ECONOMY – Defence Industries, EU Competition Policy and US Antitrust: Legal Asymmetries, Industrial Issues and Strategic Autonomy
By François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former International Affairs Officer at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD’s Expert Committee on Competition Policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches EU Institutions and Geopolitics at Excelia Business School Group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan) and UE Competition Law and Policy at the Faculty of Law of Nantes-University. He is in charge of the Economysection at Le Diplomate média.
Executive Summary
In an international context marked by the return of systemic rivalries, illustrated in particular by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the defence industries are regaining strategic centrality, raising questions about the adequacy of the legal frameworks that govern their development. This article analyses the obsolescent divergence of European competition law, structured around the preservation of the internal market under the aegis of the European Commission, vis-à-vis the American approach to antitrust, historically based on the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, but applied in a contextualized way in strategic sectors.
The study identifies two distinct logics. On the one hand, Europe favours intra-Community competition, including in strategic segments, which translates into strict vigilance on mergers and the prevention of collusive or abusive practices. On the other hand, the United States explicitly incorporates objectives of national security and industrial power, allowing certain consolidations when technological and geopolitical issues require it. This divergence has concrete effects on industrial structuring: it is manifested by the rejection of mergers such as Alstom-Siemens or, on the contrary, by the acceptance of the consolidation of major players such as Raytheon Technologies, depending on the strategic sensitivity of the sector.
The sectoral analysis, covering naval, aeronautics, missiles, land weapons and space launchers, shows that the tensions between industrial objectives and competitive requirements are particularly acute in sovereignty industries. Recent cases, such as ThyssenKrupp/EADS Atlas Elektronik, ASL/Arianespace, or theRUAG grenade cartel, illustrate that the uniform application of competition law can, without contextualisation, limit the formation of European champions and slow down the acquisition of critical capabilities.
To be operational, geopolitical competition law must not only articulate competitive rigour and industrial objectives, but also provide for explicit exemptions for sectors of sovereignty, in particular defence, allowing strategic players to consolidate certain capabilities without infringing competition rules, like the American model.
The article nevertheless qualifies the binary reading between market and power: in sectors open to competition — digital economy, consumer goods, non-strategic services — competition law remains fully relevant and effective. The major challenge therefore lies in its sectoral and temporal differentiation for the defence industries, making it possible to synchronise legal decisions with technological cycles and global rivalries.
In conclusion, a contextualised and differentiated approach to competition law, with clear exemptions for defence and sovereignty industries, is an essential condition for ensuring the innovative and credible dynamic strategic autonomy of the European Union.
Introduction
At a time when the return of high-intensity warfare on the European continent, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is brutally reconfiguring power hierarchies, the European Union continues to think of its economic order through the categories inherited from a bygone world. Conceived as an instrument for rationalising the internal market, competition law has gradually established itself as one of the most powerful normative pillars of European integration. However, this centrality has been accompanied by an effect of blindness: by absolutizing the intra-European competitive logic, the Union seems to have underestimated the transformation of world capitalism into a space of highly innovative strategic confrontation.
Conversely, the United States has never ceased to articulate its competition policy with the objectives of power. While the antitrust corpus resulting from the Sherman Antitrust Act remains formally in force, its application in strategic sectors — first and foremost defence — is part of a profoundly pragmatic interpretation, where industrial consolidation is perceived as a condition for technological and military superiority.
From then on, a structuring asymmetry appears: where Europe « disciplines » its players in the name of the market, the United States organizes theirs in the service of power. This divergence is not only legal; It has material effects on the structuring of defence industries, their capacity for innovation and their position in international competition.
In this context, the persistence of a « European legalism » — understood as the primacy given to the internal coherence of rules and norms over their strategic purpose — raises questions. Can we sustainably claim strategic autonomy without rethinking the legal instruments that govern the defence industry? Or, to put it another way, has European competition law become a luxury that the geopolitical context no longer allows?
I. Two philosophies of competition: regulated market vs. instrument of power
The opposition between the European and American models of competition cannot be reduced to a simple technical divergence or of legal nuances and economic efficiency in the application of antitrust rules. It stems from a more profound difference in the very purpose of economic law: whereas the European Union tends to conceive of competition as an autonomous norm for regulating the market with an institutional aim, the integration of formerly national markets into a single market, the United States understands it as an instrument that can be mobilized — or changed — in the service of objectives of economic power. This distinction is manifested both in the normative foundations of the two systems (A), in the concrete modalities of their implementation (B), and in their respective capacities to integrate differentiated sectoral logics (C).
A. The European model: market primacy and legal framework
EU competition law is characterised by a particularly high degree of juridification, making it one of the most integrated and autonomous areas of the EU legal order. This specificity is due in particular to the central role of the European Commission, whose powers in the field of cartels, abuse of dominant position and merger control are exercised directly with regard to companies, independently of the Member States.
As we have shown, this institutional centrality has been accompanied by a gradual transformation of competition policy, from an instrument of economic integration to a real structuring principle of the European legal order.[1] Initially conceived as a means of preventing obstacles to the common market, competition has gradually become autonomous to become an end in itself, based on criteria of economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
This evolution has been widely analysed by legal commentators. Louis Blumann thus underlines that competition law is part of a « European economic constitutionalism« , in which the preservation of competition tends to impose itself as an almost fundamental norm.[2] For her part, Marie Malaurie-Vignal highlights the rise of an economic approach to competition law, marked by the influence of cost-benefit analysis and the search for allocative efficiency.[3] This perspective must be particularly complemented by the contribution of the German ordoliberal school, whose influence has profoundly marked the European conception of competition.[4] Around figures such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm , Wilhelm Röpke and others, this school defends the idea that the market can only function effectively if it is framed by a strong legal order guaranteeing competition. Far from being an absolute laissez-faire, ordoliberalism promotes an « authorizing » state responsible for preventing concentrations of economic power and ensuring the maintenance of an open competitive structure. This approach has had a lasting influence on EU competition law, insisting on the primacy of rules and the fight against dominant positions as essential conditions for the proper functioning of the market. [5]
This autonomy of European competition law and policy is however accompanied by a strict framework for the possibilities of taking into account extra-competitive objectives. In this respect, Laurence Idot insists on the difficulty of linking competition policy with other EU policies, in particular industrial and trade policy.[6] Institutional and normative compartmentalization contributes to establishing and maintaining an absolutist form of primacy of competitive reasoning, including in sectors with a strong strategic dimension.
This tension is particularly visible in the interpretation of Article 346 TFEU, which in principle allows Member States to derogate from the rules of the Treaty on grounds related to essential security interests, in accordance with the wishes of the Founding Fathers of the EU. [7] As Marie Malaurie-Vignal points out, this provision is now being read more and more restrictively, with the European Commission taking care to limit its use in order to preserve the integrity of the internal market.[8] The result is an increasing relative marginalization of sovereignty considerations in competitive analysis, including in the field of defence industries.
Our own recent work attempts to deepen this analysis by highlighting the « de-embedded » nature of European competition law, applied as if the global market constituted a neutral and homogeneous space.[9] This approach tends to ignore the industrial strategies deployed by the great powers, as well as the distortions resulting from foreign state interventions. In a complementary perspective, Frédéric Marty highlights the limits of a competition policy designed independently of the stakes of power. In his view, the lack of an explicit link between competition and industrial policy leads to a paradoxical situation in which the European Union imposes constraints on its own companies that their international competitors do not necessarily face.[10]
Thus a European model is taking shape, characterised by strong internal coherence, of course, but also by a real difficulty in integrating the contemporary transformations of the world economy. Competition too often appears as an end in itself, and not as an instrument in the service of broader economic or strategic objectives. This configuration, long perceived as a strength in a context of regulated globalization, is now tending to reveal its limits in an environment marked by the return of systemic rivalries.
B. The American model: flexibility and strategic purpose
Unlike the European model, which is very « orderly » according to the expression of the German ordoliberals, American antitrust law is characterized by a remarkable plasticity, which is due as much to its normative foundations as to its methods of application. Stemming from the Sherman Antitrust Act, this corpus was never conceived as a closed system, but as an evolving instrument, capable of being adapted to the transformations of American capitalism.
American doctrine has largely highlighted this dimension. Thus, William Kovacic points out that U.S. antitrust policy historically oscillates between different « waves » of interpretation, reflecting the economic and political priorities of the moment.[11] Similarly, David J. Gerber insists that competition law cannot be understood in isolation from the institutional structures and public policy objectives of which it is embedded.[12]As for Eleanor Fox, she highlights the intrinsically normative dimension of antitrust, conceived not only as an instrument of economic efficiency, but also as a lever for structuring the market in the service of political values.[13]
These analyses converge on an essential idea: in the United States, antitrust law is not an autonomous system, but a tool integrated into a global economic strategy. We ourselves have recently stressed that American antitrust retains a capacity to adapt to power issues that European law is largely struggling to match.[14] This analysis is confirmed by American authors as different as the Republican Robert Bork, who highlights the anchoring of antitrust in a substantive conception of consumer welfare, or the Democrat Herbert Hovenkamp, for whom American competition law closely reflects changes in economic policies and institutional structures.[15]
In the defence sector, this flexibility takes on a particularly explicit dimension. Interactions between competition authorities and strategic institutions, in particular the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense or DoD), make it possible to integrate national security considerations into the analysis of merger operations. The creation of Raytheon Technologies in 2020 illustrates this logic: far from being apprehended solely from a competitive perspective, the transaction was evaluated in terms of its effects on the industrial and technological capacity of the United States.
French legal writers have also taken note of this specificity. Frédéric Marty thus emphasizes that the American model is based on an assumed articulation between competition policy and industrial policy, in which the former can be bent in favour of the latter.[16] This approach contrasts sharply with the European tradition of autonomy of competition law, following the ordoliberal conception.
C. A structuring divergence but sectorally differentiated
While the divergence between the European and American models is real, it cannot be absolutized. An overly binary reading would lead to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of partial convergence that run through the two systems, as well as the sectoral differentiations that nuance their scope.
On the European side, several authors have stressed the limits of a strictly competitive approach. Laurence Idot highlights the growing tensions between the logic of the internal market and the requirements of economic sovereignty, particularly in strategic sectors.[17] For his part, Louis Blumann insists on the need to link competition law more closely with the Union’s other policies, in particular industrial policy.[18] This analysis is extended by Marie Malaurie-Vignal, who stresses that competition cannot be set up as an exclusive end without the risk of producing counterproductive effects on the structure of markets.[19]
These criticisms are in line with our observations, which highlight the gap between a competition policy designed for an integrated market and an international environment marked by the rise of rivalries between systemic powers.[20] The European Union thus appears to be a « regulatory power » confronted with state or parastatal actors who fully mobilise industrial policy instruments.
On the American side, the sectoral differentiation is more explicit. While antitrust law remains rigorously applied in certain areas — notably the digital economy, as evidenced by the proceedings against large platforms — it is subject to more flexible application in sectors considered strategic. This duality confirms Eleanor Fox’s analysis, according to which American antitrust operates as a system of variable geometry, adjusted to economic and political priorities.[21]
In short, the divergence between the European and American models has less to do with the formal content of the rules than with their hierarchy.Where the United States explicitly integrates competition into a global power strategy, the European Union continues to favour an approach in which competition is in fact an end, a primary normative framework, relatively autonomous from geopolitical considerations.
This conceptual and functional asymmetry has tangible effects on the structuring of industries, particularly in the defence sector. It is reflected in particular in differences in critical size, capacity for innovation and strategic responsiveness, which call for an in-depth analysis of the industrial dynamics at work.
II. Industrial effects: structures, consolidation and innovation
Beyond the normative and institutional differences, the opposition between the European and American models of competition has concrete effects on the structuring of industries. As David J. Gerber points out, « competition law is never neutral in its economic effects; it shapes market structures as much as it regulates them. »[22] This observation finds particular resonance in the defence industries sector, where the requirements of critical size, innovation and strategic coordination come into direct tension with existing legal frameworks.
These effects are manifested through three main dynamics: industrial structuring (A), the articulation between competition and industrial policy (B), and the limits of European cooperation (C).
A. European Fragmentation vs. U.S. Concentration
One of the most visible consequences of the asymmetry between competition models is the very structure of industries. While the United States has encouraged the emergence of large integrated groups, Europe remains characterised by a relative fragmentation of its industrial players.
The European Commission’s rejection of the merger between Alstom and Siemens Mobility in 2019 is an emblematic case in this regard. Justified in the name of preserving competition on the European railway equipment market, this ban has provoked strong criticism, particularly from the French and German authorities, who saw it as an obstacle to the creation of a « European champion » capable of competing with the Chinese global competitor group CRRC.
As Frédéric Marty observes, « European competitive analysis remains largely focused on the internal market, without fully integrating global competitive dynamics« .[23] This focus leads to a form of strategic myopia, in which intra-European competition is privileged to the detriment of external competitiveness. The same phenomenon occurs in the energy sector, particularly nuclear energy, which has considerable barriers to market entry.
Conversely, the creation of Raytheon Technologies in 2020 illustrates a logic of assumed consolidation. Resulting from the merger betweenRaytheon and United Technologies, this operation was validated by the American authorities in a context marked by the rise of technological rivalries. It reflects an approach in which critical size is perceived as a condition for innovation and industrial superiority.
This divergence has been clearly identified by William Kovacic, who points out that » US antitrust policy has repeatedly adapted to allow for mergers deemed necessary for international competitiveness « .[24] In other words, concentration is not perceived as an anomaly, but as a potential instrument of power.
The result is a growing gap between European players subject to strict competitive constraints and American groups benefiting from greater latitude to consolidate. This gap is reflected in particular in differences in size, investment capacity and vertical integration.
B. Explicit Industrial Policies vs. Implicit Constraints
Beyond industrial structures, the asymmetry between the European and American models is manifested in the articulation between competition policy and industrial policy.
In the United States, this articulation is explicitly assumed. The adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022 marks a major turning point, by consecrating the return of an active industrial policy based on massive subsidies and tax incentives. As Eleanor Fox points out, « industrial policy and competition policy are not substitutes but complements« .[25] This complementarity makes it possible to include antitrust law in a global economic strategy, oriented towards competitiveness and technological sovereignty.
For our part, we have always insisted on the coherence of the American model, which is based on a close articulation between legal instruments, public policies and strategic objectives.[26] Far from being a rupture, the Inflation Reduction Act is part of a tradition of public intervention aimed at supporting sectors deemed essential or strategic.
In Europe, the situation appears more ambivalent, as already mentioned. While instruments such as the European Defence Fund or the temporary relaxation of state aid are evolving, they remain partially constrained by the competition law framework. As Laurence Idot points out, « the European Union is struggling to articulate a real industrial policy with a competition policy conceived as autonomous« .[27]
This tension translates into a form of « incomplete hybridization, » in which industrial initiatives coexist with a competitive framework that limits their scope. Louis Blumann thus stresses that » the lack of a clear hierarchy between the Union’s objectives contributes to a certain incoherence of economic policies « .[28]
The result is a paradoxical situation: while the United States assumes distortions of competition in the name of economic power, the European Union continues to favour an approach based on market neutrality, at the risk of putting its own companies at a disadvantage.
C. European cooperation and structural limits
Faced with the constraints of competition law and industrial fragmentation, European States have sought to develop forms of enhanced cooperation, particularly in the field of defence. However, these initiatives face structural limitations that reduce their effectiveness.
The FCAS (Future Combat Air System) program, involving Dassault Aviation and Airbus, is an emblematic illustration of these difficulties. Marked by industrial tensions and divergences of national interests, this project highlights the absence of a real industrial « leader », capable of imposing clear governance and a unified strategic vision, despite Dassault Aviation’s demonstrated expertise, track record and international commercial successes for decades.
As Marie Malaurie-Vignal points out, « European industrial cooperation remains hampered by competitive and national logics that are difficult to reconcile« .[29] This fragmentation is reinforced by the European legal framework for merger control, which does not encourage the concentration of players and hinders the freedom of manoeuvre of European manufacturers.
From a broader perspective, David J. Gerber observes that » fragmented governance structures tend to weaken the ability of companies to compete on a global scale . »[30] This analysis has a direct application in the European case, where the multiplicity of actors and decision-making levels slows down industrial processes.
These difficulties also reflect a deeper inability to think about industry on a European scale, in an environment marked by competition between great powers.[31] In the absence of a clear articulation between competition, industrial policy and defence strategy, European cooperation risks falling short of its potential.
Thus, the industrial effects of the legal frameworks of competition appear decisive. They help to structure markets, guide companies’ strategies and, ultimately, determine the ability of economies to compete internationally. This reality leads us to question a more discreet but equally decisive dimension: that of the time of the law and its adequacy to the requirements of the strategy.
Box 1
Exemptions and flexibility of EU and US competition law in the defence sector[32]
In the European Union, competition law is based on the preservation of the internal market, with strict application of merger control rules and the prohibition of collusive practices. Defence industries, although sectors of sovereignty, remain subject to these obligations without explicit derogations, frequently and regularly limiting the ability of States and strategic actors to consolidate critical capabilities. Article 346 TFEU is the main instrument of derogation, allowing certain Member States to justify state aid or market exclusions on grounds of national security. However, its application is limited and very regulated, requiring prior notification to the European Commission and precise justifications. In practice, the naval, aeronautics or missile cases show that the Commission assesses compatibility with the internal market and can impose conditions to limit the impact on competition, such as separation obligations or restrictions on the exchange of sensitive information. Recent communications, including the Defence Readiness Omnibus and the revision of the Merger Guidelines in 20252026, reflect a desire to further integrate security requirements into the competitive analysis in line with the requirements of the Draghi Report on European Competitiveness (2024), but no automatic and systematic exemption for defence yet exists. The European approach therefore remains essentially contextualised and ad hoc, offering limited room for manoeuvre for defence manufacturers.
In the United States, antitrust is based on historical texts such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, but the practice illustrates a great deal of flexibility in strategic sectors. Industrial consolidations in defense may be permitted if they serve national security or technological superiority. Federal agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, consider policy needs and apply implicit exemptions via « public interest » analyses as part of the Hart-Scott‑Rodino notification procedures. This approach has allowed the approval of mergers and acquisitions involving major players such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon or Northrop Grumman, even in the presence of a significant concentration, provided that safeguards are respected to preserve safety and industrial performance. The essential difference with Europe lies in the broad interpretation of the concept of « public interest« , which makes it possible to reconcile competitive logic and industrial strategy, thus approaching the European idea of a « geopolitical competition law » but with more direct and secure instruments.
In summary, Europe has tools to grant exemptions, but they remain formal, framed and ad hoc, limiting responsiveness to policy challenges, while the US applies a pragmatic and contextualised approach that serves as a model for considering clear and flexible sectoral exemptions in the EU. The construction of a genuine European geopolitical competition law would require, in equivalence with the situation in the United States, a clear definition of the sectors of sovereignty eligible for these exemptions, the establishment of simplified procedures to assess the compatibility of consolidations with strategic imperatives, as well as the combination of competitive guarantees with strategic flexibility. in order to reconcile security and market.
III. A decisive asymmetry: the time of law vs. the time of strategy
Beyond the normative and structural divergences, the opposition between the European and American models of competition reveals an even deeper asymmetry: that of their relationship to time. As William Kovacic points out, « the effectiveness of competition law depends as much on its content as on its ability to adapt to the pace of economic transformations ».[33] In sectors characterized by rapid technological cycles and high strategic stakes, the temporality of law thus becomes a determining variable of industrial power.
This temporal asymmetry is manifested through the procedural rigidity of the European model (A), the flexibility of the American model (B), and, more fundamentally, the role of time as a factor of competitiveness (C).
A. European procedural time: predictability and rigidity
European Union competition law is distinguished by a high degree of procedural formalisation, guaranteeing legal certainty for economic actors. Merger control procedures, which are governed by precise deadlines and successive examination phases, illustrate this desire for predictability and transparency.
However, this temporal structuring can also be a factor of rigidity. As Laurence Idot points out, « the increasing sophistication of European procedures is accompanied by longer decision-making times, which is likely to produce significant economic effects« .[34] In sectors where innovation is rapid and windows of opportunity are narrow, these delays can compromise the very relevance of decisions, as we have seen in the field of nuclear energy production in the United Kingdom with the deadlines imposed on the Hinkley Point C project.[35] This criticism is rightly reinforced by Frédéric Marty, for whom « the time of European law is not always aligned with economic time, which can lead to dynamic inefficiencies« .[36] In other words, the mechanical search for legal certainty – which dominates the rather technocratic mind in the implementation of the law among some analysts and administrators – can be carried out to the detriment of strategic responsiveness.
This issue is also analysed by Cristina Caffarra, who points out that « the new geoeconomics of power requires us to go beyond the traditional tools of antitrust » and that » antitrust and regulation are now part of the ‘small ball’ in the face of infrastructure and sovereignty issues « .[37]These observations, taken from his posts between 2024 and 2026, highlight the gap – increasingly worrying, not to say alarming – between the slowness of European procedures, the slowness of their modernisation and the speed of industrial transformations, particularly in the era of generative artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things or connected objects.
Thus, the European model appears to be characterized by a long, structured and predictable temporality, but sometimes unsuited to the requirements of contemporary strategic competition.
B. American strategic time: flexibility and adaptability
Conversely, the American system is distinguished by a more flexible approach to legal temporality. While antitrust law is based on ancient principles, stemming from the Sherman Antitrust Act, its application is characterized by an ability to adapt to economic and political circumstances.
As David J. Gerber points out, « U.S. competition law operates within an institutional framework that allows for rapid adjustments based on economic priorities. »[38] This flexibility is due in particular to the close interaction between competition authorities and political institutions, as well as the importance given to economic analysis in decision-making.
In strategic sectors, this ability to adapt translates into a more flexible management of procedural time. Authorities can speed up or guide decisions based on industrial issues, particularly when it comes to preserving critical technological capabilities.
This dimension is also highlighted by Eleanor Fox, who points out that » American antitrust policy has always been sensitive to the imperatives of national competitiveness « .[39] The time of law thus becomes an instrument at the service of strategy, and not an autonomous constraint. This integration translates into greater responsiveness to technological developments and international rivalries.
Box 2
Antitrust and defense industries in the United States since 1990
The history of antitrust in the U.S. defense sector reads like a permanent tension between competitive discipline and strategic imperatives. The great wave of consolidation opened by the Lockheed Martin merger in the mid-1990s marked the starting point of a movement in which the federal government, while allowing industrial « champions » to emerge, tried to preserve minimal pockets of rivalry. The transactions of this period gave rise to sophisticated legal engineering, dominated by consent decrees imposing the sale of assets and guarantees of access to sensitive markets. Some cases became emblematic, including the blocking of the attempted merger between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, a symbol of a red line when the disappearance of competition threatened critical capabilities. Other decisions, such as the approval of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, illustrate a more permissive approach when the authorities consider that competitive pressure remains, even if indirect. From the 2000s onwards, regulation became more flexible, with an increased use of behavioural remedies, before a stricter turn recently reappeared, as evidenced by the blockage of the project between Lockheed Martin and Aerojet Rocketdyne. Overall, this trajectory reveals a pragmatically applied competition law, closely coordinated with the United States Department of Defense (which became the Department of War in September 2025), in an industry characterized by a limited number of players, extreme barriers to entry, and the dominant position of a single buyer.
The most structuring case is undoubtedly the attempted merger between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman in the late 1990s. The deal would have combined two major players in key segments such as fighter jets, surveillance systems and radar. Lockheed produced the F-16 Fighting Falcon and developed the future F-22 Raptor, while Northrop Grumman brought platforms such as the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber as well as key capabilities in on-board electronics and AESA radars. The Justice Department considered that the merger would have drastically reduced the number of competitors capable of responding to the Pentagon’s calls for tenders, particularly for next-generation fighter jets and airborne command systems. The central fear was that of an irreversible loss of competition « at the top of the technological spectrum », where only two or three global players remained. The abandonment of the operation, after a formal complaint, remains a textbook case of structural intervention.
More recently, Lockheed Martin‘s proposed acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne illustrated another type of concern: vertical integration in critical chains. Aerojetis a key supplier of rocket engines and propulsion systems used in many U.S. missiles, including interceptors and tactical systems deployed on platforms like the F-35 Lightning II. The competition authority considered that the transaction would have allowed Lockheed to restrict its competitors’ access to these essential components, thus distorting competition on major programs. Conversely, the subsequent acquisition of Aerojet by L3Harris Technologies was cleared because it did not present the same risk of vertical foreclosure. Finally, the merger of Raytheon and United Technologies, which gave rise to a group covering both missiles (Patriot, Tomahawk) and aircraft engines (Pratt & Whitney, notably equipping the F-35), was validated in a context where the authorities considered that horizontal overlaps were limited. These three cases show the diversity of analytical tools used: horizontal merger control, monitoring of vertical effects, and a detailed assessment of the role of critical technologies in the overall competitive balance. See also table in Appendix 1 on the main antitrust cases in the United States since 1990.
C. Time as a variable of institutional and industrial competitiveness
Beyond institutional differences, the question of time appears to be a determining factor in industrial competitiveness. In an environment marked by accelerating technology cycles, the ability to make quick decisions becomes a major strategic advantage.
As David Gerber points out, « legal structures that do not adapt to the rhythm of the markets risk losing their economic relevance« .[40] This observation highlights the risk of a growing gap between the time of law and the time of innovation.
In the European case, this lag can lead to situations in which decisions are taken too late to really influence industrial dynamics. Conversely, the flexibility of the American model allows for better synchronization between legal decisions and market developments.
Cristina Caffarra reinforces this reading by stating that » in dynamic markets, the slowness of procedures can be more detrimental than the absence of regulation « .[41] This deliberately provocative statement highlights the importance of the temporal factor in the evaluation of competition policies.
From then on, time appears to be a hidden but essential variable of industrial and even institutional power. It is no longer just a question of knowing which rules to apply, but at what time and at what pace or with what speed. This temporal dimension must lead to a rethinking of competition law no longer as a static system, but as a dynamic instrument, capable of adapting to the requirements of the strategy.
IV. Towards a differentiated competition law? Challenges and prospects
Criticism of the rigidity of European competition law in strategic sectors has led to a growing questioning of the Union’s ability to reconcile economic efficiency and industrial autonomy. This question goes beyond the legal sphere to touch on the heart of European strategy: how can a law designed to structure the internal market integrate the imperatives of sovereignty and respond to the challenges of global competition? Recent developments in economic doctrine and European instruments show that this articulation is beginning to take shape, but is still partial and often defensive.
A. Doctrinal criticisms and recent inflections
The international literature on competition law underlines that the current application of European rules in strategic sectors often appears posthistoric, inherited from a logic centred on preserving the fluidity of the decentralised or decentralised internal market, sometimes to the detriment of the imperatives of power and industrial sovereignty. As the British Diane Coyle, a professor at the University of Cambridge, points out, reflecting the prevailing logic in the United States and the United Kingdom, the traditional distinction between competition policy and industrial policy is tending to blur in a context of structural transformation, the former can now be mobilised as an instrument in the service of the latter. in particular to support the development of strategic productive capacities.[42] Frédéric Marty insists on the fact that » the strict application of competition law, without articulation with strategic objectives, risks slowing down consolidation and innovation in sovereign industries « .[43]
This doctrinal criticism is echoed by several English-speaking authors specializing in competition law and industrial policy. The American Republicans William Kovacic and Fiona Scott Morton put forward the idea that « antitrust regimes must be sensitive to the needs of critical sectors, by integrating strategic and technological implications into the analysis of mergers« , an [44]idea supported in Europe, notably by Mario Draghi in his report on competitiveness or by the former European Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton who was rejected by the President von der Leyen and not defended at the time by the President of the French Republic, who had nevertheless renewed it in July 2024.[45]Similarly, Democrat Eleanor Fox observes: « antitrust blind to geopolitical stakes can weaken a country’s competitive position on the international level« .[46] Finally, David Gerber points out that « procedural rigidity, combined with an excessive interpretation of market principles, limits the ability of national industries to achieve critical size and technological autonomy« .[47]
At the European institutional level, these criticisms are gradually being translated into practical changes, but probably too slowly, particularly in the European institutional doctrine of competition. The European Defence Fund, set up to support strategic industrial programmes, as well as the foreign investment screening mechanism, are examples of attempts to hybridise competition protection with sovereignty objectives.[48] These instruments aim to reconcile formal compliance with competition rules with the need to protect and strengthen essential industrial and technological capacities. Nevertheless, their implementation remains heterogeneous, varying according to the Member States and the sectors concerned, which illustrates the difficulty of making a real transition from a market logic to an integrated strategic logic.
Thus, doctrinal criticism and institutional inflections tend to converge to show that the simple mechanical application of competition law is no longer sufficient in an international environment marked by growing technological and geopolitical rivalries. But the evolution is clearly much slower in Europe than in the United States. The challenge now lies in the European Union to define, in an urgency that is growing daily and as requested in particular by Mario Draghi in his already cited report of July 2024, a legal framework capable of combining competitive rigour and strategic adaptation, while maintaining transparency and coherence with regard to the single market.
B. Articulating competition and power: instruments and strategies
One of the most pressing challenges for contemporary states is to define a legal framework that reconciles the preservation of competition — a pillar of economic efficiency — with the need to support essential strategic sectors, such as defence or critical technologies. This articulation between competition and power is no longer just a question of legal doctrine: it has become a political and institutional imperative in a context of systemic rivalries and accelerated technological transformations.
In the international literature, there is a growing movement towards what some authors refer to as a » pro-competitive industrial policy « : a conception according to which the traditional instruments of competition law can and should be adjusted or supplemented by strategic objectives without sacrificing the fundamental principles of the competition order. This perspective, validated even by the OECD, so long a vector of neoliberal conceptions,[49] has been put forward in recent works that study how competition policy can be « realigned » to better integrate the objectives of industrial policy, competitiveness and strategic resilience.[50] This doctrinal convergence is thus now widely recognized in economic doctrine to justify action in Europe.
In this debate, the adaptation of the normative framework does not mean the abandonment of the rules, but rather the introduction of explicit mechanisms that make it possible to articulate merger control decisions and the evaluation of agreements with the objectives of industrial development and technological sovereignty. As an OECD report points out, effective industrial policy must be » competitive » while recognising the role that competition authorities can play (which they too rarely play) in designing and implementing coherent industrial strategies.[51] This approach tends to favour instruments based more on dynamic economic analysis — including the impact on innovation and long-term productive capacity — rather than on a strict logic of prices or immediate market shares.
The international debate on this articulation is also part of the broader framework of the transformation of economic policies. Recent publications underline that the merger between industrial and competition policy must be thought of as an adaptive process, where competition authorities and policymakers coordinate their actions to respond to contemporary structural challenges, such as supply chain disruptions, digitalisation and global competitive pressure.[52] In this context, the role of competition authorities goes beyond simple enforcement (on which rules): it is also a proactive analysis of the effects of industrial structure and public interventions, in order to ensure that policy measures do not undermine market integrity while supporting policy transitions.
In highly sensitive sectors, such as defence or critical infrastructure, this articulation is manifested in exceptional legal mechanisms that allow the strict application of competition rules to be temporarily tempered for reasons of public interest without compromising the cohesion of the internal market. The challenge then is to define transparent and time-bound criteria, which make it possible to reconcile the imperative of competitiveness and the search for strategic autonomy, in particular by integrating the impact on innovation, security and economic resilience.
Thus, the international perspective is clear: articulating competition and power does not mean substituting one for the other, but rather reconciling two complementary logics by adapting legal instruments and regulatory practices to meet the requirements of the twenty-first century — characterized by growing technological and geopolitical rivalries and by a profound transformation of industrial structures.
C. Limitations, risks and conditions of effectiveness
The implementation of differentiated law is not without risks and constraints. The main danger lies in political capture, as the selection of privileged players could favour certain companies or Member States, to the detriment of competition and innovation. This tension is reinforced by the heterogeneity of national practices, which risks fragmenting the internal market and generating asymmetries between States, compromising the coherence of European industrial policy (to which no political debate is devoted during elections to the European Parliament, for example). On the economic front, the priority given to critical mass could reduce competitive pressure and slow down innovation, producing a paradox where strategic security weakens competitiveness.
To limit these effects, it seems necessary to define precise and objective criteria for the granting of sectoral exemptions, integrating sovereignty, innovation capacity and competitiveness. European harmonisation and possible inter-State coordination for the application of these instruments is also essential to ensure that national differences do not neutralise the effects of the measures. The combination of these exemptions with European financial instruments, such as the European Defence Fund or targeted grants for strategic projects, increases their effectiveness. Finally, the introduction of strict monitoring and time limits ensures that derogations remain proportionate and limited to the necessary duration, thus maintaining a balance between strategic flexibility and competitive rigour. In this context, the construction of a contextualised and sectorally differentiated competition law is an essential lever for strengthening Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
D. Perspectives: towards a geopolitical competition law
Competition policy can therefore no longer be conceived as a neutral instrument, but tends to become a lever for broader economic objectives, particularly in terms of innovation, sovereignty and industrial policy. It also underlines that the slowness and rigidity of European procedures can undermine the EU’s ability to react to the rapid technological cycles and industrial strategies of global players, giving the time factor a central strategic importance.[55]
Thus, the adoption of a differentiated and contextualized law appears to be the most realistic way to reconcile the market and power. This approach makes it possible to go beyond the sterile alternative between uniform application and subordination to the logic of power, by transforming regulation into a tool at the service of a coherent industrial and geopolitical strategy. The key lies in the definition of transparent, time-limited criteria that can be adapted according to the strategic sensitivity of the sectors, guaranteeing both competitiveness and European autonomy in an international environment marked by technological and geopolitical competition.
Conclusion
A comparative analysis of European and American defence competition frameworks reveals a profound divergence. But it would be reductive to reduce it to a strict opposition between normative rigidity and strategic pragmatism. On both sides of the Atlantic, competition law continues to play a central role as an instrument of economic regulation—particularly in sectors open to competition, such as consumer goods and the digital economy, where it continues to serve the objectives of efficiency, innovation and consumer protection.[56]
It is precisely in the sectors related to sovereignty, and in particular in the defence industries and critical technologies, that the differences in interpretation and application become decisive. In the United States, the legacy of the Sherman Antitrust Act has never prevented the adoption of a contextualized reading of antitrust, in which the imperatives of national security and technological superiority can justify forms of industrial concentration.[57] In Europe, the European Commission’s framework remains largely structured around the preservation of the internal market, even if recent changes — the European Defence Fund, the screening of foreign investments and institutional discourse on critical industrial capacities — reflect a gradual, albeit very slow, awareness.[58]
The challenge is therefore not to substitute a logic of power for the logic of the market, but to articulate them in a coherent way. An indiscriminate application of competition law in strategic sectors can produce paradoxical effects: by seeking to avoid intra-European distortions, it risks continuing to limit the Union’s collective ability to compete with global players supported by strategic states. Conversely, an assumed differentiation — maintaining a high level of rigour in open sectors while introducing margins of appreciation in sovereignty industries — would make it possible to go beyond the sterile alternative between market and power.
Such a development would not imply the abandonment of competition law, but its inclusion in an explicit hierarchy of political and geopolitical objectives. In an international context marked by the return of systemic rivalries and the speed of technological cycles, the question is no longer to choose between regulation and power, but to design a regulation at the service of European industrial and strategic power. The emergence of a genuine geopolitical competition law is thus a major intellectual and institutional project to ensure the strategic autonomy and competitiveness of the European Union in the decades to come. Failing to act urgently to ensure this emergence, European defence industry will be condemned by the outdated application of a « post-historical » competition law in a world that has once again become « pre-hegemonic »
Appendix 1
Summary of the main antitrust and defence cases in the United States since 1990
| Case | Period | Details | Solution / Outcome | Comment |
| Lockheed / Martin Marietta | 1994–1995 | Merger creating a giant of military aeronautics | Authorized with conditions (asset transfers) | Beginning of the great post-Cold War consolidation |
| Lockheed Martin / Loral | 1995–1996 | Risks on satellites, aviation, UAVs | Consent decree + restructuring | Typical case of structural remedies |
| Raytheon / Texas Instruments(defense) | 1997 | Concentration in Military Electronics | Consent decree (divestitures) | Classic example of an antitrust remedy |
| Raytheon / Hughes Aircraft (GM) | 1997 | High concentration in radars and missiles | Consent decree | Close coordination with the Pentagon |
| Lockheed Martin / Northrop Grumman | 1997–1998 | Major merger ($11.6 billion) threatening several key markets | Blocked (abandonment after DOJ complaint) | Emblematic case: critical loss of competition |
| Boeing / McDonnell Douglas | 1996–1997 | Fusion in Civil Aviation + Defence | Allowed (without FTC blocking) | Criticized but deemed not problematic |
| General Dynamics / Newport News (shipyards) | ~1999 | Concentration in shipbuilding | Review + conditions | Strong role of the DoD in analysis |
| Northrop Grumman / TRW | 2002 | Military Satellites and Space Systems | Allowed with behavioral remedies | Focus on non-discriminatory access |
| Lockheed Martin / Titan | 2003–2004 | Space launch and satellites | Abandoned (regulatory + antitrust issues) | Mix security + competition |
| United Technologies / Goodrich | 2011–2012 | Aeronautical equipment (military and civilian) | Authorized with assignments | Hybrid civil/defence case |
| Northrop Grumman / Orbital ATK | 2017–2018 | Missiles and space launchers | Allowed with behavioral remedies | Vertical integration problem (access to competitors) |
| Raytheon / United Technologies | 2019–2020 | Raytheon Technologies Founded | Allowed (few remedies) | Shows increased tolerance to concentration |
| Lockheed Martin / Aerojet Rocketdyne | 2021–2022 | Missile engines (critical vertical integration) | Blocked (FTC complaint, abandonment) | Return of a more aggressive antitrust |
| L3Harris / Aerojet Rocketdyne | 2022–2023 | Same target (missile propulsion) | Licensed (2023) with supervision | Acceptable alternative solution |
Appendix 2
Summary of the tensions between defence industrial policy and competition law in the EU since 2000
| Case / Case | Investigation period / Decision | Details | Solution / Critical Comments | Sources / Notes |
| ThyssenKrupp / EADS / Atlas Elektronik(COMP/M.4160) – Naval Systems | Commission Decision 10 May 2006 | Joint acquisition of Atlas Elektronik (naval electronic systems: submarines, frigates, light ships, mine anti-mine systems) by ThyssenKrupp and EADS. Analysis of intra-EU market shares and definition of relevant markets. | The Commission declared the transaction compatible with the common market. Emphasis on the tension between industrial consolidation and the preservation of technical competition in fragmented markets. | European Commission, Decision COMP/M.4160, 10 May 2006¹; EURLex, Prior notification COMP/M.4160, 6 April 2006² |
| ASL / Arianespace(M.7724 – Airbus Safran Launchers / Arianespace) | Investigation started 26 Feb. 2016 – commitments accepted in 2016 | Coordination of Ariane launcher activities. Risk of exchange of sensitive information that could harm competition in the field of satellite launches. | Acceptance under « firewall » commitments to preserve competition and allow European industrial consolidation. Example of hybridization between industrial objectives and competitive protection. | European Commission, Press release Mergers: ASL / Arianespace approves Commission, 26 Nov. 2014³; Reuters, EU launches in-depth investigation, 26 Feb. 2016⁴ |
| Grenade Cartel – RUAG International | Procedure 20202022 – decision 2023 | Illegal market sharing in the defence grenade sector. First defence cartel sued by the Commission. | Settlement via leniency system. The Commission strictly applies antitrust rules, even for defence, without explicit sectoral derogations. | European Commission, Press release fines defence company €1.2M, 21 Sep 2023⁵ |
| KNDS / LDS – Merge Made Easy | Decision 2023 | Fusion in the land sector (tanks and armoured vehicles). Analysis of the impacts on intra-EU competition. | Conditional approval to preserve certain national markets and limit anti-competitive effects. Illustrative of the balance between consolidation and competition in land defence. | European Commission, Merger decision KNDS/LDS, 2023⁶ |
| Space defence – Ariane / ASL / launcher development | Consultation and follow-up 2025 | Integration of industrial and sovereignty objectives (resilience, supply chain) in the application of merger law. | Informal guidance on industrial cooperation, without clear safe-harbours. Tension between the protection of space innovation and competitive requirements. | Latham & Watkins, European Competition Law and the Defence Industry, 10 Feb 2026⁷ |
| Revision of the Merger Guidelines (Strategic Industries) | Revision in progress 2025/2026 | Discussion on the consideration of security and defence imperatives in the analysis of concentrations, particularly for critical sectors (naval, aeronautics, missiles, space). | Evolution towards contextualized assessment and weighting of industrial and strategic criteria. No formal derogation but gradual adaptation. | European Commission, Defence Readiness Roadmap, 2025⁸ |
Sources: 1. European Commission, Decision COMP/M.4160 – ThyssenKrupp / EADS / Atlas Elektronik, 10 May 2006. EUR-Lex link 2. EURLex, Prior notification published – COMP/M.4160 – ThyssenKrupp / EADS / Atlas, Official Journal of the EU, 6 April 2006. 3. European Commission, Press release: Mergers: Commission approves ASL / Arianespace, 26 Nov. 2014. 4. Reuters, EU launches in-depth investigation into Arianespace / ASL merger, 26 February 2016. 5. European Commission, Press release: fines defence company €1.2M – Grenade Cartel (RUAG), 21 Sept. 2023. 6. European Commission, Merger decision KNDS/LDS, 2023. 7. Latham & Watkins, European Competition Law and the Defence Industry, 10 Feb 2026. 8. European Commission, Defence Readiness Roadmap, 2025.
[1] F. Souty, Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Union européenne, Paris, LGDJ, 4th ed., 2013, 16 p., esp. pp. 22–45 and pp. 40-4. See in addition, by the same author, « Politique de concurrence et antitrust en Europe et aux États-Unis: perspectives transatlantiques et enjeux géopolitiques », Le Diplomate Média, 30 Dec. 2025, article available online on Le Diplomate Média (comparative analysis of European and American competition frameworks); id., « America First Antitrust: the conservative renewal of American antitrust by the Trump II Administration, continuities, ruptures and doctrinal recompositions », Le Diplomate Média, 12 Jan. 2026, online article (exploration of the American America First Antitrust doctrine); id., « The geopolitical limits of the European anti-foreign subsidy regulation », Le Diplomate Média, 21 Jan. 2026, online article (analysis of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and impact on strategic competition policy); id., « Competition law and policy in Europe in 2025: a review of the first year of the von der Leyen II Commission », Le Diplomate Média, 24 March 2026, online article (critical assessment of the evolution of European competition policy); id., « Draghi Report and European Competitiveness: How the Draghi Report Calls for a Modernisation of EU Competition Law« , Le Diplomate Média, 9 Dec. 2024 , online article (commentary on Mario Draghi’s report The future of European competitiveness, published on 9 September 2024, proposing an overhaul of competition law to meet the challenges of competitiveness and autonomy strategic strategy in the European Union
[2] Louis Blumann, Droit matériel de l’Union européenne, Paris, LGDJ, 8th ed., 2019, 720 p., esp. p. 500–540.
[3] Marie Malaurie-Vignal, Droit de la concurrence interne et européen, Paris, Sirey, 8th ed., 2022, 900 p., spec. p. 85–120
[4] See François Souty, Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Allemagne Fédérale, Paris, PUF, 1996, 128 p., coll. « Que Sais-je »? No. 3072.
[5] See, in particular, F. Souty, op.cit.; Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1952 (re-ed. 2004), 414 p.; Franz Böhm, « Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf », in ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 1, Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 1948, pp. 75-151; Viktor Vanberg, « The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism », Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, No. 04/11, Freiburg, 2004, 22 p.; David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 448 p.
[6] Laurence Idot, « Competition Policy and Economic Sovereignty », Revue Europe, 2020, No. 3, Study 5, pp. 4–12, Esp. pp. 6–9 (9 p.)
[7] The current Article 346 TFEU has its origins in Article 223 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957). Its inclusion can be explained by the desire of the founding States to preserve their sovereignty in areas related to defence and essential security interests, by excluding these sensitive sectors from the ordinary scope of the common market. This clause was particularly supported by France, which, in the context of the Cold War and the reconstruction of its defence industry, intended to guarantee the possibility of protecting its strategic production and derogating from the rules of competition and free movement. Other states, such as Italy, have also supported this approach, but the French impetus has been decisive in the formulation of this exception, conceived as a « safeguard clause » for the benefit of essential national security interests. The tendency towards a restrictive interpretation of Article 346 TFEU is mainly supported by States traditionally in favour of market opening and strict application of the competition rules. These include Germany, the United Kingdom (before Brexit), as well as several northern European states such as Sweden and the Netherlands.
These states have generally supported the European Commission’s action to strictly regulate the use of this derogation, considering that Article 346 should not be used to circumvent the rules of the internal market, particularly in the defence procurement sector. Their position is part of a more liberal and integrationist conception of the Union, favouring transparency, competition and economic efficiency, including in traditionally sensitive sectors. Conversely, states such as France have long defended a broader interpretation of this provision, in the name of preserving their strategic autonomy and protecting their defence industrial and technological base. See Box 1 below.
[8] Marie Malaurie-Vignal, op. cit. cit., spec. pp. 110–115
[9] F. Souty, « Competition and Antitrust Policy in Europe and the United States: Transatlantic Perspectives and Geopolitical Issues, » Le Diplomate, Dec. 30, 2025, online, esp. § 12–18
[10] Frédéric Marty, « Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A Necessary Articulation », Revue d’économie industrielle, n° 163, 2018, p. 9–34, spec. p. 15–22 (26 p.)
[11] David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 1st ed., 510 p., esp. pp. 45–78).
[12] Ibid.
[13] Eleanor Fox, « Antitrust, Competitiveness, and Industrial Policy, » in R. Blair, D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), vol. 1, pp. 273–294, esp. pp. 276–280 (22 p.).
[14] François Souty, « America First Antitrust: The Conservative Renewal of American Antitrust by the Trump II Administration, Continuities, Ruptures and Doctrinal Recompositions, » Le Diplomate Média, 12.01.2026.
[15] V. Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York, Basic Books, 1978, 462 p.; Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, St. Paul (MN), West Academic Publishing, 5th ed., 2015, 1036 p.
[16] Frédéric Marty, « Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A Necessary Articulation », Revue d’économie industrielle, n° 163, 2018, p. 9–34, esp. p. 15–22 (26 p.).
[17] Laurence Idot, « Competition Policy and Economic Sovereignty », Revue Europe, 2020, No. 3, Study 5, pp. 4–12, esp. pp. 6–9 (9 p.).
[18] Louis Blumann, Droit matériel de l’Union européenne, Paris, LGDJ, 8th ed., 2019, 720 p., esp. p. 512–540.
[19] Marie Malaurie-Vignal, Droit de la concurrence interne et européen, Paris, Sirey, 8th ed., 2022, 900 p., spec. p. 85–120.
[20] F. Souty, Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Union européenne, Paris, LGDJ, 4th ed., 2013, 650 p., esp. pp. 23–45 and pp. 401–430.
[21] Eleanor Fox, op.cit., esp. pp. 289–292.
[22] David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 510 p., esp. pp. 12–15.
[23] Frédéric Marty, « Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A Necessary Articulation », Revue d’économie industrielle, n° 163, 2018, p. 9–34, esp. p. 18–22 (26 p.).
[24] William Kovacic, « The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 71, no. 2, 2003, pp. 377–478, esp. pp. 410–420.
[25] Eleanor Fox, « Antitrust, Competitiveness, and Industrial Policy, » in R. Blair, D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), vol. 1, pp. 273–294, esp. pp. 276–280 (22 p.).
[26] F. Souty, « Politique de concurrence et antitrust en Europe et aux États-Unis: perspectives transatlantiques et enjeux géopolitiques », Le Diplomate, 30 Dec. 2025, online, spec. § 20–28. See also F. Souty, La Politique de la concurrence des Etats-Unis, Paris, PUF, 1995, 128 p., coll. Que-sais-je? n°2945.
[27] Laurence Idot, « Competition Policy and Economic Sovereignty », Revue Europe, 2020, No. 3, Study 5, pp. 4–12, Esp. pp. 7–10 (9 p.).
[28] Louis Blumann, Droit matériel de l’Union européenne, Paris, LGDJ, 8th ed., 2019, 720 p., spec. p. 520–530
[29] Marie Malaurie-Vignal, Droit de la concurrence interne et européen, Paris, Sirey, 8th ed., 2022, 900 p., spec. p. 115–130
[30] David J. Gerber, op. cit., esp. pp. 65–70.
[31] F. Souty, op.cit., spec. § 30–35.
[32] Box sources: F. Marty, European competition and strategic industries, Paris, LGDJ, 2022, p. 7075; European Commission, Defence Readiness Omnibus, COM(2025) 45 final, 2025; Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §18a, United States, 1976; C. Caffarra, Competition Policy International blog, 20182023 posts on defense consolidation and space launchers; Latham & Watkins, European Competition Law and the Defence Industry, 10 February 2026.
[33] William Kovacic, « The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 71, no. 2, 2003, pp. 377–478, esp. pp. 390–395 (102 p.).
[34] Laurence Idot, « Competition Policy and Economic Sovereignty », Revue Europe, 2020, No. 3, Study 5, pp. 4–12, Esp. pp. 8–10.
[35] See this case placed in the context of the investigation procedures of several years in F. Souty, « State aid, energy sovereignty and nuclear renaissance: The European Union to the test of the EDF case and state responses », Le Diplomate Média, 7 April 2026.
[36] Frédéric Marty, « Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A Necessary Articulation », Revue d’économie industrielle, n° 163, 2018, p. 9–34, esp. p. 20–24 (26 p.).
[37] See the publications of the very inspired and dynamic blog of the Anglo-Italian Cristina Caffarra, « The New Geoeconomics of Hard Power Requires New Tools. Will Europe Update? « , The Post-Bubble blog, 14 Oct. 2025; « Antitrust (and Regulation) are ‘Small Ball’: What Matters is Build Infrastructure, » The Post-Bubble blog, Sept. 24, 2025; « Is Europe Too Late to Compete in the Chips War? « , The Post-Bubble blog, 21 Oct. 2025; « Tech Sovereignty Needs Demand – To Get Supply Right, » The Post-Bubble blog, Feb 6, 2026
[38] David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 510 p., esp. pp. 95–110.
[39] Eleanor Fox, « Antitrust, Competitiveness, and Industrial Policy, » op.cit., pp. 280–285.
[40] David J. Gerber, op. cit., esp. pp. 120–130
[41] Cristina Caffarra, « Power, Not Price: On the Antitrust Agenda for the ‘Next World Order’« , Competition Policy International, 14 Feb. 2024;— « Re-Joining Trade with Antitrust » (with B. Kilic), VoxEU, 7 March 2024;— « Joining Competition Policy with Trade and Industrial Policy: Let’s Get Specific« , The Post-Bubble blog, 5 Nov. 2024;— » Trump 2.0 Will Challenge the European « Competition Safe Spaces », ProMarket, Dec 17, 2024
[42] Diane Coyle, « The Relationship Between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy in an Era of Structural Change, » Intereconomics, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2025, pp. 205–209.
[43] Frédéric Marty, Procedural Guarantees, Approach by the Effects and Purposes of Competition Policy, International Journal of Economic Law, vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 2022, pp. 63–107, esp. pp. 70–75.
[44] William Kovacic & Fiona Scott Morton, Competition Policy in Strategic Sectors: Lessons for the 21st Century, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, vol. 10, 2022, pp. 1–29, esp. pp. 12–16.
[45] This affair has unfortunately highlighted the weakness of current French convictions to continue to defend visions of industrial strategies in the European context. It has been interpreted as such in Brussels.
[46] Eleanor Fox, Antitrust and Geopolitics: Reconciling Market Rules with National Strategy, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 44, 2021, pp. 123–158, esp. pp. 135–140.
[47] David Gerber, Global Competition Law and Policy: Challenges in Strategic Industries, Oxford University Press, 2020, 382 p., esp. pp. 210–220.
[48] European Commission, European Defence Fund and Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism, Communication from the Commission, 2022, COM(2022) 550 final, pp. 8–15
[49] François Souty, « International Governance of Competition, Geopolitics and Normative Convergence », Le Diplomate Média, 18 03 2026.
[50] Tomaso Duso & Martin Peitz, « Aligning Competition Policy and Industrial Policy in the EU », Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, vol. 26, Article 6, 2026 (setting out options for a competition policy fit for industry objectives).
[51] OECD, Pro-competitive industrial policy, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 309, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2024, sections 2–3.
[52] Diane Coyle, op. cit. (argument in favour of institutional coordination for a broader economic strategy).
[53] Frédéric Marty, « Procedural guarantees, approach by the effects and purposes of competition policy », International Journal of Economic Law, vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 2022, pp. 63–107, esp. pp. 72–75.
[54] European Commission, Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy, COM(2021) 350 final. Mario Draghi, op. cit.
[55] Cristina Caffarra, « Europe’s Tech Regulation Is Not an Economic Policy », Project Syndicate, 11 October 2023, online; « Antitrust and the political economy », CEPR VoxEU, 5–6 January 2024, online.
[56] William Kovacic & Fiona Scott Morton, Competition Policy in Strategic Sectors: Lessons for the 21st Century, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, vol. 10, 2022, pp. 1–29, esp. pp. 12–16.
[57] David Gerber, Global Competition Law and Policy: Challenges in Strategic Industries, Oxford University Press, 2020, 382 p., esp. pp. 210–220
[58] European Commission, European Defence Fund and Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism, Communication from the Commission, COM(2022) 550 final, Brussels, 2022, pp. 8–15.
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