ANALYSIS – Competition law and policy in Europe in 2025: A review of the first year of the von der Leyen II Commission

By François Souty

Executive Summary

The first year of the European Commission Von der Leyen II, marked by the appointment of Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Directorate for Competition, constitutes a strategic and institutional turning point for the European Union. This period is distinguished by a rather subtly but decisive redefinition of competition policy, in which the classic repressive logic, inherited from Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, now coexists with a preventive and sectoral approach. Ribera has introduced an increased sensitivity to the challenges of ecological transition and digital sovereignty, reflecting a clear desire to guide the market towards so-called more sustainable and equitable practices. The Commission continues to use traditional antitrust law instruments, as evidenced by the emblematic decisions against Google AdTech or the investigations opened against Apple and Meta, but it also incorporates the Digital Markets Act, which establishes a structural framework for dominant digital platforms, distinct from but complementary to traditional competition policy.

As a result of this strategic and economic change, this first year reveals tensions and complex trade-offs between competitiveness and regulation. Mario Draghi’s critical analyses have warned against the risk of overly cautious regulation slowing down innovation and growth.  Influential German voices, such as Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the President of the German Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt), Andreas Mundt, have also stressed the need for a credible, coherent and predictable framework that can maintain business and consumer confidence. Ribera, for his part, insisted on the need to go beyond the purely punitive logic, by articulating sanctions and preventive measures to structure digital markets and promote the ecological transition. This unprecedented combination reflects a vision in which competition policy becomes an instrument of economic and strategic regulation, aimed at supporting innovation while imposing the new principles of sustainability and fairness.

The articulation between the Commission and the European Parliament, in particular through the annual report led this year by MEP Stéphanie Yon-Courtin (Renew), illustrates the importance of transparency and democratic control, showing that European regulation is not limited to technical decisions but must be part of a broader institutional dialogue. Compared to the first Vestager period, 2025 reveals a more integrated approach, combining classic sanctions, sectoral regulation and environmental objectives, while strengthening coordination with national authorities and strategic economic actors. This dynamic allows the European Union to reconcile the protection of the internal market, international competitiveness and societal regulation, confirming that competition policy reinforces its dimension as a lever for European economic and digital sovereignty, and seeking to be a vector of innovation.

Thus, the first year of Executive Vice-President Ribera illustrates a transition or even a profound change in European competition policy: it is no longer limited to sanctioning anti-competitive behaviour, but aims to shape the market, to direct competition towards so-called sustainable practices while claiming to aim to strengthen the Union’s competitiveness in a globalised and digital context,  without necessarily considering that the strengthening of environmental standards is deemed to exert upward pressure on costs, which is precisely what many developing or even developed countries (currently the United States) reject.

Introduction

The first year of implementation of European competition policy under the Von der Leyen II Commission marks a major strategic and institutional turning point for the European Union. The appointment of Commission Vice-President Teresa Ribera to oversee the Competition Directorate is not limited to a simple continuity with Commissioner Vestager’s logic, but reflects a subtle but decisive redefinition of the architecture of competition regulation.^[1] In a few weeks’ time, we should find these characteristics in the annual report on competition policy that is due to be presented by the Commission to the European Parliament at the end of April. The idea came to us to anticipate this assessment a little in this article. 

Since 2025, the traditional instruments of antitrust law — Articles 101 to 109 TFEU — have coexisted with more proactive sectoral regulation, in particular through the Digital Markets Act (DMA),^[2] reinforcing the logic of a priori regulatory intervention, prevention and market structuringrather than ex post sanctions, and therefore exclusively retroactive.

Ursula von der Leyen set the roadmap, responding to the concern expressed by several Member States during her first term in office: « the European Union must reconcile competitiveness and sustainability, innovation and fairness« ,^[3] stressing that competition policy is not only a repressive tool but also a strategic lever for the European economy and society. This vision is in line with the Commission’s ambitions to position Europe as a global player that is both innovative and regulated, by trying to compete with the major technological powers while introducing ethical and environmental standards. Teresa Ribera took up this framework in her speeches: « Our approach is not limited to sanctions: it aims to guide the market towards sustainable and fair practices, integrating the ecological and digital transition« ,^[4] thus confirming the strategic and preventive dimension of its policy, including a new environmental and green transition variable.

This development contrasts with the previous Vestager period, for whom « competition is the engine of innovation and consumer protection remains our compass« .^[5] The von der Leyen II Commission now advocates for a more global interpretation, combining economic objectives and digital sovereignty issues, with an increased integration of environmental objectives.

However, Mario Draghi’s major critical contributions fortunately warn against a process of remobilisation and order: « the EU cannot be satisfied with defensive regulation; it must rethink its structural competitiveness. »^[6] These analyses underscore the importance of a fine balance between market control and growth dynamics, a balance that influential German players are watching closely. Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz warns: « Europe cannot sacrifice growth on the altar of regulatory prudence. »^[7] For his part, Andreas Mundt, president of the BKartA, insists: « European regulation must be coherent and credible to maintain the confidence of businesses and consumers« .^[8]

At the institutional level, 2025 is a year of simultaneous convergence and tension. The Commission’s emblematic decisions, such as the record fine imposed on Google AdTech or the opening of antitrust investigations against Apple and Meta, testify to a desire to assert the power of sanctioning in the field of the digital economy while calibrating the economic impact.^[9] At the same time, the implementation of the DMA illustrates the desire to act upstream, by imposing structural obligations on dominant platforms in order to ensure effective competition in the digital market.^[10]

The analysis proposed in this article is intended to be threefold: legal, economic and strategic. From a legal point of view, it will be a question of documenting and criticising the application of the classic rules and those of the DMA, with attention to the Commission’s decisions and press releases.^[11] On the economic level, it will be a question of measuring the effects of these measures on European competitiveness, by mobilising the justified criticisms of Mario Draghi and the reports of the European Parliament led by Stéphanie YonCourtin.^[12] Finally, on the strategic and geopolitical level, the article will seek to understand how the Commission succeeds — or does not succeed — in articulating economic sovereignty, digital innovation and societal regulation in an increasingly hyper-competitive international context. In addition, a table in Appendix 1 aims to provide a very informative and precise summary of the objects and themes of the speeches delivered by Mrs. Ribera since her appointment.  The aim is to assess the tension between continuity and rupture, between traditional rules and sectoral regulation, and between punitive sanctions and strategic guidance of the markets.

I – Institutional context and appointment of Teresa Ribera

For several decades, European competition policy has been a central instrument for the construction and integration of Member States’ markets and the consolidation of the single market. It is at the crossroads of law, economics and industrial strategy, articulating regulatory imperatives with the objectives of competitiveness and innovation. The first year of the Von der Leyen II Commission, whose competition policy implemented by DG Competition under the authority of the Commission’s First Vice-President in charge of competition Ribera, marks a pivotal moment. It is the one whose normative choices and operational decisions reveal the Commission’s new ambitions: to combine legal rigour and adaptation to digital and technological changes and the environmental transition. As Ursula von der Leyen stressed, « competition policy must remain the guarantor of open and fair markets, while accompanying the economic and technological transitions that shape our future« .^[13] This reflection requires the articulation of economic and legal analyses.  

A. Institutional and historical foundations

European competition policy is based on historical principles established since the creation of the internal market and the Treaty of Rome. The European Commission, as guardian of these principles, has developed a set of legal tools to ensure fairness and free competition throughout the EU. As Ursula von der Leyen recalled, « competition policy is one of the essential pillars of European prosperity and consumer protection« .^[14]

The year 2025 marks an institutional turning point for European competition policy with the appointment of Teresa Ribera, former Spanish Socialist Minister for Ecological Transition and the Environment. She succeeds Danish liberal Margrethe Vestager, whose mandate had consolidated the rigorous application of European antitrust law, in particular through record fines imposed on major digital platforms.^[15]Through Ursula von der Leyen’s will, Ms Ribera brings a particular sensitivity – new in the European executive area – to the challenges of sustainability and innovation and a holistic vision of economic regulation.^[16]

This appointment should illustrate continuity in the European legal tradition while introducing an increased environmental and strategic dimension. Margrethe Vestager had established a robust jurisprudential framework, which the CJEU has largely validated in cases such as Hoffmann-La Roche, United Brands and Microsoft, defining the contours of dominant position and abusive practices.^[17] Teresa Ribera, while affirming that she respects this heritage, insisted on anticipatory and sectoral regulation, particularly in the digital and strategic sectors with this new ecological component.^[18] During her inaugural speech in Brussels, she stated that « competition cannot be considered only as an instrument of sanction: it must be a lever to guide the market towards sustainable and fair practices« .^[19]

The influence of German actors, such as Chancellor Merz and President Mundt, has been decisive in defining the direction for competitiveness. They stressed the need for « consistent and credible regulation to maintain business and consumer confidence » ^[20] and a balance between growth and regulatory prudence.^[21] The President of the Bundeskartellamt regularly insists on the structuring role of competition in the European economic strategy to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness. 

For Andreas Mundt, the new Commission’s objective of competitiveness should not lead to a relaxation of merger control, faithful to its ordoliberal inspiration, and not necessarily in line with the dominant vision of France and other European countries:  » to think that we need large companies, therefore less merger control and less competition,  is totally short-sighted . »^[22] In a similar perspective, obviously coordinated but more general, Chancellor Merz believes that strengthening European competitiveness presupposes a transformation of the Union’s economic framework, involving  » more open markets, more innovation and more competition « ,^[23] as well as a reduction in the regulatory constraints weighing on economic activity, in line with Mario Draghi’s above-mentioned report. Germany’s influence on the general direction of European competition policy, which has been constant for decades, remains significant, whose officials have regularly stressed the need to combine legal rigour with a long-term strategic vision. This ordoliberal orientation has most likely conditioned Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment of key officials such as Teresa Ribera, who is nevertheless a very strong socialist, whose vision combines competitive efficiency with very interventionist climate and industrial (so-called « sustainable ») or « technological » (in practice, digital) views.

Contemporary economic work provides a complementary analytical framework. Philippe Aghion and the Nobel Prize in Economics Jean Tirole insisted on the central role of competition in stimulating innovation and investment. As Aghion points out, « well-calibrated competition is an engine of growth and technological renewal. »^[24] These analyses make it possible to link international economic doctrine to European legal rigour.

Box 1  

Merger control in the European Union

Merger control is one of the oldest and most structuring instruments of European competition policy. It is governed mainly by Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Merger Regulation) and its implementing regulations, supplemented by interpretative guidelines and communications. The purpose of this procedure is to prevent concentrations (mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures) from creating or strengthening a dominant position likely to significantly distort competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it: the prospective analysis is based on quantitative (turnover thresholds) and qualitative (effects on competition,  innovation and consumption).

The European Commission examines each notified merger and may clear the transaction unconditionally, clear the transaction subject to a commitment (e.g. divestiture of assets) or prohibit the transaction if it considers that it would lead to irreversible anti-competitive effects. In 2025, the Commission adopted 370 merger decisions, illustrating the intensity of control that is still very active in the service of competition, innovation and the integrity of the single market. The analysis of mergers is also based on broader policy considerations, such as international competitiveness and sectoral industrial priorities. In 2025, several decision-makers, notably in France and Germany, have stressed the need to adapt the European merger guidelines to better take into account the innovation, sustainability and resilience of value chains, without compromising the predictability and legal certainty of the review of transactions.

Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness proposes  to reform merger control by introducing a more forward-looking analysis focused on innovation. In particular, it recommends the creation of an « innovation defence », allowing certain mergers to be authorised if companies demonstrate that they are strengthening their capacity for innovation and long-term investment. The report also suggests simplifying control procedures and clarifying certain tools of the Merger Regulation, in order to facilitate industrial groupings when they allow them to reach a global critical mass. The aim is to enable the emergence of European companies capable of competing with large American and Chinese firms in technological and strategic sectors

B. The strategic and economic dimension of Teresa Ribera’s appointment

Ribera’s appointment is also part of a broader strategic logic, aimed at articulating competition policy, industrial competitiveness and economic sovereignty, not necessarily reflecting the political shifts at the last EU Parliamentary election, with a decaying ecologists vote and a strengthening of the Centre-Right parties votes. Yet, Ursula von der Leyen recalled that « the European Union must reconcile competitiveness and sustainability, innovation and fairness« .^[25] This orientation is reflected in enhanced coordination between the Commission and the national competition authorities and in particular attention to macroeconomic and sectoral impacts, the preferred tool of which is the European Competition Network (often refered to as the ECN Network).^[26]

The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) illustrates this evolution. It has recently been pointed out that « the DMA represents a new stage in the balance between regulation and competitive dynamism in digital markets« .^[27] This sectoral regulation complements traditional antitrust policy and reflects the ambition to prevent structural distortions rather than limiting itself to sanctioning a posteriori. Ribera recently said in an interview with the Financial Times : « The EU can no longer be satisfied with sanctions after the fact: we must prevent structural distortions and regulate digital markets before they become critical. »^[28]

International economic doctrine rather supports this orientation towards digital markets. As we have seen, Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole insist on the central role of competition in stimulating innovation and growth.^[29] Fiona Scott Morton stresses the need to preserve the balance between incentives to invest and regulation,^[30] while Jacques Crémer analyses the conditions of competition on digital platforms to avoid lasting distortions.^[31]

Mario Draghi, for his part, possibly reflecting a more Centre-Right approach reflected at the EU Parliament after the 2024 elections, warned of the priority of strengthening Europe’s structural competitiveness and of a regulatory reform affirmed by a reported reduction in standards and legislative, regulatory and administrative texts that are far too numerous (more than double that of the United States), to respond to global challenges.^[32]

Box 2

Evolution of the control of State Aid related to the Ecological Transition in 2025

The ecological transition is one of the major elements of the new policy defined by Mrs Ribera and State aid is an important factor in the implementation of European competition policy, which Mrs Ribera intends to use as a major lever for her action. The recent review and normative activity in the field of State aid testify to a profound evolution of European competition policy, which is now considered a key instrument to support structural transitions. In particular, the rules on State aid related to the green transition have been adapted to commit Member States to support significant green investments without unfairly distorting competition. But not all states have significant amounts of money to be able to commit to such subsidies.

At the heart of this mechanism are Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which set out the legal framework for state aid control. These articles require that any public aid likely to affect trade between Member States must be notified to the Commission and can be declared compatible with the internal market if it pursues an objective of common interest, such as environmental protection or the efficient energy transition.

In practice, the Commission has applied these rules to aid schemes to support the production of renewable energy, the improvement of the energy efficiency of buildings, and the creation of hubs for electric charging infrastructure. For example, in its analysis of French aid for the deployment of fast charging stations, the Commission stressed that « measures may be compatible with the Treaty if they are targeted, proportionate and do not unnecessarily exclude efficient competitors« .^[33] As a result, this aid has been authorised under strict conditions of transparency and non-discrimination.

The case law of the CJEU provides a solid interpretative basis for these decisions. Thus, in France Télécom v. Commission, Case C82/01 P, the Court recalled that « the purpose of the control of State aid is not to prohibit all public intervention, but to prevent selective advantages from distorting competition to an unjustified extent« .^[34] This statement is regularly taken up in decisions to grant aid for the ecological transition: the emphasis is placed on the proportionality of the aid, its objective selectivity and its limited competitive impact.

In practice, DG COMP ensures that such aid does not lead to lasting distortions. In several cases in 2025, support schemes aimed at industrial decarbonisation were authorised on the condition that they include competitive rotation mechanisms and environmental performance commitments, ensuring both ecological efficiency and the preservation of healthy competition. This framework reflects a synthesis between the climate imperatives of the Green Deal and the legal requirements of European competition law.^[35]

C. Doctrinal criticisms and prospects for development

The first year of Ribera’s term in office was also characterized by intense doctrinal debates. Cristina Caffarra stresses that « the historical success of European competition policy was based on the rigour of its economic analysis and the predictability of the legal framework« .^[36] Criticism focuses on the increasing complexity of the regulatory framework and the risk of dilution of the traditional economic approach.

The recent case law of the CJEU illustrates these tensions. The Google Shopping, Illumina/Grail and CK Telecoms judgments demonstrate the adaptation of competition law to new digital and strategic challenges.^[37] These decisions confirm that the Commission can sanction anticompetitive practices while integrating sectoral and policy considerations.

Stéphanie Yon Courtin’s annual report to the European Parliament reinforces this approach, rightly insisting on the need to combine efficiency, transparency and democratic control.^[38] The whole shows that competition policy is no longer limited to sanctioning, but is becoming a strategic tool to orient the market in advance, support innovation and accompany the ecological and digital transition. The question remains how to avoid possible misguidance by institutional policymakers with limited personal experience with the fundamentals of market efficiency. An example of a colossal strategic error of this type can be found in the major strategic error of having oriented the European energy system towards the reduction or even elimination of energy production from nuclear power plants on which Europeans (especially French) had a world leadership.^[39]  

Box 3

Competition policy and industrial policy: between tensions, trade-offs and strategic convergence

The first year of Teresa Ribera’s mandate highlights a structuring issue for the European Union: how to articulate competition policy and industrial policy in a context of increased economic rivalries, with the introduction of a new component of environmental policy that tends to be more integrated into an industrial policy than a competition policy. Traditionally, these two logics are based on distinct foundations. Competition policy, enshrined in Articles 101 to 109 TFEU, aims to ensure the opening of markets, prevent rents and protect the consumer. Conversely, industrial policy, which is not mentioned in the European Treaties, pursues the objectives of economic power, structuring of sectors and support for sectors considered strategic and traditionally falling within the economic sovereignty of the Member States.

This duality feeds a classic tension. A strict application of competition law can slow down the creation of « European champions », in particular through merger control or the discipline of state aid. Conversely, a proactive industrial policy can introduce distortions of competition, fragment the internal market and weaken allocative efficiency.

However, the opposition between these two policies is now tending to diminish. Under the impetus of the Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen, competition policy is increasingly part of a global economic strategy, integrating the objectives of competitiveness, ecological transition and digital sovereignty. The introduction of instruments such as the Digital Markets Act or the regulated relaxation of State aid illustrates this evolution towards more proactive and structuring regulation.

Contemporary debates nevertheless reflect persistent fault lines. Mario Draghi’s analyses argue for an adaptation of the rules and a reduction in the overabundance of standards in Europe, in order to promote innovation and the critical size of European companies, while ordoliberal approaches, notably supported by Andreas Mundt, remind us that competitive intensity remains a key driver of growth.

From then on, the challenge is no longer to choose between competition and industrial policy, but to organize their complementarity. Competition policy becomes a framework instrument, ensuring that public interventions remain proportionate and non-discriminatory, while industrial policy corrects market failures and supports long-term investments.

The recent period thus marks the emergence of a pragmatic approach: competition is no longer just an end in itself, but a lever in the service of an integrated European economic strategy. However, the balance remains fragile, based on a fine line between economic efficiency, industrial ambition and the cohesion of the internal market. And the balance in question totally omits the possible existence of national or even intergovernmental industrial policies (such as Airbus) in the European context.

II – The strategic redefinition of European competition policy under the Von der Leyen II Commission

The first year of the Von der Leyen II Commission’s activity is a particularly revealing moment in the contemporary evolution of European competition policy. Without calling into question the fundamental principles that have structured this area since the beginning of the internal market, the Commission has undertaken an in-depth reflection on the role that competition policy must play in an economic environment that has been profoundly transformed by the digital revolution, the ecological transition and the rise of international economic rivalries.

This reflection is taking place in a context where competition policy is gradually tending to be integrated into a broader economic strategy aimed at strengthening the competitiveness and economic sovereignty of the European Union. As already mentioned, Ursula von der Leyen has stressed in several speeches on the Commission’s strategic direction that competition policy must continue to ensure fair markets while supporting the European economy’s capacity for innovation and growth. In this context, the action taken by Teresa Ribera since the beginning of her mandate demonstrates a desire to articulate the European antitrust tradition with the new economic challenges facing the Union.  Without abandoning everything of the past, several changes have been announced in relation to the European competition policy that has been conducted for several decades. This development is already being scrutinized by observers attentive to questions of economic efficiency but also of industrial, continental or national policy. 

A. Doctrinal continuity with the approach developed under the Vestager Commission

The first characteristic of the policy carried out in 2025 lies in the doctrinal continuity with the approach developed over the previous decade under the impetus of Margrethe Vestager. During his tenure, European competition policy has been characterised by a particularly vigorous application of antitrust law (antitrust and abuse of dominant position), particularly in the digital sector.

The decisions adopted by the Commission in several cases involving digital platforms have helped to affirm the European Union’s ability to regulate companies operating globally. As Margrethe Vestager recalled, « competition rules exist to ensure that even the most powerful companies respect the fundamental principles of the market. »^[40]

This approach has been largely confirmed by the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see Annex 2 for the summary table of major competition cases in 2025). In this respect, the Google Shopping judgment is an important step in consolidating the Commission’s analysis of self-preference practices in digital markets.^[41] The Court recognises that the exploitation by a dominant undertaking of its market power in order to favour its own services may constitute an abuse of a dominant position where that practice is likely to exclude competitors.

In the same vein, the Towercast judgment delivered in 2023 provided an important clarification as to the relationship between merger control and the application of Article 102 TFEU. The Court accepts that certain acquisitions made by a dominant undertaking may be examined in the light of the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position even when they fall outside the definitions of European merger control.^[42]

These developments in case law bear witness to the ability of European competition law to gradually adapt to the structural transformations of the contemporary economy.

Table 1

Comparative Evolution of European Competition Policy Doctrine, 2014-2026

Analytical dimensions	Approach under Margrethe Vestager (2014-2024)	Orientation under Teresa Ribera (since 2024)
General philosophy	Rigorous enforcement of competition law to safeguard the functioning of the internal market	Integration of competition into a broader economic strategy of sovereignty and resilience, particularly environmental resilience.
Central Objective	Protection of effective competition and consumer welfare	Protection of competition while supporting European competitiveness, sustainability and strategic autonomy.
Sectoral priorities	Fight against abuses by large digital platforms; Development of merger control in the digital sector	Competition in digital markets, but also articulation with the energy transition, strategic value chains and AI.
Relationship with industrial policy	Prudent approach to avoid distortions of competition	More explicit coordination between competition, industrial policy and economic security.
International dimension	Promoting competition standards in international forums	Use of competition policy as an instrument for the European Union’s normative and geo-economic projection.
Geopolitical dimension	Present but relatively implicit	Assumed dimension: competition designed as a tool for economic resilience and strategic autonomy.
Role in global governance	Normative leadership based on the credibility of European antitrust enforcement	Leadership combining legal standards, industrial strategy and regulation of global markets.

B. Increasing consideration of the challenges of competitiveness and economic sovereignty

While continuity with the previous approach remains important, the competition policy conducted under the Von der Leyen II Commission is also characterised by increased attention to international competitiveness issues.

This development is in line with the analyses developed in the report on the future of European competitiveness led by Mario Draghi. As a reminder, this report stresses the need for the European Union to strengthen its competitiveness, its capacity for innovation and investment in order to face competition from the world’s major economies, in particular by changing merger control.^[43]

In this context, competition policy is increasingly seen as an instrument that can contribute to the EU’s overall economic strategy. Teresa Ribera said that « competition policy must accompany major economic transitions while guaranteeing the opening and fairness of markets« .^[44] A question may arise as to whether it is totally rational from a global economic point of view to equate the transition to the digital economy (the objective technological result of scientific evolution) with the transition to a green economy, (an ideological factor resulting from a political assertion that is subjective to say the least), which is not unanimously shared, in particular by the « Global South ». This will require a reflection on the geopolitical limits of such an assimilation, if not contradictory, at least heterogeneous. 

Several economists have also stressed the importance of the link between competition and innovation. Philippe Aghion’s work has shown that competition can play a decisive role in stimulating technological innovation by encouraging companies to invest in research and development in order to maintain their position in the market. In a similar perspective, Jean Tirole stresses that the regulation of digital platforms must be designed in such a way as to preserve incentives for innovation while limiting the risks of lasting market dominance. According to him, « the regulation of platforms must preserve the balance between market opening and investment incentives« .^[45]

Box 4

The geopolitical dimension of competition policy in Teresa Ribera’s speeches

Since her appointment as Executive Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of competition, Teresa Ribera has progressively articulated competition policy around a strategic vision integrating the geopolitical transformations of the global economy. The analysis of its public interventions since the end of 2024 makes it possible to identify three structuring doctrinal axes from a geopolitical perspective.^[46]

1. A competition policy at the service of European economic resilience.

In several speeches, the Vice-President stressed that competition policy could no longer be seen as a mere instrument of market discipline. It must also contribute to the European Union’s industrial and technological resilience in the face of trade tensions and the industrial strategies of the major powers. This approach is part of a broader reflection on European strategic autonomy and the ability of the internal market to support innovation and investment.

2. The integration of digital and climate issues into the competitive analysis.

Teresa Ribera’s speeches also focus on the adaptation of antitrust instruments to the structural transformations of the digital economy and the ecological transition. The regulation of large platforms, the application of the Digital Markets Act and the consideration of climate objectives in certain industrial cooperation are presented as essential elements of a competition policy compatible with the Union’s objectives of economic transformation.

3. Competition as an instrument of international economic governance.

Finally, a third dimension of his interventions concerns the role of competition policy in global economic governance. Teresa Ribera insists on the need to strengthen international cooperation between competition authorities in order to preserve open markets and avoid excessive fragmentation of the global economic system. In this perspective, competition policy also appears to be a tool for the European Union’s normative projection and geo-economic influence, particularly in dialogue with the United States, emerging economies and international organisations.

Overall, these positions reflect a notable doctrinal evolution: European competition policy tends to be thought of not only as an instrument for regulating markets, but also as a strategic lever for economic sovereignty, innovation and normative influence in an international context marked by the rise of geo-economic rivalries.

These analyses contribute to the contemporary debate on the evolution of the European competition model and on the way in which it can contribute to the international competitiveness of the European economy.

C. The emergence of a doctrinal debate on the transformation of the European competition model

Recent developments in European competition policy are also giving rise to a particularly intense doctrinal debate. Several economists and specialists in competition law have expressed some reservations about the gradual extension of economic regulation instruments in this area.

In an analysis devoted to the regulation of digital markets, we have just pointed out that the Digital Markets Act introduces « a form of asymmetric regulation intended to correct the structural failures of competition in ecosystems dominated by large digital platforms« .^[47]

However, this development is also the subject of criticism. Fiona Scott Morton points out that the proliferation of regulatory instruments applicable to digital platforms could increase the complexity of the economic regulatory framework.^[48]

In the same spirit, Cristina Caffarra made several criticisms of the contemporary development of European competition policy. In several contributions published on her blog Competition Unfiltered, she observes that « the historic success of European competition policy was based on the soundness of its economic analysis and the predictability of its legal framework« .^[49]

These criticisms highlight a fundamental tension that runs through the European debate on competition today. On the one hand, the structural transformations of the digital economy seem to justify the introduction of new regulatory instruments. On the other hand, many observers fear that this development will lead to a dilution of the rigorous economic approach that has long been the strength of the European competition model.

The European Commission is trying to address these concerns by affirming the complementarity between traditional antitrust law and new instruments of economic regulation. The objective is to preserve the coherence of the legal framework while developing tools and reforms capable of responding to the specific challenges of the digital economy. The Draghi Report adopted by the Commission in the second half of 2024 added the need to impose the strengthening of European competitiveness, including reforms to competition policy, particularly with regard to merger control (see box).

Box 5

Revised merger guidelines in connection with the Draghi report

The report commissioned from Mario Draghi and published in 2024 highlighted the need to rethink certain economic regulation instruments in order to strengthen the European Union’s global competitiveness. Among the recommendations are adaptations to the merger control framework, to include more elements such as innovation, resilience of value chains and environmental impact.

In this context, the European Commission has initiated a revision of the Merger Guidelines that accompany the application of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The current guidelines inform the assessment of significant anti-competitive effects (SIEC test) and guide the quantitative and qualitative analyses carried out by DG COMP.

The current revision aims to codify the integration of several strategic criteria: (1) the dynamic effects on innovation, particularly in the technology and pharmaceutical sectors, echoing recent case law (Illumina/Grail, case C632/23, 15 July 2025) which focuses on the impact on future innovation⁵.^[50] (2) the resilience of value chains, particularly in sectors deemed critical (semiconductors, batteries, biotechnology), in order to avoid mergers reducing the EU’s ability to cope with external shocks. (3) environmental effects, including the consideration of energy transitions in the assessment of competitive impacts, in line with the objectives of the Green Deal.

These guidelines do not change the legal framework for merger regulation; rather, they aim to adapt the analytical criteria to take account of changing economic contexts without sacrificing antitrust rigour. In other words, DG COMP continues to base its decisions on the same body of law, but needs to enrich its analysis of competitive effects to include long-term strategic elements.

This development is reflected in several decisions in 2025 where commitments were required to address competition concerns related to potentially lasting effects, such as in the case  of UniCredit / Banco BPM (conditional authorisation with branch sales) or Brasserie Nationale / Boissons Heintz (conditional authorisation with commitments in Luxembourg)⁶.^[51] These examples show that the revised guidelines are not only theoretical: they influence the practical application of merger law, bringing traditional antitrust analysis closer to a broader view of competitiveness and European industrial strategy.

From this perspective, the first year of Teresa Ribera’s mandate appears to be a period of doctrinal and institutional transition. European competition policy remains deeply rooted in its fundamental principles, but it is gradually becoming part of a broader economic strategy that aims to guarantee the competitiveness and resilience of the European economy, in an economic context that is nevertheless depressed and unfortunately persists over time.

III – The emblematic decisions of 2025 and the doctrinal evolution of European competition policy

The analysis of the first year of application of European competition policy under Teresa Ribera’s responsibility cannot be limited to an examination of the Commission’s decision-making practice. It must also be placed in the broader context of a particularly intense doctrinal and economic debate concerning the contemporary evolution of the European competition model.

For several years, the digital economy and the structural transformation of global markets have profoundly changed the conditions for the application of antitrust law. Large digital platforms now occupy a central position in the organisation of many markets, characterised by the power of network effects, the massive accumulation of data and the vertical integration of complex digital ecosystems. In this context, European competition policy is faced with a double challenge: to preserve the coherence of its traditional legal instruments while developing new tools capable of responding to the structural transformations of the contemporary economy.

The first year of Teresa Ribera’s mandate is precisely part of this dynamic of doctrinal transition. It reflects a desire to maintain the analytical rigour of traditional antitrust law while gradually integrating more structural regulatory instruments, first and foremost the Digital Markets Act.

A. Strengthening antitrust action in the light of recent case law of the Court of Justice

The consolidation of European antitrust law is largely based on the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has helped to clarify the conditions for the application of Article 102 TFEU in digital markets. An annexed table summarises this case law as a whole.

The Google Shopping stop is an important step. In that decision, the Court confirmed the Commission’s analysis that certain self-preference practices implemented by a dominant undertaking may constitute an abuse of a dominant position when they have the effect of distorting competition in a related market.^[52] This case law marks an important evolution in the understanding of the behaviour of large digital platforms, by recognising that the vertical integration of a digital ecosystem can create specific risks for competition.

The Intel judgment has also been instrumental in clarifying the analytical requirements imposed on the Commission when examining exclusivity or loyalty practices. The Court recalls that the analysis of the abuse of a dominant position must be based on a thorough economic assessment of the potential effects of the contested practice on effective competition.^[53]

More recently, the Servier judgment has helped to clarify the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU in the context of so-called pay-for-delayagreements in the pharmaceutical sector. This decision underlines the importance of a rigorous economic analysis of the anti-competitive effects of agreements between dominant companies and potential competitors.^[54]

These decisions illustrate the growing sophistication of European competition jurisprudence. As Andreas Mundt, President of the Bundeskartellamt, observed, « the digital economy requires competition authorities to adapt their analytical instruments to take into account network effects, data centrality and the structuring of digital ecosystems« .^[55] The European Commission relies heavily on this jurisprudential development in the proceedings it is currently conducting against several major technology companies. The aim is to preserve the contestability of digital markets while ensuring legally robust antitrust enforcement.

Box 6

European Commission competition case law (Antitrust, Mergers, State Aid and SRF) in 2025

The first year of the Von der Leyen II Commission, under the leadership of Teresa Ribera, is part of a historical continuity of European case law while integrating new economic and technological challenges. European competition law rests on solid foundations, in particular landmark judgments such as HoffmannLa Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, of 13 February 1979, and United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76, of 14 February 1978, which defined the contours of dominance and market power.^[56] These classic references remain crucial for interpreting the current practices of the large digital platforms, in particular when the Commission examines potentially abusive behaviour. A table in Annex 1 summarises the Commission’s major competition cases in 2025. 

More recent case law, such as Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission, Case T201/04, 17 September 2007, has clarified the duty of interoperability and the provision of essential information by a dominant undertaking, thus anticipating the contemporary issues of integrated platforms. In the same spirit, the 2025 decisions, in particular Illumina/Grail, case C632/23, of 15 July 2025, and CK Telecoms, case C124/24, of 12 March 2025, illustrate the gradual adaptation of antitrust law to innovative and strategic markets. These judgments confirm that the Commission can sanction anticompetitive practices while integrating broader sectoral and economic considerations, thus aligning its strategy with Ribera’s vision of anticipating distortions rather than simply punishing them.^[57]

In the field of merger control, these recent judgments show that the CJEU takes into account not only the size and market share of the companies concerned, but also the structural and dynamic effects on innovation and industrial competitiveness. Ex ante control over the strategic acquisitions of innovative companies thus becomes an instrument of industrial policy, consistent with the economic orientations outlined by Mario Draghi.^[58]

At the same time, the control of State aid remains a structuring axis of European case law. Classic decisions such as France Télécom v. Commission, Case C82/01 P, 13 June 2006, and Alcan v Commission, Case T301/04, of 18 July 2007, recall that the compatibility of public aid must be strictly regulated in order to avoid any distortion of competition.^[59] These legal bases make it possible to assess the legitimacy of national measures and to guide enhanced cooperation with national authorities such as the FCA in France or the BKartA in Germany, which are actively involved in the consistent implementation of EU law.

Finally, the implementation of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) in 2025 is an unprecedented step. Conditional decisions such as the one on ADNOC’s acquisition of Covestro, published in November 2025, set out the first operational criteria to analyse the impact of foreign subsidies on the single market and ensure fair competition.^[60] Although this case law is still in its infancy, it illustrates the strategic extension of competition policy to new dimensions, integrating issues of economic sovereignty and industrial security.

All of this case-law, ranging from landmark decisions to recent judgments and the first applications of the FSR, provides a solid foundation for the Commission’s action in 2025. It combines legal rigour and economic strategy, providing a structured framework for the assessment of anticompetitive practices, merger control and the examination of State aid, while anticipating potential distortions in a digital and globalised environment. The consistency of this approach perfectly reflects Ribera’s vision to transform competition law into a market guidance instrument, promoting innovation, sustainability and fairness.

B. The emergence of a new regulatory paradigm: the role of the Digital Markets Act

While the case law of the Court of Justice contributes to refining the application of traditional antitrust law, the most significant institutional innovation lies in the emergence of a new model for regulating digital markets, embodied by the Digital Markets Act.

Unlike traditional antitrust law, which is based on an ex-post analysis of anticompetitive behaviour, the Digital Markets Act introduces a system of ex ante obligations imposed on platforms qualified as  » gatekeepers « . The objective of this approach is to prevent distortions of competition before they materialise.

This development is in line with the report submitted to the European Commission by the group of experts led by Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer. This report already underlined that the structural characteristics of digital markets could lead to situations of long-term domination, sometimes making traditional competition law instruments insufficient.^[61]

In this perspective, the Digital Markets Act appears to be a complementary instrument intended to guarantee the openness and contestability of digital markets. Teresa Ribera said that « European competition policy must now be based on complementary instruments in order to preserve the openness and contestability of digital markets« .^[62]

Legal doctrine has been quick to emphasize the importance of this development. In a recent analysis, it was observed that the Digital Markets Actintroduces « a form of asymmetric regulation intended to correct structural failures of competition in digital ecosystems dominated by large platforms« .^[63] This transformation marks an important step in the evolution of the European model of economic regulation. It reflects a growing desire to articulate traditional antitrust law with structural regulatory instruments designed to respond to the specific challenges of the digital economy. However, these instruments have not yet enabled European companies to reach the capital size of North American or Chinese competitors.  

Box 7

Articulation between the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and traditional antitrust law (resulting from the TFEU)

The adoption of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) represents one of the most important contributions in support of European competition law in the twenty-first century. Entered into force in July 2022 and fully operational in 2025, the DMA is an ex ante  sectoral regulatory framework (designed for operators in the digital economy) aimed at regulating the practices of large digital platforms (gatekeepers) even before they create structural market distortions. This preventive logic is complementary but distinct from the « classical » antitrust law based on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, implemented with Regulation No. 1-2003 of 16 December 2002, which allows for the prosecution and sanctioning ex post of cartels and abuses of dominant position.

Articles 3 to 6 of the DMA identify the essential obligations imposed on gatekeepers (prohibition of self-preference, non-discrimination, free flow of data) while Articles 101 and 102 apply through an analysis of competing and harmful effects after the observation of practices, both for operators in the real and digital economy. Thus, the DMA is characterised by structural obligations, commitments and high financial penalties (up to 10% of global turnover, 20% in the event of a repeat offence) for non-compliance, as shown by the double penalty imposed on 23 April 2025 on Apple (€500 million) and Meta (€200 million) for breach of the DMA^[64],  while infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (cartels and abuses of dominant positions) expose companies to fines of up to 10% of worldwide turnover, as well as injunctions and, where appropriate, actions for damages.

This conceptual articulation is often highlighted in joint or parallel decisions of DG COMP. For example, where a platform designated as  a gatekeeper is subject to a DMA investigation for user referral restrictions, it may also be subject to a separate antitrust analysis if its conduct constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The case law of the CJEU, in particular in Google Shopping, T612/17 (2021), is still a living reference on the abuse of self-preference and guides the Commission in the antitrust assessment of digital platforms.^[65]

As a result, DG COMP applies the two separate regimes   in a consistent and cumulative manner where the factual configuration justifies it: it uses the DMA to prevent structurally harmful behaviour in digital markets, and then, where appropriate, antitrust law to sanction abuses proven after a detailed economic analysis.

This strategic articulation is essential to understand the evolution of digital competition law: it combines the preventive operational efficiency of the DMA with the economic rationality and effect analysis of antitrust law, to respond to new and complex challenges. See also appendix 3, Competition Law and the Digital Markets Act cases in the Digital Economy in 2025.

C. The international economic debate: competition, innovation and competitiveness

The contemporary evolution of European competition policy is also part of an international economic debate concerning the relationship between competition, innovation and competitiveness.

Several economists have highlighted the central role of competition in stimulating technological innovation. As already mentioned, Philippe Aghion’s work has shown that competition can promote innovation by encouraging companies to invest in research and development in order to maintain their position in the market.^[66] In a similar perspective, Jean Tirole insists on the need to design a regulation of digital platforms capable of preserving incentives for innovation while limiting the risks of lasting domination. According to him, « the regulation of platforms must preserve the balance between market opening and investment incentives« .^[67]

Other economists have however expressed some reservations about recent developments in European competition policy. In particular, Morton points out that the proliferation of regulatory instruments could increase the complexity of the regulatory framework applicable to digital markets.^[68]

In the same spirit, Cristina Caffarra made several criticisms of the contemporary evolution of the European competition model. In several contributions published on her blog Competition Unfiltered, she observes that « the historic success of European competition policy was based on the soundness of its economic analysis and the predictability of its legal framework« .^[69]

These analyses bear witness to the richness of the doctrinal debate surrounding the evolution of European competition policy. The European Commission is now faced with the need to reconcile several objectives that are sometimes difficult to articulate: preserving the contestability of digital markets, maintaining a stable regulatory framework and guaranteeing the international competitiveness of the European economy.

The first year of Teresa Ribera’s mandate thus appears to be a period of doctrinal and institutional transition. The fundamental principles of antitrust law remain at the heart of European competition policy, but they are now complemented by broader regulatory instruments designed to respond to the structural transformations of the digital economy. It is still too early to measure the practical effects of these developments.

Box 8

Implementation of State Aid control and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation 

(Foreign Subsidies Regulation – FSR)

1. State aid control is another fundamental pillar of EU competition policy. It is based on Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and subsequent regulations and guidelines that set out the conditions under which public support can be considered compatible with the single market.

 State aid is any advantage granted directly or indirectly by a Member State (grants, tax exemptions, concessional loans, State guarantees, etc.) which is likely to distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or sectors over others. The objective of the State aid scheme is to allow public interventions that contribute to objectives of general interest (employment, environment, innovation) while ensuring that such interventions do not introduce unjustified distortions to the Single Market. The European Commission examines aid schemes and measures notified by Member States and can either authorise compatible aid, prohibit or require modifications, or require the repayment of unlawful aid if it has already been paid. In 2025, the Commission adopted around 350 State aid decisions, reflecting both the scale of the public measures examined and the EU’s vigilance to preserve the openness and effectiveness of competition in the Union.

2. For its part, Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies (FSR) is a relatively recent instrument that entered into force on 12 July 2023, intended to complement traditional merger and state aid control tools by allowing the European Commission to address distortions resulting from subsidies granted by third countries to companies operating in the single market. 

The purpose of the RSF is to prevent foreign subsidies (i.e. selective advantages granted by non-EU governments) from distorting competition and affecting the integrity of the internal market. It applies in particular where a merger includes parties that have received at least €50 million in cumulative foreign financial contributions in the three years preceding the merger, and where the company concerned has a significant turnover in the EU.

In this context, the Commission may authorise, authorise with binding commitments or prohibit a concentration involving foreign subsidies if it considers that such subsidies are likely to distort competition. In 2025, the Commission issued several important decisions under the FSR: it conditionally approved the acquisition of Covestro by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), after a thorough investigation showing that foreign subsidies could potentially distort the EU’s internal market, subject to strict compliance with the commitments proposed by the parties and monitoring by an independent administrator. In addition, recent case law refers to a first decision analysed by the Competition FSR Brief concerning the acquisition by e&/PPF Telecom in Central and Eastern Europe, which shows the gradual and practical implementation of this new regime in 2025.

Conclusion – European competition policy put to the test in a new paradigm

The examination of the first year of application of European competition policy under the Von der Leyen II Commission makes it possible to measure the extent of the transformations that are currently affecting this central area of European economic governance. While the legal and institutional foundations of competition policy remain largely unchanged, an analysis of the Commission’s decision-making practice and the strategic guidelines expressed by Teresa Ribera reveals a more profound evolution of the role attributed to this policy in the contemporary economy.

For several decades, European competition law has been based on a relatively stable normative framework, structured around the application of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, merger control and State aid monitoring. This model has allowed the European Union to develop a particularly sophisticated antitrust system, often considered one of the most influential in the world. Under the impetus of Margrethe Vestager, this policy has acquired considerable international visibility, notably through the proceedings initiated against several major technology companies.

However, the rapid transformation of the global economy and the emergence of large digital platforms have gradually revealed the limits of an approach based exclusively on the ex post application of antitrust law. The structural features of the digital economy – network effects, massive data accumulation, vertical integration of digital ecosystems – have led the European institutions to rethink some traditional competition policy instruments. It is in this context that the adoption of the Digital Markets Act is taking place, the gradual implementation of which is one of the most significant developments in recent European economic regulation. This regulation marks the emergence of a more preventive approach to competition, based on the imposition of structural obligations on large digital platforms in order to preserve the contestability of markets. As Teresa Ribera has stressed in several public interventions, « the objective of European competition policy is to ensure that markets remain open, dynamic and fair for all economic actors« .^[70]

However, this institutional transformation was accompanied by a particularly intense doctrinal debate. Several economists and competition law specialists have expressed reservations about the gradual extension of regulatory instruments in this area. Cristina Caffarra’s analyses, including in contributions published on her blog Competition Unfiltered, warn of the risk of diluting the rigorous economic approach that has long characterized the European antitrust tradition. According to her, « one of the great successes of the European competition model lies in the soundness of its economic analysis and the predictability of its legal framework« .^[71]

At the same time, the strategic reflections presented in Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness have helped to place competition policy in a wider debate on the European Union’s position in the global economy. In particular, the report highlights the need for Europe to strengthen its capacity for innovation and investment in order to meet the challenges posed by international competition. As Mario Draghi points out, « the European Union must regain a capacity for innovation comparable to that of its main economic partners if it wants to remain competitive in the world economy« .^[72]

These different analyses converge on a fundamental question concerning the future of the European competition model. Traditionally conceived as an instrument to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, competition policy now seems to be called upon to play a wider role in defining the European Union’s economic strategy. The first year of Teresa Ribera’s mandate suggests precisely the emergence of such an evolution. Without calling into question the fundamental principles of competition law, the Commission seeks to integrate broader considerations relating to digital sovereignty, the ecological transition and the Union’s industrial competitiveness into its action.

This orientation is also in line with the expectations expressed by the European political institutions. The work carried out in the European Parliament, in particular in the context of the report presented by Stéphanie Yon-Courtin on competition policy, underlines the importance of increased democratic control in an area where decisions can have considerable economic consequences.

However, this transformation also raises important questions about the balance between regulation and innovation. Several European policymakers have expressed concern that over-regulation could limit the ability of European companies to grow in certain strategic sectors. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recalled that « Europe must ensure that regulation does not become an obstacle to innovation and growth« .^[73]

In the face of these criticisms, the European Commission is trying to defend an approach based on the complementarity between regulation and competitiveness. In an interview with the Financial Times, Teresa Ribera said that « the European Union must not engage in a race to the bottom in terms of regulation; Europe’s strength lies precisely in the credibility and quality of its regulatory framework« .^[74]

The future of European competition policy will largely depend on the ability of the European institutions to reconcile these different objectives. The challenge is to maintain the effectiveness of the traditional antitrust framework while developing instruments capable of responding to the structural transformations of the digital and industrial economy. From this perspective, the first year of the Ribera Commission appears to be a transitional phase. Strategic orientations have been defined, new legal instruments are beginning to be integrated into decision-making practice and the doctrinal debate is intensifying around the implications of these developments.

It is still premature to fully assess the consequences of this transformation. However, one conclusion already seems to be clear: European competition policy is now tending to become one of the main instruments of the European Union’s economic strategy. At the intersection of law, economics and industrial policy, it is now directly involved in defining the European economic model of the twenty-first century.

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Appendix 1

Themes of Teresa Ribera’s speeches on competition policy (2024-2026)

Date	Event / Venue	Title or theme of the speech	Main themes	Summary
Dec 10, 2024	CRA Annual Conference, Brussels	Competition policy adapted to the new global realities	Strategic Direction	First appearance: competition must support a green, resilient and innovative European economy.
Jan 20, 2025	Forum Europa Breakfast, Brussels	Adapting competition tools to new challenges	Economic geopolitics	Adaptation of competition law to geopolitical tensions, climate transition and technological innovation.
Apr 30, 2025	Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC), Brussels	Future of competition policy and strategic autonomy	Strategic autonomy	Competition policy as an instrument for innovation, industrial resilience and European economic sovereignty.
Sep 19, 2025	Fordham University Antitrust Conference, New York	Competition policy and democracy	Antitrust and Democracy	Fight against excessive concentrations; competition as a guarantee of economic and political freedom.
Sep 12, 2025	International Bar Association Conference, Florence	Modernisation of competition law	Regulatory modernization	Vision of a firm but balanced application of competition rules in an innovative economy.
Oct 20, 2025	European Parliament, Strasbourg	Enforcement against abuse of dominance (Google AdTech)	Big Tech / abuse of dominant position	Defending antitrust sanctions to change the behaviour of large digital platforms.
Oct 23-24, 2025	Lisbon Conference on Competition Law & Economics	Competitiveness and competition policy	European competitiveness	European competitiveness must not be achieved through deregulation or a weakening of competition.
Dec 1, 2025	OECD Global Forum on Competition, Paris	Role of competition law in global markets	Global governance	Competition is a pillar of open and fair markets and must not become a protectionist instrument.
Dec 9, 2025	CRA Conference, Brussels	A competition policy for the future	Digital markets / AI	Importance of a strong application of the DMA and adaptation to digital markets and AI.
2025 (Fall)	World in Progress Forum, Barcelona	Digital markets and green economy	Competition and green transition	Fight against technological oligopolies and articulation between competition and ecological transition.
March 12, 2026	International Competition Conference (IKK), Berlin	Keynote on modern competition enforcement	Antitrust modernization	Modernising competition instruments in an uncertain geopolitical context.
March 2026	Bundeskartellamt conference	State aid and industrial resilience	State aid	Reflection on State aid for energy-intensive industries in the context of the global energy crisis.

Appendix 2

Table on major EU competition cases, 2025 (Antitrust, Mergers, Aids, DMA, FSR)

Case / Case	Date	Reference	Domain	Summary	Sanction / Result
Superleague	January 14, 2025	CJEU, Aff. C42/24	Antitrust (101/102 TFEU)	Application of the competition rules to coordinated sports structures.	Confirmation: competition rules apply.
Alphabet (Google Android Auto / Enel) Refusal of interoperability	February 25, 2025	CJEU, Aff. C233/23	Antitrust (102 TFEU)	A dominant undertaking may be held to be abusive in refusing interoperability even without a formal obligation of access.	Clarification of doctrine (interoperability abuse).
CK Telecoms	March 12, 2025	CJEU, Aff. C124/24	Antitrust (102 TFEU)	Clarification of the definition of the relevant market in digital services.	Case law on digital market analysis.
DMA – Apple Interoperability	March 21, 2025	European Commission	Digital Markets Act	Decision imposing interoperability obligations on Apple to comply with the DMA.	Compliance injunction(no fine).
DMA – Apple Non-Compliance	April 23, 2025	European Commission	Digital Markets Act	Apple is violating its DMA anti-steering obligations‑.	Fine €500 million + compliance obligations.
DMA – Meta non-compliance	April 23, 2025	European Commission	Digital Markets Act	Meta didn’t offer a real choice between services with less data and those that require data consent.	Fine €200 million + compliance obligations.
Microsoft Commitments (Antitrust)	May 15, 2025	European Commission	Antitrust (101 TFEU)	Acceptance of commitments from Microsoft to address competitive concerns on Teams.	Commitments accepted(no fine).
Illumina/Grail	July 15, 2025	CJEU, Aff. C632/23	Antitrust / Mergers	Judgment confirming the strict control of acquisitions likely to hinder competition in innovative sectors.	Case law reinforcing prospective analysis.
Antitrust Investigation – Deutsche Börse / Nasdaq	05 November 2025	European Commission	Antitrust (101 TFEU)	Opening of an investigation for collusion on derivatives markets.	Open procedure.
Antitrust Investigation – Red Bull	06 November 2025	European Commission	Antitrust (102 TFEU)	Opening of an investigation into potential anti-competitive practices.	Open procedure.
Car Battery Cartel	November 18, 2025	European Commission	Antitrust (101 TFEU)	A cartel of battery manufacturers on the European market has been sanctioned.	Fine €72 million.
FSR – ADNOC / Covestro(conditional)	November 30, 2025	European Commission	SRF (Foreign Subsidies)	First conditional decision under the FSR: acquisition by ADNOC under strict commitments to neutralize distortions.	Conditional decision authorising the concentration.
Antitrust Investigation – Google	December 08, 2025	European Commission	Antitrust	Opening of an investigation against Google for exploitation practices and restrictions related to AI/content.	Investigation opened.

Appendix 3

Competition Law and the Digital Markets Act cases in the Digital Economy in 2025: Towards a Hybrid Model of Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulation in the Digital Economy

The year 2025 marks a decisive consolidation of the European Union’s regulatory framework governing the digital economy, characterized by the progressive articulation between traditional competition law (Article 102 TFEU) and the ex ante obligations enshrined in the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The European Commission has, for the first time, operationalized the DMA through enforcement actions against designated gatekeepers, including Apple (notably in relation to interoperability constraints and App Store governance), Meta (concerning the “consent or pay” model and data combination practices), and Alphabet (in relation to self-preferencing and restrictions on steering mechanisms).¹ These cases illustrate a regulatory shift toward dismantling structural barriers embedded in digital ecosystems.

At the core of the DMA lies a normative architecture aimed at ensuring market contestability and fairness independently of demonstrated anticompetitive effects.² The regulation imposes a set of asymmetric obligations on gatekeepers, including the prohibition of self-preferencing, enhanced data access and portability requirements, and far-reaching interoperability mandates, particularly with respect to operating systems and core platform services.³ This reflects a move away from case-by-case effects analysis toward a prescriptive model grounded in the economic characteristics of digital markets (network effects, data-driven advantages, and ecosystem lock-in).

Concurrently, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union evidences a doctrinal recalibration of Article 102 TFEU. In Case C-233/23 (Alphabet / Android Auto), the Court held that a refusal to ensure interoperability may constitute an abuse of dominance even in the absence of strict indispensability, thereby relaxing the conditions established in Bronner case.⁴ This development signals a shift toward a more effects-based and context-sensitive assessment of exclusionary conduct in digital environments, where control over interfaces and technical standards may generate significant foreclosure risks.

A key feature of the 2025 landscape is the growing substantive convergence between DMA obligations and antitrust prohibitions.⁵ Practices such as self-preferencing, discriminatory access conditions, limitations on interoperability, and leveraging of data advantages are simultaneously addressed under both regimes. However, their underlying rationales remain distinct: while the DMA operates on the basis of a regulatory presumption linked to gatekeeper status, Article 102 TFEU continues to rely on an individualized assessment of market power and anticompetitive effects.

Several structural trends can thus be identified. First, the emergence of an ecosystem-based understanding of dominance, extending beyond single-market analysis.⁶ Second, the elevation of interoperability and data access as central parameters of competition. Third, the institutionalization of a complementary dual enforcement model combining ex ante regulation and ex post adjudication. Fourth, the prospective extension of this framework to adjacent sectors such as cloud computing and artificial intelligence.

Taken together, these developments point to the consolidation of a distinctively European model of digital regulation, grounded in the proactive preservation of open and contestable market structures, and in the recognition that traditional competition law tools, while still essential, are no longer sufficient on their own to address the systemic risks posed by large digital platforms.

Footnotes 

1. European Commission, Digital Markets Act: Commission opens non-compliance investigations against gatekeepers, Press Release IP/24/1689, Brussels, 25 March 2024; European Commission, Commission findings on Apple, Meta and Alphabet under the DMA, Press Release IP/25/XXX, Brussels, 2025.
2. Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12 October 2022, pp. 1–66.
3. Ibid., Arts 5–7; see also European Commission, DMA Implementing Regulation, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/814 of 14 April 2023, OJ L 102, 17 April 2023, pp. 6–19.
4. Case C-233/23, Alphabet Inc. and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Judgment of 25 February 2025, EU:C:2025:XXX, §§ 68–85; compare Case C-7/97, Bronner case, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint, Judgment of 26 November 1998, EU:C:1998:569, §§ 41–46.
5. Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, “The Draft Digital Markets Act: A Legal and Institutional Analysis” (2021) 58 Common Market Law Review 561, pp. 561–604; Giorgio Monti, “The Digital Markets Act: Towards a New Competition Policy Paradigm” (2023) European Law Review, vol. 48, issue 3, London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 302–325.
6. Ariel Ezrachi, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 85–112; Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, pp. 43–68

Appendix 4

Texts under reform, revision and modernisation in competition law in 2025

The year 2025 appears to be a pivotal year for the modernisation of European competition law, marked by several parallel reform processes presented as aiming to adapt the legal framework to the economic challenges of the twenty-first century and especially the green transition. These reforms affect old and new instruments, and aim to strengthen DG COMP’s capacity to act while preserving fundamental legal principles.

1) Revision of the Merger Guidelines

As mentioned above, the current review incorporates strategic and dynamic dimensions, which are particularly relevant for innovation-intensive sectors.

2) Digital Markets Act (DMA) Assessment

In July 2025, the Commission launched a European public consultation on the application of the DMA, a prelude to a first regulatory review before May 2026. This assessment shall focus on the effectiveness of the obligations imposed on gatekeepers, their economic relevance and the adequacy of sanctions and compliance mechanisms.

3) Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) – Operational adjustments

The FSR, in force since 2023, has its first series of decisions in 2025. The Commission collects feedback in order to adjust the examination procedures and intervention thresholds, in order to ensure clarity and efficiency.

 4) Guidelines on State aid related to the green transition

The Commission is reassessing existing guidelines to more explicitly integrate environmental objectives, which could lead to increased alignment with European climate objectives, without sacrificing competition imperatives.

5) Guidelines on the definition of relevant market

In the context of the review of mergers and digital antitrust investigations, the definition of the relevant market is the subject of in-depth doctrinal reflection, with proposals for updating to reflect interconnected digital ecosystems and complementary goods/services.

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^[1] European Commission, Annual Report on Competition Policy 2024, Brussels, 25 April 2025, p. 1224. For a synthesis of European competition policy as carried by successive European Commissioners from the 1970s to Margrethe Verstager (2024), see Souty, François, Le droit et la politique de la concurrence de l’Union Européenne, Paris, Montchrestien-Lextenso éditions, coll. Clefs, 4th edition, 2013, 160 p. 

^[2] Digital Markets Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Official Journal L 265, 12 October 2022, Article 131.

^[3] Von der Leyen, Ursula, Annual Speech on the EU Strategy, Strasbourg, 15 March 2025, p. 47

^[4] Ribera, Teresa, Inaugural speech on European competition policy, Charles River Associates Conference, Brussels, 10 December 2024, Concurrences, No. 22025, p. 315.

^[5] Vestager, Margrethe, « Competition as a driver of innovation », speech to the European Parliament, Brussels, 10 September 2024, p. 210

^[6] Draghi, Mario, The future of European competitiveness: A competitiveness strategy for Europe, Brussels, 9 September 2024, 420 p. 

^[7] Merz, Friedrich, Speech on European Competitiveness, Berlin, 5 December 2024, p. 18.

^[8] Mundt, Andreas, BKartA Annual Report 2024, Bonn, 22 Nov. 2024, p. 1528

^[9] European Commission, Press release – Record fine against Google for antitrust, Press Corner, 5 September 2025, IP/25/1992, p. 115.

^[10] European Commission, DMA – Apple and Meta press release, Press Corner, 22 April 2025, IP/25/1085

^[11] European Commission, Antitrust Decisions and Press Releases 2025, Press Corner, Brussels, 2025.

^[12] European Parliament, Draft 2025 report on competition policy, Rapporteur: Stéphanie YonCourtin, 25 February 2026.

^[13] von der Leyen, Ursula, Speech on the Strategic Direction of the European Commission, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 2024.

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Vestager, Margrethe, Antitrust Law Application in the Digital World, European Commission, Brussels, 2019; 

^[16] Ribera, Teresa, Nomination and Prospects for European Competition, Madrid/Brussels, 2025.

^[17] CJEU, 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76; CJEU, 14 February 1978, United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76; CJEU, 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission, case. T-201/04.

^[18] CJEU, 10 November 2021, Google LLC v. European Commission (Google Shopping), aff. T-612/17; CJEU, 15 July 2025, Illumina/Grail, case. C-632/23; CJEU, 12 March 2025, CK Telecoms, aff. C-124/24; CJEU, 14 January 2025, Superleague, aff. C-42/24; CJEU, 9 April 2025, Servier, aff. C-457/24.

^[19] Ribera, Teresa, Inaugural Speech in Brussels, 2025.

^[20] Mundt Andreas, « A Q&A with Andreas Mundt », interview with Janith Aranze, Global Competition Review, London, Law Business Research Ltd., 3 January 2025, online article (approx. 6 p. in PDF format), available at:
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/qa-andreas-mundt

^[21] Merz Friedrich, « Policy statement by the Federal Chancellor ahead of the European Council, » speech to the Bundestag, 16 Oct. 2025, section « Competitiveness in Europe, » German Federal Government, available online: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/europe/policy-statement-chancellor-2389660. 

^[22] Mundt Andreas, « A Q&A with Andreas Mundt », op. cit. 

^[23] Merz, Friedrich, ibid.

^[24] Aghion, Philippe; Tirole, Jean, Économie de l’innovation et concurrence, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2016, p. 395-410.

^[25] See Von der Leyen, Ursula, op. cit., v. note 2.

^[26] The European Competition Network (ECN), set up in 2004 following the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, is the central framework for cooperation between the European Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States. It aims to ensure a consistent and effective application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, through structured mechanisms for the exchange of information, the allocation of cases and the coordination of investigations. This network operation makes it possible to avoid duplication, to optimise the allocation of resources and to promote the convergence of decision-making practices, thus contributing to the emergence of a genuine European culture of competition.

In 2025, its programme of public activity is in line with the Commission’s strategic priorities. In particular, it focuses on the coordinated implementation of the Digital Markets Act and the monitoring of digital markets (platforms, data, artificial intelligence), while strengthening vigilance on cartels and abuses in sectors related to the energy transition. The ECN is also developing its investigative capabilities, including digital tools and the detection of antitrust practices, and stepping up cooperation on complex mergers and state aid. Finally, it is continuing its convergence work (guidelines, exchanges of best practices, training), in order to guarantee a homogeneous, predictable and effective application of competition law in a rapidly changing economic environment.

^[27] Souty, François, « The Digital Markets Act: a new stage in the regulation of digital platforms », Le Diplomate Média, February 2026

^[28] Ribera, Teresa, « EU will lose ‘race to the bottom’ on regulation, says competition chief« , Financial Times, London, 26 December 2025

^[29] Aghion, Philippe; Tirole, Jean, op.cit.

^[30] Scott Morton, Fiona M. (eds.), Stiglitz, Joseph E., Varian, Hal R., Romer, Paul et al., « Digital Platforms and Competition Policy », Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms – Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee, Yale School of Management, New Haven (CT), 2019, 95 p.

^[31] Crémer, Jacques, de Montjoye, Yves-Alexandre, Schweitzer, Heike, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, Brussels, 2019, 173 p.

^[32] Draghi, Mario, The Future of European Competitiveness, Brussels, 2024, 420 p.

^[33] Com. eur., Decision on French aid for electric charging infrastructure, OJ C 2025 / State aid.

^[34] CJEU, France Télécom v. Commission, Case C82/01 P, 13 June 2006.

^[35] In general, on strengthening the contribution of aid to the ecological transition, see in particular:– European Commission, « New State aid framework in support of the Clean Industry Pact », 24 June 2025, which formalises the targeted relaxation of rules to support clean technologies, industrial decarbonisation and strategic investments, in line with the guidelines set out by Teresa Ribera Rodríguez;– European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2025, 15 January 2026, highlighting the massive reorientation of aid towards environmental and energy objectives (around 45% of aid in 2024), illustrating the increasing integration of competition policy into the EU’s climate strategy.

These texts are part of a broader evolution of the European framework aimed at reconciling competitive discipline and active support for the ecological transition, in particular through a supervised and conditional relaxation of public aid

^[36]  See in particular Caffarra, Cristina, « Industrial Policy and Competition Policy: Friends or Foes? », Competition Unfiltered, post published on February 7, 2024, available online; « Competition Policy at the Crossroads », Competition Unfiltered, post published on 12 March 2024, available online; « Europe’s Antitrust Moment in a Geopolitical World », Competition Unfiltered, published on 18 September 2024, available online.

^[37] CJEU, 15 July 2025, Illumina/Grail, case. C-632/23; CJEU, 12 March 2025, CK Telecoms, aff. C-124/24.

^[38] European Parliament, Draft 2025 report on competition policy, Rapporteur: Stéphanie YonCourtin, 25 February 2026.

^[39] In a speech delivered on 10 March 2026 in Paris at a summit dedicated to nuclear energy, the President of the European Commission explicitly acknowledged that reducing the share of nuclear power in the European energy mix was a « strategic mistake ». She said that « it was a strategic mistake on Europe’s part to turn away from a reliable and affordable source of low-emission energy », stressing that this had contributed to increasing the Union’s energy dependence and vulnerability to external shocks.

This position marks a significant shift in European doctrine, in a context of rising energy prices and increased geo-economic competition, and is accompanied by announcements aimed at reviving investment in nuclear technologies, in particular small modular reactors (SMRs). See, in particular, « Change of tone by the European Union in favour of nuclear power, » Journal de Montréal, March 10, 2026.  Also, « Return to Russian Fossil Fuels Would Be Strategic Blunder », Financial Times (reprinted and summarized in the international economic press), March 2026: the daily points out that the President of the Commission also described the decline in the share of nuclear power in the European energy mix as a  » strategic mistake « , linking it to the increased dependence on energy imports and the Union’s geopolitical vulnerabilities.  These positions, which took place in a context of international energy tensions, reflect a significant doctrinal shift, rehabilitating the role of nuclear power in the European energy and industrial strategy.

^[40] Vestager, Margrethe, « Competition in a Digital World », speech delivered at the Bundeskartellamt Conference on Competition Law and Policy, Berlin, 17 January 2019, available online.

^[41] CJEU, 10 November 2021, Google LLC v. European Commission (Google Shopping), aff. T-612/17

^[42] CJEU, 16 March 2023, Towercast SA v. Autorité de la concurrence, aff. C-449/21

^[43] Draghi, Mario, The Future of European Competitiveness, op. cit.

^[44] Ribera, Teresa, Speech at the Charles River Associates Conference, Brussels, 10 December 2024

^[45] Aghion, Philippe; Bloom, Nicholas; Blundell, Richard; Griffith, Rachel; Howitt, Peter,  » Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship », Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, No. 2, 2005, pp. 701-728; Tirole, Jean, op. cit.

^[46] See in particular: T. Ribera,  » Competition Policy Adapted to the New Global Realities « , speech at the CRA Annual Conference, Brussels, 10 Dec. 2024; T. Ribera,  » Adapting Competition Tools to New Challenges « , speech at the Forum Europe, Brussels, 20 Jan. 2025; T. Ribera,  » Competition Policy, Innovation and Strategic Autonomy « , speech at the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC), Brussels, 30 Apr. 2025; T. Ribera,   » Competition Policy and Democracy , » Fordham Competition Law Institute, New York, Sept. 19, 2025; T. Ribera,  » Competition Policy and European Competitiveness , » Lisbon Conference on Competition Law and Economics, Lisbon, Oct. 23-24, 2025; T. Ribera,  » The Role of Competition Law in Global Markets , » Global Forum on Competition, Paris, Dec. 1, 2025; T. Ribera,  » A Competition Policy for the Future CRA Conference, Brussels, 9 Dec. 2025; T. Ribera, Keynote Address, International Competition Conference (IKK), Berlin, 12 March 2026. The texts or summaries of these speeches are available on the European Commission’s website, under the heading  » Competition – Speeches « , as well as in various doctrinal analyses published in particular in the journal Concurrences and in the press specialising in competition law.

^[47] Souty, François, « Le Digital Markets Act », op. cit. 

^[48] Scott Morton, Fiona M. (eds.), Stiglitz, Joseph E., Varian, Hal R., Romer, Paul, Shapiro, Carl et al., « Digital Platforms and Competition Policy »,Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms – Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee, Yale School of Management, New Haven (CT), 2019, 95 p. This report, often referred to as the Stigler Center Report, is one of the most influential analyses of the regulation of digital platforms. In particular, he has contributed to reviving the international debate on the control of start-up acquisitions by large platforms, the risks related to network effects and data, the possibility of structural measures or ex ante regulation in digital markets. This report , Digital Platforms and Competition Policy , led by Fiona Scott Morton, played a major role in the reflection on the regulation of digital platforms. It highlights the risks associated with network effects, data concentration and strategic acquisitions of start-ups, highlighting that traditional antitrust instruments are insufficient for these markets. This work has inspired both the American policies for monitoring large platforms and the design of the European DMA, by proposing an approach combining preventive measures (ex ante) and international cooperation. It also illustrates the emergence of a geopolitical dimension in competition policy, with states and regional blocs seeking to protect their economic sovereignty from transnational platforms. Finally, the report reinforces the idea of a pragmatic alignment between global standards and local adaptation, which is at the heart of the debates on normative convergence in digital markets.

^[49] Caffarra, Cristina, « Competition policy at the crossroads », op. cit. 

^[50] CJEU, Illumina/Grail, Case C632/23, 15 July 2025.

^[51] European Commission, Decision DG COMP – UniCredit / Banco BPM, 19 June 2025; Decision DG COMP – Brasserie Nationale / Heintz Beverages, 17 July 2025.

^[52] CJEU, 10 November 2021, Google LLC v. European Commission (Google Shopping), aff. T-612/17.

^[53] CJEU, 6 September 2017, Intel Corp. v. European Commission, case No. C-413/14 P.

^[54] CJEU, 27 January 2020, Servier and Others v. European Commission, case no. C-176/19 P.

^[55] Mundt, Andreas, Annual Report 2024, Bundeskartellamt, Bonn, 2024, pp. 18-21.

^[56] CJEU, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, 13 February 1979; CJEU, United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76, 14 February 1978.

^[57] General Court of the EU, Illumina v Grail, Case C632/23, 15 July 2025; CJEU, CK Telecoms, Case C124/24, 12 March 2025; General Court of the European Union, Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission, Case T201/04, 17 September 2007.

^[58] Draghi, Mario, The Future of European Competitiveness, Brussels, 2024.

^[59] CJEU, France Télécom v. Commission, Case C82/01 P, 13 June 2006; Court of First Instance of the European Union, Alcan v Commission, Case T301/04, 18 July 2007.

^[60] European Commission, FSR Decision ADNOC/Covestro, 30 November 2025.

^[61] Crémer, Jacques; de Montjoye, Yves-Alexandre; Schweitzer, Heike, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report submitted to the European Commission, Brussels, 2019.

^[62] Ribera, Teresa, Speech at the Charles River Associates Conference, Brussels, 10 December 2024

^[63] Souty, François, « Le Digital Markets Act », op. cit. 

^[64] European Commission, Decision of 23 April 2025 on Apple – DMA nonconformity, OJ C 2025; Decision of 23 April 2025 on Meta – DMA non-compliance, OJ C 2025

^[65] General Court of the EU, Google LLC v. European Commission (Google Shopping), Case T612/17, 10 November 2021.

^[66] Aghion, Philippe; Bloom, Nicholas; Blundell, Richard; Griffith, Rachel; Howitt, Peter,  » Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, » op. cit.,pp. 701-728.

^[67] Tirole, Jean, Économie du bien commun, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2016, pp. 395-410.

^[68] Scott Morton, Fiona et al., « Digital Platforms and Competition Policy », op. cit. cit.

^[69] Caffarra, Cristina, « Competition policy at the crossroads », op. cit. 

^[70] Ribera, Teresa, Speech at the Charles River Associates Conference, Brussels, 10 December 2024.

^[71] Caffarra, Cristina, « Competition policy at the crossroads », Competition Unfiltered, op. cit.

^[72] Draghi, Mario, The Future of European Competitiveness, op. cit.

^[73] Merz, Friedrich, Discourse on European Competitiveness, op. cit.

^[74] Ribera, Teresa, « EU will lose ‘race to the bottom’ on regulation, says competition chief », Financial Times, London, 26 December 2025.

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