ANALYSIS – International Competition Governance, Geopolitics and Normative Convergence
By François Souty, PhD i Econ History, frmr International Affairs Officer at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD’s expert committee on competition policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches EU Competition Law and Policy at the Faculty of Law of Nantes-University and Geopolitics at Excelia Business School Group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan).
Executive Summary
Since the end of the twentieth century, competition policy has gradually become a central element of global economic governance. Initially conceived as a technical instrument for regulating domestic markets, it has spread internationally with the globalization of Trade and the emergence of new economic powers. The failure of its formal integration into the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has led to the development of a more flexible institutional architecture based on forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International Competition Network.
This governance promotes the dissemination of common standards while leaving States the possibility of adapting their policies to national realities. The work of William E. Kovacic, Frédéric Jenny, Eleanor M. Fox and Joseph E. Stiglitz underlines that competition policy is now moving beyond economic efficiency to become a policy instrument. With the rise of digitalisation, concentrated markets and the assertion of the economies of the « Global South », competition law and policy are increasingly becoming a geopolitical lever, allowing states and regional blocs to exert influence, protect their economic sovereignty and also shape or even recompose the rules of global trade even outside the WTO. However, developed countries, and particularly those of the European Union, should pay close attention to the process for vital reasons of competitiveness.
Introduction
Since the end of the twentieth century, competition policy has gradually established itself as a central instrument of global economic governance within states, whether in the Western Hemisphere, North and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, Asia, from Japan and South Korea to China and India. Competition institutions are currently developing at high speed, particularly in Africa at the continental and sub-regional levels, particularly in the English-speaking region (COMESA), in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as demonstrated by the participation of many delegations during the last World Competition Forum held in Paris on 1 and 2 December 2025.[1] We have also recently published an analysis of the modalities and themes of the emergence of the « Global South » with UNCTAD, in the exponential development of competition law and policy instruments over the past quarter century.[2] While these instruments were initially conceived as a set of technical tools for the regulation of the domestic markets of a few developed countries in North America and Europe, aimed mainly at protecting the consumer and promoting economic efficiency, it is now intimately linked to geopolitical issues, international power relations and development asymmetries. The relative failure to formally integrate competition into the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in particular through the Working Party on International Trade and Competition created in 1996[3], has led to the emergence of a fragmented but complementary institutional architecture, articulated around technical and normative forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Policy (hereafter IGE Competition) and the International Competition Network (ICN).[4]
In this context, competition policy goes far beyond the purely legal or economic sphere to become a vector of influence and a revelation of international tensions. As Eleanor Fox and Daniel Crane point out, « the internationalization of antitrust law is transforming national frameworks, creating networks of cooperation that complement formal norms while respecting national subsidiarity. »[5] This observation highlights the role of informal cooperative networks that now structure global competition governance, in particular through normative exchanges, technical assistance and coordination between national authorities.
The objective of this article is to propose a synthetic and forward-looking reading of the main developments in competition policy since the creation of the WTO Working Party in 1996, by analysing the complementary – and sometimes competing – role of international institutions, while integrating the major doctrinal reflections. The work of several American authors, and French authors, over the past 30 years has shed light on European and comparative perspectives on the harmonization and differentiation of standards : the former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Professor William Kovacic, as well as those of Professor Fréderic Jenny, who chaired the OECD’s Competition Committee for nearly forty years (a record), offer an analytical bridge between the two approaches. American and European antitrust standards, by insisting on the construction of global normative standards[6]. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize in Economics, for his part, has repeatedly drawn attention to the implications of competition policy for economic development and the regulation of global markets, stressing that competition policy associated with competitiveness cannot be dissociated from broader objectives, including equitable growth and sustainable development.[7]
This article is therefore developed around three main axes divided into seven sections. The first axis consists of situating the historical and institutional evolution of competitive governance, highlighting the strengths and limitations of the WTO, OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN. The second axis aims to clarify the tension between normative convergence and differentiation adapted to national and regional contexts, by integrating the comparative analysis of American, European and emerging doctrines. The third, finally, introduces the forward-looking challenges that shape contemporary competition policy: the digitization or digitalization of the economy, the global concentration of markets, the ecological transition and the rise of national industrial strategies, all factors that accentuate its geopolitical dimension.
By adopting an approach combining doctrinal analysis, international comparison and normative foresight, this article seeks to demonstrate that competition policy is now a global regulatory instrument, but also a major strategic issue, to which policymakers must pay particular attention. It can no longer be seen as a simple tool for consumer protection, a means of increasing or reducing the impact of industrial policy, a tool for trade integration in a regional market or static efficiency: it is inseparable from the question of sustainability, equity, economic strategy for development and the resilience of global [8]economic systems. This idea of a competition policy linked to a plurality of objectives beyond the sole economic efficiency carried out for a long time by the United States until the 2000s, in particular with the strong imprint of the economists of the Chicago School, has been undermined in the developed world by what has been called the « Brussels School ». This incorporated the dual objective of « undistorted competition » concerned with economic efficiency (strongly inspired by the German Ordoliberal School), but also a second objective of undistorted competition « within the common market » (thus meeting an institutional objective of economic integration of several markets into a single market) under the terms of the Treaty of Rome of 1957.[9] The idea of a competition policy linked to a plurality of objectives promoted in the 1970s and 1990s by European countries was largely overtaken from the 1990s onwards by the emerging countries of the Global South, both developed and still developing, as we have recently recalled. [10]
The introduction of the emerging market perspective, notably through the work of the BRICS and the regional initiatives coordinated by the Eurasian Economic Commission, also makes it possible to nuance the traditional vision centred on the OECD and the United States. As Eleanor Fox reminds us about developing markets, « adapting competition rules to the level of market development is not only legitimate, but essential to avoid the imposition of standards that may be ill-adapted to local realities ».[11] This observation will be central to the discussion of differentiated normative strategies and the articulation between global standards and the specific needs of emerging economies, as has been observed recently in UNCTAD’s analysis of the emergence of the Global South in the field of competition.[12]
Finally, the introduction specifies the methodological framework chosen: a systematic analysis of the work and recommendations of international organizations, a synthesis of European, American and emerging doctrines, and a particular attention to normative and geopolitical foresight. All of these elements form the basis of the analysis developed in the following seven sections, making it possible to construct a coherent and integrated vision of global competition governance, largely printed by the democratic countries of the « North », essentially grouped together initially within the OECD (America, Europe, South Korea, Japan).
I. Competition policy as a vector of global governance: competition between international organizations
Since the 1990s, competition policy has evolved well beyond its traditional domestic regulatory functions, to become a central vector of global economic governance. This transformation reflects the increasing interconnection of markets, the globalisation of value chains and the rise of transnational economic actors. The internationalisation of antitrust and competition standards has thus created new networks for the coordination and dissemination of best practices, as Eleanor Fox has already noted.[13] These networks do not replace national systems, but complement them, promoting the convergence of practices while respecting – more or less in some cases – the legal and economic diversity of the participating countries. They can work in favour of but also against national manufacturers, not for economic reasons but for ideological reasons, hidden behind the implementation of more or less favourable and subjective standards, even though they are presented as objective by the secretariats of international organizations.[14] This justifies all the more a strong scientific and analytical investment by the parties concerned, with a very strong lead of some countries compared to others.
The OECD has played a pioneering role in this process since the 1990s, by establishing a whole series of wide-ranging soft law normative guidelines (called « Recommendations » and « Decisions-Recommendations ») and by providing a framework for the dissemination of « good practices » to national competition authorities.[15] According to Frédéric Jenny, « the OECD functions as a standards laboratory, where competition principles are analysed, tested and adapted to different market configurations ».[16] The organisation has thus favoured the standardisation of certain instruments, such as the assessment of cartels and their economic harmfulness or the assessment of abuses of dominant positions and mergers, while maintaining a flexible and consultative approach.
At the same time, the establishment of the WTO Working Group on International Trade and Competition in 1996 marked an attempt to formally integrate competition policy into the multilateral system. However, the draft quickly revealed the limits of a binding framework, due to the economic, political and institutional differences between developed and developing countries. As we ourselves pointed out in relation to the work carried out in the WTO between 1996 and 2004, « the Geneva experience has shown that legal convergence cannot be achieved without taking into account economic disparities and national priorities, particularly for emerging countries ».[17]
In this context, the ICN, created in 2001, appeared to be a complementary forum, more pragmatic and oriented towards operational cooperation, in an attempt to bring together – or even force them to bring together – the European and American positions following the suspension of the work of the WTO Working Group on International Trade and Competition Policy. largely under American pressure. William Kovacic insisted on the role of the ICN in the construction of global normative standards: « the ICN constitutes a bridge between the doctrinal approaches of the United States and the European Union, facilitating a pragmatic convergence of competition law practices ».[18] The network has promoted the exchange of good practices, training and technical assistance, while remaining voluntary and non-binding, on a matrix that was initially American and gradually refocused towards European categories (with strong German involvement) and then Asian (Japan, South Korea). This model has also made it possible to overcome some of the doctrinal and normative difficulties encountered during the decade at the WTO and the OECD, by providing a space where competition authorities can test, compare and adapt their approaches without legally binding pressure. The ICN has also served to avoid increasing the growing number of applications from non-OECD countries seeking membership in the OECD by starting with the intermediate « observer » stage of the OECD Competition Committee. Several countries, such as Brazil, have even ended up becoming major contributors alongside the competition authorities of the most advanced countries, members of the Committee in question, and major partners also within the ICN.[19]
The creation of the International Competition Network (ICN)
The International Competition Network (ICN) was created in 2001 at the initiative of the competition authorities of the United States and Canada. Its establishment comes in a context marked by the failure of negotiations aimed at integrating competition policy into the framework of the World Trade Organisation. Within the WTO’s working group on trade and competition, several states, including the United States, are reluctant to adopt a binding multilateral framework that could limit their autonomy in the field of competition law. In this perspective, the creation of the ICN appears to be an alternative solution based on voluntary cooperation between national authorities.
The Network, a flexible and non-binding structure, aims to promote the convergence of practices and the exchange of experience between competition authorities without creating international legal obligations. The United States is instrumental in its design and development, with the support of Canada and other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. Gradually, the competition component of the European Commission is joining this initiative and helping to strengthen its legitimacy. The ICN has thus gradually established itself as a central forum for the dissemination of « good practices » and the informal harmonization of competition policies at the global level.
At the same time, UNCTAD, through its Group of Experts on Competition Policy, has highlighted the importance of adapting competition to development needs. According to the organisation, « competition policy cannot be dissociated from the objectives of structural transformation and economic sovereignty, especially for developing countries ».[20] This perspective contrasts with the more technocratic approach of the OECD and the pragmatic orientation of the ICN, but it is complementary: it reminds us that competition cannot be only an instrument of static efficiency and that its effectiveness must also be measured in terms of economic and social development, as already observed.
The combination of these approaches has produced a fragmented but resilient institutional architecture. On the one hand, the OECD and the ICN have assumed a normative leadership role, disseminating standards of « good practice » and encouraging voluntary adherence by States. On the other hand, UNCTAD has maintained a critical space, particularly relevant for emerging countries, which reminds us that the principles of competition must be adapted to each economic and social context. This duality illustrates the constant tension between harmonization and normative differentiation, which is now a central feature of the new global governance of competition.[21]
Doctrinal works enrich this understanding. Frédéric Jenny insists on the need for « pragmatic convergence », which allows countries to align themselves with certain practices while maintaining room for manoeuvre adapted to their economic context.[22] For our part, we underlined the historical role of the European institutions and their ability to influence international standards, while respecting the legal diversity of countries, through their continental tradition and the resistance of certain states.[23] Bill Kovacic, by organizing an increased convergence of American and European approaches, insists on the evolutionary and experimental nature of international cooperation, by erasing the strong American propensity for the unilateral and extraterritorial application of American antitrust law.[24] Finally, Eleanor Fox reminds us that the internationalization of antitrust must be thought of as an inclusive process, taking into account the specific needs of emerging countries and their level of development.[25] Indeed, the extraterritorial application of antitrust law has become progressively more discreet over the past two decades as a result of this process of convergence.
The growing influence of emerging countries, particularly through the BRICS and the regional coordination led by the Eurasian Economic Commission, introduces an additional dynamic into this architecture. These actors seek to promote approaches adapted to their markets and development priorities, sometimes in addition to or in contrast to the OECD and ICN standards. As Eleanor Fox notes, « adapting competition rules to the level of market development is not only legitimate, but essential to avoid the imposition of standards that are ill-adapted to local realities ».[26]
Thus, competition policy has become a central instrument of global economic governance, not only because of its technical role in regulating markets, but also because of its ability to reflect power relations, geo-economic rivalries and asymmetries in development. This geopolitical dimension, further reinforced by digitalization, global market concentration, and the rise of national industrial strategies, will be explored in the following sections, where we will analyze the tensions between convergence and differentiation, digital and sectoral challenges, and comparative contributions from international doctrines and actors.
II. Convergence and divergence on international standards
One of the major challenges of global competition governance lies in the tension between normative convergence and contextual differentiation. Since the creation of the WTO’s Working Group on International Trade and Competition in 1996 (which was suspended indefinitely in 2004), international institutions have tried to promote a degree of homogenization of rules, while recognizing that national, economic and institutional contexts may warrant adaptations. As the Americans Eleanor Fox and Daniel Crane have repeated and reformulated, it was important to fill the gap in American-European normative considerations following the failure of the WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition: in fact, « efforts to harmonize competition policy must take into account the diversity of economic development and institutional capacities; otherwise, they risk imposing standards that are not aligned with local realities. »[27]
The failure to integrate competition policy into the WTO
The question of the integration of competition policy into the multilateral trading system emerged at the end of the 1990s in the context of the work of the World Trade Organization. In 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Conference established a working group to examine the interaction between trade and competition policy. The objective was to explore the possibility of establishing multilateral principles on combating anti-competitive practices affecting international trade. However, the negotiations quickly ran into strong divergences among WTO members.
Many developing countries express concern that new international obligations may emerge that could limit their industrial policy and regulatory space. The United States, for its part, is reluctant to adopt a legally binding multilateral agreement that could restrict its autonomy in the application of antitrust law. These differences finally led to the abandonment of the project at the Cancún ministerial conference in 2003. As a result of this failure, international cooperation on competition has mainly developed outside the framework of the WTO, notably through UNCTAD, but also through informal forums such as the International Competition Network.
Since the 1980s, the OECD has asserted a leading role in standard-setting, drawing up guidelines and disseminating principles inspired by the European and American economic model. These standards concern the evaluation of cartels, abuse of dominant position, mergers and acquisitions and the international coordination of sanctions. Typically European issues, such as state aid or the application of competition rules to public services or to firms holding exclusive or special rights, remained more in the shadows until the 2000s. Frédéric Jenny insists on the voluntary and pragmatic nature of this leadership: « The OECD does not impose binding rules; It proposes principles that serve as a reference for national authorities, thus encouraging pragmatic convergence rather than formal harmonisation ».[28] This approach has often made it possible to establish a common basis of « good practice », while respecting the specificities of national legal systems.
The ICN, for its part, has consolidated this dynamic by promoting an operational cooperation network. William Kovacic observed that « the ICN facilitates the development of consensus standards while allowing flexibility in national application, effectively bridging doctrinal differences between jurisdictions. »[29] Workshops, guidelines and technical assistance programmes have thus contributed to disseminating American and European practices to emerging authorities, creating a flexible but influential frame of reference that even UNCTAD has more or less ended up following from a methodological point of view, varying on the standards themselves as already indicated.
Indeed, this normative convergence has reached its limits when it has been confronted with development objectives. The IGE Competition has pointed out year after year that international standards, mainly developed by and for developed countries, may prove to be unsuitable for emerging and developing economies: « The application of competition rules in isolation from development priorities risks compromising structural transformation and national sovereignty. »[30] We recalled that the logic of convergence must therefore be tempered by a logic of differentiation, taking into account the level of development, the structure of the markets and the specific economic objectives of each country, especially when two member countries (China and India) alone have more than three billion inhabitants, producers and consumers.[31]
This tension is also manifested in the doctrinal differences between the American, European, and emerging approaches. The US approach emphasises economic efficiency and maximising consumer welfare, while Europe favours a balance between efficiency and competition protection as an institutional value. Jenny notes that « European law focuses not only on consumer welfare, but also on market fairness and institutional coherence, which can diverge from US antitrust priorities. »[32] In emerging countries, approaches tend to integrate the development dimension, as shown by the experience of the BRICS, where competition is thought of in relation to industrial transformation and economic sovereignty.
Joseph Stiglitz reinforces this critical perspective by stressing that « competition policy cannot be dissociated from broader social and development objectives; Its design must take into account inequalities, the structure of the market and the capacity of regulatory institutions. »[33] This approach is in line with that of UNCTAD, which stresses the importance of adapting competition standards to local constraints, particularly in developing and emerging countries.
Normative convergence does not exclude institutional innovation and mutual learning. Bill Kovacic insists on the role of international forums in promoting the circulation of practices and experimentation: « Through workshops, peer reviews and collaborative initiatives, authorities learn from each other, adapting global standards to national realities ».[34] This dynamic has enabled emerging countries such as India, Brazil and China to gradually adopt competition rules that are fully compatible with the best international standards, while maintaining specificities adapted to their markets or deliberately chosen for them.
In practice, the normative divergence manifests itself in the differentiation in the application of the principles: some countries emphasize the protection of SMEs and the regulation of public monopolies, while others prioritize the regulation of multinationals and digital platforms. Eleanor Fox insisted again in 2021 that « adapting competition rules to economic realities is both legitimate and necessary; One-size-fits-all approaches risk leading to regulatory failures. »[35] This is particularly relevant in the context of the digital transition and the globalisation of markets, where concentration and economic power are extremely heterogeneous across countries and sectors.
Finally, the combination of convergence and divergence shapes a plural and adaptive institutional architecture, where the OECD, ICN and UNCTAD compete with each other but nevertheless cooperate and retain complementary missions. Pragmatic convergence has made it possible to reduce conflicts and harmonise practices, while differentiation protects areas of development and economic sovereignty. This duality is now a pillar of global competition governance, and will serve as a basis for analysing sectoral and digital challenges in the next section.
III. Digital and sectoral challenges of competition policy
The advent of the digital economy has profoundly transformed market structures and, consequently, competition policy practices, implementation and standards. Digital platforms, artificial intelligence, big data and integrated ecosystems are disrupting traditional models, concentrating economic power in a small number of global players. Joseph Stiglitz rightly points out that « the digital economy amplifies market power, network effects and information asymmetries, requiring a reorganization of traditional antitrust tools. »[36] These transformations pose new challenges, both for national authorities and for international organizations such as the OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD, which must adapt their standards and practices to emerging sectoral realities.
The OECD quickly identified the need to reassess its guidelines for digital markets. The Competition Policy Committee has developed reports on platform regulation, the impact of algorithms on prices and competition, and data governance.[37] Frédéric Jenny insists on the preventive role of ex ante regulation: « in digital markets, competition authorities must anticipate potential abuses and design regulatory interventions that prevent market seizure before it happens ».[38] Once again, the OECD’s approach emphasizes the dissemination of good practices and technical cooperation between authorities, with a focus on step-by-step solutions tailored to each jurisdiction.
The ICN, for its part, has initiated specific working groups on competition in the digital economy and platform practices, promoting the exchange of experiences between authorities with various levels of expertise. Bill Kovacic notes that « the ICN’s work on digital markets illustrates how peer learning can build capacity for global application, enabling authorities to adapt common principles to national contexts. »[39] This approach makes it possible to combine normative convergence and flexibility, while building the premises of shared operational standards.
UNCTAD, through its Expert Group, highlights the specific risks for developing countries, where international digital concentration can exacerbate economic asymmetries. It has been observed that « emerging economies face the dual challenge of integrating into global digital markets while protecting domestic companies and ensuring that their development goals are not compromised. » [40] In this context, normative differentiation appears essential: the same antitrust intervention applied in a mature market can be counterproductive in an emerging economy, by slowing down local competition and innovation.
However, the sectoral challenges go beyond digital. Strategic industries, such as energy, telecommunications, aeronautics, and critical supply chains, are also experiencing increased concentration, reinforced by national industrial policies. Eleanor Fox stresses that « Sectoral regulation and competition policy must be coordinated to respond to market failures without stifling innovation or strategic development ».[41] International cooperation is therefore crucial for exchanging sectoral analyses and anticipating the risks of transnational monopoly.
In the digital field, the question of data and its control constitutes a new field of normative confrontation. The authorities must reconcile consumer protection, competition regulation and economic security. Stiglitz reminds us and even regularly emphasizes that data is not only an economic asset; It is a source of economic power (including highly sophisticated intellectual property rights) that can distort markets if ownership of this data is too concentrated.[42] Incidentally, it should be noted that this observation highlights the interdependence between competition policy, data regulation, intellectual property rights and geopolitical issues, particularly in the face of dominant players from different continents (especially the United States and China). We will come back to the crucial importance of the concentration of data markets, especially financial ones, in a later article.
Global competition governance is therefore now based on three dimensions, after a relative disappearance of the essential priority of prosecuting cartels in previous decades: (i) the dissemination of global standards via the OECD and ICN, (ii) adaptation to national and developmental contexts via UNCTAD and emerging countries, and (iii) the integration of sectoral and digital specificities. Bill Kovacic insists on the role of international forums in this coordination: « International networks allow competition authorities to develop proactive strategies, share application experiences and align their approaches with emerging sectors ».[43] The transnational dimension of digital platforms makes it absolutely necessary in principle to strengthen cooperation between competition authorities. As William E. Kovacic explains, effective competition law enforcement in the digital economy depends on the ability of national authorities to coordinate their investigations, share information and harmonise their remedies. Unfortunately, this cooperation is not self-evident and raises many legal issues, in particular between authorities in countries with very different levels of development. The objective is no longer just to sanction anti-competitive practices, but to anticipate economic imbalances and build coherent global regulation.
Finally, the BRICS and other emerging economies are introducing an additional dynamic – to which we will return – but some aspects of which should be mentioned here. China, India, Brazil and Russia are developing their own sectoral and digital standards, which may complement or differ from OECD-ICN approaches. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), whose secretariat is provided for all the competition authorities of the member countries around the BRICS by a former very high-level member of the Russian Antimonopoly Authority, coordinates certain regional initiatives, integrating local specificities and industrial priorities.[44] According to the latter, Alexey Ivanov, cooperation between the competition authorities of the BRICS constituent countries aims to adapt global competition governance to the transformations of global markets and value chains, by promoting greater openness of economic networks and limiting the exclusionary power of large platforms and technological monopolies.[45] The very New Yorker Democrat Eleanor Fox stresses, almost in support of the BRICS, that « recognizing and integrating the regulatory innovations of emerging economies is essential for a truly inclusive and effective global governance of competition ».[46] The integration of these perspectives enriches the institutional architecture and reinforces the normative legitimacy of international standards.
BRICS cooperation on competition policy
Since the early 2010s, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) have developed a cooperative framework aimed at harmonizing their approaches to competition law and policy. This work is based on regular exchanges between national authorities, technical workshops, training programmes and benchmarking of antitrust practices. The objective is to strengthen the effectiveness of national policies while promoting a pragmatic convergence of standards, adapted to the economic contexts of each of the member countries.
The Secretariat of the Eurasian Economic Commission (CEE), of which Russia has a decisive position in terms of the staff provided, plays a central role in the coordination and structuring of this work. It provides methodological support, organises seminars and establishes guidelines for the sharing of experiences and the dissemination of good practices. This mechanism allows the BRICS to pool expertise, to follow international developments, and to integrate regional and sectoral specificities into their competition standards.
This cooperation is part of a logic of strategic strengthening: it allows the BRICS to create an alternative normative space to the forums dominated by the OECD or the ICN, while supporting the economic development and industrial sovereignty of its members. The initiative also reflects the desire to influence international discussions and promote competition models that are compatible with their economic and geopolitical priorities.
Ultimately, competition policy in the digital and strategic sectors illustrates the need for an integrated and forward-looking approach. Convergence and normative differentiation, international cooperation and local adaptation, anticipation of imbalances and promotion of innovation are now the central principles of effective global governance that create a dynamic of coordination of competition policies. In the next section, we will analyze how these dynamics are reflected in the practice of merger policies, sanctions and monopoly regulation, with particular attention to geopolitical tensions.
IV. Merger Policies, Sanctions and Monopoly Regulation: International and Comparative Issues
The regulation of mergers and acquisitions and the control of monopolies constitute a series of essential instruments of competition policy, both to ensure economic efficiency and to preserve the diversity and competitiveness of markets. In a global context marked by the internationalisation of companies and the increasing concentration of economic power, these instruments have a major geopolitical dimension. As Eleanor Fox points out, « merger control is no longer a purely domestic issue; cross-border mergers have implications for market structure, innovation and consumer welfare globally. » [47]
Since the 1990s, the OECD has promoted guidelines for merger review, with a focus on assessing market and competition effects. Frédéric Jenny, Franco-Swiss Chair of the OECD’s Competition Committee for more than thirty years (from the early 1990s until 2025), insists on the importance of rigorous analytical methods, combining an economic approach and legal considerations: « the examination of mergers must be based on a careful analysis of the market, taking into account market shares, barriers to entry and potential anti-competitive effects ».[48] These principles have served as a reference for many national authorities and have facilitated a pragmatic convergence of practices, even without a binding framework. The OECD’s standard-setting system found an echo chamber in the early 2000s with the creation of the ICN after a few years of progress in work within the WTO between 1996 and 2001.
The ICN has therefore played a complementary role in promoting the exchange of experiences on merger review, notification, investigation procedure and remedies. Bill Kovacic, who strongly supported the development of the ICN, whose origin is largely inspired by the United States, points out that it « allows competition authorities to share methodologies, case studies and enforcement experiences, thus enhancing global coherence while respecting national discretion ».[49] This approach promotes mutual learning and the implementation of operational standards adapted to various jurisdictions.
At the same time, the regulation of monopolies and abusive practices is a central issue, particularly for digital markets and strategic sectors where the main operators no longer know the limits of their borders. Eleanor Fox observes that « monopoly power, whether natural or acquired, can distort global markets; Effective regulation requires coordination and understanding of cross-border effects. » [50] Sanctions, whether financial or structural, play a deterrent role but must be calibrated according to the size of the market, the level of development and the local institutional capacity. Joseph Stiglitz stresses that « sanctions in developing economies must be carefully designed to avoid unintended consequences that could harm competition or economic development. » [51]
UNCTAD recalls that in emerging countries, the regulation of monopolies must be integrated into the objectives of development and structural transformation. We stressed that « the design and implementation of antitrust measures in emerging economies must take into account local market structures, industrial policy and the promotion of domestic competition ».[52] This perspective, shared in particular by Eleanor Fox, as mentioned elsewhere, is opposed to a uniform approach and illustrates the need for normative differentiation while participating in pragmatic convergence.
Merger control and monopoly regulation policy is also influenced by new international dynamics, including industrial strategies and the rise of global firms. The BRICS, China, India and Russia are developing practices that may complement or differ from OECD and ICN standards. The Eurasian Economic Commission has also coordinated competing regional approaches of the OECD-ICN to examine mergers and limit abuses of dominant position, taking into account the policy priorities of the Member States.[53]
A fundamental aspect is the interaction between sanctions, prevention and international coordination. Authorities need to calibrate remedies to avoid both laissez-faire and over-repression, anticipating impacts on competition and innovation. Kovacic observes that « effective enforcement requires a balance between deterrence and market efficiency, with coordination between jurisdictions to handle multi-jurisdictional cases. »[54]The ICN has set up cooperation programmes on cross-border mergers, allowing authorities to share information, analysis and remedies, while respecting the sovereignty of each State.
Recent experiences show that sectoral and digital practices make the application of traditional rules even more complex. Integrated platforms and global enterprises pose specific challenges for merger control and the prevention of monopolistic behaviour, and to take into account network effects, data concentration, and platform ecosystems in particular to remain effective. Stiglitz rightly reminds us that « without proactive and contextual measures, digital markets risk entrenching inequalities and distorting incentives for innovation ».[55]
Thus, the pragmatic convergence between the OECD, the ICN and national authorities, combined with the normative differentiation promoted by UNCTAD and emerging countries, constitutes today the main architecture of merger governance and monopoly regulation. This multifaceted approach makes it possible to anticipate economic imbalances and promote a more balanced global market, while integrating local specificities and development priorities. But the general promotion of competitiveness can be to the detriment of the countries that are less willing to make the effort. It is this lack of mobilisation for competitiveness that largely motivated Mario Draghi’s report on the vital need to strengthen the competitiveness of Europe and its Member States, including France, which is marked by its very weak mobilisation to regain a collective dynamic that it had nevertheless been able to carry very well in the past.
V. Normative and prospective perspectives of international cooperation
As global economies become increasingly interdependent, competition policy can no longer be limited to a national or sectoral role. It is now at the heart of global economic governance, as a vector of cooperation, but also of geopolitical tensions. The OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD play a complementary role in the construction of flexible international standards, while leaving room for differentiation for national and developmental contexts. Eleanor Fox insists on this duality: « global convergence in competition policy must balance uniform principles with flexibility to adapt to the diversity of economic realities ».[56]
One of the major developments concerns the formalisation of prospective cooperation. Instead of limiting themselves to sanctions or control, the competition authorities are now aiming to anticipate economic and sectoral imbalances. Bill Kovacic notes that « anticipatory cooperation, through shared directives and forward-looking workshops, allows authorities to avoid market distortions before they occur. » [57] These initiatives are in principle intended to strengthen the resilience of markets and limit the risks of normative conflicts, particularly in the digital context and global value chains. Nevertheless, such attempts at anticipation by administrative authorities do not guarantee full effectiveness: the European Union is probably the first group of nations in the world to have prospective legislation on digital markets and yet does not have a signalled digital power compared to North America or East Asia.
The OECD pursues a standard-setting approach by promoting the dissemination of universal principles, such as competitive neutrality, transparency and economic efficiency. Frédéric Jenny stresses that « the normative guidance of international institutions provides a reference framework, which helps to align national practices without imposing uniform legal obligations ».[58] These principles provide a basis for pragmatic convergence, while leaving room for national adaptations to take account of market structure and policy priorities.
UNCTAD, by contrast, has sought to create and then maintain a « swimming lane » specific to the group of non-Western countries and regularly recalls the need to integrate a developmental and sovereign dimension. We have insisted on the importance of normative differentiation: « competition policy in developing economies must take into account industrial strategy, structural transformation and market capacity; A purely doctrinal approach risks marginalizing local realities. »[59] This perspective is essential to ensure that international standards are not perceived as an instrument of taxation by developed countries.
International cooperation is no longer limited to formal standards alone. Forums such as the ICN promote the sharing of experiences, methodologies and empirical analyses, creating collective learning. In particular, Fox notes that « peer learning networks are essential for the dissemination of best practices, especially for authorities with limited capacity for enforcement ».[60] This is also the reason why the members of UNCTAD’s Expert Group on Competition have embarked on the peer review exercise of one or two experiences in the development of national competition laws on an annual basis. This dynamic has strengthened the capacity of emerging states to actively participate in global normative construction but also to integrate good practices into their local policies, as we have recently mentioned.[61]
The digital economy and the globalisation of platforms accentuate the need for anticipatory coordination. Data, algorithms and embedded ecosystems pose risks of concentration and impediment to competition that cannot be solved by traditional ex-post interventions. Joe Stiglitz points out that « digital markets require forward-looking regulation that addresses concentration, network effects, and the potential exploitation of consumers and small businesses. »[62] This precautionary approach involves closer international cooperation, as well as dialogue with relevant sectors and sectoral regulatory authorities.
Normative perspectives also include legitimate differentiation between jurisdictions. The BRICS and emerging economies are experimenting with their own solutions, adapted to their needs, while participating in global initiatives. The Eurasian Economic Commission, for example, has coordinated regional standards for merger control and monopoly regulation, taking into account industrial priorities and economic development.[63] Eleanor Fox insists that « recognizing and integrating these diverse approaches strengthens the legitimacy and effectiveness of international competition governance. » [64]
Finally, the prospective dimension calls for a systemic and plural vision. International standards must include not only market regulation, but also coordination with industrial, technological and environmental policies. Frédéric Jenny stresses that « future competition policy must be global, taking into account the interactions with industrial strategy, data governance and sustainability objectives ».[65] Dynamic adaptation of standards and multi-institutional coordination are therefore essential to ensure inclusive and resilient governance.
In conclusion, for this part, international cooperation in the field of competition today appears to be an evolving normative process, combining pragmatic convergence, legitimate differentiation and anticipation of economic and sectoral imbalances. This plural architecture constitutes the basis of a global governance capable of reconciling economic efficiency, development and sovereignty, while offering a solid basis for facing the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century.
VI. Comparative experiences of emerging market and BRICS competition policy
Since the end of the 1990s, as already mentioned, emerging countries and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) have developed increasingly structured competition policies, often inspired by international standards, while integrating specific objectives of economic development, industrialization and strategic sovereignty. This evolution testifies to the normative plurality already mentioned, because the work of this BRICS group complements, and sometimes diverges, from the practices of the traditional authorities of the OECD and the ICN.
In China, competition policy reform has been built around the Anti-Monopoly Law of 2008, supplemented by sectoral guidelines for digital markets and strategic technologies.[66] According to Eleanor Fox, « China’s approach reflects both respect for international antitrust principles and the integration of national industrial strategy, highlighting a pragmatic mix of global standards and national priorities. » [67] Chinese regulation combines merger control, sanctions against abuse of dominant position and ex ante interventions in sectors deemed strategic, while actively participating in international cooperation initiatives via the ICN.
India, on the other hand, has put in place a robust merger control and abusive practices prevention framework, with a particular focus on consumer effects and industrial development. Stiglitz points out that « India illustrates the challenge for emerging economies: to integrate global antitrust norms while protecting domestic markets and encouraging structural transformation. »[68] The Competition Commission of India (CCI)is also developing guidelines for digital markets and working with the ICN to share its experience, while adapting international standards to local realities.
Brazil, with its legal and regulatory tradition inherited from civil law, has emphasized procedural transparency and the sanctioning of anti-competitive practices, while adopting an integrated economic policy vision. We have observed that « Brazil’s approach seeks to reconcile consumer protection, market efficiency and national development objectives, illustrating the potential for a nuanced, contextual » and even coordinated competition policy within the framework of the concept of « economic defence » (cf. the name given to its own national competition authority, the Economic Defence Council or CADE).[69] The Brazilian authorities have developed mechanisms for regional and international cooperation, while defending their ability to intervene in sectors deemed essential for economic development.
Russia, through the FAS (Federal Antimonopoly Service), has combined traditional merger control and sanctions instruments with particular attention to strategic sectors, such as energy, armaments and telecommunications. Frédéric Jenny points out that « Russia demonstrates the interplay between competition law enforcement and national policy priorities, stressing that regulatory tools can be adapted to support broader economic objectives ».[70] This approach, although aligned with certain international standards, illustrates the tension between normative convergence and sovereign objectives.
The BRICS share a common desire for regional and international cooperation, including through the Eurasian Economic Commission and other multilateral forums. These initiatives aim to harmonise certain practices, facilitate the exchange of information and develop sectoral standards for mergers and the regulation of monopolies, while preserving national room for manoeuvre. Fox notes that « the integration of BRICS experiences enriches global antitrust governance, proposing alternative methodologies and highlighting the importance of context-specific approaches. »[71]
What is happening on the African continent also deserves attention. The spread of competition law in Africa is part of a progressive dynamic of regional economic integration. Several regional organizations, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the West African Economic and Monetary Union and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, have adopted legal frameworks to regulate anti-competitive practices in their respective markets. The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area reinforces this momentum by paving the way for greater coordination of competition policies across the continent. The experience of the COMESA Competition Commission, a regional authority responsible for the control of certain cross-border mergers, illustrates the first forms of supranational enforcement of competition law. These initiatives could eventually form the foundations of a continental architecture of competitive regulation accompanying African economic integration.
Towards a continentalization of competition law in Africa
Since the 2000s, several regional initiatives have shown a gradual evolution towards a continentalization of competition law on the African continent. This dynamic is part of the broader movement towards regional economic integration and the construction of an integrated African market. Several regional economic organisations have gradually adopted common competition rules. For example, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has a regional competition framework applied by a regional authority competent for certain cross-border transactions. Similarly, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) have put in place legal mechanisms to regulate cartels and abuses of dominant positions in their respective economic areas.
The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) marks a further step in this process. By aiming at the gradual constitution of a continental market, this initiative promotes the emergence of a reflection on the harmonization or coordination of competition policies between African States. Although legal frameworks are still largely fragmented, these regional initiatives help to disseminate the principles of competition law and strengthen cooperation between national authorities. They could eventually form the basis of a continental architecture of competitive regulation accompanying African economic integration.
In this context, the experience of COMESA occupies a special place. The COMESA Competition Commission, established in 2013 and based in Lilongwe, Malawi, is one of the first supranational competition authorities in Africa. It has jurisdiction to examine certain mergers with a regional dimension, as well as to deal with anticompetitive practices affecting more than one Member State. Its action aims to ensure the uniform application of the competition rules within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and to avoid divergent decisions between national authorities. Through its merger control, investigation and institutional cooperation activities, the Commission contributes to the spread of a culture of competition in the region and is a pioneering experiment that can inspire future developments in competition law on a continental scale.
However, as already observed, these experiences highlight important normative divergences. While the OECD and the ICN insist on economic efficiency and competitive neutrality, the BRICS explicitly integrate the objectives of industrial development, the protection of local companies and strategic sovereignty. Joe Stiglitz points out that « emerging economies face unique trade-offs: how to foster competition while promoting industrial growth and national resilience ».[72] This tension underlines the importance of an open and inclusive international dialogue, capable of recognising the diversity of economic and social priorities, which have been delayed in particular by the OECD and the ICN (which explains China’s regular and continuous participation in the work of UNCTAD’s IGE Competition, but which in most cases avoids the OECD and the ICN). In other words, if the competition authorities of the European Union and its member states wish to work with the Chinese competition authorities, the best thing to do is to organise and develop bilateral cooperation, as has been done regularly by the European Commission since the 1990s.[73]
UNCTAD, through its role of critical reflection, helps to highlight these divergences and complementarities, by proposing analytical frameworks adapted to developing economies and by promoting the consideration of the structural dimension of markets. We have often observed that UNCTAD’s work since 1980-1990 has been a bridge between global normative convergence and national development needs, proposing policies that respect economic diversity.[74]
Finally, the comparative analysis of the BRICS illustrates the need for a flexible and plural global governance architecture, capable of reconciling normative convergence and contextual differentiation. International cooperation, the training of experts, the exchange of experiences and participation in networks such as the ICN or regional forums appear to be essential instruments for building an inclusive, adaptable and geopolitically legitimized competition policy by its participants, who increasingly want to be locomotives of the Global South.[75]
VII. Synthesis of BRICS contributions and articulation with international standards
The evolution of competition policy over the past three decades highlights a profound transformation of the global institutional and normative landscape. While the OECD and the ICN have promoted pragmatic convergence around the principles of economic efficiency and competitive neutrality, the BRICS have provided an alternative and complementary dimension, explicitly integrating the objectives of development, economic sovereignty and structural transformation. This plurality of norms illustrates the complexity of global economic governance and the growing role of competition policy as a geopolitical instrument, or at the very least, it is increasingly necessary to systematically assess the geopolitical aspects that can have a more or less significant impact on the conditions of implementation on various aspects of competition policy.[76]
An analysis of the national and regional experiences of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – reveals diversified but converging approaches on some key points. China, for example, combines formal compliance with international standards with a proactive strategy of controlling digital and strategic sectors, as Eleanor Fox points out: « China demonstrates how emerging economies can integrate international antitrust standards while advancing national industrial strategy. »[77] India and Brazil, for their part, emphasize consumer protection and the promotion of competitive markets, while taking into account industrial and social development objectives.
Russia and other member states of the Eurasian Economic Union illustrate the importance of regional coordination. The Eurasian Economic Commission‘s standards and practices enable the development of harmonized standards for merger control and monopoly regulation, while respecting national policy priorities⁴. This articulation between regional cooperation and international commitment enriches the normative dialogue and facilitates the emergence of practices adapted to heterogeneous markets.
The contribution of the BRICS complements the critical reflection carried out by UNCTAD. We stressed that « UNCTAD’s framework provides guidance for integrating competition policy with development objectives, enabling emerging economies to participate meaningfully in global governance without sacrificing local priorities. »[78] This perspective therefore contributes to making international governance more diversified or « inclusive » and legitimate, by reconciling normative convergence and contextual differentiation. It correspondingly increases the need for Europeans to follow UNCTAD’s work more closely, as it can influence all the more the normative developments consolidated in global governance.
The synthesis of the lessons learned from the BRICS shows that the coexistence of international standards and differentiated local practices is not only possible, but probably necessary to face contemporary challenges in reflection of the new geopolitical dimension of competition policy that is spreading like wildfire. The regulation of digital markets, the protection of strategic value chains and the control of global economic concentrations require a pluralistic and flexible approach, capable of combining anticipation, cooperation and national adaptation. Bill Kovacic also stresses that international cooperation must go beyond technical exchanges and include forward-looking mechanisms: « Authorities must develop forward-looking strategies that anticipate market developments, technological disruptions and cross-border impacts, ensuring consistent but contextual application ».[79] The BRICS, by experimenting with hybrid models, offer important analytical instruments likely to enrich the normative and operational conception of global governance.
Finally, this synthesis highlights three major orientations for the future: firstly, a strengthening of international coordination: it is a question of creating systematic bridges between the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and regional forums to facilitate the exchange of good practices and the anticipation of cross-border challenges. Secondly, a legitimate normative differentiation: the application of competition principles must take into account the level of development, sectoral structures and national strategic priorities, in order to avoid the impression of a uniform imposition of standards. Finally, a forward-looking and systemic approach: governance must integrate industrial, technological and environmental policies, particularly in digital markets and global value chains.
In short, the BRICS do not only represent emerging players on the world economic scene; they constitute pillars of a normative pluralism, capable of strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of international competition governance in an alternative way to Western countries, whether we deplore it or not: attention must be paid to the conditions and aspects of their institutional and normative development, some countries do not hesitate to occupy very active seats that multiply their audience and their capacity for influence within the OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD (Brazil, South Africa in particular)! The articulation of their practices with the standards of the OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD also illustrates a dynamic of pragmatic and differentiated cooperation, offering a model for the construction of a world economic order often presented as more inclusive, resilient and adaptable to the geopolitical and technological challenges of the twenty-first century, where the absent are always wrong. For the European Union, in particular the Commission (DG Comp.) and some countries (Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal), there are strong strategic considerations to participate in and maintain an active watch on all the forums concerned.
Conclusion: Competition policy as a geopolitical issue in global economic governance
An analysis of the work carried out since 1996 within the WTO, OECD, UNCTAD and the International Competition Network reveals a profound transformation of competition policy, initially conceived as a technical instrument of national regulation, and now central to global economic governance. This evolution reflects the international balance of power, the asymmetries of development and contemporary geo-economic rivalries.
The failure to formally integrate competition into the multilateral framework of the WTO has led to an institutional recomposition characterized by fragmentation and complementarity. The OECD and the ICN have gradually assumed a normative leadership role, disseminating standards of « good practice » based on economic efficiency and competitive neutrality. Conversely, UNCTAD, through the IGE Competition, maintained a critical space, recalling that competition cannot be dissociated from the objectives of development, structural transformation and economic sovereignty. Competition policy in developing economies must take into account industrial strategy and structural transformation; A purely doctrinal approach risks marginalizing local realities.
The inclusion of the experiences of the BRICS enriches this perspective. China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa demonstrate that it is possible to reconcile adherence to international standards with national priorities, or even the emergence of new regional spaces in the process of integration (see the remarkable example of Africa), including industrial development, protection of strategic markets and integration of digital and technological policies. The Eurasian Economic Commission also illustrates the importance of regional coordination to create harmonized standards, while respecting national priorities.
From a prospective perspective, the global normative architecture appears to be both resilient and fragile. It is resilient because it allows for a pragmatic convergence of national practices without legally binding agreements, thus avoiding political deadlocks. It is fragile because it relies heavily on informal mechanisms, voluntary membership and a persistent asymmetry in states’ ability to influence. Emerging challenges – digitalisation, concentrated markets, industrial policies, securing value chains and ecological transition – reinforce the geopolitical dimension of competition and accentuate the tension between international cooperation and strategic withdrawal.
At the normative and prospective level, three major orientations emerge: (1) to strengthen international coordination between OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and regional bodies, by facilitating the exchange of experiences, methodologies and empirical analyses. (2) agree to promote legitimate normative differentiation, taking into account the level of development, market structures and national priorities, in order to reduce the perception of competition policy as an instrument of domination. (3) adopt a forward-looking and systemic approach, integrating ex-ante regulation, data governance, coordination with industrial and technological policies, and consideration of sustainability and economic resilience.
This pragmatic, differentiated and anticipatory approach is reflected in the doctrinal contributions of the main authors on the international dimension of competition policy cited in this reflection. International.
Ultimately, the geopolitics of competition policy reveals a lasting tension between the ideal of a competitive global market and the reality of a fragmented and hierarchical international system that recent years have largely highlighted. The challenge for the coming decades is not so much the formal harmonization of rules as the construction (or reconstruction) – which remains more or less fragmented – of a plural, inclusive and adaptable governance, capable of reconciling competition, development and sovereignty in a global environment in recomposition. This governance will have to simultaneously integrate economic efficiency, consumer protection, development priorities and global strategic issues, thus consolidating competition policy as a real geopolitical instrument and global economic regulation.
[1] See OECD, World Competition Forum, Paris, 2025. This forum brought together the competition authorities of more than 110 countries at the OECD in Paris on 1 and 2 December 2025 under the chairmanship of Professor Frédéric Jenny, for the last time since its foundation in 2001 (see below). In 2025, the topics discussed were the effects of AI on competition in other mainstream markets, competition rules in the health sector, competition in informal markets, and the peer review of Kenya’s competition regime. A roundtable chairmanship (on competition rules in healthcare) was entrusted for the first time to Dr. Fahad Ibrahim Alshathri, Governor-General of the General Authority for Competition, the national competition authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
[2] Souty F., « Competition, development and the emergence of the « Global South » at UNCTAD: geopolitical lessons (1980-2025) », Le Diplomate Média, 10 March 2026, 37 p.
[3] World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on International Trade and Competition, Geneva, WTO, 1996.
[4] Souty F., « From the Halls of Geneva to the Shores of the Low Countries: the Origins of the International Competition Network », in Lugard P. (editor), The International Competition Network at Ten. Origins, accomplishments and aspirations, Cambridge-Portland, Intersentia, 2011, p. 39-50.
[5] Fox, Eleanor M. & Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, Saint Paul (MN), West Publishing, 2nd ed., 2017, p. 45.
[6] Jenny, Frédéric, Competition Law and Policy in Europe: Challenges and Perspectives, Paris, Larcier, 2010, p. 12-18.
[7] See, in particular , Stiglitz, Joseph, « Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy », in Bonakele, T., Fox, E. M. and Mncube, L. (eds.), Competition Policy for the New Era: Insights from the BRICS Countries, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, xii-270 and in particular p.. 4-21.
[8] Souty, François, « From the Halls of Geneva », op.cit.
[9] Souty, François, Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Union européenne, Paris, Montchrestien-Lextenso éditions, 4th edition, 2013, 160 p. On the Brussels School, see p. 24-30.
[10] Souty, F., « Concurrence, développement et émergence du « Sud Global », op.cit. to note 2.
[11] Fox, Eleanor M. & Bakhoum, Mor, Making Markets Work for Africa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 89.
[12] Op. cit., at note 2 infra.
[13] Op. cit. cit.
[14] Fox, Eleanor M. & Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues op.cit., 2nd ed., p. 45.
[15] See the main standard-setting instruments adopted by the OECD Council in the field of competition policy on the proposal of the Competition Committee: Recommendation of the Council concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings (2014); Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2012, 2023 Amendment); Recommendation of the Council on Structural Separation in Regulated Industries (2001); Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review (2005); Recommendation of the Council on Competition Assessment (2009); Recommendation of the Council on Competitive Neutrality (2021); Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement (2021);Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels (1998, revised 2019); as well as the Recommendation of the Council on Intellectual Property Rights and Competition (2023). These instruments constitute the main international standards of » soft law » in competition policy developed within the framework of the OECD. They are only known within the community of competition authorities that are members of the OECD and are often de facto integrated into European national or regional laws (the Council recommendation on competitive neutrality was adopted under the decisive influence of Europeans and in particular of the European Commission’s DG Competition, which officially has only one observer seat within the OECD).
[16] Jenny, Frédéric, « Competition Law and Policy in Europe: Challenges and Perspectives », in Demeulemeester, J.-L. et al. (eds.), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations, Brussels, Larcier, 2010, p. 12-18.
[17] Souty, François, « From the Halls of Geneva », op. cit..
[18] Kovacic, William, « Bridging Antitrust Doctrines Across Borders, » in Fox, E. M. and Crane, D. A. (eds.), Antitrust Stories (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 2007), 478 p., p. 101-115.
[19] V. on the participation of non-member States in the work of the OECD’s Competition Committee, organised in the framework of the Organisation’s « Global Relations » strategy. Historically, several jurisdictions have participated in the Committee’s work as observers, including Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Chinese Taipei, before some of these States subsequently acceded to the OECD or changed their status. The Russian Federation, a long-time observer and participant in the work of the Committee, had its participation in all OECD bodies suspended by Council decision of 8 March 2022 following the military aggression against Ukraine, resulting in its exclusion from the work. At the same time, the OECD has strengthened the integration of new partners, including Ukraine, which now participates in the work of the Competition Committee. More broadly, the participation of non-member economies is now taking place in different forms (participants, associates or partners), including Argentina, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Peru, South Africa, Chinese Taipei and Ukraine. As part of the OECD’s global engagement strategy, some States also have the specific status of « Key Partners« ,namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa, which regularly participate in the work of many of the Organisation’s committees, including the competition committee. Finally, in addition to formal participation in OECD bodies, the Organisation involves a wider number of jurisdictions in its work through the Global Forum on Competition, a dialogue platform that brings together more than a hundred competition authorities each year. This forum allows the involvement of authorities from non-OECD member states; this is the case, for example, of Saudi Arabia, whose Governor of the General Authority for Competition (GAC) chaired a roundtable discussion at the Global Forum on Competition session held in December 2025. The United Arab Emirates and other States thus have the same status as Saudi Arabia in the latter context. See in particular OECD, OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, vol. 6, No. 1-2, 2004, p. 93; OECD-ICN, Report on International Co-operation in Competition Enforcement, 2021; OECD Council Decision of 8 March 2022 suspending the participation of Russia and Belarus in the work of the OECD. A distinction should be made between the Competition Committee, the OECD’s permanent body responsible for conducting analytical work and developing soft law instruments in competition matters, and the Global Forum on Competition, a broader framework for multilateral dialogue involving a large number of non-member jurisdictions for exchanges of experience and thematic discussions between competition authorities. This is complemented by the Regional Centres for Competition established by the OECD in different regions of the world (notably in Budapest, Seoul and Lima), which aim to disseminate competition policy standards and best practices to national authorities. These bodies are served and fed by a competition division of about ten to fifteen administrators, consultants and assistants within the OECD Secretariat.
[20] UNCTAD, Report of the Group of Experts on Competition Policy, Geneva, United Nations, 2010, p. 22-38.
[21] Souty, F., « Competition, development and the emergence of the « Global South », op.cit
[22] Jenny, Frédéric, « Competition Law and Policy in Europe », op. cit., p. 12-18.
[23] Souty, François, From the Halls of Geneva to the Shores…, op.cit. p. 45-60.
[24] Kovacic, William, « Bridging Antitrust Doctrines Across Borders, » op.cit.
[25] Fox, Eleanor M. & Bakhoum, Mor, Making Markets Work for Africa, Oxford: OUP, 2019, p. 89.
[26] Fox, Eleanor M., « International Antitrust and Development, » Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 29(3), 2021, p. 481-500.
[27] Fox, Eleanor M. & Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, 2nd ed., Saint Paul, MN: West Academic Publishing, 2017, p. 78.
[28] Jenny, Frédéric, « Competition Law and Policy in Europe: Challenges and Perspectives », in BUCCIROSSI (P.) (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2008, p. 25-32.
[29] Kovacic, William, « Bridging Antitrust Doctrines Across Borders, » in Fox, E. M., and Crane, D. A. (eds.), Antitrust Stories (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 2007), 478 p., p. 115-130.
[30] UNCTAD, Report of the Expert Group on Competition Policy, Geneva: United Nations, 2010, p. 41-53.
[31] Souty, François, « From the Halls of Geneva … op . cit. p. 62-74.
[32] Jenny, Frédéric, Competition Law and Policy in Europe: Challenges and Perspectives, Paris: Larcier, 2010, p. 25-32.
[33] Stiglitz, Joseph, op.cit.
[34] Kovacic, William, « Bridging Antitrust Doctrines, » op. cit.
[35] Fox, Eleanor M., op.cit., p. 488-495.
[36] Stiglitz, Joseph, op. cit.
[37] OECD, Competition and the Digital Economy, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018, p. 14-46.
[38] Jenny, Frédéric, « Digital Markets and Competition Policy », Concurrences – Competition Law Review, (1-2020), Paris, Concurrences, 2020, p. 33-55.
[39] Kovacic, William, « International Antitrust Cooperation and the Digital Economy », in Kovacic, W. E., and Burnier da Silveira, P. (eds.), Global Competition Enforcement: New Players, New Challenges, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2019, 424 p., contribution p. 78-101.
[40] Souty, François, « Competition Policy in Emerging Economies… « , op.cit. p. 75-90.
[41] Fox, Eleanor M. & Bakhoum, M. op.cit., p. 112.
[42] Stiglitz, Joseph E, « Market Concentration Is Threatening the US Economy, » Project Syndicate, March 11, 2019. A general idea ardently defended by the Nobel Prize in Economics Stiglitz is that the increasing concentration of markets constitutes a threat to economic growth and contributes to the increase in inequality, by allowing large companies to exercise excessive market power. It is the shared view of this situation that inspired the adoption of the Digital Markets Act by Europeans in 2023, mentioned elsewhere.
[43] Kovacic, William, « International Antitrust Cooperation in Digital Markets, » in Antitrust Law and the Digital Economy, Washington, DC, American Bar Association, 2019, p. 78-101.
[44] Eurasian Economic Commission, Competition Policy Reports 2015–2020, Moscow, EEC Press, 2020, p. 23-47.
[45] A. Ivanov, « BRICS and the Global Competition Law Project », in Competition Policy for the New Era: Insights from the BRICS Countries, Oxford, OUP, 2017, p. 115-135.
[46] Fox, Eleanor M., op. cit. p. 490-495.
[47] Fox, Eleanor M. & Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, op.cit., p. 103.
[48] Jenny, Frédéric, « Merger Control and Digital Markets », in De Streel, Alexandre and Larouche, Pierre (eds.), Competition Law and the Digital Economy, Brussels, Larcier, 2020, p. 45-67.
[49] Kovacic, William E., « International Antitrust Cooperation in Merger Review, » in The Global Antitrust Enforcement Handbook, Washington, DC, American Bar Association, 2019, p. 131-150
[50] Fox, Eleanor M., Antitrust in the Digital Era, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, 2019, p. 210-225.
[51] J. E. Stiglitz, « Market Concentration Is Threatening the US Economy, » Project Syndicate, March 11, 2019, n.p.
[52] Souty, François, « From the Halls of Geneva to the Shores of the Low Countries« , op. cit., p. 92-104.
[53] Eurasian Economic Commission, op. cit., p. 48-69.
[54] Kovacic, William E., « International Antitrust Cooperation in Merger Review, » in The Global Antitrust Enforcement Handbook, Washington, DC, American Bar Association, 2019, p. 131-150.
[55] Stiglitz, J. op. cit.
[56] Fox, Eleanor M. & Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust, op. cit., p. 150.
[57] Kovacic, William, International Antitrust Cooperation, op. cit., p. 98-115.
[58] Jenny, Frédéric, « Normative Foundations of Competition Policy », in De Streel, Alexandre and Larouche, Pierre (eds.), Competition Law and the Digital Economy, Brussels, Larcier, 2015, p. 40-62.
[59] Souty, François, Competition Policy in Developing Economies, op. cit. p. 105-199.
[60] Fox, Eleanor M., « International Antitrust and Development », op. cit., p. 502509.
[61] Souty F., « Competition, Development and the Emergence of the ‘Global South’ at UNCTAD », op. cit.
[62] Stiglitz, Joseph, op. cit.
[63] Eurasian Economic Commission, Competition Policy Reports 2015–2020, op. cit.
[64] Fox, Eleanor M., Making Markets Work Globally, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 120-132
[65] Jenny, F., Normative Foundations of Competition Policy, op. cit., p. 40-62.
[66] Souty, François, « China: the anti-monopoly law of 30 August 2007 », Concurrences, n° 4-2007, 1 December 2007, p. 158-164.
[67] Fox, Eleanor M., Antitrust in Emerging Markets: China, in Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, 2nd ed., Saint Paul, MN: West Publishing, 2017, p. 165
[68] Stiglitz, Joseph, op. cit.
[69] Souty, François, From the Halls of Geneva to the Shores of the Low, op cit., p. 105-119.
[70] Jenny, Frédéric, Competition Policy in Russia and Strategic Sectors, in I. Lianos and A. Ivanov (eds.), Global Food Value Chains and Competition Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022, p. 78-101.
[71] Fox, Eleanor M., « Making Markets Work Globally », in Jenny, Frédéric and Kovacic, William E. (eds.), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 140-155.
[72] Stiglitz, Joseph, op. cit.
[73] Souty, François, « China: Bilateral agreements: Chinese and European competition authorities sign, on the occasion of the 15th China-EU summit, a Memorandum of Understanding equivalent to the one concluded in 2011 by the Chinese authorities with their American counterparts », Chroniques internationales,Concurrences, n° 4-2012, p. 200-201.
[74] Souty, François, « From the Halls of Geneva to the Shores of the Low Countries », op. cit., p. 105-119.
[75] Souty F., « Competition, Development and the Emergence of the « Global South » at UNCTAD », op.cit.
[76] See in particular Souty, F., « The geopolitical limits of the European anti-foreign subsidy regulation », Le Diplomate Média, 21 January 2026, 49 p.
[77] Fox, Eleanor M., Antitrust in Emerging Markets : China, in Fox, Eleanor M. and Crane, Daniel A., Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, 2nd ed., Saint Paul (MN), West Publ., 2017, p. 178
[78] Souty, François, Competition Policy in Developing Economies, op. cit.
[79] Kovacic, William, International Antitrust Cooperation in Emerging Markets, op. cit.
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