implementation. Instead, it set out principles and guidelines for States to adapt to their legal traditions, levels of development and institutional capacities. This flexibility was intentional and reflected a deep skepticism in developing countries towards externally imposed regulatory models, the « North ». To oversee the implementation and interpretation of the SET, UNCTAD established the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.[26] The mandate of the IGE was to provide a forum for intergovernmental discussion, exchange of experiences and monitoring of developments in national and international competition policy. From the outset, it was not conceived as an implementing body, but as a deliberative and consultative forum based on consensus-building.
The first sessions of the IGE focused on identifying common forms of restrictive practices affecting developing countries, such as international cartels, abuse of dominant positions by multinational companies and restrictive licensing agreements. These discussions revealed both the diversity of national experiences and the common challenges of conducting cross-border business. The IGE thus functioned as an epistemic community, gradually building a shared vocabulary and analytical framework to deal with competition issues from a development perspective.[27]
3. Technical assistance and « capacity building »
In parallel with its normative work, the IGE has quickly become a vehicle for technical assistance and capacity building. UNCTAD soon began to provide advisory services to countries considering the adoption of competition laws or the establishment of competition authorities. These efforts were based on the recognition that legal principles alone were insufficient without institutional capacity and political commitment.
Early assistance programs emphasized adaptability rather than reproduction. UNCTAD experts encouraged countries to adapt competition laws to their economic structures, concentration levels and development priorities. This approach contrasted with subsequent trends towards convergence and harmonization, and heralded UNCTAD’s enduring focus on policy space.[28]
By the end of the 1980s, the basic architecture of UNCTAD’s competitive examinations work was firmly in place. The UN framework provided a normative anchor, while the IGE served as an institutional forum for dialogue, learning and progressive development of standards. Although progress was often slow and consensus fragile, this fundamental phase established principles that would shape the following decades of work.[29]
This period was referred to as « constructive ambiguity« , in which flexibility and inclusiveness were favoured by the UNCTAD Secretariat over legal precision. This ambiguity, far from being a weakness, allowed the IGE to survive changing political and economic contexts and remain relevant as competition law spread across the developing world in the 1990s and beyond. But this ambiguity may also have slowed down the interest of competition authorities in developed countries, particularly in Europe, for this forum.
II – Consolidation and normative development of the IGE (1990s–early 2000s)
The 1990s marked a decisive phase in the evolution of the IGE. This period has been characterized by a number of key thematic aspects: the rapid diffusion of competition law in developing and transition economies, the deepening of globalization and the emergence of new international forums dealing with competition issues. In this context, the IGE has consolidated its role as a central platform for normative reflection, institutional learning and guidance on the conditions for the implementation of competition law towards development (definitions of exemption regimes or exceptions, sectoral regulations, attention to import and distribution monopolies, duration of intellectual property rights, etc.).
1. Global dissemination of competition law, Model Law on competition and the role of UNCTAD
After the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of market-oriented reforms, an increasing number of countries have adopted competition laws for the first time. By the early 2000s, more than half of the UN member states had adopted competition legislation, many with the direct support of UNCTAD. This expansion has fundamentally altered the work of the IGE, shifting its focus from conceptual debates on restrictive business practices to the practical challenges of implementing and enforcing competition law.[30]
UNCTAD has responded by strengthening its advisory services and refining its analytical tools in a budgetary context that is still very limited under pressure from developed countries. The IGE became a forum where newly established authorities could exchange experiences, identify common obstacles and discuss how competition law could be aligned with national development strategies. During this period, UNCTAD has moved from principle to practice, without abandoning its development compass.[31]
One of the most significant developments of this phase was the development and further development of UNCTAD’s Model Law on Competition (UNCTAD) Model Law on Competition. Rather than serving as a model for uniform adoption, Model Law was designed as a flexible frame of reference, offering alternative formulations and commentaries reflecting various legal traditions and policy objectives.[32]
The IGE’s discussions around the Model Law revealed a deliberate effort to preserve policy space. Provisions on abuse of dominance, merger control, and exemptions have been developed to allow states to take into account factors such as industrial development, public interest, and market structure. This approach has often contrasted with the emerging convergence trends led by advanced economies, emphasizing instead a « contextual competition policy« .[33]
2. Development, policy coherence, interaction with emerging international forums
Throughout the 1990s, the IGE increasingly addressed the relationship between competition policy and other areas of economic governance, including trade liberalization, privatization, and regulatory reform. UNCTAD’s analyses have highlighted the risks of introducing competition law into highly concentrated or poorly regulated markets without complementary policies. The IGE discussions stressed that competition policy should not be seen as an end in itself, but as part of a broader development strategy. This perspective has resonated strongly with developing countries in times of structural adjustment, where privatization has often led to the substitution of private monopolies for public ones. UNCTAD’s guidelines have highlighted the need for sequencing reforms and strengthening of regulatory institutions in parallel with the enforcement of competition.[34]
The consolidation of the IGE’s activities has occurred in parallel with the emergence of other international competition forums, including the expansion of the OECD’s competition activities and the creation of the ICN in 2001. While these developments have raised concerns about duplication and fragmentation, UNCTAD has positioned the IGE as a complementary forum, emphasizing inclusiveness and development-orientation.[35]
Former U.S. FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic observes that UNCTAD’s continued relevance during this period stems from its ability to » offer something fundamentally different: a forum where diversity of institutional design was not only tolerated but actively valued. » [36] The IGE thus became a space where developing countries could voice concerns that were not always a priority elsewhere, including market access, equity and capacity constraints.
3. Institutional learning, peer reviews and evaluations
Although formal voluntary peer reviews became more important later, the 1990s laid the foundation for institutional peer learning, in the form of peer reviews within the IGE, allowing for the evaluation of emerging regulatory authorities and regimes in the Global South by experts from experienced competition authorities, generally from the « North ». Member States – particularly the competition authorities of developed countries coordinated under the aegis of a « moderator » or coordinator elected and confirmed annually by the heads of these national authorities who are members of the Bureau of the OECD Competition Committee – have increasingly presented national experiences, legislative reforms and enforcement challenges for collective discussions. These exchanges have fostered a form of mutual learning and greatly helped to better identify best practices adapted to different levels of development.[37]
This phase can been referred to as progressive institutionalization, during which the IGE developed routines and methodologies that would later support more formalized control mechanisms. By the early 2000s, the IGE had established itself as a stable and respected forum, capable of adapting to the rapidly changing landscape of global competition law. Typically, countries such as Argentina, South Africa, Thailand or Vietnam have followed this real learning curve.
By the end of the 2000s, the IGE had successfully navigated a complex environment marked by globalization, legal diffusion, and institutional competition. It had strengthened its normative framework, strengthened its role in providing technical assistance and reaffirmed its development-oriented identity.
We can conclude that this period had demonstrated the resilience of the model supported by UNCTAD: rather than converging towards a single global standard, the IGE contributed to legitimizing diversity as a force in international competition governance. This legacy would prove particularly important as new challenges — digitalization, cross-border enforcement and the rise of emerging economies — began to dominate the agenda in the years that followed.[38]
III – Legal developments and global interfaces of the IGE (years 2000–2010)
From the mid-2000s, the work of UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Expert Group on Competition Law and Policy entered a phase of substantial deepening. This period has been marked by the maturation of many national competition regimes in developing and transition economies, the intensification of cross-border economic activity and the emergence of new forms of market power. In response, the IGE has gradually evolved from fundamental and institutional issues to substantive issues of increasing complexity, has diversified its issues by even broadening them towards consumer protection in developing countries,[39] while positioning itself in an increasingly saturated international competition governance landscape.[40]
1. Broadening competition laws, merger control and transforming market structures
Since the mid-2000s, UNCTAD’s IGE has accompanied a phase of normative expansion marked by the consolidation of national competition laws in a growing number of developing and transition economies. This period corresponds to a qualitative change: the challenge no longer lay mainly in the formal adoption of competition laws, but in their effective implementation and in the refinement of the analytical tools mobilized by the national authorities.[41]
Discussions in the IGE have gradually moved away from general principles to complex substantive issues, such as assessing abuses of dominance in historically concentrated markets, defining relevant markets in highly informality economies, and assessing anti-competitive effects in unstable regulatory environments.[42] This evolution reflected a realization: the mechanical importation of standards developed in advanced economies guaranteed neither economic efficiency nor institutional legitimacy.
The question of the abuse of domination occupied a central place. In many states, markets remained structured around former public monopolies or firms that emerged from partial privatization processes.[43] The IGE stressed that the strict application of the classic categories of exclusionary abuse had to be contextualised in order to avoid two symmetrical pitfalls: inaction in the face of restrictive practices consolidating inherited dominant positions, and excessive intervention likely to weaken sectors still in the process of restructuring.[44] This approach reflected a pragmatic conception of the control of unilateral behaviour, articulating economic analysis and institutional reality.
Merger control – the instrument of sovereignty par excellence – has become increasingly important in a context of increasing cross-border mergers. Developing countries were faced with transactions affecting their markets without necessarily having the expertise capacity comparable to that of large jurisdictions.[45] UNCTAD’s work has highlighted the challenges of setting appropriate reporting thresholds, circulating relevant information and assessing complex conglomerate or vertical effects.[46]
In contrast to an approach that focuses strictly on the short-term welfare of the consumer, the IGE accepted that the examination of mergers could include, subject to transparency and legal certainty, considerations of public interest linked to economic development.[47] It should be noted that the integration of development objectives does not constitute a deviation from competitive rationality, but the expression of an assumed pluralism of the purposes of competition law in emerging economies. This is a variant that is not widely accepted by developed countries.[48]
Thus, the in-depth phase did not result in a simple increase in technicality; it corresponded to a reconfiguration of competitive analysis itself, now conceived as intrinsically dependent on the institutional context.
2. International cartels, cooperation and institutional learning through peer reviews
In parallel with the substantial deepening of the substantive rules, the IGE has intensified its work on international cartels and cooperation mechanisms between competition authorities. The increase in cross-border trade exposed developing countries to international agreements with local effects, without national authorities always having the legal or technical means to prosecute them effectively.[49]
Discussions within the IGE focused on investigative techniques, the use of leniency programmes and the modalities of voluntary cooperation.[50]Emphasis was placed on the sharing of experiences and the gradual dissemination of survey standards adapted to varying institutional capacities. In this context, UNCTAD has adopted a position distinct from previous plans to establish a binding multilateral instrument on competition. It has favoured a gradual approach, based on trust and technical assistance rather than on mandatory normative harmonization.[51]
William Kovacic has rightly described this evolution as « progressive internationalism « , stressing that cooperation in the field of competition is based less on formal obligations than on the construction of a shared institutional capital.[52] This perspective corresponds to the reality of the persistent asymmetries between jurisdictions with significant extraterritorial investigative resources and those whose jurisdiction remains essentially territorial.
The major institutional innovation of this period, however, remains the expansion of voluntary peer reviews. Initiated in the mid-2000s by UNCTAD, these mechanisms consist of an in-depth assessment of a State’s legal and institutional framework, combining doctrinal analysis, economic assessment and practical recommendations.[53] Reviews are discussed publicly within the IGE, promoting transparent dialogue and collective ownership of the recommendations made.
This system has a double originality. On the one hand, it preserves the sovereignty of the State under review, which retains control over the timetable and the follow-up given to the recommendations. On the other hand, it creates a horizontal learning space, allowing the participating authorities to confront their practices without litigation logic.[54] This method helps to strengthen the legitimacy of the international normative process by anchoring it in the concrete experience of States rather than in abstract prescriptions.
The peer reviews have thus consolidated the identity of the IGE as a cooperative and inclusive forum, distinct from the forums focused primarily on technical convergence among advanced economies. They have also contributed to structuring an epistemic community of competition law practitioners from various institutional contexts, promoting the gradual dissemination of common standards adapted to local realities.[55]
In this sense, the deepening phase of the years 2000–2010 cannot be understood solely as an increase in legal sophistication; It is also a moment of institutionalization of a specific method of international competition governance, based on voluntary cooperation, comparative learning and supervised normative pluralism.
3. Assessment of the deepening phase and interface with the OECD and the ICN
At the end of the 2010s, the IGE Competition had established itself as a forum with a dual maturity, both technical and institutional. The increasing sophistication of the topics addressed – complex merger control, international cooperation on cartels, integration of public interest considerations – demonstrated an ability to deal with highly technical issues, while the stabilisation of working methods, in particular through voluntary peer reviews, revealed a lasting organisational consolidation.[56] However, this phase of deepening has not resulted in a normative alignment with a single model of competition; on the contrary, it has confirmed UNCTAD’s commitment to a pluralistic approach to competition law.
In contrast to a purposive reading of global governance based on gradual convergence towards a homogeneous standard of consumer welfare, the IGE has maintained an approach that recognizes the diversity of economic structures, public priorities, and institutional capacities.[57] This orientation is not based on doctrinal relativism, but on an explicit consideration of the heterogeneity of national contexts. Frédéric Jenny stressed that global competition governance cannot be reduced to a process of technical harmonisation; it involves trade-offs between economic efficiency, distributive equity and development objectives.[58] In this context, UNCTAD has assumed a balancing function, helping to ensure that international standards are not exclusively shaped by jurisdictions with the most advanced enforcement capacities.[59] It has thus preserved a normative space allowing the transparent integration of complementary objectives such as industrialisation, regional cohesion or the correction of structural asymmetries, without weakening the requirement of legal predictability.[60]
This development has taken place in a densely populated institutional environment, marked by the rise of the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Competition Network.[61] The OECD has distinguished itself by a substantial production of standards, based on recommendations, guidelines and peer reviews between the majority advanced economies.[62] TheICN, on the other hand, is based on a flexible network of competition authorities that focus on the development of best practices and methodological convergence.[63] In this context, UNCTAD’s specificity lies in its inclusive universality (inclusive in the sense of including developing countries and more broadly the « Global South »), its close articulation between normative thinking and technical assistance, as well as the explicit anchoring of its work in development issues.
Far from competing for standard-setting authority, the IGE has positioned itself as a functional interface between jurisdictions at different stages of institutional development.[64] This intermediation function has helped to mitigate the risk of polarization of the global discourse between « producers » and « receivers » of norms and to promote a more horizontal circulation of experiences.
Finally, the deepening of the IGE’s work took place in a context of increasing fragmentation of global economic governance.[65] As already observed, this dynamic of progressive internationalism has been based on trust, voluntary cooperation and gradual institutional learning.[66] In a now polycentric architecture, the IGE does not produce binding standards; it contributes to structuring common expectations and disseminating flexible standards adapted to national capacities, which explains its ability to address emerging themes such as the digital economy and sustainability.
4. An exemplary case for UNCTAD: the dynamic « continentalization » of competition law in Africa
Since the early 1980s, UNCTAD has been one of the main sources of reflection, normative dissemination and capacity-building in competition law and policy, particularly through the IGE.[67] The UNCTAD Secretariat has made considerable efforts to support the development of competition authorities in Latin America and Africa (not to mention Asia). By providing a permanent forum for dialogue between established and emerging jurisdictions, as well as through numerous training seminars for African competition authorities, UNCTAD has contributed to the development of a competitive culture in developing economies and to the progressive structuring of national and regional authorities. It is in line with this dynamic that the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 26 February 2026 by the competition authorities of the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).[68]
The agreement establishes a formal framework for cooperation to organise the exchange of information, the coordination of investigations, mutual technical assistance and the sharing of best practices in the application of competition and consumer protection rules, in particular where the practices in question have a cross-border dimension. In its logic, the initiative is reminiscent of the European model set up in the 1960s around the European Commission, within the framework of the European Economic Community, and then deepened within the European Union.[69] But it is also part of a truly continental dynamic, marked by the entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), resulting from the Agreement signed in Kigali on March 21, 2018 and entered into force on May 30, 2019.[70] The AfCFTA provides for the adoption of sectoral protocols, including a protocol on competition policy, intended to establish principles and mechanisms for cooperation at the level of the entire African continent.
In this context, the 2026 interregional memorandum can be read as an intermediate milestone between the sub-regional level and the continental architecture under construction. It strengthens horizontal coherence between regional economic communities, while preparing the future articulation with the continental rules of the AfCFTA. Beyond its technical dimension, it is thus a further manifestation of the affirmation of the « Global South » in international competitive governance. While competition law has long been shaped by the experiences of North America and Europe, the emergence of coordinated African networks, backed by a continental single market project, reflects a gradual shift in the centres of normative initiative. The practical impacts could be significant: for companies, a more coherent and potentially more demanding control environment on a regional and, ultimately, continental scale; for the authorities, an increased capacity to investigate and negotiate with multinational actors; for consumers, enhanced protection in an African economic area that is in the process of advanced integration.[71]
IV – UNCTAD in a comparative perspective: distinctions with the OECD and the ICN
As international competition governance has become more dense since the late 1990s, the IGE has evolved alongside other major forums, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Competition Committee and the Global Competition Forum, as well as the International Competition Network. By the end of the 2010s, the IGE had firmly established itself as a forum capable of dealing with technically complex issues while preserving its development-oriented identity. His work during this phase demonstrated that competition law could evolve without abandoning diversity of objectives and institutional design. This institutional coexistence, far from being redundant, reveals lasting structural differences in mandates, normative orientations and methods of action. We can describe this period of the years 2010-2020 as mature pluralism, during which UNCTAD managed to combine substantial rigour and normative flexibility This success laid the foundations for the IGE’s engagement in even more complex challenges in the 2020s, including digitalization, sustainability and multipolar governance.[72]
The analysis can be structured around three axes: the institutional foundations and the conception of the objectives of competition policy; the nature of standard-setting instruments and the place of capacity building; and finally, the respective inclusion of these forums in the political economy of contemporary competition.
1. Institutional foundations and design of objectives
It should be recalled that the IGE is a formal intergovernmental body placed under the authority of the United Nations General Assembly, open to all UN member states.[73] This universality gives it a singular legitimacy, enshrined in the UN normative framework that explicitly gives priority to sustainable development and inclusive growth.[74] Conversely, the OECD’s Competition Committee is mainly composed of advanced economies, while the ICN is based on a flexible network of national competition authorities rather than an inter-state organisation.[75]
This institutional divergence has a direct impact on the definition of the agenda of work in Geneva each year. UNCTAD’s inclusiveness implies that the concerns of developing countries should be a constituent part of the discussions.[76] This pluralism reflects not only UNCTAD’s procedural inclusiveness but also a less narrow analytical approach than that prevailing in other standard-setting forums.
The OECD’s Global Forum on Competition – in particular at its December 2024 and December 2025 sessions on competition in the digital age and competitive resilience in a fragmented geo-economic context respectively – illustrates the privileged orientation towards methodological convergence and the deepening of analytical standards.[77] This work has contributed considerably to the sophistication of the control of cartels and mergers.[78]
Conversely, the IGE defends a pluralist conception of the objectives of competition policy, integrating economic development, structural transformation and considerations of equity.[79] Eleanor Fox refers to this orientation as « developmental competition policy », recognising the legitimacy of contextual objectives alongside traditional efficiency criteria.[80] This approach is reflected in the Model Law on Competition and in debates about the public interest and public companies.¹[81]
2. Standard-setting instruments and capacity-building
The difference between these forums is also manifest in the nature of their instruments. The recommendations of the OECD Council and the ICN’s recommended practices are soft law, but exert a strong normative influence in favour of convergence.[82]
The texts adopted in the framework of UNCTAD, in particular the » UN Set » and the recommendations of the IGE, are explicitly designed as flexible guidelines adapted to differentiated institutional contexts.[83] This flexibility corresponds to a conscious choice. Frédéric Jenny observes that UNCTAD has avoided any « premature standardization », allowing national regimes to evolve gradually according to their own constraints.[84]
This orientation is particularly visible in the area of capacity-building, which is a central element of UNCTAD’s mandate.[85] The IGE serves as a platform for the exchange of legislative and institutional experiences between jurisdictions facing comparable challenges.[86]
Voluntary peer reviews are an example of this approach. Conducted under the aegis of UNCTAD and discussed publicly within the IGE, they are based on a cooperative dialogue rather than on evaluation against a uniform standard.[87] William Kovacic stressed that these mechanisms promote institutional trust and progressive learning, which are essential in an environment marked by significant asymmetries.[88]
3. Political Economy of Competition and Comparative Legitimacy
The uniqueness of the IGE Competition lies in its explicit engagement with the political economy of competition law. Unlike mainly technical-analytical approaches, the IGE starts from the premise that competition policy is part of differentiated institutional and productive trajectories, and that it necessarily interacts with the industrial policy choices, ownership structures and social balances specific to each State. This perspective is in line with contemporary analyses of developmental antitrust, according to which competition cannot be dissociated from the objectives of economic transformation and the reduction of structural asymmetries[89]
In this context, UNCTAD’s debates directly address issues such as the role of state-owned enterprises, the relationship between competition and development planning, regulatory capture, and the coherence between competitive discipline and industrialization strategies.[90] Where the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Competition Network favour methodological convergence based on economic analysis and the promotion of common procedural standards, the IGE takes on a more explicitly contextualised approach.[91] This difference does not reflect a conflict of principles, but a divergence of emphasis: UNCTAD recognizes that in many developing economies, competition policy coexists with concentrated markets, a strong State presence and significant institutional constraints.
This approach is particularly echoed in the work of Eleanor Fox, who advocated the idea of a « developmental competition policy » that is attentive to institutional contexts and the imperatives of economic inclusion.[92] Similarly, Frédéric Jenny stresses that the international legitimacy of competition policy depends on its ability to integrate multiple objectives without sacrificing analytical coherence.[93] The IGE thus appears, once again, as a space of differentiation or at least of normative mediation, where the universality of competitive principles is confronted with the diversity of national trajectories.
In fact, this openness contributes decisively to the comparative legitimacy of the IGE: the European Founding Fathers of the IGE may seem to pay more attention to this trend by stimulating bilateral continental cooperation between the European Union and Africa through its two African capacity building programmes for COMESA and WAEMU (it is often better-known under its French acronym UEMOA) engaged in the process of African continentalization. For many states in the Global South, competition law is not perceived as a simple instrument for allocative optimization, but as a tool likely to affect sensitive social and sectoral balances. By opening a space for discussion on these dimensions, UNCTAD promotes national ownership of reforms and limits the risk of mechanical importation of institutional models.[94] This position is more broadly in line with analyses relating to the pluralism of global economic constitutionalism, according to which international economic governance cannot be reduced to the export of homogeneous standards without taking into account political and social contexts.[95]
Understood in this way, UNCTAD’s specific contribution lies less in the imposition of normative uniformity than in the legitimization of a structured pluralism within a shared global dialogue. This ability to articulate analytical rigour and contextual sensitivity explains the enduring relevance of the IGE despite the proliferation of international competition forums. Far from duplicating the work of the OECD or the ICN, it occupies a complementary function in a now polycentric architecture: that of a space where the diversity of objectives, institutional experimentation and development concerns are constitutive of normative reflection. This comparative advantage has been further accentuated in the 2020s, as emerging powers have claimed a greater role in defining the global competition agenda and debates have broadened to the interactions between competition, sustainability and economic sovereignty.
V – Emerging Powers, Multipolar Governance and the Transformation of UNCTAD’s IGE in the 2020s
The 2020s marked a structural turning point in the evolution of the IGE. While continuity with the historically development-oriented mandate remains evident, the decade is distinguished by the consolidation of a multipolar landscape of competition governance. Emerging economies—notably China, India, and South Africa—are no longer participating only as recipients of technical assistance, but as producers and disseminators of standards.[96] The way in which these countries communicate their national experiences in terms of competition has often signalled the rise of a regional or even global power at the economic and even geopolitical level.
This shift is part of a broader transformation of global geopolitics and geoeconomics,[97] marked by the rise of digital markets, the resurgence of industrial policies and the assertion of economic sovereignty strategies. In this context, the IGE has gradually evolved into a forum for mutual learning and plurilateral coordination, where exchanges no longer follow a vertical North-South scheme but take the form of horizontal South-South interactions between authorities facing similar challenges.[98]
1. Emerging powers as normative entrepreneurs
China’s participation in the work of the IGE has intensified significantly during the 2020s, including in discussions around digital platforms, data-driven market power, and the competitive implications of state-influenced firms.[99] China’s experience in controlling concentrations in the technology sectors, cracking down on abuses of dominant position in digital markets and supervising integrated conglomerates has provided the IGE’s debates with examples illustrating how competition law works in hybrid systems combining market mechanisms and structuring public intervention, such as China.[100]
India has taken on an equally significant role, particularly in debates around digital ecosystems, algorithmic pricing, and telecommunications markets.[101] The Indian contributions emphasized the need to preserve market contestability while promoting local innovation, access for small and medium-sized enterprises, and effective consumer protection in highly intermediated environments. We will come back to this in the specific section of the BRICS to follow.
More voluntarily than India, South Africa has been keen to share lessons from its experience in controlling mergers in historically concentrated markets and mobilising public interest criteria to address structural inequalities⁶ at the international level.[102] South Africa has also made very strong progress in the dynamics of the ICN by assuming the chairmanship of working groups as well as by providing dense and abundant contributions, in a context where the ICN, it should be recalled, was nevertheless founded and governed by the competition authorities of the countries of the North. This approach, articulating competitive objectives and distributive considerations, has helped to legitimize within the IGE a broader conception of the aims of competition policy.
The IGE in the 2020s no longer functions as a one-way channel of technical assistance; emerging economies are now shaping both the substance and tone of normative discussion.[103] This evolution reflects a redistribution of epistemic authority in the global governance of competition. Conceptual innovations no longer come exclusively from historically dominant jurisdictions; They are also emerging from systems facing challenges of rapid development, accelerated digitalization and industrial restructuring.
This phenomenon has contributed to the gradual transformation of the IGE into a multipolar normative laboratory, despite the chronic shortage of human resources of the small team of the Directorate of Competition and Consumer Protection of the Secretariat. Rather than aiming for a uniform convergence around a single model, the forum tends to promote flexible coordination based on the exchange of experiences, institutional experimentation and the recognition of differentiated trajectories. In an international environment marked by heightened geo-economic tensions, this capacity for pluralistic integration is one of the conditions for the resilience of international cooperation in the field of competition, which also explains the Secretariat’s growing audience among emerging competition authorities.
2. Competition policy, BRICS, Eurasian integration and plurilateral dialogue
The growing influence of emerging powers in international economic governance has been reflected, particularly significantly, in the field of competition policy. This evolution is not limited to increased participation in existing forums: it corresponds to a more structured strategy of normative projection. In this regard, the coordinated engagement of the BRICS has been a key vehicle for consolidating a collective voice of emerging economies.[104]
The cooperation developed by the BRICS competition authorities, in particular through their international conferences and their active participation in the work of UNCTAD and the IGE, has fostered the development of a common discourse on several structuring themes: merger control in highly concentrated markets, the role of state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors, and the competitive framework of large digital platforms.[105] This coordination does not necessarily aim at a formal harmonisation of legislation, but rather at building an interpretative convergence on principles adapted to the economic realities of emerging countries.[106]
In particular, the issue of state-owned enterprises illustrates the doctrinal specificity defended by several BRICS members. Contrary to a strictly neutralist approach to competition, some authorities put forward the legitimacy of industrial policy and development objectives, insofar as they remain compatible with the preservation of market contestability.[107] This orientation is part of a broader reflection on the relationship between competition and development, already highlighted by comparative doctrine.[108]
The regulation of digital platforms constitutes a second area of doctrinal affirmation. Internal BRICS discussions have highlighted the risks of structural asymmetries related to data concentration, network effects and crowding-out strategies in two-sided markets.[109] These concerns are in line with some European analyses, while differing from them by a particular insistence on digital sovereignty and national control of strategic infrastructures.[110]Thus a plural approach to digital competition is emerging, where considerations of equity, development and strategic autonomy complement the traditional analysis in terms of allocative efficiency.
At the same time, the involvement of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) has introduced a particularly significant dimension of regional integration. As a supranational body of the Eurasian Economic Union established by the 2014 Treaty, the Commission has its own powers in the field of cross-border anticompetitive practices and the control of certain regional mergers.[111] This institutional configuration offers an intermediate model between intergovernmental cooperation and true supranational authority, partially bringing the Eurasian experience closer to that of the European Union, while retaining specificities linked to economies in transition.[112]
The EEC’s work on digital markets and normative harmonization demonstrates a commitment to building an integrated competitive space that can withstand extraterritorial pressures.[113] It thus contributes to the pluralization of normative production centers in competition law, in a context marked by the rise of economic multipolarity and by the relative fragmentation of global legal regimes.[114]
Taken together, the BRICS and EEC initiatives are contributing to the emergence of a more structured plurilateral dialogue, in which emerging economies are no longer content to adopt standards developed elsewhere, but actively contribute to their redefinition. This dynamic reflects a more profound transformation of international competition governance, which is now traversed by logics of normative differentiation and rebalancing of doctrinal influences.[115]
3. Digital markets, industrial policy and state influence
Throughout the 2020s, the digitalization of economies has become a substantial unifying theme within the work of UNCTAD and particularly of the IGE.[116] The successive sessions addressed structuring issues such as algorithmic collusion, data concentration and portability, the dominance of large digital platforms and the specific challenges related to the regulation of multi-sided markets.[117]
The issue of algorithmic collusion, in particular, has attracted increasing doctrinal attention due to the ability of artificial intelligence systems to implicitly coordinate pricing behaviors without direct human intervention.[118] Similarly, data concentration has emerged as a key driver of market power, which can reinforce network effects and create substantial barriers to entry.[119] These structural transformations have led the IGE’s discussions to go beyond the classic analysis based exclusively on market shares to integrate dynamic indicators related to the control of digital infrastructures and ecosystems.
These debates were explicitly linked to industrial policy considerations. Many states, including emerging economies, are actively supporting the development of strategic technology sectors — sovereign cloud, digital payment infrastructure, artificial intelligence — while affirming their commitment to competition principles.[120] This apparent tension between public intervention and the preservation of market contestability was a central focus of the discussions.
The work of the IGE has thus highlighted the need for increased normative coherence: poorly calibrated industrial interventions can, in fact, unintentionally strengthen dominant positions or create lasting structural distortions.[121] However, the experts also recognised the legitimacy of industrial strategies geared towards development and economic diversification, provided that competitive guarantees are integrated ex ante into the design of public policies.[122] This approach reflects an integrated conception of economic governance, in which competition policy is not an external remedy, but a structuring element of the overall regulatory architecture.
In this perspective, Eleanor M. Fox observed that UNCTAD’s approach to digital markets « refuses to separate competition law from issues of development, power and inclusion« .[123] This analysis underlines the originality of UNCTAD’s positioning : far from adopting a strictly technical reading of competition law, it places it in a broader reflection on equity, market access and the reduction of global economic asymmetries.[124]
Thus, digital markets appear as a normative laboratory where competitive regulation, economic sovereignty and industrial strategy meet. The ability to articulate these dimensions now determines the credibility and effectiveness of competition policies in an environment marked by technological concentration and geo-economic multipolarity.[125]
4. Cross-border cooperation, capacity building and inclusive competition
During the 2020s, the consolidation of cross-border cooperation mechanisms has emerged as one of the structuring axes of the IGE Competitionwork.[126] In a context marked by the increased internationalisation of value chains and the digitalisation of trade, anticompetitive practices increasingly transcend national borders, making close coordination between competition authorities essential.
Discussions focused in particular on transnational cartels, the effects of which can affect several jurisdictions simultaneously, as well as on the coordination of merger examinations involving multinational companies.[127] The issue is not limited to the exchange of information: it also concerns the alignment of investigation schedules, the consistency of the remedies imposed and the prevention of contradictory decisions.[128] In the field of public procurement, tendering fraud — in particular in the form of bidding concerted — has been identified as a prime area for cooperation, due to its direct impact on the efficiency of public spending and its negative impact on economic development.[129]
In this context, voluntary peer reviews conducted under the auspices of UNCTAD continued to play a central role.[130] These mechanisms are based on a structured but non-binding assessment of national competition regimes, combining technical analysis, policy recommendations and institutional dialogue. They contribute not only to improving the normative and institutional quality of the systems examined, but also to strengthening mutual trust between authorities.[131] By promoting transparency and comparative learning, these examinations contribute to the emergence of a common culture of competition, while respecting the diversity of legal and economic contexts.
A notable feature of the decade is the rise of emerging economies as peer reviewers and providers of expertise. This reflects a shift towards a horizontal capacity-building model, in which technical assistance is no longer based exclusively on a North-South axis, but is based on a logic of plurilateral exchanges.[132] According to William E. Kovacic, this model reflects » a maturation of international competition governance, where learning flows in several directions « .[133] It is less a question of exporting a single model than of encouraging a reciprocal circulation of experiences, adapted to the varied institutional realities.
At the same time, the IGE agenda reaffirmed competition policy as an instrument of inclusive and sustainable development.[134] This is in line with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, recognizing that open and contestable markets can help reduce inequalities, integrate SMEs, and improve access to essential goods and services.[135]
The discussions explored how competition law enforcement can foster the participation of SMEs in public procurement, support regional integration and ensure fair access to digital markets.[136] Competition is then seen not only as a mechanism for disciplining dominant players, but also as a lever for economic inclusion. However, this broader approach presupposes a cautious articulation with other public objectives, in particular environmental and social objectives.
The increasing integration of sustainability considerations into competitive analysis is a significant development in this respect. The authorities are faced with the question of the extent to which environmental cooperation agreements between companies can be compatible with the competition rules.[137] The IGE discussions highlighted the need to develop analytical frameworks to integrate environmental gains into the assessment of competitive effects, without weakening vigilance against unjustified restrictions.
In this perspective, the doctrine emphasizes that the contemporary evolution of international competition governance reflects a movement towards an assumed multipolarity. It was emphasized that this phase marks the transformation of the IGE into a truly pluralistic forum, where normative guidance, technical assistance and academic dialogue converge to ensure that competition law remains responsive to the challenges of development and sustainability in a rapidly changing global economy.[138]
Thus, cross-border cooperation, horizontal capacity building and integration of the Sustainable Development Goals appear to be the three pillars of a renewed governance of competition. Far from being limited to technical coordination, this evolution reflects a gradual redefinition of the very purposes of competition law, which is now designed as an instrument of systemic regulation in the service of a more inclusive and resilient economic order. This is clearly visible in the tables in the appendix that follow.
Indeed, between 2020 and 2025, the comparative tables in annexes 1 and 2 focusing on the discussions held within the framework of UNCTAD highlight the thematic evolution structured around the analytical axes mentioned above. The first category of debates concerns substantive competition law enforcement issues, including the analysis of digital markets and platforms, monopsony issues, merger control and the fight against cross-border cartels. These themes reflect the gradual adaptation of competition law instruments, already observed, to changes in market structures in the global economy. A second category includes discussions on the relationship between competition policy and broader public policy objectives, such as poverty reduction, environmental sustainability or interactions with industrial policy. This orientation reflects UNCTAD’s specific mandate, which places competition policy in the context of economic development. A third axis concerns international cooperation between competition authorities, in particular in the fight against cross-border cartels and in the exchange of information between jurisdictions. Finally, a fourth set of work focuses on institutional and capacity-building for investigations and sanctions, including through voluntary peer reviews of national competition regimes and technical assistance programmes for authorities in developing countries. The 2025 session thus once again confirms several structural trends observed since the beginning of the decade: the growing centrality of digital markets in the debates, the permanence of the theme of international cooperation in the fight against cartels, and the anchoring of competition policy in the objectives of economic development and structural transformation, which distinguishes UNCTAD from other international forums for discussion and international cooperation in the field of competition.
Conclusion – The « Global South » and the normative recomposition of competition law at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
The development and history of UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Expert Group on Competition Law and Policy is not one of mere technical development. It embraces the major changes in the international political economy since the end of the twentieth century: the contestation of the economic order inherited from the post-war period, the rise of liberal globalization, and then the gradual affirmation of a multipolar world in which emerging economies are no longer just recipients of standards, but co-architects of their development.[139]
Originally conceived as a forum for discussion on restrictive business practices in the context of the New International Economic Order, the UNCTAD forum has gradually acquired a denser identity: that of a normative laboratory where competition law is thought of from the needs of development².[140] This orientation has never meant a rejection of the fundamental principles of open markets or the fight against cartels; rather, it has been to place them in a broader understanding of structural asymmetries, institutional constraints and differentiated economic trajectories.[141]
UNCTAD’s specific contribution lies in this constant link between universality and pluralism. Far from promoting rigid harmonization, it has favoured a flexible framework, based on equity, sovereignty and adaptability, as expressed in the 1980 United Nations Set of Principles and Rules.[142] This « constructive ambiguity » — often seen as a weakness in more technocratic forums — has proven to be a source of resilience.[143] It has allowed the gradual appropriation of competition law by States with heterogeneous legal traditions and production structures, thus favouring a deep-rooted diffusion rather than a formal transplantation.[144]
With the affirmation of the « Global South » during the 2000s and 2010s, this dynamic has changed scale. The major emerging economies — China, India, Brazil, South Africa — as well as South-South cooperation networks have transformed the nature of dialogue.[145] It is no longer a question of a vertical transfer of knowledge, but of a reciprocal normative production. Debates on merger control, international cartels, the regulation of digital platforms or the relationship between competition and industrial policy now reflect multiple experiences, often from economies where the state plays a structuring role.[146]
In this context, the reflection on competition cannot be dissociated from the issues of development, industrialization, social inclusion and sustainability.[147] Digital markets, data concentration, the ecological transition and the securing of value chains are questioning the classic categories of antitrust law.[148] UNCTAD, precisely because it has never rigorously separated competition and development, appears to be singularly well placed to accommodate these tensions.
This approach is particularly echoed in the thinking of Rubens Ricupero, former Secretary-General of UNCTAD, who believes that economic multilateralism can only survive by fully integrating the aspirations and priorities of the developing world[149]. Ricupero recalled that the real challenge was not to impose uniformity, but to build common rules capable of reflecting the diversity of historical experiences.[150] Applied to competition law, this intuition leads us to consider the plurality of models not as a transitory anomaly, but as the very condition for lasting legitimacy.
The rise of emerging powers and the current geopolitical fragmentation could raise fears of an erosion of international consensus. However, UNCTAD’s experience suggests another reading: that of adaptive multilateralism, based on mutual learning and progressive trust.[151] Peer review mechanisms, technical assistance and cross-border cooperation have helped to forge an epistemic community where knowledge flows in several directions.[152]
Ultimately, the emergence of the « Global South » within the international governance of competition does not represent a radical break, but the culmination of a long-term process: one by which states that were once in a peripheral position have gradually acquired the capacity to influence the normative frameworks that structure the world economy.[153] The IGE Competition shows that competition law can function not only as a technical instrument for regulating markets, but also as a lever for structural transformation, articulating growth, sovereignty and economic justice in an irreversibly multipolar world.
Appendix 1
Topics of the IGE Competition round tables and seminars, 2020-2025
| Year | Session / Framework | Main topics of round table or discussion | Developing country dimension |
| 2025 | 23rd Session | Competition law enforcement in digital markets and platforms | Challenges for authorities with limited capacity in regulating global platforms |
| International cooperation in the fight against cross-border cartels | Importance for import-dependent open economies | ||
| Interaction between competition policy and public policies (development, innovation, economic transformation) | Recurrent debate on the place of competition in development strategies | ||
| Institutional capacity-building and technical assistance | Support to competition authorities in developing countries | ||
| 2024 | 22nd Session | Competition Law Enforcement in Digital Markets and Ecosystems | Challenges for authorities with limited resources |
| Competition policy and poverty reduction | Direct link between competition and development | ||
| Recent developments in merger control standards | Harmonization and adaptation of practices | ||
| Report of the Working Group on Cross-Border Cartels | Need for international cooperation | ||
| Voluntary peer review: Egypt | Institutional strengthening of a competition authority | ||
| 2023 | 21st Session | Application of competition law to monopsony units | Impact on agricultural producers and labour markets |
| International cartels and cooperation between authorities | Information exchange and coordination | ||
| Competition and sustainability | Integration of the Sustainable Development Goals | ||
| 2022 | 20th Session | Competition policy and post-COVID-19 economic recovery | Supporting SMEs in vulnerable economies |
| Competition in socially critical markets during the pandemic | Access to essential goods | ||
| Interaction between competition and consumer protection and data | Institutional challenges in the digital transition | ||
| Voluntary peer review: Bangladesh | Institutional development | ||
| 2021 | 19th Session | Competition in digital markets and platforms | Capacity of competition authorities in developing countries |
| Advocating for competition during the COVID-19 crisis | Pro-competitive reforms | ||
| Cross-border cartels and international cooperation | Strengthening cooperation between authorities | ||
| Voluntary peer review: Malawi | Institutional strengthening | ||
| 2020 | 8th Review Conference of the United Nations Set | Competitive neutrality and the role of public enterprises | This is a central issue in economies with a large number of public enterprises |
| Competition policy and response to the COVID-19 economic crisis | Pro-competitive reforms for recovery | ||
| Implementation of the United Nations Competition Set and international cooperation | Technical assistance and policy convergence |
Appendix 2
Comparative mapping of competition themes UNCTAD, OECD, ICN (2015-2025)
| Main Theme | UNCTAD | OECD | ICN | Analytical observations |
| International cartels and cooperation between authorities | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Central theme in all three organizations, reflecting the need for international cooperation in competition law enforcement |
| Digital Markets and Platforms | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Dominant topic since the second half of the 2010s, with different approaches (development, economic analysis, application procedures) |
| Merger control | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | This is a classic topic covered in the three forums, particularly concerning notification thresholds and the analysis of acquisitions in the digital economy |
| Investigation procedures and good administrative practices | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | The CCM plays a particularly important role in the development of procedural guidelines |
| Competition and industrial policy | ✓ | ✓ | (✓) | Topic more prominent in UNCTAD, particularly in the context of development strategies |
| Competition and poverty reduction/development | ✓ | — | — | Theme of UNCTAD because of its development mandate |
| Institutional strengthening and technical assistance | ✓ | (✓) | (✓) | Central dimension for UNCTAD, secondary for OECD and CCM |
| Competition and environmental sustainability | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Emerging topic since about 2020 |
| Competitive neutrality and the role of public enterprises | ✓ | ✓ | — | An important theme in economies where state-owned enterprises play a major role |
| Economic analysis of market power (monopsony, innovation) | (✓) | ✓ | ✓ | The OECD often develops the most in-depth economic analyses |
| Consumer protection and competition | ✓ | ✓ | (✓) | OECD and UNCTAD focus more on institutional interactions |
| Essential markets (health, food, energy) | ✓ | (✓) | — | Often discussed in the context of development and economic crises |
✓ = regularly covered theme(✓) = treated but less central theme— = rarely addressed theme
[1] « Market power » is the ability of a firm (for instance in a dominant position) or a group of them (e.g. a cartel) to abstract itself from the pressure of competitors and the balance of power between producers, distributors and consumers animated by an « invisible hand », in order to prevent rational prices oriented towards the real costs of production and distribution to be set with a « reasonable » margin of a few percent as at each stage of the value-added chain.
[2] The « Global South » refers to a political-economic category that emerged at the end of the 1960s to describe the relations of domination between industrialized countries and « Third World » countries. The term does not refer strictly to a geographical location in the southern hemisphere, but to a structural position in the economy and the international order: states marked by a colonial history, a lower level of development, a dependent insertion into globalization and limited influence in international institutions. Today, the concept of the Global South is used in international relations and political economy to refer to a heterogeneous collection of countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Oceania, united less by geography than by historical trajectories and common claims to equity and global governance.
[3] Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 30), held in Belém, Brazil, Nov.-Dec. 2025; see, in particular, the final declarations and positions of developing country groups on carbon adjustment mechanisms and differentiated commitments.
[4] Souty, F., « The Challenges of Globalization for Developed Countries in Competition », Revue Economique et Sociale, Lausanne, 64 (March 2006), pp. 27-38.
[5] Jenny, F., « Competition Law and Global Governance », in Drexl, L., et al. (eds.), Competition Policy and Globalisation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 3–25. Frederic Jenny, former Advisor to the Court of Cassation, Professor of Economics at ESSEC, former Chairman of the WTO Working Group on the Interrelations between International Trade and Competition Policy between 1997 and 2004, former Vice-President of the Competition Council, former Chairman of the OECD Competition Committee, is one of the very few former heads of European competition authorities (French in this case) to have published dozens of articles on the theme of competition and development. It is the true European equivalent of the great American academics William Kovacic and Eleanor M. Fox, cited below. Working alongside him for nearly thirty years has been a great privilege and honour.
[6] From 1996 to 2018, we attended all the sessions of the IGE in question, as coordinator of the OECD Competition Committee constantly re-elected by its Bureau. From 2021 to 2024, we resumed participation in the sessions as a representative of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition. Since the 1990s, multiple academic articles have reported on our observations on each session of the IGE. This article does not, of course, detail all the international, legal and diplomatic incidents that have marked this forty-five-year perspective.
[7] United Nations General Assembly, resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980. See UNCTAD, A Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Res. 35/63, 5 Dec. 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10, New York, United Nations, 1981, 45 pp., spec. pp. 3-12; see also UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, First Session, Geneva, 1982, Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.1/1, pp. 1-8.
[8] Ibid.
[9] UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices: Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1981, pp. 3–12.
[10] Souty, F., « From the Halls of Geneva to the shores of the Law Countries: the Origins of the International
Competition Network », in Lugard, P., (editor), The International Competition Network at Ten. Origins, accomplishments and aspirations, Intersentia, Cambridge (UK) – Portland (Oregon), 2011, p. 39-50
[11] International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), Report to address the global antitrust problems of the 21st Century, Washington, 2000, 300 p.
[12] EC Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, Brussels, 18.06.1996, COM 284 final, 59 p. This phase of the creation of the CCM will be described later in the United States’ global strategy, which is formidable and highly effective, in the field of competition and antitrust law. See the previous note for now.
[13] UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1997: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1997, pp. 1–35.
[14] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition, Geneva, 2010, 125 p. (various editions)
[15] Fox, Eleanor M., « Equality, Discrimination and Competition Law: Lessons from and for Developing Countries, » World Competition, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2018, pp. 379–398. Eleanor Fox is an American Democratic academic who has long analysed the interactions between competition and development in an exemplary and inspiring way. His publications on this subject are innumerable and all deserve to be cited!
[16] Kovacic, William, « Global Competition Policy: Institutions for Cooperation, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 76, 2009, pp. 663–688. Bill Kovacic is the equivalent of Eleanor Fox on the Republican side with the major asset of having chaired the US Federal Trade Commission, providing her with an exceptional experience. Very few former heads of competition authorities in other developed countries, especially in Europe, have devoted so many articles and advice to competition authorities in developing countries. His publications cover all conceivable facets of competition law topics, from the most developed and sophisticated to the most operational.
[17] Souty, F., « Why do we need additional WTO Competition rules promoting non-discriminatory Competition Laws
and Competition Institutions in WTO Members », in Petermann, E.U., ed., Preparing the Doha Development Round, Challenges to the legitimacy and efficiency of the World Trading System, (Colloquium at the European University Institute, Florence, 27-28 June 2003), Florence, 2005, pp. 170-182. Souty, F., « UNCTAD: Model Law, International Competition, Developing Countries and Special and Differential Treatment », Concurrences, Revue des Droits de la concurrence, No. 2-2006, p. 156-158. Souty, F., « UNCTAD’s Work on Competition: Evolution and Development Dimension, » Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2010, pp. 899–925. As our extensively published columns and articles on UNCTAD between 1996 and 2018 are mainly published in the Concurrences Review, we will not mention them later in this article, focusing on the articles of the three best connoisseurs of international competitive dynamics over the last two decades, Professors Eleanor Fox, Frédéric Jenny and William Kovacic.
[18] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: An Overview, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2016, pp. 1–20.
[19] UNCTAD, Competition Issues in the Digital Economy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2019, pp. 1–25.
[20] UNCTAD, Emerging Economies and Competition Policy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2021, pp. 7–22.
[21] UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices: Background Documentation, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1977, pp. 1–20.
[22] UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 1978, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1978, pp. 45–68.
[23]United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, New York, 1974. Also UNCTAD, Multinationals and Development, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1974, pp. 30–55.
[24] Jenny, Frederic, « Antitrust and Development, » OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, 2003, pp. 7–25.
[25] UNCTAD, United Nations Implementation , Geneva: UNCTAD, 1985, pp. 5–18. UNCTAD, United Nations on Competition Policy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000, pp. 1–15.
[26] UNCTAD, Report of the First Session of the IGE on Restrictive Business Practices , Geneva: UNCTAD, 1981.
[27] UNCTAD, United Nations Implementation Review , Geneva: UNCTAD, 1988.
[28] Jenny, Frederic, « Globalization, Competition and UNCTAD », in UNCTAD (ed.), Competition Policy at the Turn of the Century, Geneva, 1999, pp. 3–15.
[29] There are a large number of working documents, which it is impossible to mention here, published each year by the UNCTAD Secretariat referenced under a symbol « TDB » since the late 1980s to provide a basis for work and exchanges by delegates of competition authorities from their respective capitals for periods of two weeks initially. gradually reduced to one working week in Geneva from the 1990s.
[30] Several Secretariat working papers of note include: UNCTAD, Global Trends in Competition Law, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2002, pp. 5–18. UNCTAD, IGE Report, 1998, paras. 10–22. UNCTAD, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building in Competition Policy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999, pp. 3–15.
[31] UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Development: New Challenges, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1997, pp. 1–25.
[32] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition, Geneva, UNCTAD, 2000 edition, 55 p. Several editions in all the working languages of the United Nations and multiple subsequent editions.
[33] Fox, Eleanor M., « Competition Law and the Millennium, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 69, 2001, pp. 205–224.
[34] See, in particular, several working papers of the Secretariat, each of about fifteen pages in accordance with the standard in force at UN-Geneva: UNCTAD, Trade Liberalization and Competition Policy, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1996. UNCTAD, Privatization, Competition and Regulation, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1998. UNCTAD, Competition Issues in the Privatized Sectors, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999.
[35] Fox, Eleanor M., « Globalisation and Competition Policy, » Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 24, 2000, pp. 168–180.
[36] Kovacic, William, « International Competition Institutions, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 69, 2001, pp. 647–662.
[37] UNCTAD, Exchange of Experiences in Competition Law, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000. UNCTAD, Review of the Activities of the IGE, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2002. UNCTAD, Competition Policy after 20 Years of the United Nations as a Whole , Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000. UNCTAD, Competition Policy in Transition Economies, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2003.
[38] Kovacic, William, « Institutional Design in Competition Law, » Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 8, 2007, pp. 203–233.
[39] Souty, F., « UNCTAD: The 7th UN Competition Review Conference sets the five-year framework for the Intergovernmental Group of Competition Experts, strengthens the competition/consumer protection interface and creates a group of experts on consumer protection law », Concurrences N° 4-2015, p. 232-236.
[40] UNCTAD, IGE Competition Report, Geneva, UNCTAD, 2006. Generally speaking, each annual session of the IGE Competition was the subject of a detailed report, integrating the comments of the delegations in the formal opening and closing sessions and the themes debated by each session of the IGE.
[41] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (2010) – Revised Commentary, New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2010, pp. 3-9.
[42] UNCTAD, The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Economic Development, TD/B/C.I/CLP/15, Geneva, 2011, pp. 2-6.
[43] Ibid., pp. 7-10.
[44] UNCTAD, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolization, TD/B/C.I/CLP/19, Geneva, 2012, pp. 4-8.
[45] UNCTAD, Challenges in Merger Control in Developing Countries, TD/B/C.I/CLP/20, Geneva, 2013, pp. 3-7.
[46] Ibid., pp. 8-12.
[47] UNCTAD, Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control, TD/B/C.I/CLP/23, Geneva, 2014, pp. 5-11.
[48] Fox, E.M., « Competition Policy and Development, » World Competition, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-28.
[49] UNCTAD, Review of Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance in Competition Law and Policy, TD/B/C.I/CLP/6, Geneva, 2008, pp. 7-10.
[50] UNCTAD, The Use of Leniency Programmes as a Tool for the Enforcement of Competition Law, TD/B/C.I/CLP/25, Geneva, 2016, pp. 2-6.
[51] UNCTAD, International Cooperation in Competition Cases, TD/B/C.I/CLP/4, Geneva, 2007, pp. 4-9.
[52] Kovacic, W.E., « The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, » Boston University Law Review, 2001, vol. 81, pp. 148-155.
[53] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Methodology, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/4, Geneva, 2007, pp. 1-6.
[54] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned, New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2013, pp. 9-14.
[55] Jenny, F.. « The Role of UNCTAD in the Promotion of Competition Policy », in J. Drexl (ed.), Competition Policy and Development, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 270-280.
[56] UNCTAD, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy – Report of the Seventeenth Session, TD/B/C.I/CLP/47, Geneva, United Nations, 2018, pp. 2-6.
[57] Fox, E.M., « Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Competition-Oriented Trade Policy », International Lawyer, 2000, vol. 34, pp. 1201-1215.
[58] Jenny, F., « Global Governance in Competition Law, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2016, vol. 4, pp. 10-14.
[59] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (2010) – Revised Commentary, New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2010, pp. 6-9.
[60] Ibid., pp. 8-12.
[61] OECD, Competition Committee – Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments 2015, Paris, OECD, 2016; ICN, Operational Framework, 2012.
[62] OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/Final, 1998. We will come back to this type of soft law normative tool in a future article focused on « the North ».
[63] ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures, 2002-2017 (as amended).
[64] Jenny, F., « The Role of UNCTAD in the Promotion of Competition Policy », in J. Drexl (ed.), Competition Policy and Development, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 270-280.
[65] Sokol, D., « The Transformation of International Antitrust, » Minnesota Journal of International Law, 2010, vol. 19, pp. 209-215.
[66] Kovacic, W.E., « The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, » Boston University Law Review, 2001, vol. 81, pp. 148-155.
[67] As a reminder, see note 6 above.
[68] Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Law and Consumer Protection between the EAC Competition Authority, the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission, the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority and the WAEMU Commission, signed on 26 Feb. 2026, Joint Communiqué, 3 p., § 2-6.
[69] For the record, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, entered into force on 1 Jan. 1958, arts. 85 and 86 (now arts. 101 and 102 TFEU); Reg. Council No. 17/62, 6 Feb. 1962, OJEC 13, 21 Feb. 1962, pp. 204-211; Reg. (EC) No 1/2003 of the Council, 16 Dec. 2002, OJEU L 1, 4 Jan. 2003, pp. 1-25; Eur. Comm., Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJEU C 101, 27 Apr. 2004, pp. 43-53.
[70] Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, signed in Kigali on 21 March 2018, entered into force on 30 May 2019, Articles 1 and 3; African Union, Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, Addis Ababa, 2018, 54 p.; on the Protocol on Competition, v. Decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union adopting the Phase II Protocols (2023).
[71] V. Gerber, D. J., Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, Oxford, OUP, 2010, XVI-410 p., esp. pp. 335-372; Jenny, F., « International cooperation on competition policy: recent developments », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2019, pp. 1-8.
[72] Fox, E.M., « Pluralism in Competition Law, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 78, 2012, pp. 305–328.
[73] UNCTAD, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy – Report of the Seventeenth Session, TD/B/C.I/CLP/47, Geneva, United Nations, 2018, pp. 2-4.
[74] Res. UNGA 35/63, 5 Dec. 1980 (adoption of the « Set »), cited above.
[75] OECD, Competition Committee – Mandate and Structure, Paris, OECD, 2023; ICN, Operational Framework, 2012.
[76] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (2010) – Revised Commentary, Geneva, UN, 2010, pp. 6-9.
[77] OECD, Global Forum on Competition – Summary of Discussions, Paris: OECD, Dec. 2024; Id., Dec. 2025.
[78] OECD, Recommendation C(98)35/Final concerning the fight against so-called « hard core » cartels, Paris, OECD, 1998.
[79] UNCTAD, The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Economic Development, TD/B/C.I/CLP/15, Geneva, United Nations, 2011, pp. 2-6.
[80] Fox, E.M., « Competition Policy and Development, » World Competition, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-28.
[81] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition, supra, pp. 45-52.
[82] OECD, Competition Policy and Convergence, Paris, OECD, 2014.
[83] Res. UNGA 35/63, supra.
[84] Jenny, J., « Global Governance in Competition Law, » J. Antitrust Enforcement, 2016, vol. 4, pp. 10-14.
[85] UNCTAD, Review of Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance in Competition Law and Policy, TD/B/C.I/CLP/6, Geneva, United Nations, 2008.
[86] Ibid., pp. 7-12
[87] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Methodology, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/4, Geneva, United Nations, 2007.
[88] Kovacic, W.E., « The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, » Boston University Law Review, 2001, vol. 81, pp. 148-155.
[89] Sokol, D., « The Developmental State and Competition Law, » University of Illinois Law Review, 2013, vol. 2013, No. 2, pp. 513-563; see also Fox, E.M., « Competition Policy and Development, » World Competition, 2010, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 15-28.
[90] UNCTAD, Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises, TD/B/C.I/CLP/30, Geneva, United Nations, 2015, pp. 3-12; UNCTAD, Competition and Industrial Policy, TD/B/C.I/CLP/50, Geneva, United Nations, 2017, pp. 5-14.
[91] OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/Final, Paris: OECD, 25 March 1998; ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, 2010, online: www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
[92] Fox, E.M. op.cit., p. 17-24.
[93] Jenny, F., « Global Governance in Competition Law, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 3-19, Esp. pp. 10-14.
[94] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: A Methodology Note, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/4, Geneva, United Nations, 2007, pp. 7-15.
[95] Krisch, N., Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford, OUP, 2010, pp. 69-95; see also de Búrca, G., Keohane R, and Sabel, C., « Global Experimentalist Governance », British Journal of Political Science, 2014, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 477-486.
[96] UNCTAD, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy – Report of the Twentieth Session, TD/B/C.I/CLP/54, Geneva, United Nations, 2022, pp. 4-9.
[97] Souty, François, Yon-Courtin, Stéphanie « UNCTAD: The Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) holds its 15th annual meeting and consecrates the emergence of the BRICS in the field of competition policy »,Concurrences N° 1-2017, Art. No. 83334, pp. 234-238.
[98] UNCTAD, Competition Law, Policy and the Digital Economy, TD/B/C.I/CLP/57, Geneva, United Nations, 2023, pp. 2-6.
[99] UNCTAD, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat: Competition Issues in the Digital Economy, TD/B/C.I/CLP/52, Geneva, United Nations, 2021, pp. 7-12.
[100] Zhang, A. « Chinese Antitrust in the Digital Era, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2022, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 421-448.
[101] UNCTAD, Competition Policy in Digital Markets: Experiences from Developing Countries, TD/B/C.I/CLP/60, Geneva, United Nations, 2024, pp. 10-18; Competition Commission of India, Market Study on Telecom Sector in India, New Delhi, CCI, 2021.
[102] Competition Commission of South Africa, Public Interest Guidelines in Merger Control, Pretoria, CCSA, 2023; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: South Africa, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2012/1, Geneva, United Nations, 2012, pp. 15-22.
[103] Frison-Roche, M.A. (ed.), The Globalization of Competition Law, Paris, Dalloz, coll. Themes & Comments, 2021,
[104] On the institutional structuring of BRICS cooperation in competition matters, see Ivanov, Alexey (Editor), Competition Law in BRICS Countries, Moscow, HSE Publishing, 2017, p. 15 s. A. Ivanov represents one of the best trained and most relevant Russian authors on competition policy and antitrust issues. The book is emblematic of the emergence of the Global South in the international debate on competition.
[105] BRICS International Competition Conference, Joint Communiqués (ed. div.); see also UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, United Nations, latest sessions.
[106] Sokol Daniel, and Guzman, Andrew, (eds.), The Internationalization of Antitrust Law, Oxford, OUP, 2014, p. 3.
[107] On the consideration of state-owned enterprises in emerging economies, see Fox, E.M., and Bakhoum, M., Making Markets Work for Africa, Oxford, OUP, 2019, p. 87 ff.
[108] Jenny, Frédéric, « Competition and Development: Perspectives for Emerging Economies », in Mélanges en l’honneur de Laurence Idot, Paris, LGDJ, 2018, p. 245 ff.
[109] Lao, Marina, « Platform Markets and Competition Law, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2020, p. 1 ff.
[110] Bradford, Anu, The Brussels Effect. How the European Union Rules the World, Oxford, OUP, 2020, p. 52 ff. (on normative extraterritoriality, by comparative analogy).
[111] Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014, Chapter XVIII; see Eurasian Economic Commission, Annual Report on the State of Competition in the EAEU, Moscow, ed.
[112] On the comparison with the European experience, see Roman Petrov and Peter Van Elsuwege (eds.), Post-Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration, London, Routledge, 2018, p. 132 ff.
[113] Eurasian Economic Commission, Report on Competition in Cross-Border Digital Markets, Moscow, 2021.
[114] Farrel, Henry, and Newman, Abraham, « Weaponized Interdependence, » International Security, 2019, vol. 44, p. 42.
[115] Jenny, Frédéric, « Competition and Development: Prospects for Emerging Economies », in Mélanges en l’honneur de Laurence IDOT, Paris, LGDJ, 2018, p. 245. Also Jenny, Frederic, « Competition and Development », in Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Baptiste Racine, Paris, LGDJ, 2019, p. 321 ff.
[116] UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, United Nations, sessions 2020-2023.
[117] UNCTAD, Digital Economy Report 2021, Geneva, United Nations, 2021, p. 85 ff.
[118] Ezrachi, Ariel, and Stucke, Maurice E., Virtual Competition. The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 75 ff.
[119] Geradin, Damien and Katsiffis, Dimitrios, « Data as a Source of Market Power », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2020, p. 1 ff.
[120] Mazzucato, Marianna, The Entrepreneurial State, London, Anthem Press, 2013, p. 1 ff.
[121] OECD, Competition Policy and Industrial Policy, Paris, OECD, 2022, p. 12 ff.
[122] Jenny, F., « Industrial Policy and Competition Policy: Friends or Foes? », in Competition Law and Policy in the Global Economy, Paris, ICC Publishing, 2020, p. 45 ff.
[123] Fox, Eleanor M., « Competition, Development and Digital Markets », in UNCTAD, Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy, Geneva, United Nations, 2019, p. 9
[124] Fox Eleanor M. and Crane, Daniel, (eds.), Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, St. Paul, West Academic, 2017, p. 112 ff.
[125] Farrell, Henry, and Newman, Andrew, « Weaponized Interdependence, » International Security, 2019, vol. 44, p. 42.
[126] UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, United Nations, sessions 2020-2023.
[127] OECD, International Co-operation in Competition Investigations, Paris, OECD, 2021, p. 7 ff.
[128] Sokol, Daniel, « Merger Control and International Coordination », in Gerber, D. J., (ed.), Competition Law and Globalization, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 233 ff.
[129] OECD, Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, Paris, OECD, 2016, p. 15 ff.
[130] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, United Nations, ed.
[131] Gal, Michal S., « The Effects of Peer Review in Competition Law », World Competition, 2018, p. 3 ff.
[132] Jenny, F. « Capacity Building and Competition Policy », in Competition Policy for the 21st Century, Paris, ICC Publishing, 2019, p. 55 ff
[133] Kovacic, William E., « The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, » Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2018, p. 1ff.
[134] United Nations, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, New York, 2015.
[135] Fox, E.M., and Bakhoum, M., Making Markets Work for Africa, Oxford, OUP, 2019, p. 145 ff.
[136] OECD, Sustainability and Competition Policy, Paris, OECD, 2022, p. 9 ff.
[137] UNCTAD, Competition and Consumer Protection Policies for Inclusive Development, Geneva, United Nations, 2020.
[138] Souty, François, « International Governance of Competition in the Multipolar Era », International Journal of Economic Law, 2021, p. 27 ff.
[139] Rodrik, Dani, The Globalization Paradox. Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2011, 346 p., spec. pp. 200-235.
[140] Memorandum item, United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980, Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63, 15 pp.; see also UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules, TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2, Geneva, United Nations, 2000 (consolidated version).
[141] Fox, Eleanor M., « Antitrust and Development », New York University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper, n° 17-33, 2017, 45 p., esp. p. 3-12; see also. Fox, Eleanor M., « Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, » Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 2000, vol. 13, pp. 211-232.
[142] Jenny, F/, « The International Regulation of Competition: The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules », in Zäch, Roger (ed.), Towards WTO Competition Rules, Berne, Staempfli, 1999, 414 p., spec. pp. 35-58.
[143] Souty, François, « L’ambiguïté constructive du droit international de la concurrence », in Idot, Laurence (ed.), Mélanges en l’honneur de Laurence Idot, Paris, Dalloz, 2019, 812 p., spec. p. 523-538; see also Souty, François, Le droit international de la concurrence, Paris, LGDJ, coll. « Bibliothèque de droit international », 2012, 612 p.
[144] UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Model Framework for Peer Reviews, UN Doc. TD/B/C.I/CLP/3, Geneva, United Nations, 2012, 74 p.; see also. UNCTAD, Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy at UNCTAD: 15 Years of Experience, Geneva, United Nations, 2017, 96 p.
[145] Roberts, Andrew, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, 240 p., spec. pp. 142-180; see also Acharya, Amitav, The End of American World Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014, 148 p.
[146] UNCTAD, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy – Reports on Digital Markets, TD/B/C.I/CLP/54 et seq., Geneva, United Nations, 2021-2023.
[147] UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2022: Development Prospects in a Fractured World – Global Disorder and Regional Responses, Geneva, United Nations, 2022, 198 p., esp. chap. IV.
[148] Crémer, Jacques; de Montjoye, Yves-Alexandre; Schweitzer, Heike, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, 150 p., esp. pp. 27-62; see equal. Evans, David S.; Schmalensee, Richard, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms, Boston, Harvard Business Review Press, 2016, 272 p.
[149] Ricupero, Rubens, The United Nations and the Development Agenda: A Personal View, Geneva, UNCTAD, 2004, 82 p., esp. pp. 15-28.
[150] Ricupero, Rubens, « The Future of UNCTAD in a Changing World Economy », Address to the Trade and Development Board, Geneva, 2003, reproduced in UNCTAD, Annual Report 2003, Geneva, United Nations, 2004, pp. 5-14.
[151] Hoekman, Bernard M.; Mavroidis, Petros C., World Trade Organization (WTO): Law, Economics, and Politics, London, Routledge, 2007, 250 p., esp. pp. 181-205; see also Shaffer, Gregory, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003, 224 p.
[152] Kovacic, William J., « The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, » Minnesota Journal of International Law, 2001, vol. 10, pp. 43-110; Id., « Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or Divergence?, » Columbia Journal of European Law, 2008, vol. 14, pp. 301-349.
[153] Pahuja, Sundhya, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 310 p., esp. pp. 189-245; see also Anghie, Antony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 356 p.
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