ECONOMY – China’s Competition Law: From the 2007 Anti-Monopoly Law to the Strategic Regulation of an Integrated Market Economy (2008–2025)
By François Souty
François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former Head of International Affairs at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD Committee of Experts on Competition Policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches EU institutions and geopolitics at the Excelia Business School group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan) and EU competition law and policy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Nantes.
He is in charge of the Economics section at Diplomate Média.
» If you know your adversary and know yourself, you will not fear the outcome of a hundred battles. » Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Fifth Century B.C. ¹ [1]
Executive Summary
Chinese competition law, resulting from the 2007 anti-monopoly law, has gradually established itself as a central instrument for regulating the market economy in China, the implementation of which reveals a profound institutional and functional evolution. Far from a simple process of importing Western standards, its development reflects the construction of a hybrid model of economic governance, articulating international legal rationality and structural public policy objectives.
The analysis of the period 2008–2025 highlights three major dynamics. The first is that of a gradual institutionalization of the system, marked by the initial fragmentation of the supervisory authorities, then by their centralization within the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in 2018, strengthening the coherence and implementation capacity of the system. The second dynamic relates to the diversification of enforcement practices, which now systematically cover cartels, abuses of dominant position and merger control, with a significant intensification of interventions in the strategic and digital industrial sectors. The third dynamic concerns the reconfiguration of the purposes of competition law, which is increasingly articulated with industrial policy objectives, the unification of the internal market and the regulation of platform capitalism.
The study also highlights a differentiated typology of implementation, characterized by a sectoral and strategic application of the law, as well as a complex treatment of foreign operators, whose situation reveals a persistent tension between international normative convergence and the logic of economic sovereignty. The recent development of « common prosperity » policies and the reform of the 2022 anti-monopoly law further accentuate this structural dimension, by integrating more explicitly the objectives of regulating large platforms and rebalancing economic relations.
Finally, the comparative analysis shows that the Chinese model cannot be reduced to a simple imperfect transposition of European or American standards, nor to an unequivocal deviation, but must be understood as an institutionally hybrid system of competition, close in some aspects to Asian models of development, while distinguishing itself from them by the extent of administrative centralization and the depth of integration between competition law and economic strategy.
From this perspective, Chinese competition law appears less as an autonomous body of norms than as an evolving instrument of economic governance, whose main function lies in the continuous adjustment of market structures to the macroeconomic and strategic objectives of the State.
Introduction
This maxim of Sun Tzu’s, frequently used well beyond its original field, offers a particularly enlightening key to interpreting the contemporary dynamics of economic regulation in China. It refers to a Confucian strategic rationality based on knowledge of power relations and the permanent adaptation of governance instruments, rather than to a strictly normative and abstract conception of law that can be found in American and European legal experiences. However, there are many bridges and potential communities of analysis between the different legal spaces.
Applied to the field of competition law, this perspective makes it possible to approach the Chinese anti-monopoly law not as a simple transplanted legal device, but as a well-digested instrument inscribed in a broader architecture of economic regulation and industrial management. Adopted in 2007 and entered into force in 2008, this law marks a major step in the construction of a modern competition law in China, the initial reading of which already highlighted the structural tensions between competitive logic and economic policy imperatives.[2]
Nearly twenty years after its adoption, the issue is no longer only that of the normative coherence of the text, but that of its effective implementation. The evolution of the supervisory authorities, now grouped within the State Administration for Market Regulation, the intensification of repressive practices in certain strategic sectors, as well as the increasing sophistication of the instruments of enforcement, invite us to shift the analysis from the normative to the empirical level.
From this perspective, the implementation of competition law in China reveals a persistent tension between the affirmation of an increasingly elaborate formal legal framework and its inclusion in assumed economic and industrial policy objectives. Far from being reduced to the identification of a hypothetical « Chinese model », this dynamic calls for a detailed analysis of decision-making practices, sectoral priorities and institutional logics that structure the effective application of competition rules.
The interest of such an approach is twofold. On the one hand, it allows a better understanding of the concrete methods of regulating economic behaviour in a rapidly changing legal system. On the other hand, it allows for a comparative perspective with European standards, particularly in terms of the control of anticompetitive practices and mergers, in order to assess the degrees of convergence and divergence of the implementation systems.
I. THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW (AML) OF 2007: NORMATIVE ARCHITECTURE AND TRANSNATIONAL GENEALOGY OF A HYBRID COMPETITION LAW
The analysis of the Chinese anti-monopoly law adopted in 2007 requires us to place its elaboration in a double movement of internal legal modernization and the international circulation of economic regulation models. Far from constituting a legal system developed ex nihilo, this text appears to be the product of a progressive construction, both inspired by foreign experiences and structured by the institutional constraints specific to the Chinese economy. This original ambivalence largely explains the characteristics of its subsequent implementation.
A. An economic modernization law under political and institutional constraint
The adoption of the Chinese anti-monopoly law is a direct consequence of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which was a structuring turning point in the recomposition of Chinese economic law and in the gradual formalization of a market legal order.[3] This context of international openness played a decisive role in the genesis of the law, by requiring the Chinese authorities to build a legal framework capable of meeting the requirements of predictability, transparency and regulation of economic behavior expected in a globalized trading system.
The anti-monopoly law thus responds to a twofold founding logic. On the one hand, it participates in the integration of China into the world economy through the adoption of a formal legal instrument of competition regulation, inspired by international standards developed in particular in the United States and the European Union or in the OECD and UNCTAD. On the other hand, it pursues an equally structuring internal objective, well mastered by the texts and practices within the European Union: the gradual unification of a historically fragmented internal market, marked by the persistence of local administrative barriers, differentiated provincial industrial policies and territorialized economic protection strategies.
However, this dynamic of legal harmonization is immediately framed by an essential structural constraint related to the maintenance of the leading role of the State in the planning and orientation of the economy. Doctrine very early on stressed that the anti-monopoly law could not be understood as a simple transposition of Western models of competition, but should be understood as an instrument of finalized economic regulation, organically integrating considerations of industrial policy, macroeconomic stability and economic sovereignty.[4] This characteristic places Chinese competition law in a logic of hybrid economic governance, in which the market is framed and oriented rather than simply liberalized.
Beyond the regulation of the behaviour of private companies, the law pursues a structural objective of integrating the Chinese domestic market, which is one of its most significant but sometimes underestimated objectives. In an institutional context marked by the strong autonomy of local governments and by fiscal and economic incentives to protect local actors, the law explicitly targets so-called « administrative monopoly » practices, i.e. the behaviour of local or sectoral public authorities that fragment the national market through territorial restrictions, regulatory discrimination, location requirements or obligations to use designated operators.[5]
This dimension is essential because it reveals a functional extension of the field of competition, beyond the objectives of economic efficiency and market fluidity: it is therefore not limited to disciplining only the behaviour of companies on the market, but extends to the regulation of the normative behaviour of the public authorities themselves, as producers of rules likely to generate competitive distortions: this phenomenon is extremely little known to Western government and institutional officials. In this sense, the anti-monopoly law is part of a broader project to build a unified national market, aimed at reducing the logic of territorial partitioning and promoting the circulation of goods, services, capital and technologies throughout the Chinese territory: in this respect, this construction is similar to the institutional dynamics of the EU’s competition policy.
Finally, this architecture reflects a tension that is constitutive of the Chinese system: the coexistence between a logic of external economic opening, intended to ensure integration into globalization, and a logic of internal control of market conditions, aimed at preserving the coherence of the national economic system. The anti-monopoly law thus appears to be a doubly functional instrument: a tool for international integration and a mechanism for internal unification, but always under the supervision of a state that remains a central player in economic regulation.
Box 1
The administrative monopoly in Chinese competition law in the mirror of European law[6]
Administrative monopoly in Chinese competition law refers to practices by which administrative authorities or bodies vested with public prerogatives use their regulatory or decision-making power to restrict, exclude or distort competition.[7] Introduced in a structured manner by the AML that came into force on August 1, 2008, this concept aims to provide a framework for a specific feature of the Chinese economic system: the close interweaving of public power and the functioning of markets.
The forms of administrative monopoly are explicitly identified by the law: restrictions on the free interregional movement of goods,[8] imposition of mandatory transactions with designated operators,[9] discrimination against companies outside a local jurisdiction,[10] or the enactment of rules excluding certain market players. These practices often reflect strategies of local protectionism or support for state-owned or semi-public enterprises, in contradiction with the objective of unifying the Chinese domestic market.
Over the period 2008-2015, the application of these provisions remained relatively cautious. The competition authorities – then fragmented among several bodies – acted mainly by means of recommendations or administrative injunctions. However, some cases have brought to light practices of territorial partitioning (particularly in the transport, construction or local public services sectors), leading the State Council to intervene to promote the removal of administrative barriers to competition.
From 2015 onwards and especially after the creation of the SAMR in 2018, the control of administrative monopolies has gradually been strengthened. The revision of the anti-monopoly law in 2022 consolidated this development by introducing more explicit mechanisms for ex-ante control of public policies (fair competition review system) and strengthening the responsibility of administrative authorities in the event of harm to competition. Between 2018 and 2025, several campaigns aimed to eliminate discriminatory local regulations, particularly in public procurement,[11] tenders[12] or access to essential infrastructure. This period thus marked the institutionalisation of control, even if its effectiveness remained dependent on the administrative hierarchy and national political priorities.
A parallel can be drawn with European Union law. Article 106 TFEU regulates public companies and those benefiting from exclusive or special rights, by requiring compliance with the competition rules unless there is a need related to service missions of general economic interest. Similarly, Article 107 TFEU prohibits, under certain conditions, State aid likely to distort competition. However, the European logic differs significantly: it does not directly target the acts of public authorities as such (except through State aid or certain restrictions on free movement), but rather their effects on companies. Conversely, Chinese law directly addresses administrative action itself as a potential source of distortion of competition, which gives the concept of administrative monopoly a more organic and institutional scope.
Ultimately, between 2008 and 2025, the administrative monopoly has moved from a principle that is still largely programmatic to a more operational legal tool, mobilized as part of a broader policy to build a unified national market. Nevertheless, the tension remains between, on the one hand, the desire to promote competition and, on the other hand, the maintenance of a structuring role of the State in the economy, which further limits the contentious scope of the mechanism.
B. A classic hardware architecture crossed by exceptional logics
On the formal level, the Chinese anti-monopoly law takes up the now canonical structure of contemporary competition laws, articulated around three pillars: prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, prohibition of abuse of dominant position and control of concentrations. This tripartite architecture reflects a desire to align with international standards of competition regulation, in particular those stemming from the American and European systems.
However, this structure is immediately relativized by the presence of open concepts, indeterminate standards and economic purpose clauses, which permeate the entire normative system. The reference to « public interest », « economic security », or « economic and social development objectives » introduces a logic of permanent weighing between competitive efficiency and extra-competitive considerations.[13]
This normative indeterminacy is not a mere technical imperfection, but a structural feature of Chinese competition law, allowing for flexible adaptation to current political and industrial priorities. It gives administrative authorities a central role in determining the effective content of the competition standard, which brings the Chinese system closer to a model of administered competition regulation rather than a jurisdictionalized model.
In addition, this flexibility is reflected in an implicit sectorisation of competition law, with certain areas being subject to a mitigated or modulated application of ordinary law because of their strategic nature (energy, telecommunications, finance, critical infrastructure). This sectorisation produces a functional fragmentation of the competition standard, which contrasts with Western systems based on the unity of competition law.
Finally, this open architecture promotes a constant articulation between competition law and industrial policy, in which competition is conceived not as an autonomous norm but as an instrument of macroeconomic optimization. This instrumentalist conception is reinforced by the presence of explicit and implicit exemption mechanisms, which structure the entire system.
C. Initial institutional fragmentation and its structuring effects
In its initial configuration, the implementation of the AML is based on a particularly fragmented tripartite institutional architecture, characteristic of the Chinese administrative system and its logic of non-integrated functional specialization.
Initially, therefore, merger control was entrusted to the MOFCOM, while anti-competitive practices were divided between the NDRC, which was responsible for pricing and price fixing, and the SAIC, which was responsible for non-pricing practices and abuses of dominant position.
This institutional fragmentation reflects a historical logic of sectoral governance of the economy, in which economic competences are distributed among several authorities with different rationalities (planning, industrial regulation, administrative control). However, it quickly generated structural tensions: divergences in the interpretation of the applicable law, inconsistencies in the standards of proof, heterogeneity of decision-making practices and fragmentation of administrative litigation.
Legal writers have pointed out that this architecture leads to a competition law with variable geometry, depending not only on the type of conduct in question but also on the competent authority seized.[14] This situation has also limited legal predictability and strengthened the margins of administrative discretion in the application of the law.
Faced with these difficulties, a gradual movement of rationalization and institutional concentration began in the mid-2010s, culminating in the creation of the SAMR in 2018.[15] This reform reflects a desire to centralize competitive enforcement and unify the administrative standard, without entirely eliminating the underlying sectoral logics.
D. A transnational legal construction: selective influences and recompositions
The Chinese AML is part of a dense process of international circulation of legal models of competition, characteristic of the globalization of economic law. However, this process is not a simple normative transplant, but a logic of strategic selection, hybridization and institutional recomposition.
The influence of European Union law is particularly structuring, particularly in terms of merger control, economic reasoning based on market effects and the institutional structuring of competition authorities. The European model has also played an indirect role through the dissemination of procedural standards (notification, analysis of effects, centralised administrative control within a single large entity such as the European Commission’s DG Competition). The State Council reports from time to time on its attention to competition policy.[16]
The American model exerts a distinct influence, more doctrinal and analytical, through the dissemination of the paradigm of standard consumer welfare and the economic analysis of competition law from the Chicago School.[17] This influence is perceptible in the emphasis placed on economic efficiency and the rationality of markets. Still concerning the Anglo-Saxons, the Australian model, less often analyzed, has nevertheless played a significant role in the dissemination of pragmatic and educational enforcement practices, in particular through the experience of theAustralian Competition and Consumers Commission (ACCC) and Alan Fels, former President of the ACCC, marked by a strong orientation towards regulatory efficiency and negotiation with companies.[18]
The German ordoliberal tradition, mediated by European law, has also contributed to structuring the conception of competition as a legal order framing economic power, in particular through the notion of « competitive order » and the structural limitation of dominant positions.[19]
Finally, the European Commission has played a major institutional role in the dissemination of technical and procedural standards, in particular via the EU-China competition policy dialogues, which have enabled a partial convergence of tools without convergence of objectives.[20]
However, these influences must be interpreted through a specifically Chinese logic of selective normative recomposition, in which foreign models are functionally integrated, but re-inscribed in an institutional architecture dominated by the priorities of industrial policy and economic stability.
E. A structuring doctrinal reading: founding ambiguity and hybrid rationality of the system
As soon as the law was adopted, specialized French doctrine highlighted the fundamentally hybrid nature of the Chinese system, highlighting the structural ambivalence between competitive opening and maintaining state management of the economy.
It has thus been stressed that the anti-monopoly law cannot be analysed as a simple instrument of economic liberalisation, but must be understood as a mechanism for state regulation of the market, combining competitive discipline and industrial policy objectives.[21] This reading has been confirmed and deepened by subsequent analyses of the first enforcement practices, which highlight the evolving, selective and contextual nature of the application of Chinese competition law.
International doctrine has also pointed out that the Chinese system is characterized by a structural coexistence between formal legal normativity and administrative management of the economy, which profoundly distinguishes this model from Western systems based on the primacy of competition law as an autonomous norm.[22]
This hybridization has a major consequence: the implementation of competition law in China cannot be understood solely from the traditional categories (cartels, abuses, concentrations), but presupposes an analysis of the underlying institutional rationalities, including the objectives of industrial policy, social stability and macroeconomic coordination. Thus, the original ambiguity of the anti-monopoly law is not a temporary weakness, but a structural characteristic of the Chinese competition system, which remains stable over the period 2008–2025, despite successive institutional reforms.
II — THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CHINESE COMPETITION LAW: FROM ADMINISTRATIVE FRAGMENTATION TO CENTRALIZED AND STRATEGIC REGULATION (2008–2025)
The evolution of Chinese competition law since the entry into force of the anti-monopoly law in 2008 must be understood as a gradual but structuring process of institutionalization that is at once administrative, normative and practical, the coherence of which only becomes fully apparent on a long scale. This process is part of a broader dynamic of transformation of the Chinese regulatory state, marked by a gradual reconfiguration of the modes of public intervention in the economy, in which competition constitutes both an instrument of market discipline and a lever of economic policy. It is characterized by a persistent tension between, on the one hand, an initial institutional fragmentation inherited from Chinese bureaucratic sectoral logics and, on the other hand, a growing organizational rationalization leading to the affirmation of a centralized, hierarchical and strategically oriented model of economic regulation.
Far from constituting a simple technical evolution of positive law, this trajectory reflects an in-depth recomposition of market governance instruments after ten years of practical experience (2008-2018), in a system where competition law cannot be dissociated from industrial policy, nor from the imperatives of territorial integration, nor from the macroeconomic objectives pursued by the central State.[23] It is thus part of a more general sophisticated movement that can be described as the « economization of administrative economic law« , in which competitive instruments are mobilized as regulatory technologies in the service of a structural management of development. This model is likely to attract the attention of leaders in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia.
A. A fragmented initial architecture from an Asian and OECD comparative perspective
In its initial phase, China’s anti-monopoly law implementation system was based on an institutional architecture split between three main authorities that we described several times twenty years ago: the MOFCOM for merger control, the NDRC for pricing practices, and the SAIC for non-tariff behavior.[24] This functional distribution, based on a substantive logic of infringements, reflected a segmented administrative approach to competition law, consistent with the sectoral structure of the Chinese State apparatus.
Such fragmentation has produced heterogeneity in analytical standards, variability in decision-making practices and low legal predictability, particularly noticeable in cross-border operations and cases involving foreign firms. The OECD has pointed out early on that this type of multi-agency architecture is a factor of structural complexity in emerging economies, particularly in the absence of robust mechanisms for horizontal coordination and normative prioritisation.
The comparative literature confirms that this model is not unique to China. Japan, under the aegis of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, has long articulated industrial policy and competitive enforcement within a highly administered institutional framework,[25] while South Korea, through the Korea Fair Trade Commission, has developed a model in which competition regulation is part of a state-led economic development strategy.[26] However, unlike these gradually unified models, the Chinese case is distinguished by the extent of the initial dispersion and the absence of a clearly identified decision-making center until the end of the 2010s.
From this perspective, the initial Chinese fragmentation must be understood not as an anomaly, but as an accentuated variant of an Asian model of administrative economic regulation, characterized by a relative subordination of competition law to development objectives.
B. A gradual increase in enforcement and the structuring of an active competition policy
From the 2010s onwards, the application of anti-monopoly law has undergone a significant shift towards more structured, more visible and progressively more analytical enforcement. The Chinese authorities are developing a more systematic practice of investigations, particularly in strategic industrial sectors, infrastructure and, increasingly, digital markets, reflecting an extension of the material scope of competition law.
This development is accompanied by a process of professionalization of the authorities, documented by both the OECD and UNCTAD, which underline the growing integration of economic analysis tools and the increase in the skills of the administrations in charge of law enforcement.[27]It is also reflected in greater visibility of decisions, increased formalization of procedures and intensification of sanctions, helping to strengthen the external credibility of the Chinese competition system.
At the same time, the official discourse, relayed in particular by the People’s Daily[28], insists on the need to fight against monopolistic behaviour in order to build a unified national market and guarantee fair competition, revealing a growing link between competition law and domestic market integration policy. The Hong Kong press, in particular the South China Morning Post, highlights the intensification of proceedings targeting the major digital platforms, marking the entry of Chinese competition law into a phase of regulation of digital capitalism characterised by a strong strategic dimension.[29]
Thus, Chinese enforcement is no longer limited to a corrective function of market failures, but tends to be part of a proactive logic of market structuring, prefiguring subsequent developments towards increased centralization.
C. The 2018 reform: institutional centralization, administrative hierarchy and consolidation of the competitive function
The decisive turning point came with the administrative reform of 2018 and the creation of the SAMR, which brings together the competences previously dispersed between MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SAIC. This reform cannot be reduced to a simple operation of organizational rationalization: it constitutes a real reconfiguration of the mode of exercise of the competitive function within the Chinese state, marked by a logic of centralization, but also of increased administrative hierarchy.[30]
By unifying the functions of investigation, decision-making and sanctioning within the same entity, the reform puts an end to the logic of institutional competition between agencies and allows the emergence of an identifiable decision-making centre, capable of producing a more coherent and predictable administrative doctrine. This development responds to the recurrent criticisms relating to the legal uncertainty generated by the initial fragmentation, in particular in mergers involving international players.
However, this centralisation is accompanied by a greater integration of the competition authority into the hierarchical structure of the executive, which distinguishes the Chinese model from independent authorities of the European type. The SAMR is not an autonomous authority in the Western sense, but a component of a unified administrative apparatus, whose orientations are likely to be aligned with the economic policy priorities defined at the central level.[31]
In this perspective, the 2018 reform can be interpreted as a double movement: on the one hand, an increased legalization of enforcement, through the consolidation of procedures and standards of analysis; on the other hand, a functional politicization of competition regulation, resulting from its narrower integration into the strategic objectives of the State.[32]
D. Unified market, administrative monopolies and systemic reconfiguration of the role of competition law
The recent evolution of Chinese competition law is part of the strategy of building a unified national market , which is a structuring axis of contemporary Chinese economic policy.[33] Based on the model directly inspired by European competition policy, this strategy aims to correct the territorial fragmentation inherited from decentralized development, by reducing local administrative barriers, limiting provincial protectionist practices and strengthening the fluidity of trade at the national level.
In this context, the issue of « administrative monopolies » is undergoing a profound reconfiguration. Initially understood as a specific category of restrictions attributable to public authorities, it is now tending to be integrated into a broader issue of disciplining anticompetitive behaviour by all economic actors, including public ones.[34] Competition law thus becomes an instrument for regulating interadministrative relations, helping to redefine the relationship between central and local authorities.[35]
This evolution reflects a broadening of the functional scope of competition law, which is no longer limited to the correction of market failures, but actively participates in the institutional construction of the market itself. In this configuration, competition is not simply protected, it is produced and organized by public action.[36]
A comparison with the European Union model highlights a partial convergence in the use of competition law as a vector of market integration. However, unlike the European model, which is based on a functional separation between competition regulation and public policies, the Chinese system is characterised by a structural interweaving between these different dimensions.
E. Selective convergence, normative hybridization and functionalization of competition law
The evolution of Chinese competition law is part of a dynamic of selective convergence with international standards, particularly in terms of merger control, economic analysis and formalization of procedures. However, this convergence remains fundamentally instrumental and contextualized.[37]
As UNCTAD points out, emerging economies tend to import legal frameworks while adapting them to the requirements of their development strategies.[38] In the Chinese case, this adaptation takes the form of a normative hybridization in which the tools of competition law are integrated into a state-led economic governance architecture.[39]
This hybridisation is reflected in the functionalisation of competition law, understood as an instrument at the service of broader economic objectives, such as innovation, financial stability or industrial policy.[40] It also implies greater flexibility in the application of the rules, allowing the intensity of enforcement to be adjusted according to political priorities.
Several studies, including ours, highlight this articulation from the first years of implementation, highlighting the coexistence of imported legal rationality and endogenous economic management.[41] This reading remains confirmed by recent literature, which insists on the strategic dimension of Chinese enforcement.[42]
F. Exemptions and exempted sectors: a normative architecture at the service of economic governance (densified and secure version)
The examination of exemptions from Chinese competition law highlights a normative architecture that cannot be understood solely from the classical paradigm of derogations from the prohibition of anticompetitive practices. In the context of Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), these exemptions are part of a broader logic of articulation between competitive discipline and economic policy objectives (or in other words industrial policy).[43] reflecting an instrumental conception of competition law within the Chinese political economy.[44]
From the outset, the AML has included mechanisms to neutralise or mitigate the application of competition rules in certain sectors or situations. Thus, explicit exemptions concern in particular agricultural activities or certain forms of economic cooperation, revealing a structural consideration of the imperatives of sectoral stability and rural development.[45] More broadly, the possibility of derogating from the competition rules when a restriction is justified by objectives of general interest (innovation, economic efficiency, technological development) formally brings the Chinese system closer to Western models, while distinguishing itself from them by the extent of the administrative margin of appreciation. [46] This configuration gives the administrative authorities a wide margin of appreciation, in contrast to jurisdictional systems such as that of the European Union, where derogations are strictly regulated and subject to in-depth judicial review.[47]
This specificity can also be observed in the treatment of administrative monopolies, which constitute a central category of Chinese competition law (see Box 1). The AML devotes a specific chapter to the prohibition of abuse of administrative power restricting competition.[48] However, the implementation of these provisions reveals a structural tension: while the law aims to regulate anticompetitive interventions by public authorities, it simultaneously recognizes their decisive role in the organization of the market. This ambivalence has been largely underlined by legal commentators, which insist on the difficulty of reconciling competitive control and administrative prerogatives in a system where the State remains a central economic actor.[49]
Recent developments, in particular the 2022 reform of the AML, confirm this orientation. The introduction of a « fair competition review » mechanism now requires administrative authorities to assess ex ante the competitive impact of their normative acts, reflecting an attempt to integrate the principle of competition more systematically into public action.[50] However, this mechanism remains internal to the administration and is not accompanied by judicial control equivalent to that observed in Western systems, which limits its binding scope.
From this perspective, exemptions should not be analysed as anomalies or marginal derogations, but as constitutive elements of the system. They reflect an organised coexistence of several economic rationalities, in which competition coexists with the objectives of industrial policy, economic security and social stability. Exemptions thus reveal an advanced « normative hybridisation », in which certain restrictions on competition can be tolerated as long as they contribute, for example, to development or stability objectives.[51] They are part of a logic of balancing rather than the primacy of the competitive principle. This configuration gives the authorities significant latitude in the interpretation and application of the rules, allowing the intensity of enforcement to be adjusted according to strategic priorities.
A comparison with the OECD systems reveals a structural divergence. Whereas Western laws provide for strictly regulated exceptions to a dominant competition principle, the Chinese system is based on a logic of administrative balancing, in which competition is one objective among others, which can be modulated according to the needs of economic governance.[52] From a comparative perspective, the OECD systems also recognise the taking into account of public policy objectives, but within a legally constrained framework. The Chinese model, on the other hand, organises a functional cohabitation between competition and public intervention, without a clearly established normative hierarchy.[53]
Thus, exemptions appear less as a limit to competition law than as a revelation of its real function: that of a flexible regulatory instrument, integrated into a state architecture for steering the market, rather than as an autonomous normative order.
III — THE TYPOLOGY OF SANCTIONED PRACTICES: A DIFFERENTIATED IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW BETWEEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, STRUCTURAL REGULATION AND STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE OF THE ECONOMY (2008–2025)
As already observed in the previous section, the analysis of the implementation of the Chinese anti-monopoly law reveals an administrative practice characterized by a plurality of rationalities of intervention, which go beyond the mere repression of anti-competitive behavior in the classical sense. Chinese competition law thus appears as an instrument of differentiated economic regulation, articulating market discipline, sectoral restructuring and industrial policy objectives. It is necessary here to go into the types of anticompetitive practices justifying the implementation of Chinese competition law. This configuration of differentiated economic regulation explains the diversity of decisions and the difficulty of apprehending them from the categories strictly derived from Western models, in which a more uniform and jurisdictionalized application logic prevails.
A. Horizontal cartels: between market discipline and correction of structural imbalances
The repression of horizontal cartels has historically been one of the first fields of application of AML. The Chinese authorities have repeatedly intervened in sectors characterised by overcapacity, territorial fragmentation or informal coordination between actors, such as cement, steel, chemicals or certain agricultural sectors.
The OECD stresses that these interventions must be understood not only as sanctions for collusive behaviour, but also as instruments contributing to the rationalisation of industrial structures, particularly in sectors with overproduction.[54] In China, the fight against cartels is thus part of a broader logic of economic stabilisation and unification of the internal market, which gives enforcement a quasi-structural dimension.
This approach differs from the European and American models, in which the repression of cartels is based on a logic of almost absolute prohibition (hardcore cartels) regardless of sectoral considerations. In China, on the other hand, the intensity of repression can vary according to the economic context, reflecting a form of functional selectivity in the application of competition law.[55]
Box 2 – Main cartel cases and cartels sanctioned in China, 2008-2026[56]
Since the entry into force of the anti-monopoly law in 2008, the crackdown on cartels in China has emerged as one of the most visible aspects of enforcement, particularly in the first decade of implementation. Under the impetus of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), then the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) from 2018, the authorities have developed a sustained practice, initially focused on horizontal price-fixing agreements in traditional industrial sectors.
The first significant cases concerned markets such as cement, chemicals or industrial components, often on a regional scale, making it possible to structure the tools for investigation and sanctions. However, enforcement quickly took on an international dimension, marked by the prosecution of large foreign companies. The cases of LCD screens (2013) and manufacturers of car parts and bearings (2014), mainly involving Japanese and Korean groups, gave rise to particularly high penalties, culminating in more than RMB 12 billion in fines in the automotive sector (1). These cases illustrate the ability of the Chinese authorities to intervene in transnational cartels and to apply the law effectively to foreign companies operating on the Chinese market.
However, this international dimension does not exhaust the reality of enforcement. At the same time, the authorities have dealt with a large number of domestic cartels, often organised at the local level in sectors such as building materials, energy or certain pharmaceutical segments. These cases, which receive less media coverage and are generally less heavily sanctioned individually, reveal a competitive fabric still marked by coordination practices, sometimes facilitated by professional structures or interactions with local authorities (2).
The overall analysis thus highlights a double dynamic. On the one hand, the highest penalties and the most emblematic cases mainly concern foreign companies, which contributes to the international credibility of the system and its deterrent effect. On the other hand, domestic cartels, which are more numerous but less visible, are part of an internal market discipline function, placing competition law in a logic of national economic regulation.
Since the end of the 2010s, enforcement has also tended to diversify, integrating more complex sectors, including certain activities related to the digital economy, while maintaining a hard core focused on price agreements. The creation of the SAMR has strengthened institutional coherence and the coordination of investigations, accentuating the professionalization of the system.
Overall, China’s cartel practice is characterised by a high level of repression, openness to prosecution of international players and a close link between competition objectives and economic regulation. This combination gives Chinese competition law both a domestic and a global scope, reflecting its growing role in market governance (3).
B. Abuse of dominant position: regulation of infrastructures and supervision of systemic actors
The second major category concerns abuses of dominant positions, particularly in strategic sectors and network industries. The authorities’ interventions have frequently targeted operators in a monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation in the energy, telecommunications or transport sectors, revealing a logic of structural regulation of concentrated markets.
In emerging economies, UNCTAD notes that competition law tends to be used as an instrument for regulating industries dominated by powerful firms, often closely linked to national industrial policies.[57] In China, this dynamic is reinforced by the central role of state-owned enterprises, whose dominant position is both an instrument of economic policy and a potential object of competition regulation.
This ambivalence is particularly visible in the treatment of large digital platforms, which have been the subject of increasing attention since the late 2010s. The authorities’ interventions reflect a desire to prevent a » disorderly expansion of capital » and to maintain a balance between innovation, competition and economic stability.[58] Competition law thus becomes a tool for supervising systemic players, beyond the mere sanction of individual abuses.
Box n°3
The main cases of abuse of dominant position sanctioned in Chinese competition law since 2008[59]
Since the entry into force of the anti-monopoly law in 2008, litigation and enforcement relating to abuses of dominant position in China have been structured around a few emblematic cases that have gradually clarified the standards of analysis and the priorities of the authorities. In the first phase, the case law was marked by seminal private disputes, such as the case of Huawei v. InterDigital, in which the Chinese courts recognized that a holder of essential patents could abuse its dominant position by imposing excessive or discriminatory royalties and by tying essential and non-essential patent licenses, thus contributing to the emergence of a national doctrine of FRAND obligations (1). Conversely, the case of Qihoo 360 v. Tencent illustrated the initial caution of judges in characterizing dominance, with the Supreme People’s Court refusing to find abuse in the absence of sufficient evidence of market power, despite restrictive practices in the digital economy (2).
From the mid-2010s onwards, administrative enforcement has asserted itself with far-reaching decisions, first and foremost the Qualcomm case (2015), which resulted in a record fine of RMB 6.09 billion for excessive pricing, tying and discriminatory conditions in the mobile technology sector (3). This decision was a major milestone in establishing the applicability of competition law to intellectual property rights and high-tech markets. More recently, the authorities’ attention has shifted to digital platforms, with emblematic cases targeting Alibaba and Meituan, marking the emergence of regulation of digital ecosystems and practices of exclusivity or foreclosure of markets (4).
Overall, these cases reveal a gradual evolution from a still experimental litigation to a more structured and strategic enforcement, characterised by sectoral diversification (telecommunications, digital, consumer goods) and an increase in sophistication of economic analysis. Between 2008 and 2023, the Chinese authorities dealt with more than a hundred cases of abuse of dominant position, with significant cumulative sanctions, testifying to the growing integration of this instrument into market regulation and national economic policies (5).
C. Merger control: strategic filter and instrument for allocating market structures
Merger control has been a central focus of the implementation of the AML since its entry into force. The Chinese authorities have rapidly developed a substantial practice, marked by particular attention to the structural effects of operations, particularly in sectors deemed sensitive or strategic.
OECD analyses highlight an increase in the sophistication of economic analyses and a gradual professionalisation of procedures, particularly after the centralisation of competences within the SAMR in 2018.[60] This evolution is reflected in an increased formalisation of competitive tests, while maintaining a certain flexibility in their implementation.
However, merger control in China retains a discretionary and strategic dimension, allowing extra-competitive considerations, such as economic security, industrial policy or national interests to be taken into account (see in particular the multiple merger bans issued by the Chinese competition authorities in Appendix Table 5). Some emblematic decisions have thus been interpreted as indicative of the use of merger control as a tool for screening investments and managing international economic relations, not hesitating to engage like the United States in an extraterritorial application of competition law.[61]
From a comparative perspective, this approach partially brings China closer to the European model, while differing from it by the absence of strict compartmentalization between competitive analysis and public policy objectives. On the other hand, the highly strategic industrial nature of the Chinese model should be highlighted, with a very strong contrast to European law with a very asymmetrical international trade dynamic.
Indeed, the consolidated examination of all the cases identified highlights several structuring features of merger control in China since 2008 (see the table in Appendix 5). On the one hand, the very limited number of formal bans — essentially Coca-Cola / Huiyuan (2009) and the P3 alliance (Maersk / MSC / CMA CGM, 2014) — contrasts with the increasing role of informal blocking mechanisms, in particular the abandonment of operations for lack of authorization, as in the cases of Nvidia/Arm or Intel/Tower Semiconductor. This practice gives the Chinese authority a de facto veto power, which is often less visible but just as effective than the explicit prohibition. On the other hand, the very high proportion of transactions involving foreign companies, or even exclusively foreign companies, underlines the structurally extraterritorial nature of Chinese control, based on the criterion of effects on the domestic market. In this respect, the P3 case is a particularly revealing milestone, in that it illustrates China’s ability to block a global transaction that is tolerated in other major jurisdictions, thus marking the assertion of decision-making autonomy in the regulation of global competition.[62]
In addition, the sectoral analysis reveals a concentration of interventions in strategic areas — semiconductors, biotechnology, agrochemicals, industrial infrastructure — which correspond closely to industrial policy and economic security priorities. The remedies imposed, often of a structural nature and sometimes with a global scope, testify to a high degree of sophistication and a desire to influence the organization of the markets beyond Chinese territory alone. Finally, the general evolution of the system confirms that merger control cannot be reduced to a technical instrument for preserving competition: it is part of a broader logic of integrated economic governance, articulating market discipline, management of strategic dependencies and supervision of global players. All of these elements converge towards the idea of a hybrid model, in which competitive analysis coexists with industrial and geoeconomic considerations, helping to redefine the traditional balances of merger law in a context of recomposition of the world economy.
Box 4 – Merger control in China since 2009[63]
Merger control in Chinese competition law, introduced by the 2008 anti-monopoly law and gradually consolidated by the decision-making practice of MOFCOM and then SAMR, is characterized by a rapid rise in power and an affirmation of its specificities, particularly with regard to its extraterritorial scope and its articulation with economic policy objectives. From its first years of application, the Chinese regime has distinguished itself by sustained activity and by the ability of the authorities to intervene in transactions of global scope, including when these were initiated outside Chinese territory.
The emblematic Coca-Cola / Huiyuan case (2009) is a structuring starting point in this respect, marking the only formal prohibition of a concentration of major importance. This decision, based on concerns relating both to conglomerate effects and to the protection of a strategic national player, signalled the desire of the Chinese authorities to exercise substantial and autonomous control over transactions affecting their internal market (1).
Beyond this prohibition, Chinese practice has mainly been oriented towards conditional approvals with remedies, often of a structural nature, in cases such as Western Digital / Hitachi, MediaTek / MStar, Dow / DuPont or Bayer / Monsanto. These decisions illustrate an interventionist approach, in which the authorities do not hesitate to impose asset disposals or business restructuring on a global scale in order to preserve competition in Chinese markets (2). This global dimension of the remedies underlines the ability of Chinese law to produce effects beyond its territory, by imposing constraints on international groups operating in several jurisdictions.
One of the most remarkable features of this regime lies precisely in its extraterritorial application. Like the US and European regimes, Chinese competition law is based on an effects test, allowing the authorities to examine any transaction likely to have an impact on Chinese markets, regardless of where the concentration took place (3). In practice, a large proportion of the most significant cases thus concern transactions between foreign companies, whose potential effects on competition in China justify the intervention of the authorities.
This logic can also be observed in recent cases where the lack of Chinese authorisation has led to the abandonment of global operations, such as in the Nvidia/Arm or Intel/Tower Semiconductor cases. In these cases, the SAMR‘s blocking power is exercised in an indirect but decisive way, revealing the central role of Chinese control in the global governance of mergers (4).
All in all, merger control in China appears to be both a legal and a strategic instrument, combining a competitive analysis inspired by international standards and an explicit consideration of national economic interests. The scarcity of formal prohibitions contrasts with the intensity of conditional interventions and with the growing influence of the Chinese regulator on transnational operations, confirming the inclusion of competition law in a broader logic of economic and industrial regulation (5).
D. The digital turnaround: platforms, ecosystems and systemic regulation
From the end of the 2010s, Chinese competition law underwent a major shift with the development of enforcement targeting digital markets and large platforms. The decisions adopted in this area mark the shift from regulation focused on traditional market structures to an approach oriented towards digital ecosystems and network effects.
UNCTAD points out that this evolution corresponds to a more general transformation of competition law in contemporary economies, characterized by an increased consideration of data, platforms and innovation dynamics.[64] In China, this change is particularly rapid and is taking place in a context of the rise of national technology giants.
Competition law is thus becoming an instrument for the systemic regulation of digital capitalism, aimed at regulating informational economic power, preventing exclusionary practices and maintaining a balance between innovation and public control. This evolution is accompanied by a strengthening of normative instruments, in particular through the platform-specific guidelines adopted by the SAMR in 2021.[65]
E. Treatment of Foreign Firms: Perceived Asymmetry, Structural Selectivity, and Doctrinal Debate
The treatment of foreign companies is a sensitive issue in the implementation of Chinese competition law. Several cases involving multinational companies have raised questions about the predictability of decisions and equal treatment.
Foreign chambers of commerce have regularly expressed concerns about procedural transparency and legal certainty. However, OECD analyses suggest that the hypothesis of systematic discrimination should be put into perspective, stressing that the differences observed can be explained by the sectoral structure of markets and by national economic priorities.[66]
From this perspective, the apparent asymmetry is less a result of an explicit policy of discrimination than of a structural selectivity of enforcement, oriented towards certain sectors or types of actors. This reading makes it possible to go beyond a strictly contentious approach to place the implementation of competition law in a broader logic of economic governance.
F. Synthesis: an instrumental typology at the service of a hierarchical regulation of the economy
All the practices analysed highlight the implementation of Chinese competition law characterised by a functional differentiation of legal instruments. Far from being uniformly applied, the rules are used selectively according to the sectors, the actors and the objectives pursued.
This configuration reflects the existence of a hierarchical regulation of the economy, in which competition law is one instrument among others in the service of a global development strategy. The doctrine underlines that this hybridization between market discipline and economic governance is a structuring characteristic of competition systems in emerging economies.[67]
In the Chinese case, this logic is particularly successful: competition law is not limited to regulating the market, but actively participates in its structuring, stabilization and strategic orientation. The result is a typology of sanctioned practices that can only be understood in the light of this instrumental function.
IV — CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINESE COMPETITION LAW: INSTITUTIONAL CENTRALIZATION, DIGITAL REGULATION AND GEOECONOMIC RECOMPOSITION (2015–2025)
The recent evolution of Chinese competition law reflects a structural transformation of its purposes and instruments. From the mid-2010s, and even more so after the 2018 reform and the revision of the 2022 anti-monopoly law, the implementation of competition law in China is part of a dynamic of systemic regulation of economic structures. This evolution confirms the contemporary doctrinal analysis according to which competition systems can no longer be understood as autonomous normative sets, but as integrated instruments of economic and institutional governance.[68]
A. The centralization of enforcement and the consolidation of the SAMR as a pivotal authority
The creation of the SAMR in 2018 was a decisive moment in the institutional recomposition of Chinese competition law. By merging previously dispersed competences between several agencies, this reform has enabled the emergence of a single authority with transversal power over merger control, abuse of dominant position and the repression of anticompetitive practices.
The OECD stresses that this centralisation corresponds to a general trend towards rationalising institutional competition architectures, but that the Chinese case is distinguished by a stronger integration between market regulation and industrial policy objectives.[69]
From a comparative law perspective, the former President of the US Federal Trade Commission, William Kovacic, analyses this type of configuration as characteristic of the so-called « developmental competition regimes« , in which the competition authority is structurally inserted into a state-led economic development strategy.[70]
B. The 2022 reform of the anti-monopoly law: tightening of standards and functional extension
The revision of the anti-monopoly law that came into force in 2022 marks an important step in the consolidation of the Chinese system. It strengthens sanctions, expands investigative tools and introduces increased attention to digital markets and platforms.
This reform is part of a broader strategy to build a unified national market, regularly put forward by the Chinese authorities and relayed by the People’s Daily, which insists on the need to reduce local administrative barriers and guarantee homogeneous competition throughout the country.
The OECD analyses this development as an attempt to strengthen the internal coherence of competition law, but also as a functional extension of it towards general economic policy objectives.[71]
C. The digital turnaround: platforms, data and regulation of market ecosystems
One of the most structuring features of the recent period is the rise of digital technology as a central field for the implementation of competition law.[72] The Chinese authorities have intensified their action against major technology platforms, particularly in the e-commerce, digital financial services and delivery sectors.
The South China Morning Post has widely described this phase as a « tech crackdown« , pointing to the succession of investigations and sanctions targeting dominant digital players.[73] SAMR itself uses this notion of technological crackdown.
The contemporary academic literature interprets this evolution as a profound change in competition law. Eleanor Fox and Michael Trebilcock point out that contemporary regimes tend to shift from a logic focused on market structures to one focused on the systemic effects of economic power, particularly in platform and data markets.[74]
From this perspective, China appears to be an advanced laboratory for the regulation of digital ecosystems, where competition is thought of not only in terms of price and market share, but also in terms of control of information infrastructures.
D. « Common prosperity » and extension of the purposes of competition law
As of 2020, China’s competition policy is explicitly part of the strategic framework of « common prosperity« , which marks a significant shift in the definition of its goals. This orientation gives competition law a more assertive redistributive dimension, particularly in sectors characterised by a high concentration of economic power, such as digital platforms, finance or certain segments of the real estate economy. Competition law thus tends to go beyond its traditional function of protecting the competitive process to contribute to a broader objective of rebalancing economic structures and limiting power asymmetries between actors.
In concrete terms, this development is reflected in an intensification of controls on large companies, increased attention to exclusionary practices and the effects of market foreclosure, as well as closer coordination with other instruments of economic regulation. It is part of a movement to integrate competition law into a more global strategy of economic governance, aimed at regulating the dynamics of concentration and preserving social stability. In this perspective, the OECD stresses that the Chinese case is part of a more general trend towards the broadening of the missions of competition authorities, particularly in economies facing phenomena of economic concentration and income polarisation, while retaining specificities linked to the structuring role of the State in the orientation of economic policies.[75]
E. Selective convergence, hybridization and integrated economic governance
From a technical and institutional point of view, this extension of objectives is accompanied by a dynamic of selective convergence with international standards, in particular European standards, in terms of merger control, analysis of unilateral practices and integration of economic analysis tools. However, this convergence remains functional and framed by the imperatives of industrial policy, economic security and technological sovereignty, which limits its normative scope and underlines its instrumental nature.
Contemporary doctrine highlights that the Chinese case is less a matter of a process of harmonization than of a strategic recomposition of competition law instruments, adapted to a specific institutional context.[76] In this perspective, William E. Kovacic insists on the fundamentally hybrid nature of contemporary competition regimes, in which economic rationality, political objectives and institutional constraints coexist.[77]All of these transformations thus lead to the requalification of Chinese competition law as an instrument of integrated economic governance, mobilized not only to preserve competitive mechanisms, but also to structure the internal market, supervise dominant players, regulate digital platforms and support economic and technological development objectives.
This evolution is part of a broader global recomposition of competition law, characterized by a growing blurring of the boundaries between competition policy, industrial policy and economic regulation, and by the emergence of hybrid models combining market discipline and strategic intervention by the State.
CONCLUSION
At the end of this analysis, Chinese competition law appears less as a stabilized normative set in the classic sense of Western systems than as an evolving instrument of economic governance, whose purposes are reconfigured to the rhythm of the structural transformations of the Chinese economy itself. From the 2007 anti-monopoly law to the 2022 reform, including the institutional centralization carried out in 2018 and the recent acceleration of enforcement in the digital sector, a continuous trajectory is emerging: that of competition law gradually integrated into a global strategy for the organization of the internal market and the management of platform capitalism.
This trajectory highlights a structuring, but assumed, tension between two legal rationalities. On the one hand, an imported rationality, inspired by international competition standards, nourished by European and American models, and consolidated by the global circulation of economic and legal doctrines. On the other, an endogenous rationality, in which competition is conceived not as an autonomous end, but as an instrument in the service of broader ends: economic stability, territorial integration, industrial policy and, more recently, technological sovereignty.
It is precisely in this articulation that the singularity of the Chinese model of competition law enforcement lies. It cannot be reduced to a simple imperfect transposition of Western standards, nor to a pure authoritarian deviation from them. It must be understood as a hybrid system, in which the legal instruments of competition are continuously reconfigured by the objectives of the regulatory state, in a logic of permanent adaptation to the needs of economic transformation.
This normative plasticity finds a singular echo in the classical Chinese tradition of thought. Lao Tzu wrote that « he who governs well does not constrain, but lets things take their natural course ». Transposed to the economic field, this intuition does not refer to an absence of regulation, but to a form of indirect regulation, where order is born from the adjustment of forces rather than from the rigidity of rules. In a complementary way, Confucian thought, centered on the harmony of social relations and the proper place of hierarchies, sheds light on a conception of competition based less on the absolutization of economic conflict than on its institutional channeling.
Understood in this way, the implementation of Chinese competition law is not a simple technique for correcting market failures, but an art of equilibrium, where the legal rule becomes an instrument for the dynamic adjustment of economic and social relations. It is part of a broader tradition of government by modulation, in which normativity is not opposed to strategy, but is integrated into it.
At a time when contemporary competition systems are themselves undergoing a form of recomposition — between concerns about economic sovereignty, regulation of digital platforms and the return of industrial policies — the Chinese experience appears less as an exception than as a revealer. It highlights, particularly acutely, the growing porosity between competition law and global economic governance.
It is perhaps in this sense that the ancient wisdom retains a contemporary analytical scope here. As Confucius suggests, « to govern is to rectify »: it is still necessary to determine what must be rectified, and according to what balance. Chinese competition law illustrates precisely this fundamental question, where the legal norm becomes less a stopping point than an instrument for the continuous regulation of market imbalances.
In this movement, competition ceases to be a simple principle of economic organization to become a technique of government of contemporary capitalism. And it is undoubtedly in this silent transformation, more than in its explicit rules, that the deepest scope of the Chinese model of competition law enforcement lies.
Appendix 1
Typology of the Implementation of Chinese Competition Law (2008–2025)
| Offence Category | Dominant sectors | Lead Authority | Dominant intervention logic | Implied purpose |
| Horizontal agreements | steel, cement, chemicals, agriculture | NDRC/SAMR | Correcting market imbalances | Stability + integration of the internal market |
| Abuse of dominant position | Energy, telecoms, infrastructure, digital | SAMR | Structural regulation of dominant positions | Coaching National Champions |
| Merger control | Industry, Tech, Finance | SAMR | Strategic and economic filter | Industrial policy + economic security |
| Digital economy | Platforms, Data, E-Commerce | SAMR | Systemic regulation of ecosystems | Platform Power Control |
| Foreign operators | Industry, Tech, Pharma | SAMR / MOFCOM (Historical) | Sector selectivity | Economic sovereignty + competition |
Table I sources: 1. OECD, Exemptions and Exceptions in Competition Law: Comparative Approaches, OECD Publishing, 2017, pp. 15–28. 2. UNCTAD, Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises in Emerging Economies, Geneva, 2019, pp. 33–44. 3. OECD, National Security Considerations in Competition Law, OECD Roundtable Report, 2020, pp. 10–19. 4. UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Macroeconomic Stability, Geneva, 2021, pp. 61–72.
Appendix 2
China/European Union/OECD/United States Comparison Table
| Geographical area | China (AML – administrative monopoly) | European Union | OECD (competitive neutrality) | United States |
| Main purpose | Acts of public authorities distorting competition | Companies + States via aid and regulation | Distortions of competition related to public undertakings | Business behaviour (indistinct public/private) |
| General logic | Discipline of administrative intervention | Protection of the internal market | Competitive fairness between the public and private sectors | Prevention of private monopolistic practices |
| Main target | Local or sectoral administrative authorities | Member States + Public Enterprises | States and public companies | Private companies (mainly) |
| Central legal instrument | AML 2008 + revision 2022 (regulatory control) | Arts 101–109 TFEU (in particular 106 and 107) | OECD Recommendations (soft law) | Sherman Act (1890), Clayton Act (1914) |
| Equivalent concept | Administrative monopoly | State aid / SGEI (Arts 106–107 TFEU) | Competitive neutrality | State action doctrine (partial) |
| Control Type | Ex ante + administrative (SAMR, fair competition review) | Jurisdictional + European Commission | Soft law / best practices | Jurisdictional (antitrust litigation) |
| Central issue | Fragmentation of the Chinese domestic market | Distortions of the single market | Distortions related to public ownership | Abuse of private market power |
| Degree of systematization | High but variable effectiveness | Very high and jurisdictionalized | Non-binding normative | High but not public sector oriented |
ANNEX 3
EXEMPTIONS FROM CHINESE COMPETITION LAW
Typology, foundations and comparative perspective
| Exemption Category | Legal basis and economic logic (China) | Sectors concerned | Application/scope | EU/OECD/other systems comparison |
| 1. Exemptions based on public interest and industrial policy | Finalised logic of competition law: competition is an instrument of economic policy (industrial modernisation, ecological transition, sectoral restructuring). | Heavy industry, energy transition, corporate restructuring, environmental policies. | Possible authorisation of anti-competitive practices if they contribute to macroeconomic or industrial objectives. Strong administrative discretion. | OECD: recognition of opt-out clauses in emerging economies to integrate industrial policy¹. EU: much more regulated approach via economic efficiency (Art. 101 §3 TFEU). |
| 2. Exemptions related to state-owned enterprises and regulated sectors | Coexistence between competition law and public service missions or economic stability objectives. | Energy, telecommunications, transport, financial infrastructure, public banks. | Partial or modulated application of competition law when the behaviour is linked to public missions or sectoral regulation. | EU: subjection of public undertakings to competition law subject to strict subject to Art. 106 TFEU. OECD: vigilance on distortions linked to public undertakings. |
| 3. National Security and Strategic Interest Exemptions | Increasing integration of the imperatives of economic, technological and security sovereignty into economic law. | Information technology, data, critical infrastructure, semiconductors, cybersecurity. | Influence on merger control and certain market practices in sensitive sectors. Broad administrative discretion. | OECD: international trend towards the integration of national security into competition policies³. EU: screening of foreign investments (Regulation 2019/452). USA: CFIUS (highly developed control of foreign investments). |
| 4. Implied exemptions related to administrative and macroeconomic coordination | Flexible planning and economic stabilisation (employment, prices, growth). | Cyclical sectors, industries sensitive to price stability, regional policies. | Administrative tolerance of anti-competitive practices when they serve macroeconomic stability or sectoral public policy objectives. | OECD/UNCTAD: characteristics of economies where the state plays a structural coordinating role⁴. EU: lack of explicit recognition of such exemptions (principle of primacy of competition). |
| 5. Structural sectoral exemptions (hybrid regulatory areas) | Superposition between sectoral regulation and competition law. | Public infrastructure, networks, essential services. | Hybrid regimes where sector-specific regulation can take precedence over antitrust law. | UNCTAD: frequent coexistence between sectoral regulation and competition in emerging economies². EU: gradual separation of regulation and competition but strong interactions (networks). |
| 6. Exemptions based on permitted agreements or conduct | Explicit recognition of certain justified anti-competitive cooperation. | Industrial cooperation, research and development, sectoral rationalization. | Conditional authorisation (efficiency, economic interest, non-elimination of competition). | EU: exemptions regulated by Art. 101 §3 TFEU (pro-competitive effects and consumer benefit). OECD: efficiency-based approach. |
Appendix 4
Top abuse of dominance cases in China (since 2008)
| Sanctioned company | Authority / Jurisdiction | Nature of the practices pursued | Penalties imposed |
| Qualcomm (2015) | NDRC | Excessive prices, tying (essential and non-essential patents), discriminatory conditions | Fine of RMB 6.09 billion (USD ≈,975 million) |
| Tetra Pak (2016) | SAIC | Tied Selling, Exclusivities, Contractual Restrictions in Packaging Equipment | Fine of RMB 667 million |
| InterDigital (2013) | Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court | Excessive royalties, discriminatory practices (essential patents – FRAND) | Damages + injunctions |
| Tencent (2013) | Supreme People’s Court | Alleged exclusionary practices (interoperability, access restrictions) | Absence of sanction (non-characterization of dominance) |
| Alibaba (2021) | SAMR | Exclusivities (« choose one from two »), restrictions on merchants | Fine of RMB 18.2 billion (USD ≈ 2.8 billion) |
| Meituan (2021) | SAMR | Merchant exclusives, platform restrictions | Fine of RMB 3.44 billion |
| China Telecom / China Unicom(2011) | NDRC | Alleged collective abuse, discriminatory prices in the broadband market | Commitments, no formal fine |
| Chongqing Qingyang (2013) | NDRC | Refusal of transactions, exclusionary practices on the local market | Administrative penalties (detailed non-public amount) |
| Eastman Chemical (2017) | NDRC | Vertical restraints and exclusionary practices | Administrative fine (moderate amount) |
| Yangtze River Pharmaceutical(2021) | SAMR | Excessive prices in the pharmaceutical sector | Fine of approximately RMB 764 million |
| Alibaba (cloud / data practices, subsequent surveys) | SAMR | Data practices and digital ecosystems | Corrective actions + enhanced supervision |
Appendix 5
Merger control in China: bans and structural remedies (2008–2026)
| Operation (business) | Nationality of companies | Activities concerned | Authority | Nature of the intervention | Key Competitive Concerns | Measures imposed |
| Coca-Cola / Huiyuan (2009) | United States / China | Drinks/juices | MOFCOM | Prohibition | Conglomerate effects, market power | Prohibition |
| P3 Alliance (Maersk / MSC / CMA CGM) (2014) | Denmark / Switzerland / France | Shipping (containers) | MOFCOM | Prohibition | Collective domination on Asia-Europe roads | Prohibition |
| Nvidia/Arm (2022) | United States / United Kingdom | Semiconductors / Architectures | SAMR | Abort (implicit blocking) | Systemic risks, technological control | Abandonment |
| Intel / Tower Semiconductor(2023) | United States / Israel | Semiconductors (foundries) | SAMR | Abort (implicit blocking) | Reduced competition | Abandonment |
| Illumina / Grail (2021–2023) | United States / United States | Biotechnology / diagnostics | SAMR | Post-merger sanction | Vertical integration, foreclosure | Fine + divestment |
| Mitsubishi Rayon / Lucite (2009) | Japan / United Kingdom | Chemistry (MMA) | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Dominant position | Asset disposal |
| Pfizer / Wyeth (2009) | United States / United States | Pharmaceutical | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Horizontal risks | Divestments |
| Panasonic / Sanyo(2009) | Japan / Japan | Electronics / Batteries | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Battery concentration | Disposals |
| Seagate / Samsung HDD (2011) | United States / South Korea | Computer Storage | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Market concentration | Hybrid commitments |
| Western Digital / Hitachi (2012) | United States / Japan | Computer Storage | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Reduced competition | Structural separation |
| Google / Motorola Mobility (2012) | United States / United States | Telecoms / Software | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Conglomerate Effects | Commitments |
| Glencore / Xstrata(2013) | Switzerland / Switzerland | Mining / Raw Materials | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Dominant position | Disposals |
| MediaTek / MStar(2013) | Taiwan / Taiwan | Semiconductors | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Risk of monopoly | Separation + divestitures |
| Dow / DuPont (2017) | United States / United States | Chemistry / agrochemicals | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Concentration R&D | Divestments |
| Bayer / Monsanto(2018) | Germany / USA | Agrochemicals / seeds | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Dominant position | Disposals |
| Linde / Praxair(2018) | Germany / USA | Industrial gases | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Sector concentration | Divestments |
| Essilor / Luxottica(2018) | France / Italy | Optics / Distribution | MOFCOM | Conditional Authorization | Vertical effects | Limited Remedies |
| Danaher / GE Biopharma (2020) | United States / United States | Biotechnology | SAMR | Conditional Authorization | Technological concentration | Divestment of activities |
Sources 1. MOFCOM, « Announcement No. 22 of 2009 on Prohibiting the Acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group by Coca-Cola, » March 18, 2009; see OECD Analysis, Competition Policy in China, 2011, p. 38. 2. MOFCOM, « Conditional Approval of Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, » 2009; see Hogan Lovells, MOFCOM Merger Control Review, 2010. 3. MOFCOM, « Pfizer/Wyeth Conditional Clearance, » 2009; v. Freshfields, China Merger Control Review, 2010. 4. MOFCOM, « Panasonic/Sanyo Decision, » 2009; v. OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in China, 2010. 5. MOFCOM, « Seagate/Samsung HDD Decision, » 2011; v. K. Davies, « China’s Merger Control Regime, » World Competition, 2013, p. 145. 6. MOFCOM, « Western Digital/Hitachi Decision, » 2012; v. Allen & Overy, China MOFCOM Merger Control, 2013. 7. MOFCOM, « Google/Motorola Mobility Decision, » 2012; see ABA, Antitrust Law Developments, 2017, p. 987. 8. MOFCOM, « Glencore/Xstrata Conditional Clearance, » 2013; see Norton Rose Fulbright, Global Antitrust Review, 2014. 9. MOFCOM, « MediaTek/MStar Decision, » 2013; v. S. Wang, « China Merger Remedies, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2015, p. 212. 10. MOFCOM, « Dow/DuPont Conditional Clearance, » 2017; v. OECD, Competition Trends, 2018, p. 56. 11. MOFCOM, « Bayer/Monsanto Conditional Clearance, » 2018; see OECD, OECD Peer Review: China, 2019, p. 28. 12. MOFCOM, « Linde/Praxair Decision, » 2018; see Clifford Chance, China Antitrust Review, 2019. 13. MOFCOM, « Essilor/Luxottica Decision, » 2018; v. Linklaters, Asia Antitrust Review, 2019. 14. SAMR, « Danaher/GE Biopharma Conditional Approval, » 2020; v. SAMR Annual Report, 2021. 15. Financial Times, « Nvidia abandons $66bn Arm deal amid regulatory opposition, » Feb. 8, 2022; v. equal. antitrust comments, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2022. 16. Reuters, « Intel terminates Tower deal after failing to secure China approval, » Aug. 16, 2023; v. analysis, MLex, 2023.
[1] « If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles », TZU Sun, The Art of War, Fifth century B.C.
[2] See our article published as soon as the law in question was adopted in 2007: SOUTY, François, « La loi anti-monopole chinoise du 30 août 2007 : une première analyse », Revue Concurrences, 2007, n°4, p. 1–15.
[3] WTO, Report on China’s Accession Protocol, Geneva, World Trade Organization, 2001.
[4] Wang, Xiaoye, Competition Law in China, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2014, chaps. 1 and 4.
[5] Huang, Yong, « Administrative Monopoly in China: Origins, Evolution and Regulation, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, vol. 6, 2018, pp. 1-25. On the concept of « administrative monopolies » (行政垄断) and their treatment in Chinese law, see also the Chinese doctrine on economic law and the commentaries of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission Guidelines on Abuses of Administrative Power (2008 et seq.).
[6] General sources for the box: WANG, Xiaoye, Competition Law in China, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2014, 432 p. An essential reference work on Chinese competition law, offering a systematic analysis of the 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law. The author devotes substantial developments to administrative monopoly, considered as a structural obstacle to the unification of the Chinese domestic market and as a survival of practices stemming from the planned economy. HUANG, Yong, « Administrative Monopoly in China: Origins, Evolution and Regulation », Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, vol. 6, 2018, pp. 1–25. A leading doctrinal article analyzing the historical genesis of the administrative monopoly, its institutional inclusion in the Chinese legal system, and the difficulties encountered in the effectiveness of its regulation by Anti-Monopoly Law. The author highlights the tensions between normative centralization and the autonomy of local authorities. QIAN, Yu; WU, Jinglian, « The Political Economy of Administrative Monopoly in China, » China Economic Review, Amsterdam, Elsevier, vol. 23, 2012, pp. 1–12. Political economy study explaining the maintenance of administrative monopolies by local government incentives to protect domestic companies and local fiscal interests. The article sheds light on the institutional logics underlying administrative restrictions on competition. GERADIN, Damien; LAYNE-FARRAR, Anne; PETIT, Nicolas, EU Competition Law and Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012, approx. 1100 p. Reference work on European Union competition law, used here for conceptual comparison purposes, in particular on Articles 106 and 107 TFEU relating to public enterprises, special or exclusive rights and state aid. The analysis allows us to put into perspective the specificity of China of direct control of anticompetitive administrative acts. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Competition Policy in China: The Regulation of Administrative Monopolies, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2019, 180 p. Detailed institutional report analysing recent Chinese reforms in the control of administrative monopolies, including the development of the fair competition review system and efforts to harmonise local regulations with national competition objectives. The report highlights the persistent limitations related to administrative fragmentation and heterogeneous application of the law.
[7] AML 2008 (revised 2022), Art. 8: General principle of prohibition of abuses of administrative power restricting competition.→ Main basis of the concept of administrative monopoly and basis for the regulation of anticompetitive administrative acts
[8] AML, Art. 32: Prohibition of restrictions on the free movement of goods between regions. → Targets internal territorial barriers and market partitioning practices
[9] AML, Art. 34: prohibition of imposing compulsory transactions with designated operators. → Applies to market capture practices by administrative designation of suppliers
[10] AML, Art. 33: Prohibition of discriminatory practices and barriers to market access.→ Concerns inter-jurisdictional discrimination and entry restrictions
[11] AML, Art. 35: Prohibition of excluding or restricting the participation of companies in tenders. → Protects non-discriminatory access to public procurement and public procurement procedures
[12] Ibid.
[13] SOUTY, François, « La loi antimonopole chinoise du 30 août 2007 : une première analyse« , Concurrences Review, 2007, No. 4, p. 1–15.
[14] WILLIAMS Mark, Competition Law in China, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 45–48
[15] Creation of the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) by the 2018 administrative reform. The SAMR in 2021 was elevated to the rank of National Antimonopoly Bureau. In 2021, the antitrust function of the SAMR was upgraded to the State Anti-Monopoly Bureau, a vice-ministerial level structure, but not an independent ministry. Y. REN, F. ZHANG, J. LIU, « Insights of China’s Competition Law and its Enforcement: the Structural Reform of Anti-Monopoly Authority and the Amended Anti-Unfair Competition Law », J. Eur. Comp. Law Pract. , 2019, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 36–45, Esp. p. 38 ff.
[16] GERBER, David J. & QIU, Meng, « Two Steps Forward and One Step Back? US, EU and China’s Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation and International Trade, »World Competition, Kluwer, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2022), pp. 3–28.
[17] V. SOUTY François, « America First Antitrust: The Conservative Renewal of American Antitrust by the Trump II Administration, Continuities, Ruptures and Doctrinal Recompositions », Le Diplomate Média, 12.01.2026.
[18] Clifford Chance, China AML Review, 2012, section 3, n.p.
[19] EMCH, Adrian, « China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Implementation and Development, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2016, pp. 210–213.
[20] The European Commission regularly reports on China-EU competition cooperation programmes implemented by DG COMP in its annual reports published each year in the spring, after they have been presented by the European Commissioner for Competition to the European Parliament. On these relations, see in particular China State Council, Policy paper on EU: Deepen China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, see http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2014/08/23/content_281474983026968.htm updated: Apr 2,2014.
[21] SOUTY, François, » The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law of 30 August 2007: A First Analysis « , Concurrences Review, 2007, No. 4, p. 1–15.
[22] SOUTY, François, » La mise en œuvre de la loi antimonopole chinoise (AML): premiers développements « , Revue Concurrences, 2009, n°2, p. 45–67.
[23] ZHANG K., « The Creation of SAMR and China’s Institutional Reform », Chinese Journal of Competition Law, 2019, p. 23 ff. It should be noted that the cycle of about ten to twenty years of experience before the renovation or restructuring of the initial competition law was observed in the United States (1890-1914), at the level of the European Union, albeit in several stages (1961-1991 for the emergence of merger control and then 1991-2001 with the appearance of Procedural Regulation 1-2001). The same phenomenon can be observed in Germany, France, Italy, etc.
[24] Ibid.
[25] OECD, Competition Law and Policy in China, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2011, p. 34; OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, 2019, p. 15 ff
[26] DREXL J., « Comparative Competition Law », in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2020, esp. § 45 ff.
[27] OECD, OECD Competition Trends 2025, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2025, spec. p. 3 et seq., stressing that competition authorities need to « constantly develop their tools » and strengthen their analytical capacities in the face of changing markets and the digital economy. UNCTAD, Capacity-building on Competition Law and Policy for Development: A Consolidated Report, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/7, Geneva, 2008, spec. p. 5 et seq., highlighting – updated annually – training programmes for agents, institutional strengthening and development of technical skills of competition authorities.
[28] Previously known as The People’s Daily.
[29] South China Morning Post, « Beijing launches antitrust investigation into Trip.com ahead of Lunar New Year break, » Jan. 14, 2026, stating that antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms « have become the norm » in the State Administration for Market Regulation’s action; v. also « China warns platforms on monopolistic tactics such as ‘lowest price’ requirement, » Dec. 17, 2025, on strengthening guidelines for digital platforms. Available online: https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3339915/beijing-launches-antitrust-investigation-tripcom-ahead-lunar-new-year-break?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[30] Zhang K., « The Creation of SAMR and China’s Institutional Reform », op. cit.
[31] DREXL J., « Comparative Competition Law », op.cit.
[32] Faure, M., Zhang, X., op.cit.
[33] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, « Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of a Unified National Market » (中共中央 国务院关于加快建设全国统一大市场的意见), 10 Apr. 2022, text setting out the objectives of building a « unified, efficient, rules-based and fair competition » market, as well as the strengthening of antimonopoly policies; available online: https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202204/11/content_WS625360f2c6d02e533532900f.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[34] Huang, Yong, « Administrative Monopoly in China: Origins, Evolution and Regulation, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, vol. 6, 2018, pp. 1-25, esp. pp. 10-18, on administrative flexibility in the enforcement of Chinese competition law.
[35] Jenny F., « Competition Law and Public Restraints, » World Competition, 2016, p. 12 ff.
[36] FOX E., « Antitrust in Emerging Economies », Fordham International Law Journal, 2012, p. 98 ff.
[37] GERADIN D., EU Competition Law and Economics, Oxford, OUP, 2020, p. 54 ff.
[38] UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Industrial Development in Emerging Economies, Geneva, 2018, p. 44 ff.
[39] Cheng T., « Competition Law in East Asia », in Fox E., Trebilcock M. (eds.), The Design of Competition Law Institutions, Oxford, OUP, 2013, p. 256 ff.
[40] Wang S., « Institutional Development of Chinese Antitrust Authorities, » Asia Pacific Law Review, 2017, p. 89 ff.
[41] SOUTY F., « China: The Three Chinese Competition Authorities… « , Concurrences, No. 4-2013, Art. No. 59518, p. 198. For more details: WANG Xiaoye, Competition Law in China, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2014, spec. chaps. 2 and 6.
[42] Ibid.
[43] WANG Xiaoye, Competition Law in China, Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed., 2014, spec. chaps. 4 and 6 on the structure of Anti-Monopoly Law and exemptions based on public policy and economic regulation.
[44] XU G., EMCH A., « The Amendment of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, » CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2022, Spec. on the Integration of Public Policy Objectives into the Revised AML.
[45] Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (2008), arts. 56 and 57 (sectoral exemptions, including agricultural exemptions).
[46] UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition: Commentary and Emerging Practices, Geneva, 2018, p. 67 ff.
[47] TRAUTMANN, Christian; SCHWALBE, Ulrich, European Competition Law: Cases, Texts and Context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2017, 980 p., spec. pp. 215-260 (Art. 101 §3 TFEU) and pp. 310-365 (Art. 106 and 107 TFEU).
[48] Anti-Monopoly Law (2008), chap. V (abuse of administrative power restricting competition). QIAN, Yu; WU, Jinglian, « The Political Economy of Administrative Monopoly in China », China Economic Review, Amsterdam, Elsevier, vol. 23, 2012, pp. 1-12, esp. pp. 5-9, on macroeconomic coordination and incentives of local authorities.
[49] YANG Y., « The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities vs Administrative Agencies », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2019, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 379–385 (tension between enforcement and administration).
[50] AML Amendment 2022, Art. 5 (fair competition review system). V. OECD, Competition Law and Policy in China: 2018 Institutional Reform, OECD Roundtable Report, 2019, pp. 5–14.
[51] UNCTAD, Competition Issues in Developing Countries, Geneva, 2019, p. 102 ff.
[52] OECD, Competition Policy in Emerging Economies: Exemptions and State Intervention, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2019, 180 p., esp. pp. 45-78 (competitive neutrality and the role of the State) UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Industrial Development in Emerging Economies, Geneva, 2018, p. 44 ff.
[53] OECD, Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, Paris, 2015, p. 22 ff.
[54] OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2019, esp. pp. 28–34.
[55] WANG Xiaoye, Competition Law in China, Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed., 2014, esp. p. 180 ff.
[56] Box sources: 1. NDRC, LCD Cartel Decisions (2013) and Auto Parts (2014); see M. Faure, X. Zhang, « China’s Antitrust Enforcement, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2015, p. 215. 2. F. Jenny, « Competition Law Enforcement in China, » World Competition, 2016, p. 23. 3. OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, Paris, 2019, p. 30; see equal. ABA, « Antitrust Enforcement in China, » Antitrust Magazine, 2024.
[57] UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Industrial Development in Emerging Economies, Geneva, 2018, pp. 51–60.
[58] State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly in the Platform Economy Sector, 2021. Available online.
[59] Box sources: 1. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. InterDigital Inc. , Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, 2013; see analysis: « Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: From China’s Perspective, » China Law Vision, 2014. 2. Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, Supreme People’s Court, 2013; v. presentation: « China’s supreme court publishes example antitrust cases, » MLex, 2018; see also summary: Global Compliance News, « Antitrust and Competition in China. » 3. NDRC, Qualcomm decision, 10 Feb. 2015; v. analysis: « A Case Study: … Qualcomm, » Dechert OnPoint, 2015. 4. Zhenguo Wu, Mingming Wu, « Antitrust Enforcement in China: 15 Years in Review, » ABA Antitrust Magazine, 2024, mentioning the Alibaba, Meituan, and Tencent cases. 5. Ibid., indicating 109 cases of abuse of dominance between 2008 and 2023 and significant cumulative sanctions.
[60] OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, supra, pp. 72–85
[61] FOX E., « Antitrust and Globalization », New York University Law Review, 2003, p. 1141 ff. (classically used for a geopolitical reading of merger control)
[62] We have reported on this ban. V. F. Souty and S. Yon-Courtin, « China: The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (…) pronounces the prohibition of a mergerwith extraterritorial scope », Concurrences, No. 3-2014, 17 June 2014. The P3 alliance project in maritime transport between Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM isextremely interesting aimed at pooling their capacities on the world’s main maritime routes, particularly Asia-Europe. While the American and Europeanauthorities had not obstructed the operation — having analyzed it as an operational cooperation that did not eliminate the commercial autonomy of shipowners —the MOFCOM banned the alliance in 2014. The Chinese decision is based on the fear of collective domination on certain strategic routes, which could lead tohigher prices and weaker competition, in particular to the detriment of operators present on the Chinese market. It thus marks a substantial divergence ofassessment between the major competition authorities and illustrates the affirmation of a more interventionist approach, integrating structural and industrialconsiderations. This prohibition is above all an emblematic case of the extraterritorial application of Chinese merger law: although the transaction concernedexclusively foreign companies, its potential effects on maritime trade linked to China were sufficient to justify its ban, revealing the ability of the Chineseregulator to directly influence the structuring of world markets.
[63] Box sources: 1. MOFCOM, « Announcement No. 22 of 2009 on Prohibiting the Acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group by Coca-Cola, » March 18, 2009; see OECD, Competition Policy in China, Paris, 2011, p. 38. 2. OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, Paris, 2019, pp. 26-30; see also S. Wang, « China’s Merger Remedies Practice, » Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2015, p. 212. 3. A. Zhang, « Extraterritorial Application of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, » Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2011, p. 715. 4. Financial Times, « Nvidia abandons $66bn Arm deal amid regulatory opposition, » Feb. 8, 2022; Reuters, « Intel terminates Tower deal after failing to secure China approval, » Aug. 16, 2023. 5. OECD, OECD Competition Trends, 2023, p. 54; v. equal. PETIT, N. European Competition Law, Paris, LGDJ, 2022, 996 p. for a comparative perspective, or more synthetic, SOUTY, F., Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Union Européenne, Paris, Montchrestien-LGDJ, 2013, coll. Clefs, 4th ed. 160 p.
[64] UNCTAD, Digital Economy Report 2021, Geneva, 2021, Esp. Chapter IV
[65] SAMR, Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy Sector, 2021. Available online.
[66] OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: China, Paris, 2022, spec. sections on competition and foreign companies.
[67] Cheng T., « Competition Law in East Asia », in Fox E., Trebilcock M. (eds.), The Design of Competition Law Institutions, Oxford, OUP, 2013, p. 256 ff.
[68] Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock, « The Design of Competition Law Systems: China in Comparative Perspective, » Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2023, pp. 412–446.
[69] OECD, Competition Policy in China: Institutional Developments and Enforcement Trends, OECD Publishing, 2020, pp. 14–26.
[70] William E. Kovacic, « China’s Competition Law in a Global Context: Institutional Design, Enforcement Priorities and Industrial Policy Interfaces, » Georgetown Law Review, 2022, pp. 1187–1235.
[71] OECD, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in China, OECD Roundtables, 2022, pp. 31–42.
[72] See our series of articles, each with a section devoted to Chinese regulation of the digital economy: SOUTY François, « European Digital Markets Act, competition policy and sovereignty: Geopolitical consequences and strategic impact of the law on the digital economy », Le Diplomate Média, 05/02/2026; SOUTY, F., « Cyberspace, security, sovereignty, technology and global geopolitical rivalries: Legal issues, regulation and priorities for the European Union and France, United States, china and Russia », Le Diplomate Média, 12/02/2026; SOUTY, F. « Artificial Intelligence, Normative Sovereignty and Geopolitics: The Fragmentation of Global Governance Between Technological Powers », Le Diplomate Média, 03.03.2026.
[73] See, in particular, South China Morning Post, « China’s tech giants vow to fix algorithm issues amid government crackdown, » Jan. 4, 2025; « China warns platforms on monopolistic tactics such as ‘lowest-price’ requirement, » Dec. 17, 2025 (illustrating the « tech crackdown » phase and the intensification of Chinese authorities’ interventions against large digital platforms).
[74] Fox, E.M. & Trebilcock, M. J., op. cit., pp. 420–438.
[75] OECD, Competition Policy and Inclusive Growth: China Case Study (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2022), pp. 31–42, esp. pp. 33–37 (analysis of the link between economic concentration, inequality and the extension of the tasks of competition authorities); see also. OECD, Promoting Competition for Inclusive Growth, Paris, 2018, pp. 15–22; see also OECD, OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: China, Paris, 2019, pp. 28–32 (evolution of competition policy objectives in China).
[76] OECD, Global Competition Law Convergence and Divergence, OECD Competition Committee Roundtables, DAF/COMP(2023)3, Paris, 2023, pp. 22–37, esp. pp. 25–30 (on the logics of national ownership of international standards); v. equal. UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition: Commentary, Geneva, United Nations, 2018 (re-ed. 2020), chaps. I and II; see also ZHANG, A., « The Evolution of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, » Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2020, pp. 1–35.
[77] KOVACIC, William E., « China’s Competition Law in a Global Context: Institutional Design, Enforcement Priorities and Industrial Policy Interfaces, » Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 110, 2022, pp. 1187–1235, esp. pp. 1210–1228; see also id., « The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, » Antitrust Law Journal, 2003, p. 377 (for a comparative perspective on model hybridization); see also FOX E.M. and TREBILCOCK, M. J. op. cit. , spec. pp. 420–438.
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