ANALYSIS – Financial Markets and Competition: Transatlantic Geopolitics of Market Data Markets

By François Souty

François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former Head of International Affairs at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD Committee of Experts on Competition Policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches EU institutions and geopolitics at the Excelia Business School group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan) and EU competition law and policy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Nantes.

He is in charge of the Economics section at Diplomate Média.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Jean Bergevin, Head of the Antitrust Unit in the Directorate for Antitrust and Financial Markets EC DG Competition between 2017 and 2022, from whom we learned so much about the processing of market data by antitrust and competition law. The analysis featured here is based on this experience, accompanied by up-to-date public data on market data.  It was an honour and a pleasure to work on these topics with our colleagues Jolanta, Charlotte, Charlene and Florina in this « Antitrust and Financial Markets » unit from 2018 to 2021.

Executive Summary

Market data has become an essential infrastructure for the functioning of modern financial markets, conditioning trade execution, risk management, regulatory compliance and price formation. Initially perceived as a technical by-product, they now occupy a central position, the control of which confers a major economic and strategic power, which competition and market regulation is reluctant to consider as such.

Since the mid-2010s, market data markets have been characterized by increasing concentration, accompanied by a significant and persistent rise in prices, with no clear link to costs or innovation. Despite the objectives of transparency and competition introduced by the European MiFID I and MiFID II directives, economic analyses and user feedback regularly highlight the existence of structural imbalances and potentially anti-competitive practices. These practices are mainly based on three levers: (1) the strategic use of intellectual property rights, (2) complex and non-transparent pricing structures, and (3) contractual lock-in mechanisms limiting data substitutability. They contribute to creating high barriers to entry and increasing the dependence of financial players – especially European – on a small number of dominant suppliers, all of them North American.

The analysis shows that market data does not constitute a single market, but a set of ecosystems of segmented relevant markets (pre- and post-trade, indices, derivatives, aggregation, research, etc.), within which some operators occupy quasi-monopolistic positions. This fragmentation of markets reinforces the market power of these operators, which is highly inflationary, while complicating the implementation of competition law. The economic consequences are significant: European financial institutions bear additional costs estimated at between 30% and 40% compared to the United States. These additional costs can represent several tens of millions of euros per year for an average player. On the scale of the European market, this corresponds to tens of billions of euros in additional annual costs, directly affecting competitiveness, innovation and, ultimately, European end investors. Beyond the economic dimension, these dynamics raise geopolitical and sovereignty issues. Europe appears structurally dependent on mainly American and British suppliers for access to critical data, which limits its strategic autonomy in a key sector of the financial economy. A comparison with the United States highlights a marked contrast: despite some similar practices, the multiplicity of suppliers, price transparency and more proactive and dissuasive antitrust regulation make it possible to contain prices and preserve more effective competition.

In this context, in support of the main European asset managers’ organisations, the article suggests an adaptation of regulatory and competition tools to the specificities of market data markets. In particular, it proposes the establishment of a dedicated framework, inspired by the Digital Markets Act, in order to better supervise the dominant players (« gatekeepers« ) and reduce structural imbalances. Otherwise, investors in the European Union and its Member States will see a long-term and very expensive dependence on non-European market data providers perpetuate – and will suffer – in a field that is nevertheless central or even vital for its economic and financial autonomy.

Introduction

Today, market data is an essential input to the functioning of modern financial markets, similar to the fuel for a car or commercial vehicle engine. This data is used cross-functionally by all players – trading venues, asset managers, banks, investment firms, index providers, back-office service providers, insurance companies – for both trade execution and risk management, regulatory compliance and price formation. Long considered a technical by-product of trading activity, market data has gradually acquired the function, if not the regulatory status, of an essential economic infrastructure, to the point that effective access to certain categories of data now conditions the entry, survival and competitiveness of players on the financial markets.[1] This point is legally essential: this economic centrality also gives financial data markets a growing geopolitical dimension, insofar as the control of data, intellectual property rights and dissemination infrastructures are now concentrated in the hands of a limited number of players, mainly North Americans, raising issues of strategic dependence and economic sovereignty to which this article will come back later. Despite the technical complexity inherent in the functioning of the financial markets, it seems extremely important to us to lift a corner of the veil on the value markets of several hundred thousand billion Euros and on the dynamics of their geopolitics.

From the mid-2010s until the end of this decade, this march towards the concentration of market data providers has been accompanied by an increasing attention paid to the competitive structure of financial data markets and, more specifically, to the behaviour of providers able to exercise their market power. Several benchmark economic studies have shown a substantial and recurrent increase in the prices of market data, often brutal, asymmetrical, and difficult to explain by changes in production or distribution costs.[2] The major report of the Danish economist firm, Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data of 2018, already cited, shows that the fees for access to market data have increased significantly since the entry into force in 2007 of a European MiFID I [3] directive  putting European stock exchanges in competition with new financial trading platforms that are little known to the general public, such as systematically internalise,[4] without this development being correlated with proportionate investments or an equivalent improvement in the quality or diversity of the services provided, despite the adoption in 2014 of a new MiFID II directive.[5]

These findings directly raise the question of the existence of potentially anticompetitive practices, foremost among which are abuses of a dominant position on markets characterised by high concentration and the absence of effective substitutability.[6] Subsequent work by Copenhagen Economics has highlighted the central role played by intellectual property rights and licensing agreements in consolidating this market power. Næss-Schmidt, Buhr and Jensen point out that the combination of exclusive control of certain data, restrictive use licences, non-negotiable pricing and regulatory dependence on users is likely to produce effects equivalent to exclusion or lock-in mechanisms.[7]

The concerns expressed by end-users confirm and reinforce this economic analysis. Professional associations of asset managers have repeatedly denounced the existence of a structural imbalance in the contractual relations between providers and users of market data. The German Association of Asset Managers (Fondsverband der deutschen Investmentgesellschaften – BVI) explicitly refers to practices that may amount to abuse of a dominant position, or even monopolisation strategies, characterised by unilateral price increases, increasing complexity of price grids and restrictions on use limiting the ability of users to develop competing services.[8] BVI alone has 113 members with total assets under management of more than €4,800 billion.  In France, an association of investors has been set up to complement and support the work of BVI or Nordic investors: COSSIOM.[9] In total, all these associations, whose reports were used in particular to prepare this article, represent around 34,400 billion €.

Table 1.  Leading European Asset Management Associations

Association	Country	Approximate number of members/management companies	Assets under management represented
BVI	Germany	113 members	> €4,800 billion
French Association of Financial Management (AFG)	France	approx. 330 collecting societies (400 members in total)	approx. €5,400 billion
Assogestioni	Italy	approx. 300 members	approx. €2,500–3,000 billion*
The Investment Association	United Kingdom	approx. 250 members	approx. £9,100 billion (≈ €10,600 billion)**
INVERCO	Spain	approx. 200 members	approx. €400–500 billion*
EFAMA	Europe (federation)	28 national associations + 60+ corporate members	approx. €34,400 billion

Sources: French Association of Financial Management, 2025 institutional presentation; BVI, About the Industry, 2025; EFAMA, Asset Management in Europe – Fact Book 2025; Assogestioni, institutional presentation; The Investment Association, annual survey 2024.

These suspicions are empirically echoed in the independent report published in 2025 by the British firm Market Structure Partners, at the request of a series of European financial associations mentioned above. By highlighting a sustained growth  in market data revenues  by the main European trading platforms between 2017 and 2024, regardless of the evolution of trading volumes, this report suggests that traditional competitive mechanisms only slightly constrain the pricing behaviour of certain providers. These elements feed the hypothesis that market data markets  have, in several segments, the characteristics of essential infrastructures operated by players with sustainable market power.[10]

A central element of the recent literature lies in the questioning of an aggregated approach to the financial data market. Market data does not constitute a single market, but a set of distinct relevant markets, differentiated in particular by the type of data (pre-trade, post-trade, real-time or deferred data), by the authorised uses, by the categories of users and by the associated regulatory constraints.[11] This fragmentation, recognised by the professional associations of market data managers  themselves, allows certain operators to occupy quasi-monopolistic positions in specific segments, while escaping a global qualification of dominance on the aggregate market.[12]

In this context, the competitive analysis of market data markets appears paradoxical. On the one hand, European Union law on financial markets explicitly requires that data be provided « on reasonable commercial terms »;[13] on the other hand, the developments observed over the past decade suggest the existence of practices likely to contravene the fundamental principles of competition law, particularly in terms of abuse of dominant position.[14] Despite several decisions and investigations by the European Commission since the early 2010s in related or related sectors, market data markets  remain relatively unexplored in a systematic way from this angle.[15]

It is to this analytical deficit, with a legal, but also geopolitical and financial perspective, that this article intends to address. The study of the relationship between financial data, economic sovereignty and geopolitics precedes a detailed mapping of the different relevant market data markets, based on existing economic studies and institutional work, in order to identify the segments on which market power is concentrated. Then the examination of alleged or established anticompetitive practices is developed, in the light of the cases already handled by the European Commission since 2010 as well as the communications of user associations. Thirdly, there is a more geopolitical perspective, analysing the growing dependence of European players on suppliers or holders of rights to market data. Finally, competition policy and regulatory options likely to address these challenges are being studied, including the hypothesis of a Digital Markets Act-type instrument specific to financial markets, to target gatekeepers who control the main relevant markets identified.

I – Market data, digital sovereignty, geopolitics, relevant markets and market power

Market data is the backbone of modern financial reporting. They are not limited to the simple dissemination of numbers: they include real-time feeds, historical series, benchmarks, derivatives and aggregation services, used by investors for trading, risk management, index calculation and regulatory compliance.

This part aims to describe the relationship between financial data, economic and geopolitical sovereignty and the effective functioning of the relevant markets that are in practice highly segmented, combining segmentation by products, which distinguishes types of data and their specific uses, and geographical segmentation, which reflects the technical, regulatory and commercial constraints specific to each region. The almost instinctive reaction of competition investigators – who are highly trained in the issue of relevant markets in the real economy but much less so in the case of digital markets – tends to make them also instinctively wary of too fine market segmentations, in particular market data. Unfortunately, there are very few investigators in the competition authorities, including the EC DG Competition, trained in the extremely specific and complex issues of application of competition rules to the financial markets and particularly in the most dematerialized aspects of market data.   

The objective here is therefore to highlight in the first place the considerable volumes of additional costs observed in the European Union compared to the United States, calling into question the very existence of European financial sovereignty despite its colossal weight in world business life. Secondly, the concentration of players, practices likely to generate additional costs and the risks of abuse of dominant position, based on Danish, German, Nordic and French studies. The analysis of the structure of market data markets has recently been further developed by the report There’s No Market in Market Data already mentioned. This last document underlines that there is no single and homogeneous market for market data, but a constellation of markets fragmented according to the types of data, uses and contractual terms. This fragmentation leads to the identification of narrow relevant markets, within which certain suppliers exercise significant market power (referred to as « abuse of dominant position » in competition law), despite an apparent plurality of players at the aggregate level. The report also highlights the low substitutability of financial data, its indispensability for trading, valuation and regulatory compliance, as well as the existence of high barriers to entry related to fixed costs, network effects and control of broadcast infrastructure. In this context, complex pricing structures, restrictive licensing and service bundling practices are likely to have lock-in effects and limit effective competition in certain segments, thus confirming that competitive analysis of market data must be conducted at a granular, market-by-market level, rather than in an aggregated manner.[16]

1. Financial data, economic and geopolitical sovereignty

Market datamarketsare at the intersection of three structural dynamics: the financialization of the economy, the digitization of market infrastructures and the rise of data sovereignty issues. Unlike other information assets, financial data has a double specificity. On the one hand, their use in the EU is made mandatory or quasi-mandatory by the regulatory framework applicable to financial markets, which severely limits the ability of users to turn to substitutes. On the other hand, their control is inseparable from intellectual and contractual property rights that give their holders structuring power over the entire financial value chain.

In this context, the potential anti-competitive practices observed in market data markets cannot be analysed solely from the micro-economic perspective of pricing or allocative efficiency. They also raise broader questions about the strategic autonomy of European players, dependence on infrastructures controlled by a limited number of international groups, and the ability of public authorities to preserve the integrity and competitiveness of European financial markets. This articulation between competition law, sectoral regulation and geopolitical considerations is a common thread running through this article.

The competitive and geopolitical analysis of market data markets cannot ignore their overall economic weight. While estimates of the annual turnover directly generated by the sale of financial data vary significantly depending on the scope used, several studies converge to highlight rapid and sustained growth since at least 2018. Above all, when we think not only in terms of income streams, but in terms of the cumulative value of the relevant financial data markets, integrating the diversity of segments (trading data, post-trade data, reference data, indices, derivatives, use and redistribution licenses) as well as their indispensable nature for the entire financial value chain, the orders of magnitude become considerable.[17]

On a global scale, available sector estimates currently place the value of the global financial market data in an approximate range of between $50 billions and $70 billions per year (approximately €45 billions to €65 billions), depending on the scope chosen (stock market data, indices, terminals, analytical services and flow redistribution). This market is now one of the most concentrated and strategic segments of the global financial economy.  The highest estimates — sometimes in excess of €100 billions — actually include much broader scopes of data analytics, big data or financial analytical software, which must be distinguished from the financial market data in the strict sense. This reflects the expansion of uses, the regulatory dependence of players and the concentration of economic control on a very limited number of dominant suppliers.[18] This dynamic reinforces the idea that market data markets are not only a competitive issue, but also a major strategic issue for regional economies and financial systems. In quantitative terms, the orders of magnitude are considerable. Based on converging estimates by Copenhagen Economics, BVI, COSSIOM and European trade associations, it can be estimated that the additional costs borne by European market data users are between 30 and 40% compared to a price level observed in a competitive environment comparable to that of the United States.[19] Compared to a cumulative annual value of the European market data market, these additional costs would represent several billion euros or even more than ten billions € per year. Over a period of ten years, the cumulative cost gap between the European Union and the United States could thus reach several tens of billions of euros, an order of magnitude comparable to the Union’s annual industrial or strategic investment budgets. There are several American and Anglo-Saxon studies that are very directly comparable, and sometimes even more explicit than European studies on the Europe/United States price differential. They do not always give a « single official ratio », but they robustly document the idea of a more competitive US market on market data and therefore relatively more disciplined prices, or at least better supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the American financial markets authority.[20]

It should be stressed that these costs are not abstractions: they are ultimately passed on to European institutional investors, pension funds, savers and policyholders, in a system where end users – investors – are very fragmented and have very limited bargaining power in the face of globalised suppliers. They are therefore not only an issue of competition, but also an issue of economic justice, fairness and the overall competitiveness of European financial markets. This comes at a time when European countries are desperate for the considerable capital needed to grow their digital operators.

Table 2. Estimates of the cumulative annual value of market data markets  by continent and segment (€ billions)

Continent	Pre-trade data	Post-trade data	Baselines / Indices	Derived Data / Licenses	Estimated total
North America	120 – 200	100 – 180	80 – 150	100 – 170	400 – 700
Europe	80 – 130	70 – 120	60 – 100	90 – 150	300 – 500
Asia Pacific	50 – 90	40 – 80	30 – 70	80 – 160	200 – 400
Africa / MO	10 – 15	10 – 15	5 – 10	10 – 15	35 – 55

Sources: Studies by Burton-Taylor International Consulting, BCG Expand, McKinsey & Company, the work of the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), the Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management (BVI), as well as various analyses relating to the revenues of stock exchanges, index providers and financial data platforms. The amounts shown are aggregated orders of magnitude including not only direct revenues from the sale of data, but also licenses, derivative uses, redistributions and analytical services associated with market infrastructures.

Table 2 first highlights the systemic scale of market data markets, the cumulative value of which reaches exceptionally high orders of magnitude on a global scale. North America remains the dominant pole, followed by Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, while Africa and the Middle East remain marginalized in the overall structuring of the market. Beyond the differences in size, the segmental analysis reveals a structural homogeneity of the four main categories of data (pre-trade, post-trade, indices and derived data), which are found in all geographical areas with relatively comparable orders of magnitude. However, this apparent convergence masks profound differences in competitive structuring, with the most dynamic segments in terms of value being those related to derived data and licensing, i.e. precisely those where contractual and monetisation leverage is the highest.

A more strategic reading of the picture highlights three major imbalances. Firstly, a persistent North-South asymmetry, in which Europe, despite its global economic weight, remains structurally dependent on non-European suppliers for access to data infrastructures. Secondly, a transversal concentration by segments, each geographical area being dominated by a limited number of players capable of simultaneously controlling several layers of the information value chain. Finally, there is a direct geopolitical implication, insofar as mastery of the most valuable segments of market data confers the power to structure the conditions of access to the financial markets themselves. This configuration transforms market data into an indirect but decisive vector of economic power, justifying its full integration into contemporary analyses of financial sovereignty and economic security. Market data markets have a very uneven geographical distribution, reflecting both the historical location of financial infrastructures, the concentration of the main providers and the relative importance of regional financial markets. The available estimates, based on sector reports and economic studies, make it possible to establish the overall size of market data markets from €950 billions to €1650 billions. This aggregate value set of the highly fragmented relevant market data markets (flows and licenses) is based on the following values by continent, for which the main characteristics can be summarized as follows:[21]

– North America: the market is the most developed and mature, with a high concentration around a few historical players (NYSE, NASDAQ, CME Group). The cumulative value of market data segments is estimated to be between €400 billions and €700 billions, reflecting both primary market data and derivatives and post-trade services.

– Europe: the cumulative value of European markets is estimated at between €300 billions and €500 billions, with a similar concentration, but spread over a set of regional markets (London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Milan stock exchanges). The structuring of European markets is strongly influenced by MiFID II and data disclosure requirements.

– Asia-Pacific: the Asian market, dominated by the stock exchanges of Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, represents a cumulative value of between €200 billions and €400 billions, with rapid growth since 2018, driven by digitalization and the gradual opening of the Chinese and Indian markets.

– Africa and the Middle East: these markets remain very limited, probably representing less than €50 billions cumulatively, due to the shallowness of local financial markets and dependence on foreign suppliers.

2. Segmentation by products and barriers to entry

 Market data is now a complex and indispensable ecosystem for financial markets, including real-time feeds, historical series, benchmarks, derivatives and aggregation services, used for trading, risk management, index calculation and regulatory compliance.[22] The definition of the relevant markets – based on the analysis of the products themselves but also in their geographical dimensions – is an essential prerequisite for the possible identification of abuse of dominant practices.

From the point of view of product markets, academic literature and doctrine in Europe and the United States generally identify seven to eight relevant markets:[23] pre-trade data, post-trade data, indices and benchmarks, derived and calculated data, historical data, aggregation services as well as emerging complementary services. Each segment responds to specific uses and is subject to distinct pricing models, which contributes to the complexity and concentration of the market.

Markets have very high barriers to entry, which largely explain the concentration observed and the difficulty for new entrants to establish themselves. Structural barriers include the high fixed costs of collecting and aggregating flows in real-time, centralization of trading venues, as well as intellectual property rights and exclusive licenses on primary flows.[24] These factors, confirmed by French analyses (COSSIOM, France Post-Marché, AMF), create economic and contractual obstacles that discourage direct competition.[25]

In addition to these obstacles, there are behavioural and strategic barriers used by dominant suppliers to consolidate their position. Incumbents can impose complex pricing models, with sudden increases or aggregation fees that penalise entrants and smaller players.[26] Restrictive contracts often prohibit the redistribution or combination of flows with other sources, thus limiting substitutability and the development of competitive alternatives.[27] In addition, artificial product differentiation, for example by varying granularity or format, forces users to take out several licenses, strengthening the hold of existing suppliers[28].

Studies conducted at European level confirm these observations. Copenhagen Economics highlights that incumbent providers are exploiting their position to segment the market and lock in end-users, especially Northern European banks and asset managers.[29] BVI points out that European concentration is exacerbated by policy practices such as restrictive contractual clauses and complex pricing structures.[30] French analyses corroborate these points, highlighting the costs and complexity of licensing for European players, in particular banks and investment funds.[31] Finally, Finans Danmark and the Nordic Investment Fund Association show that these conditions make the entry of new European suppliers economically unviable, increasing dependence on American and British suppliers.[32]

By combining structural barriers and strategic behaviour, the market remains highly concentrated and difficult to contest, despite its growing economic importance. These characteristics structure not only the pricing of flows but also the competitiveness of European players, a point that will be central in the analysis of additional costs and anti-competitive practices in the following sections.

3. Geographic Segmentation

The relevant markets are also differentiated by legal and economic doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic according to their geographical area, as location influences access, regulation and the structure of flows.

North America represents a mature and highly concentrated market, dominated by NYSE, Nasdaq and CME Group, and is the main hotbed of market data aggregators, with more than a dozen major providers, operating on all continents.

Europe has a fragmented but highly concentrated market, with London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam and Milan as the main hubs. The presence of EU member operators is very limited: only two significant European players can be observed, while the majority of suppliers are American or British.[33]

French analyses confirm this structural dependence and highlight the costs of licences as well as the difficulties for new entrants.[34]

The fast-growing Asia-Pacific is centred on Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, while Africa and the Middle East remain smaller and peripheral markets, largely dependent on imported flows. This geographical segmentation clearly shows Europe’s structural dependence on non-European suppliers, a decisive factor for the analysis of anti-competitive practices and the additional costs borne by European consumers.[35]

3. Dominant players, market concentration and dependence of European consumers

As already noted, market observation shows that the concentration of suppliers is extremely high in continental Europe, while the United States and the United Kingdom each have a dozen major operators.[36] On the European continent, as noted, only two EU member players play a significant role in several segments, including pre/post-trade, indices and aggregation.

This concentration creates a significant structural imbalance and limits effective competition. It gives the few dominant operators a high level of market power, limiting substitutability and increasing barriers to entry. European consumers, especially banks, asset managers and hedge funds, incur significant additional costs to access flows that their US counterparts can obtain at a lower cost.[37] This concentration also creates an environment conducive to anti-competitive practices, such as sharp price increases or restrictive contractual terms, which increase the dependence of European users.

The analysis of the relevant markets shows a high dependence of European consumers. Asset managers and pension funds such as BlackRock, Amundi, Allianz Global Investors, DWS or UBS AM, as well as banks and brokers such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, Barclays or Credit Suisse, are highly dependent on these flows.  European hedge funds and  professional traders are also a highly exposed user group.

This concentration entails significant additional costs for end users.[38] To confirm the previous observations concerning European additional costs compared to market data prices in North American markets, it should be noted that European licenses for a real-time data feed can cost 1.5 to 2 times more than for an equivalent feed in the United States. For an average institutional fund, annual licences can be as high as EUR 2 to 5 million, of which 30 to 40 % are considered to be additional costs attributable to the merger. For example, subscriptions to the MSCI or FTSE Russell indices can cost between €100,000 and €300,000 per year in Europe, compared to $60,000 to $150,000 in the United States.

Three main lessons emerge from an examination of the economic structure of market data markets: the precise segmentation and complexity of the markets justify the definition of distinct relevant markets. Concentration in the relevant markets and high barriers to entry, both structural and strategic, limit the entry of new players and strengthen the market power of dominant suppliers. This concentration is logically reflected in prices that are significantly higher than those observed in the United States and in significant additional costs for European banks and asset managers, confirmed by Danish, German, Nordic and French analyses. The examination to be followed of the anticompetitive practices documented by the investigations of the EC DG Competition will highlight in particular the restrictive contractual clauses and market foreclosure strategies that are the basis for excessive price increases.

II – Anticompetitive practices and additional costs on market data markets

The analysis of the structure of European market data markets revealed a highly concentrated configuration, marked by high barriers to entry, low substitutability of offers and structural dependence of end-users on a small number of integrated providers. In this context, the price differences observed between Europe and the United States cannot be interpreted as simple differences in cost structure, but must be understood through the prism of competition law and strategies for the valuation of information infrastructures.

The practices observed combine intellectual property rights, contractual segmentation of flows, increasing complexity of licenses and restrictions on use, producing cumulative lock-in effects already documented by the European Commission and market works. The analysis is organized around three sets: emblematic cases of regulation, mechanisms of additional costs related to IPRs and finally contractual lockout practices.

1. Emblematic cases and limited regulatory framework for market practices in the EU

Four cases relating to anticompetitive practices relating to market data since 2010 deserve attention.

a. S&P ISIN / CUSIP (2010–2011): monetization of reference identifiers and appropriation of information infrastructures

The S&P ISIN / CUSIP case, investigated between 2010 and 2011, is one of the first European disputes to have highlighted the gradual transformation of standardised financial identifiers into truly autonomous economic assets. The case was opened by the European Commission (DG Competition) following complaints and reports from professional users of financial data, market infrastructures and associations representing European asset managers and financial intermediaries. The authorities’ attention focused on the practices of Standard & Poor’s, then the holder of rights to CUSIP codes and a central player in the international dissemination of financial identifiers associated with ISIN codes used in clearing, settlement and back-office transactions.

The heart of the dispute was the commercialization of paid licenses for the use and redistribution of U.S. financial identifiers within the EU. The Commission considered that the pricing and contractual practices implemented by S&P raised serious questions under competition law, insofar as European financial institutions had no economically realistic alternative to access these references, which had become essential to the daily functioning of international financial markets.

The contractual architecture examined by the Commission was based on several cumulative mechanisms. On the one hand, the licences were calculated according to the number of internal users and the methods of data dissemination within banking groups or financial infrastructures. On the other hand, existing flows were subject to regular tariff increases, estimated by several professional analyses at between 10 and 15% per year, regardless of any significant change in the technical costs of production or maintenance.[39] This dynamic led to a continuous increase in the cost of access to identifiers that had become essential to the fulfilment of the regulatory and operational obligations of financial players.

The originality of the case lies in the very nature of the assets concerned. Unlike traditional market data — price feeds, historical data or indices — ISIN and CUSIP codes are reference information infrastructures, necessary for the unambiguous identification of financial instruments throughout the trading and post-trade chain. Their function is therefore quasi-regulatory and systemic. However, precisely because they are standardized and universally used, these identifiers acquire an exceptional economic value: the more universal their use becomes, the more strategic their control becomes.

The European Commission has thus been confronted with a particularly delicate issue: that of the boundary between legitimate intellectual property and private appropriation of an infrastructure that has become essential to the functioning of the market. The dossier highlighted the way in which rights initially conceived as mechanisms for protecting information investment could be used as instruments for capturing rent on standards that had become essential.

Subsequent doctrinal and professional analyses, in particular those of the BVI in 202-2021, have highlighted that this contractual architecture produced a particularly powerful lock-in effect.[40] Unlike other segments of market data where a certain substitutability is still possible, reference identifiers cannot be replaced without calling into question the very interoperability of financial infrastructures. The absence of a credible alternative thus gives the rightholder a structural ability to impose its pricing and contractual conditions on all users.

The S&P ISIN/CUSIP case  thus appears to be a major precedent in the contemporary understanding of financial data markets. It reveals that market power can result not only from the possession of high value-added data, but also from the control of technical standards essential to the circulation of financial information. In this respect, this case foreshadows several issues that will later be found in the S&P / IHS Markit, Refinitiv or Bloomberg cases: transformation of information infrastructures into private assets, structural dependence on users and strategic use of intellectual property rights to reinforce lock-in effects.

However, the S&P model has its own specificity compared to the other cases studied. Where Bloomberg organizes a lock-in by functional integration of uses and Refinitiv is based on a contractual fragmentation of flows, S&P exercises an even more fundamental power: that of controlling a universal language of financial identification. The lock is therefore not the result of technological exclusivity or an integrated software architecture, but of the control of an information infrastructure that has become essential to the very circulation of financial securities in the globalized economy.

b. S&P / IHS Markit (2021): Concentration and Recomposition of Financial Data Architectures

The merger between S&P Global and IHS Markit, notified and reviewed in 2021, is part of a broader movement to consolidate global market data and index infrastructures, characterized by a gradual integration of information value chains from raw data production to index derivatives and advanced analytical services. The European Commission’s investigation was triggered due to concerns about the cumulative effect of this transaction on already highly concentrated segments, including financial indices, benchmarks and certain post-trade services.[41]

The core of the competitive control was the ability of the merged entity to combine, within the same integrated group, assets that had previously been partially separated: on the one hand, reference codes (including CUSIP) and identifier databases, and on the other hand, index and high-value-added analytical services activities. This vertical and horizontal integration raised a specific risk of strengthening market power, not only through the accumulation of market shares, but above all through the ability to recompose data chains.

In order to address these concerns, the European Commission has imposed a set of structural remedies, including the partial divestiture of certain CUSIP-related assets as well as commitments on the availability of reference data segments and non-discriminatory access to certain key components.[42] These measures were intended to preserve a degree of contestability on the most sensitive segments of the financial data infrastructure.

However, ex-post analyses, including those of the 2021 BVI,[43] highlight the intrinsic limitations of such remedies in markets characterised by strong functional integration of data. In practice, the legal separation of certain assets does not neutralize the economic capacity of integrated groups to reconstitute equivalent offers by recombining other segments: proprietary indices, pre- and post-trade data, analytics tools and derivatives can be aggregated to reproduce control effects similar to those prior to the transaction.

This dynamic reveals a central structural point: competitive value does not lie in assets in isolation, but in their ability to recompose into complete data architectures. Thus, even in the case of targeted divestitures, dominant operators retain the ability to exercise market power through functional integration, which limits the effectiveness of conventional remedies based on asset disaggregation.

The comparison with the other configurations studied makes it possible to specify the place of this model. Unlike S&P ISIN/CUSIP, where market power is based on a non-substitutable infrastructural node, and Bloomberg, where it is based on a closed ecosystem of integrated use, the S&P / IHS Markit case  illustrates a form of domination through the strategic recomposition of modular information value chains. Power here does not derive from a single asset or a closed environment, but from the ability to articulate heterogeneous data bricks into integrated products that are difficult to contest.

This configuration thus confirms a now central characteristic of market data markets: competition is no longer exercised on distinct and isolable markets, but on complex informational architectures, in which the boundary between reference data, indices and analytics becomes structurally porous. In this context, mergers produce not only effects of scale, but also effects of reorganising the possibilities of economic combination of data, making any corrective action based on partial asset separations particularly delicate.

Finally, and very importantly, this case actually presents a very strong economic and functional continuity with the previous S&P ISIN / CUSIP, despite the difference in legal qualification between an antitrust procedure based on a possible abuse of a dominant position and a merger examined ex ante under merger control. In both cases, the central question remains that of the control of information infrastructures that have become essential to the functioning of financial markets. The ISIN/CUSIP case focused on the monetization of reference identifiers considered non-substitutable; the S&P/IHS Markit case reveals, ten years later, a further step in this dynamic, namely the integration of these reference assets into much broader architectures combining indices, analytics, derivative data and valuation services. Thus, where the ISIN/CUSIP case highlighted market power based on the possession of an essential information standard, the S&P / IHS Markit operation illustrates the ability of large market data groups to recompose this power within integrated financial data ecosystems. This continuity also explains why several European professional associations, in particular the BVI and certain sectoral contributions addressed to the Commission, have explicitly brought the two cases together in order to highlight the risk of indirect reconstitution of dominant positions already identified in previous disputes.

c. Thomson Reuters / Refinitiv (2018–2021 process): contractual fragmentation and industrialization of license segmentation

The Thomson Reuters/Refinitiv case is part of a deep restructuring of the global market data market, which began in 2018, whenThomson Reuters‘ Financial & Risk business was sold to the Blackstone fund, giving birth to Refinitiv, before its subsequent integration into the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) in 2021. This sequence goes far beyond the capital or industrial dimension alone: it takes place in a context of structural transformation of the economic model of large financial infrastructures, in which revenues from market data fees are gradually becoming an autonomous and strategic profit center, sometimes more dynamic than revenues from traditional trading or clearing activities.[44] The integration of Refinitiv into LSEG illustrates the growing convergence between market infrastructures, financial data and integrated analytical services.

Unlike the S&P ISIN/CUSIP cases, which are based on the control of essential reference identifiers, or the Bloomberg model, which is characterized by an integrated and highly captive environment, the Refinitiv model is based less on the ownership of a single asset or a closed ecosystem than on a logic of industrialization of contractual fragmentation. Analyses by Copenhagen Economics in 2021 and BVI in 2020–2021 highlight an extremely segmented structuring of data offerings: real-time feeds, historical data, post-trade data, derivatives, redistribution rights and analytical services are marketed in the form of separate modules, each subject to specific licenses, often non-substitutable and above all which are difficult to pool between entities of the same financial group.[45]

This architecture produces a particular economic mechanism. Where S&P locks access through the centrality of an infrastructural identifier and Bloomberg organizes dependency through an integrated technology environment, Refinitiv operates by multiplying contractual points of friction. Economically homogeneous data is thus transformed into a series of legally differentiated products, subject to distinct conditions of use. The inflationary effect is therefore not mainly the result of a uniform increase in unit prices, but of the cumulative addition of micro-licences made essential to reconstitute complete information coverage.[46]

The consequences are particularly acute for banks, market infrastructures and asset managers operating on a pan-European or global scale. Restrictions on pooling between subsidiaries, trading rooms or jurisdictions frequently lead to a duplication of licences for identical uses. The converging work of the BVI, Copenhagen Economics and several professional contributions from COSSIOM estimate that this contractual structure generates additional structural costs of around 30 to 40%, with no identifiable correlation with the technical costs of producing or disseminating the data.[47] These additional costs are mainly the result of the complexity of the licensing model itself and the operational difficulties associated with the recomposition of user rights.

This logic of extensive segmentation also has an important kinship with the evolution observed in the S&P / IHS Markit case. In both cases, market power is no longer the result of the sole possession of an isolated strategic asset, but of the ability to recompose functional sets of data and analytical services that are difficult to replace. However, where S&P / IHS Markit is mainly based on a dynamic of concentration and vertical integration of data assets, Refinitiv is more of a strategy of control through contractual granularity and the increasing complexity of authorized uses.

Finally, this configuration highlights a major difficulty for contemporary competition law. The foreclosure observed does not necessarily result from explicit exclusivity or a formal refusal of access, but from a contractual architecture that is sufficiently complex to make any attempt at partial substitution economically irrational. It is therefore a diffuse but particularly effective form of market power, based less on prohibition than on the potential disruption of competing uses. In this respect, the Refinitiv case illustrates the emergence of contemporary mechanisms of information locking that partially escape the classic categories of abuse of dominance law, while producing economic effects comparable to those of a closed infrastructure.

d. Bloomberg Terminal (consolidated model since the 1990s, documented effects 2019–2021): systemic locking by integrated ecosystem

The Bloomberg model is part of a long consolidation trajectory that began in the 1990s, during which time the terminal gradually established itself as a central infrastructure for global financial information, combining real-time data dissemination, analysis tools, professional messaging and trading functionalities. Unlike other market players, Bloomberg adopted a vertical integration strategy very early on aimed at bringing together all uses of financial information within a single, contractually closed environment.[48]

Contemporary competitive questions, as they appear in the BVI and Copenhagen Economics analyses between 2019 and 2021, are not the result of a formalised litigation investigation by the European Commission comparable to the S&P or S&P/IHS cases, but rather of a accumulation of sector reports, economic studies and feedback from institutional users (banks, asset managers, hedge funds). This work converges to underline that the Bloomberg terminal occupies a singular position in the market data ecosystem, as an almost obligatory access point to a significant part of the world’s financial flows.

The specificity of the model lies in a so-called integrated ecosystem architecture, in which data is not only sold, but incorporated into a complete functional environment. The terminal combines access to market data, pricing tools, advanced analytics, messaging systems and trading functions, creating a strong interdependence between the different components of the service. This integration produces a lock-in effect that is not based on an exclusive right to the data, but on the practical and economic difficulty of decoupling uses once they have been internalized in the operational processes of financial institutions.

The economic analyses of Copenhagen Economics (2021) and the work of the BVI (2021)[49] highlight a double mechanism of additional costs. On the one hand, there is a high direct cost of subscription per user, which is already a significant barrier for multi-site European institutions. On the other hand, there is a structural indirect cost, resulting from the inability to efficiently combine Bloomberg data  with competing sources, due to contractual restrictions and the centrality of the device in user workflows. This second effect is particularly important because it greatly reduces the effective substitutability of the service, even in the presence of technically comparable alternatives.

The Bloomberg logic  is thus clearly different from the other two models analyzed. Where S&P ISIN/CUSIP relies on the control of an indispensable infrastructural node (market identifiers), and Thomson Reuters / Refinitiv relies on a contractual fragmentation of data flows, Bloomberg relies on a strategy of complete internalization of the information value chain. In other words, it is neither a monopoly on a standard, nor a multiplication of licenses, but a global capture of the environment of use.

This difference also explains the particular nature of the locking observed. In the Bloomberg case, user dependence is not the result of an explicit legal constraint of exclusivity, but of a phenomenon of organizational and cognitive inertia: financial institutions structure their decision-making, trading and risk management processes around the terminal, making any attempt at partial substitution extremely expensive. The lockdown is therefore less contractual than systemic.

Finally, comparative analyses of the three major market models show that Bloomberg occupies an intermediate but singular position in the typology of market power of financial data infrastructures. It shares with S&P a form of functional centrality, and with Refinitiv a logic of capture by uses, but it is distinguished by the intensity of the total functional integration of services, which transforms the terminal into a real cognitive infrastructure of global financial markets. Thus, Bloomberg can be considered a hybrid position between a data provider, a business platform and an integrated cognitive infrastructure. Like the large digital relational platforms for private individuals (social networks), Bloomberg‘s power stems less from the mere possession of information than from its ability to organize users’ interactions, professional routines and informational dependencies within a closed environment with very strong network effects.

2. Intellectual property rights and structural production of additional costs

Intellectual property rights occupy a central place in the economic structuring of market data markets. Far from being a simple mechanism for protecting innovation, they function in this sector as instruments for the economic segmentation of uses, allowing the establishment of lasting contractual barriers and the extraction of recurring informational rents. Financial data thus tends to be transformed into an autonomous asset, capable of being valued independently of its marginal cost of reproduction or dissemination.

In contemporary financial markets, intellectual property does not only concern original content in the classic sense of copyright, but also technical repositories, nomenclatures, databases, identifiers of financial instruments, indices and dissemination architectures. This functional extension of intellectual property allows the main market data providers to organize a cumulative pricing: primary access to data, internal redistribution, dissemination to end customers, analytical use, archiving, feeding algorithms or integration into risk management systems. Each usage layer is separately licensed and monetized, which leads to an increase in contractual and operational compliance costs[50].

The S&P ISIN/CUSIP case (2010–2011) is a particular illustration of this structural rent logic. By controlling CUSIP identifiers and linking them with ISIN codes, S&P has been able to implement a pricing policy based on the number of users, redistribution methods and functional uses of the data. Several market players then denounced recurring annual tariff increases, disconnected from the real costs of production or maintenance of the databases concerned.[51] This case has helped to highlight the ability of the holders of rights on information infrastructures that have become almost indispensable to impose contractual conditions that are difficult to circumvent in practice.

More broadly, the phenomenon is part of a dynamic of « informational enclosure » of market infrastructures, in which data that has become essential to the functioning of the financial system is gradually privatized through database law, user licenses and contractual restrictions.[52] Several authors emphasize that economic scarcity here is not linked to the production of the data itself — the marginal cost of reproduction of which is extremely low — but to the legal and technical capacity to control access and use.[53] Economic value then comes less from the intrinsic informational content than from the power of exclusivity attached to its control.

The work of Copenhagen Economics published in 2021 has greatly contributed to objectifying this issue on a European scale. The study highlights that pre- and post-trade flow prices in Europe are around 50 to 80% higher than those observed in comparable US markets.[54] However, these differences cannot be explained either by substantial differences in technical costs or by significant differences in quality of service. They are mainly the result of more fragmented market structures in Europe, a multiplicity of licenses and a stronger ability of operators to contractually segment data uses. The study also highlights that the historical absence of fully operational consolidated tape in the EU has ended up strengthening the market power of primary data platforms and providers.

The Thomson Reuters / Refinitiv (2020–2021) and Bloomberg cases  confirm this dynamic of contractual fragmentation and the multiplication of costs incurred. In these models, financial institutions frequently have to acquire several separate licenses for uses that are economically similar: internal consultation, inter-subsidiary distribution, use on multiple workstations, feeding algorithmic tools, historical storage or external redistribution. This logic of contractual segmentation produces an overlapping of fees that is likely to generate very significant additional costs for financial institutions, with some professional studies noting that overall market data expenses can reach several tens of millions of euros per year for medium-sized institutions. Several European professional associations have also denounced a lack of price transparency and a particularly marked asymmetry of negotiation between global data providers and institutional users.[55]

This evolution is helping to transform large market data infrastructures into quasi-private utilities with structural economic power. The gradual concentration of suppliers around a few global groups — notably Bloomberg L.P., London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), S&P Global and Intercontinental Exchange — further strengthen this ability to unilaterally set the economic conditions for access to financial information. From this perspective, intellectual property rights appear less as traditional instruments for stimulating innovation than as mechanisms for the economic governance of market information infrastructures.

In addition to this difference in economic structure, there is a significant doctrinal divergence between the European and American approaches to financial data. In the United States, regulatory and competition doctrine has historically been marked by a more functional conception of market data as an infrastructure necessary for the proper functioning of financial markets. Since the 1970s, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. federal securities and exchange markets authority, has linked the dissemination of market data to the objective of a National Market System designed to ensure the transparency, integrity and accessibility of American financial markets. This approach has led to the emergence of consolidated tape mechanisms and relatively more intrusive monitoring of the pricing arrangements imposed by data exchanges and providers.[56] Even though the major US operators have gradually developed very advanced monetisation strategies, US doctrine continues to attach particular importance to the systemic nature of access to financial information and the need to avoid excessive barriers to entry for intermediaries and investors.

Conversely, the European approach has historically been built in a more fragmented framework and more influenced by the logic of intellectual property, competition between trading platforms and private contractualization of uses. The liberalisation introduced by MiFID I has encouraged the multiplication of trading venues without simultaneously creating a unified data consolidation tool comparable to the US model.[57] In this context, the European Commission and regulators have long favoured a logic of competition between data providers rather than an approach that assimilates market data to a quasi-public infrastructure. Several authors point out that the European Union initially considered market data mainly as economic assets that could be marketed freely, whereas American doctrine tended to understand them more as a functional element of the financial market architecture.[58] It was only after the MiFID II/MiFIR revisions  and the recent debates on  European consolidated tapes that the Commission gradually began to recognise the potential anti-competitive effects of this informational fragmentation and the need for more harmonised and transparent access to market data.[59]

3. Typology of foreclosure practices and competitive effects

The market data economy is characterised by the existence of particularly sophisticated lock-in mechanisms that allow the main providers of financial information to consolidate their market power in the long term. These practices are not based solely on classic phenomena of horizontal concentration, but on a combination of intellectual property rights, functional integration of services, technological dependence, contractual segmentation of uses and informational asymmetries. In this sector, competitive foreclosure stems less from the technical impossibility of switching suppliers than from the extremely high economic, operational and regulatory costs associated with such substitution.

a. IPR and maintenance of dominant positions

The S&P/Capital IQ (2011) and S&P Global/IHS Markit (2021) cases particularly illustrate the ability of intellectual property rights holders to maintain, or even strengthen, dominant positions by constantly reshaping their data offerings and functional architectures. Financial data is no longer a stand-alone product but an integrated whole combining repositories, indices, real-time feeds, analytical solutions, regulatory compliance tools and software infrastructures, whose interdependence mechanically reinforces the output costs for institutional users.[60]

The increasing vertical integration observed between data production, financial indices, risk management tools, analytical platforms and dissemination solutions creates particularly powerful cumulative dependency effects. The more a financial institution internalizes the technical standards, software interfaces and data histories of a given provider, the more costly it becomes to switch providers, both financially and regulatory. In the S&P/Capital IQ case, the European Commission had already noted that the combination of specialised financial databases and analytical solutions could significantly increase the barriers to entry into financial reporting markets.[61] Ten years later, the S&P Global/IHS Markit transaction confirmed this dynamic of structural integration. Several market participants pointed out that the concentration of data repositories, indices and analytical services in the hands of a small number of global operators risked producing long-term anti-competitive dependency effects.[62]

The competitive remedies imposed in these transactions — targeted asset transfers, licensing commitments or access guarantees — have certainly made it possible to limit certain immediate overlaps, but without fundamentally calling into question the foreclosure effects linked to the functional integration of services. Contemporary economic doctrine, in particular the former chair of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, sometimes describes these phenomena as « ecosystem lock-in », in which market power results less from the ownership of an isolated dominant product than from the control of a complete information environment combining data, software, technical standards and contractual uses.[63] From this perspective, intellectual property rights appear less as simple instruments for the protection of innovation than as mechanisms for consolidating economic dependence.

b. Excessive prices and geographical asymmetries

The work of Copenhagen Economics published in 2021 has greatly contributed to objectifying the structural asymmetries existing between the European and American market data markets while explaining in a very rational, very logical and substantiated way. This must be emphasized. The study in question demonstrates, as already observed, that the prices of pre- and post-trade flows marketed in the EU are 50 to 70 % higher, or even more for certain institutional user profiles, than those observed in comparable US markets, without any substantial technical differences that could justify such differences.[64] According to the authors, these divergences are mainly the result of the structural fragmentation of European trading venues, the historical absence of fully operational consolidated tape, and the increased ability of providers to contractually segment data usage.

The cumulative superimposition of costs is a central element of the European economic model here. The same institution may have to pay separately fees for primary access to flows, their internal redistribution, their historical archiving, their integration into algorithmic systems, their cross-border use or their dissemination to certain categories of customers. Contractual compliance costs thus become a substantial component of the final price of financial data.[65] Several European professional associations have also pointed out that this price fragmentation structurally favours very large establishments capable of absorbing high fixed costs, to the detriment of intermediate-sized players and new entrants.[66]

Geographic asymmetries also concern the bargaining power of users. While American players more frequently benefit from consolidated and standardised access to financial information, European institutions continue to be confronted with a much more fragmented contractual architecture. This situation reinforces the economic power of the world’s leading data providers and contributes to the emergence of a structural dependence on a limited number of global operators.

c. Systemic contractual foreclosure

The contributions of the French COSSIOM, the  German BVI and Finans Danmark published between 2020 and 2021 highlight the existence of a real systemic contractual lock-in within European market data markets.[67] Licensing agreements imposed by major providers, particularly American for the largest volumes, frequently limit the portability of data, its combination with competing sources, its multi-entity distribution or its exploitation in cloud infrastructures and algorithmic systems. These restrictions produce particularly significant economic effects in Europe, by sharply increasing switching costs and preventing the emergence of alternative solutions capable of efficiently aggregating different sources of information.

The lock-in here is the result of an accumulation of interdependent technical and contractual constraints. Several studies point out that certain licensing clauses produce effects close to vertical market restrictions, in particular when they limit the interoperability of systems, impose proprietary formats or restrict the transferability of historical data and analytical infrastructures.[68] Institutional users are thus locked into complex architectures where any substantial change in information flows involves considerable technical, legal and regulatory costs.

This dynamic contributes to reinforcing particularly high barriers to entry for new players. The costs of building competing offerings are no longer solely related to the acquisition of the data itself, but also to the ability to reproduce technical standards, historical repositories, compliance tools, and analytical infrastructures that have become almost essential in the day-to-day functioning of contemporary financial markets.

d. Doctrinal contrast between the European and American approaches

The European and American approaches differ significantly in their approach to foreclosure practices associated with market data. In the United States, regulatory doctrine has historically been influenced by the concept of the National Market System developed by the SEC since the 1970s. Market data is more widely regarded as an essential component of the financial infrastructure, justifying relatively intrusive supervision of disclosure and pricing arrangements.[69] Even though U.S. operators have also developed advanced data monetization strategies, the U.S. system retains a more centralized and regulatory-controlled logic, notably through consolidated tape  mechanisms and consolidated distribution plans overseen by the SEC.

Conversely, the EU has long favoured an approach based on competition between trading platforms and the contractual freedom of data providers. The MiFID I directive  of 2004 encouraged the multiplication of trading venues without simultaneously creating a consolidated mechanism comparable to the American model.[70] Several authors consider that European doctrine initially underestimated the systemic effects of informational fragmentation produced by this regulatory architecture.[71] In this context, intellectual property rights and contractual licenses have gradually acquired a structuring function in the distribution of economic power in financial data markets.

However, the recent reforms of MiFIR and the debates on European consolidated tapes reflect a significant doctrinal evolution. The European Commission now recognises more explicitly that certain forms of fragmentation and contractual foreclosure can produce structural anti-competitive effects that are incompatible with the objectives of integrating European financial markets.[72] This evolution marks a gradual rapprochement with a more « infrastructural » conception of financial data, in which access to market information tends to be understood not only as a private economic asset, but as an essential condition for the competitive and transparent functioning of markets.

To sum up, all the cases analysed between 2010 and 2021 highlight a systemic structuring of European market data markets around combined foreclosure mechanisms. Intellectual property rights, contractual segmentation and infrastructure concentration produce cumulative effects that go beyond individual cases. The four S&P ISIN/CUSIP, S&P/IHS Markit, Thomson Reuters/Refinitiv and Bloomberg cases  illustrate different modalities of the same phenomenon: the transformation of financial data into strategic assets that are difficult to replace. These dynamics generate additional structural costs for European users and contribute to a persistent gap with the American market. They cannot be analysed as one-off anomalies, but as structural features of contemporary financial data markets. It is therefore possible to examine the systemic implications of these findings now, by articulating competition law, financial regulation and economic sovereignty in a broader geopolitical framework.

Scope1 – Market data : towards a new subject of European law on abuse of dominant position?

This box highlights the profound transformation of market data, which has gradually moved from being a simple technical by-product of financial markets to a strategic information infrastructure. This evolution now places financial data at the crossroads of competition law, financial regulation and digital sovereignty issues, gradually leading European law to favour ex ante regulatory mechanisms  inspired by new governance models for platforms and systemic data.

1. Financial data becomes strategic infrastructure

Long perceived as a mere technical by-product of stock market activity, market data has gradually become an autonomous economic asset and an essential infrastructure of contemporary financial capitalism. Banks, asset management companies, trading platforms and algorithmic operators are structurally dependent on these flows to meet their regulatory obligations, ensure the best execution of orders, value financial instruments and calibrate their market strategies. This development has profoundly transformed the position of the major market infrastructures — such as Euronext, the London Stock Exchange Group or Deutsche Börse — which no longer control only trading platforms, but also access to information resources that have become essential to the very functioning of financial markets. Market data thus has characteristics similar to essential facilities, insofar as its value is a direct result of network effects, liquidity concentration and the difficult to replicate nature of the flows produced.

2. Informational rent, excessive prices and regulatory lock-in

The rise of revenues from market data has led to a growing debate on the existence of information rent situations. For several years, banks, asset managers and financial infrastructures have been denouncing a rapid increase in the costs of accessing real-time feeds, professional licenses, APIs and financial indices. Some legal writers consider that this price inflation reflects less an increase in technical costs than a structural market power allowing dominant operators to charge excessive prices within the potential meaning of Article 102 TFEU and the United Brands case-law. This economic dependence is reinforced by the European regulatory framework itself (outside of competition law): the transparency and best execution requirements imposed by the MiFID II and MiFIR directives  require financial players to have permanent access to reliable, standardised and exhaustive data. The regulator thus contributes indirectly – but in fact – to reinforcing the indispensable nature of the flows held by the major market infrastructures, creating a form of « information lock-in » in which users have extremely limited room for negotiation.

3. The limits of traditional antitrust law in relation to data infrastructures

Despite these criticisms, the European competition authorities remain very cautious in the use of the traditional tools of the law on abuse of dominant position. Qualifying as excessive prices remains particularly difficult in markets where fixed costs are high, where business models are multifaceted and where the value of data depends directly on network externalities and platform liquidity. The authorities must arbitrate between two opposing risks: tolerating long-term situations of information rent or discouraging the investments necessary for the development of European financial infrastructures. This difficulty partly explains why market data cases have rarely led to heavy litigation penalties comparable to those observed in other digital sectors. Above all, it reveals the limits of a competition law historically designed for traditional industrial markets and less adapted to integrated, systemic information infrastructures that are highly dependent on technical standards.

4. Towards ex ante regulation of systemic information infrastructures

Faced with these limitations, the EU seems to be gradually shifting its legal centre of gravity towards ex ante regulatory mechanisms. The recent reforms of MiFIR, the debates on consolidated tape and the discussions on the price transparency of financial data reflect a growing desire to structurally organise the conditions of access to flows rather than to sanction individual abuses ex post. This development now brings market data closer to the broader issues of European digital law. As in the platform markets covered by the Digital Markets Act, data here becomes a strategic asset that makes it possible to control market access, structure economic dependencies and lock in usage ecosystems. Financial infrastructures thus appear to be one of the laboratories of the new European informational antitrust, at the frontier of competition law, sectoral regulation and economic sovereignty. Behind the controversies relating to the prices of market data is a more fundamental question: that of the control of the information infrastructures that have become essential to the functioning of the contemporary digital economy.

Ultimately, the issues raised by market data — structural dependence on information infrastructures, rent capture by integrated players, asymmetries of access and inadequacy of the ex post tools of Article 102 TFEU — are directly in line with the logic that led to the adoption of the Digital Markets Act. In both cases, European law tends to shift its centre of gravity from the ex post sanction of abuses to an ex ante regulation of information infrastructures that have become systemic. However, there remains a major difficulty: the geopolitical limits of the effectiveness of this regulation, since an essential part of the infrastructures, standards and data providers remains controlled by large groups, mainly American or Anglo-Saxon, de facto reducing the real capacity of the European Union to impose its own competitive and strategic balances in the long term.

III – Economic, regulatory and geopolitical impacts of market practices

The analysis of anticompetitive practices observed on market data markets  cannot be dissociated from their systemic effects on the European financial economy. The phenomena of contractual lock-in, artificial segmentation of licences and extensive appropriation of intellectual property rights produce consequences that go far beyond the mere bilateral relationship between suppliers and users. They directly affect the cost structure of financial institutions, modify the conditions for the exercise of competition, influence the direction of European regulation and contribute more broadly to a form of informational dependence of the EU and its Member States vis-à-vis mainly North American or Anglo-Saxon players. The analyses developed by Copenhagen Economics, BVI, Finans Danmark, COSSIOM and several communications from national authorities converge to show that market data markets are now an economic, regulatory and geopolitical issue.[73] Regulatory, competition and industry authorities will need to pay much more attention to this issue.

1. Structural economic effects on European users

The economic consequences of the observed practices appear to be particularly significant for European financial institutions, whether they are investment banks, management companies, pension funds, hedge funds or market infrastructures themselves. As illustrated by the S&P ISIN/CUSIP, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters/Refinitiv cases, the costs borne by users are no longer solely the result of the price of gross access to data feeds, but of an accumulation of peripheral royalties related to redistribution terms, internal usage restrictions, multi-site licenses, data histories or associated analytical tools.[74]

Studies by Copenhagen Economics show that, for a medium-sized European financial institution operating in several jurisdictions, the cumulative additional costs related to contractual fragmentation and multiple licenses can reach several million euros per year, sometimes between 2 and 5 million euros depending on the structure of uses and the number of entities involved.[75] These costs are all the more significant as they occur in an environment where the margins of financial intermediation activities have gradually decreased as a result of competition and prudential constraints.

Comparative analyses between the European and American markets also point to a particularly large price differential. Copenhagen Economics and several BVI communications  estimate that pre- and post-trade flows marketed in Europe are frequently charged between 50 and 80% more than in the United States, even though the technical costs of production and distribution appear to be relatively comparable.[76] This asymmetry creates a structural competitive disadvantage for the European institutions, which are forced to devote an increasing share of their operational expenses to the acquisition of data that has become essential for compliance with regulatory obligations and the conduct of negotiation strategies.

Beyond the financial cost alone, these practices also produce significant organizational and strategic effects. The proliferation of specialized licenses and contractual restrictions reduces the ability of institutions to pool their flows between subsidiaries, to develop internal data processing architectures or to quickly substitute one provider for another.[77]This creates a focus on legal, technical and compliance teams managing highly complex contract environments, reducing internal innovation capabilities and increasing dependence on large, global vendors.

This dynamic ultimately contributes to transforming market data into an almost incompressible cost of modern financial activity. Where data has historically been a technical support for market activity, it is now becoming an autonomous source of economic rent, the growth of which supports a growing share of the valuation of major international financial infrastructures.

2. European regulation confronted with the limits of ex-post control

Faced with these developments, European authorities have gradually tried to regulate the practices of the main market data providers through a combination of competitive and sectoral tools. The European Commission’s interventions in the S&P ISIN/CUSIP and S&P/IHS Markit cases illustrate this desire to limit the effects of excessive concentration and the locking mechanisms linked to reference data.[78] In the context of the S&P/IHS Markit transaction, the Commission imposed a number of structural commitments relating in particular to certain assets related to CUSIP codes  and reference data activities.

However, these interventions quickly revealed the limits of traditional competitive control applied to highly integrated information markets. Analyses by the BVI and several European industry associations show that the structural remedies imposed in mergers are not necessarily sufficient to recreate effective competition when dominant positions are based on integrated data ecosystems, strong network effects and complex contractual architectures.[79] Even after certain asset sales, the major operators retain in practice the ability to recompose integrated offers combining indices, analytics, trading data, histories and broadcasting services.

In addition to competition law, European sector regulators have also tried to increase the transparency of data markets. The successive reforms of MiFID II and MiFIR, as well as the work on the European consolidated tape[80], pursue the objective of reducing asymmetries in access to financial information and improving the comparability of data costs.[81] National authorities such as the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) have also published several analyses relating to price transparency and the conditions of access to market data.

In this context, professional associations have played a particularly active role. The BVI in Germany and Finans Danmark in the Nordics have tirelessly increased communications, consultations and economic studies to document the effects of tariff increases and lock-in practices.[82] This mobilization also reveals an important characteristic of market data markets: a large part of the European regulatory dynamic is based not on spectacular sanctions, but on an accumulation of technical work, public consultations and institutional pressure aimed at gradually attracting the attention of the European Commission.

Despite these initiatives, the results remain relatively limited and insufficient to reverse the transatlantic divide to the detriment of European operators, unfortunately undeniably. Pricing structures remain complex, licenses are not very transparent and market positions are highly concentrated. European users continue to suffer from high costs and significant contractual restrictions, even after several competitive or regulatory interventions.[83] This situation is gradually fuelling the idea that the traditional tools of competition law are insufficient to deal with information infrastructures that have become systemic.

3. Europe’s growing geopolitical dependence on financial data

Finally, it should be noted that market data markets have an increasingly visible geopolitical dimension. The concentration of the main suppliers around North American or Anglo-Saxon players – such as Bloomberg, S&P Global or Refinitiv – places European financial institutions in a situation of structural dependence for access to the data flows essential to the functioning of the markets.[84]

This dependence is not only about economic issues; it also affects information sovereignty and financial security. Data infrastructures are now critical elements in the functioning of contemporary markets: they condition price formation, trading strategies, risk management, clearing mechanisms and even certain prudential obligations. As a result, the ability of a few private players outside Europe to control access to these flows confers a market power that goes far beyond the traditional framework of competition.

The BVI  communications and several Nordic studies have thus underlined that a substantial change in licensing policies, pricing conditions or technical terms of access could produce significant systemic effects for European players.[85] Even after the commitments imposed in certain mergers, Europe’s dependence on non-European suppliers remains structurally high, in particular for benchmarks, global indices and some strategic derivative flows.[86] The case is far from over: Thomas Richter, President of BVI, announced on February 5, 2025 that he had filed a complaint against CUSIP and seriously highlighted the problems posed by the contractual practices concerned: « Together with other European associations, we have filed a competition complaint against CUSIP Global Service, the authority that issues the identification numbers of American securities. It aims to prevent data monopolies from abusing their market power. We also support the development of standards to expand the low-cost data offering for fund companies, thereby reducing the cost burden. In addition, we collaborate with data providers to promote high-quality, low-cost data products and services, preferably license-free.»[87]

This situation reveals more broadly the geopolitical limits of European regulation. The EU can regulate the conditions for carrying out activities on its territory, impose transparency obligations or control certain mergers; However, it remains largely dependent on actors whose decision-making centres, technological infrastructures and intellectual property rights are located outside its direct legal space. In other words, European regulation can mitigate certain abuses, but it still struggles to reduce the structural dependence created by the economic extraterritoriality of the world’s major providers of financial data.

The most recent analyses by the BVI and Copenhagen Economics show that the structural imbalances observed in the early 2020s largely persist today.[88] European markets continue to be characterised by high concentration, low supplier substitutability and persistently high access costs.[89] This permanence of imbalances explains why market data is no longer analysed only as a technical or competitive issue, but as a strategic issue relating to digital sovereignty, European industrial policy and the economic security of financial infrastructures.

Box 2 – Market data price differentials between Europe and the United States: orders of magnitude and economic significance

The studies available in the economics of regulation and in the analysis of financial infrastructures converge on the existence of a significant price differential for market data between Europe and the United States. Although there is no single, stable and legally bound ratio, several market studies (Copenhagen Economics, SIFMA/BCG, Finans Danmark) estimate that the costs borne by European users are, depending on the segment and type of licence, between 30% and 80% higher than those observed on the American markets. In an aggregated and conservative reading, the range of 50% to 70% is frequently used as an indicative approximation of the most significant structural differences, particularly for multi-user and multi-entity licenses.

These differences are not only the result of a homogeneous tariff differential, but of the very structure of the markets concerned. In the United States, competition between suppliers, partial substitutability of flows and the presence of a regulated data consolidation mechanism are helping to contain price levels. In Europe, on the other hand, the fragmentation of data sources, the concentration of infrastructure providers and the complexity of licensing models promote cumulative effects of contractual costs, particularly related to usage restrictions and sub-licensing obligations.

From a quantitative point of view, if we take into account the cumulative value estimates of market data markets (around €300 to €500 billion for Europe and €400 to €700 billion for North America, depending on the scope chosen), a differential of around 50% to 70% can be interpreted, purely for illustrative purposes, as representing a potential economic gap of around €150 to €300 billion to the detriment of Europeans. However, such an approximation should be read with caution, as these amounts aggregate heterogeneous segments (pre-trade, post-trade, indices, derivatives) and do not correspond to strictly comparable price flows. We will come back to this.

From a doctrinal point of view, these differences feed into a broader reflection on the structural effects of financial information markets. They suggest that market data  pricing cannot be analysed solely in terms of production costs, but must take into account contractual foreclosure effects, network externalities and asymmetries in market power between infrastructure providers and end-users. From this perspective, the issue of transatlantic price differentials is less an isolated figure than an indicator of institutional divergences between an American model based on litigation competition and a European model more structured by sectoral regulation. The big question is to what extent the European political authorities want to act to restore Europe to a high level of competitiveness, which Mario Draghi has been calling for since his report officially published in September 2024.[90]

It is therefore noted that the substantial additional costs for end-users, but also the concentrated structure of the markets, which has not changed despite regulatory interventions and the complexity of licensing, directly affect the competitiveness and profitability of European financial institutions. In the absence of effective solutions, the dependence of European financial markets on North American and British providers of financial data – which are the fuel of financial institutions – creates geopolitical and strategic risk, increasing the vulnerability of the European market to changes in contractual or pricing conditions. In summary, it is confirmed that the combination of IPRs, excessive prices and contractual foreclosure continues to affect European operators, not only economically, but also on a regulatory and strategic level. Analyses by European asset managers’ associations – representing tens of billions of euros in investments each year – have for more than fifteen years highlighted the need for continuous monitoring and targeted interventions to improve competition and reduce the additional costs observed in European markets compared to equivalent US markets, without eliciting an effective response from the Commission to date. It is therefore interesting to provide a brief overview of the operating conditions that determine the superior efficiency of the U.S. financial data markets.

IV – Anticompetitive practices and the structure of market data markets  in the United States

The study of the American market data markets is of particular interest from a comparative perspective, since they constitute both the main world centre for the production of financial data and the space where the major international providers of feeds, indices and reference data have historically developed. The United States is home to the majority of the world’s major financial data infrastructures, around major aggregators and market data providers, such as Bloomberg, S&P Global, Nasdaq, Intercontinental Exchange and Refinitiv. However, despite this considerable economic concentration, prices on the American market remain generally lower than those observed in Europe, while foreclosure phenomena appear to be relatively more limited.

This apparent paradox can be explained by several structural factors: historically more intense competition between trading venues, more interventionist sectoral regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, greater transparency of pricing policies and, above all, an antitrust culture more oriented towards controlling the concrete economic effects of mergers and contractual practices. The US authorities have thus gradually considered that market data is not only a commercial issue, but also an essential infrastructure for the proper functioning of the financial markets.

The analysis of American practices therefore highlights a fundamental difference with Europe: the risks of concentration and abuse also exist in the United States, but they are partially offset by competitive and regulatory mechanisms that further limit the ability of dominant operators to transform their informational power into sustainable rent. This comparison thus sheds light on the structural weaknesses of the European financial data market.

1. Real anti-competitive practices but more regulated

The American market data markets are by no means free of anticompetitive practices. U.S. federal authorities, in particular the U.S. securities and exchange commission, and one of the two federal authorities responsible for competition protection and antitrust enforcement, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,[91] have repeatedly identified behaviour that could limit competition or artificially increase the costs of accessing financial data.[92] However, unlike in Europe, these practices are part of an environment where inter-platform competitive pressure remains significant, which tends to limit their systemic scope.

The S&P ISIN/CUSIP case is particularly revealing in this respect. As in Europe, the US authorities have examined the competitive consequences of the monetisation of CUSIP identifiers and their articulation with the associated data flows and the issues of intellectual property rights. At stake was S&P Global‘s ability to transform a reference identifier essential to the functioning of the post-trade sector into an autonomous source of economic rent, based on a monopolistic conception of intellectual property rights. In particular, the US authorities monitored the commitments made in the context of the S&P/IHS Markit merger in order to avoid an excessive focus on master data and associated licenses.[93] A recent U.S. case law application to CUSIP has been summarized in Box 3 below).

The work of the BVI and several economic analyses nevertheless show that some foreclosure practices have persisted after the structural commitments imposed at the time of the operation.[94] Integrated offerings combining reference data, indices, pre- and post-trade feeds and analytical services continued to produce significant dependencies for professional users. However, in contrast to the European situation, the presence of significant competing suppliers and the possibility of partially recomposing flows from alternative sources limited the extent of the additional costs.[95]

The contractual practices observed at Bloomberg and Refinitiv also have similarities with European models. American doctrinal and professional analyses have highlighted the existence of restrictions relating to the redistribution of data, the pooling of licenses between entities or the combined use of competing flows.[96] The Bloomberg model, based on the integration of the terminal, analytical tools and proprietary feeds into a unified technical environment, has notably aroused criticism comparable to that expressed in Europe. However, the presence of credible alternatives — including FactSet, ICE Data Services, Morningstar or Nasdaq Data Link — has limited Bloomberg‘s ability to impose a lockdown as deep as in Europe.[97]

The US merger regulation also plays a key role in this dynamic. The S&P/IHS Markit transaction illustrates a more interventionist approach by the US authorities, based on a combination of structural commitments, behavioural monitoring and non-exclusivity obligations.[98] Where the European authorities have mainly sought to limit certain concentration effects, the US authorities have placed more emphasis on maintaining effective replacement capacity between data providers.

This difference in competitive philosophy appears to be central. In the United States, authorities generally consider that the main risk lies less in the existence of powerful players than in the absence of real competitive alternatives for users. The objective is therefore not to prevent the emergence of large integrated operators, but to preserve minimum conditions for free entry or the emergence of new competitors and market contestability.

2. Structural price restraint mechanisms in the United States

The persistent gap between US and European market data prices  is mainly due to structural differences in the organisation of markets and in the regulation of financial infrastructures. Comparative analyses conducted by Copenhagen Economics, Expand Research and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association show that the United States has a much denser and more efficient economic environment (price) than that observed in Europe.[99]

The first factor is the multiplicity of suppliers. The U.S. market is based on the coexistence of many trading platforms and several major producers of financial data, each with relatively substitutable offerings. This plurality fosters continuous competition between market infrastructures, index providers, analytical platforms and feed distributors. Users can thus arbitrate between different offers or recompose their data architectures from several competing providers.

The second factor is the higher level of regulatory price transparency. Data feed pricing policies are subject to relatively significant disclosure and supervision obligations under the control of the SEC.[100] This transparency reduces information asymmetries between suppliers and users and facilitates collective bargaining by major U.S. financial institutions.

The greater interoperability of flows is also a fundamental difference with Europe. Historically, U.S. infrastructures have developed more open models that allow users to combine multiple data sources within relatively compatible technical architectures.[101] This possibility of  » multi-homing  » mechanically reduces the effects of captivity observed in contractually closed environments, as they manifest themselves more strongly in the European financial data ecosystem.

In addition, there is an American antitrust tradition that has historically been more attentive to the concrete economic effects of mergers and restrictive covenants. The joint interventions of the SEC and the DOJ in transactions affecting financial data markets have gradually established a supervisory framework that is relatively deterrent to the most manifestly exclusive behaviors.[102] Even where some restrictive practices remain, dominant operators know that they operate in an environment where legal and regulatory challenges remain credible.

Finally, large U.S. users themselves have considerably more bargaining power than their European counterparts. Large US investment banks, global asset managers and professional consortia have the collective bargaining capacity to obtain more favourable pricing conditions and to withstand price increases more effectively.[103] This capacity for counter-power is a determining factor in limiting the phenomena of information rent. All of these mechanisms explain why the anticompetitive practices identified in the United States generally produce less marked economic effects than in Europe. Prices remain high in some specialist segments, but the overall competitive structure of the market further limits the ability of a single supplier to sustainably transform its market power into systemic dependence.

3. A growing divergence in economic and structural efficiency between the US and European markets

The comparison between the American and European market data markets finally reveals a profound structural divergence in the way competition is organized around financial information infrastructures.

In the United States, economic concentration is taking place in an environment where several competing liquidity centres, alternative platforms and a relatively strong ability of users to recompose their flows. Competition is less about the existence of the data itself than about the conditions of their distribution, analytical integration and commercial dissemination. This dynamic maintains a certain contestability of the market despite the power of the major operators.

In Europe, on the other hand, the historical fragmentation of financial markets, combined with the relative weakness of the large European providers and the regulatory dependence created by MiFID II, has gradually favoured a concentration around a limited number of dominant players, often non-European. Network effects are more powerful, alternatives are rarer and substitution possibilities are much more limited.

The difference is therefore not only due to the number of operators present on the market, but to the effective ability of users to change providers, to redesign their data architectures and to collectively negotiate their conditions of access. While the American market retains a logic of competition between partially substitutable ecosystems, the European market tends more towards a structural dependence on American information infrastructures, which have become almost unavoidable.

This divergence also explains the differences observed in the approach of public authorities. The American authorities traditionally favour the maintenance of minimum conditions of competitive contestability, while the European Union is gradually tending to shift its intervention towards a logic of ex ante regulation inspired by contemporary debates on digital platforms and information gatekeepers. Market data markets thus appear to be one of the most revealing laboratories of contemporary transformations of competition law in the data economy.

Box 3 – The CUSIP case in the United States: Market Data, antitrust, intellectual property, competitive intensity

The recent US litigation relating to market data reflects a significant evolution in competition law applied to financial information infrastructures. Long treated solely from the perspective of copyright and commercial licenses, financial data — in particular reference identifiers such as CUSIP — are now analyzed as systemic assets that can produce lock-in effects comparable to those of digital platforms.

The case of Dinosaur Financial Group LLC, Swiss Life Investment Management Holding AG and Hildene Capital Management LLC v. S&P Global, American Bankers Association and FactSet (S.D.N.Y., 2022–2024) exemplify this evolution. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have used intellectual property rights on the basis of identifiers that have become indispensable in order to impose multiple licenses, restrictions on use and high royalties. The dispute thus puts at the center of the debate a structuring question: can an intellectual property right legitimately be mobilized to control access to an information infrastructure that has become essential to the functioning of financial markets?[104]

From a legal point of view, the main issue lies in the relationship between copyright and the Sherman Act. The defendants invoke the protection of databases as original compilations, while the plaintiffs argue that a universal market standard cannot be transformed into a monopoly rent without falling into an anti-competitive exclusionary practice. This tension is all the stronger as US courts seem increasingly willing to examine not only the existence of intellectual property rights, but also their strategic use in market structuring.[105]

In this perspective, the federal courts have accepted at this procedural stage that certain practices could fall within the scope of a prohibited monopolization, despite the existence of intellectual property rights. The Southern District of New York  judge’s formula sums up this difficulty: « Is this an antitrust case disguised as a copyright case? Or is it the other way around? « .[106] This hesitation reflects an increasingly functional American approach: it is not the legal title of the law that is decisive, but its economic effects on competition.

This dynamic is part of a U.S. institutional ecosystem characterized by a combination of three factors: a high intensity of private litigation (class actions), a historically more interventionist antitrust tradition in the platform and infrastructure markets, and the capacity of the authorities (U.S. DOJ, U.S. SEC) to articulate competition law and sectoral regulation. This architecture encourages a more direct challenge to market behaviour, including when it is based on intellectual property rights.

Conversely, the European model is based more on sector-specific ex-ante regulation (MiFID II, MiFIR, consolidated tape project, DMA), complemented by more prudent ex-post control of abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. This approach, which is more structured but less contentious, tends to produce a paradoxical effect: it regulates behaviour without always generating a direct correction of price levels. As observed on several occasions, several empirical analyses from sector reports (Copenhagen Economics, BVI, Finans Danmark) suggest that market data prices remain structurally higher in Europe than in the United States, with differences of up to 50 to 80% on certain comparable flows.[107]

An explanatory hypothesis often put forward is that of an institutional correlation between competitive intensity and the level of regulation. In the United States, the greater threat of antitrust litigation, combined with greater supplier substitutability and relative transparency of offers, would exert deflationary pressure on prices. In Europe, on the other hand, the combination of a strong structural dependence on a few dominant suppliers and sectoral regulation focused on transparency rather than price contestation could help maintain higher tariff levels, without necessarily triggering spontaneous competitive rebalancing.

It should be stressed, however, that this correlation cannot be interpreted as mechanical causation. Price differences are also due to market structure, the history of financial infrastructures and the nature of technical standards. Nevertheless, recent American litigation tends to show that competition law, when it is activated in a contentious and not only regulatory manner, can play a more direct role in the contestation of informational rents.

Finally, these cases illustrate a progressive intellectual convergence between the two systems: the recognition of the fact that certain financial standards and market data have acquired such an infrastructural character that their governance can no longer be understood solely from the perspective of intellectual property. The main divergence therefore remains less conceptual than methodological: ex post litigation and strong judicial participation in the United States, ex ante regulation and sectoral supervision in Europe.

In summary, the analysis of anticompetitive practices on the US market data markets shows that, even in a more competitive environment, risks of concentration and foreclosure remain. However, the structure of the American market, with its multiple suppliers, its price transparency, its substitutability of flows and its proactive regulation, makes it possible to contain the extent of the additional costs and to offer market data 50% cheaper than in Europe.

In comparison, for the record, the European market remains highly concentrated, with only a few dominant operators, high barriers to entry, and users heavily dependent on expensive and fragmented licenses. The additional costs for European financial institutions are therefore much higher, and restrictive contractual practices reinforce dependence and limit the emergence of new players.

Thus, the existence of common anti-competitive practices in America and the moderating effects of a structured competitive environment provide an instructive contrast with Europe and underline the importance of active regulation to preserve competition and limit additional costs for end consumers.

Conclusion

The analysis developed in this study leads to a general conclusion: market data markets can no longer be understood as simple technical markets for the provision of financial information. They now constitute critical information infrastructures, located at the intersection of competition law, financial regulation, the platform economy and contemporary issues of economic sovereignty. Therefore, all the previous developments allow us to identify four major structural characteristics.

The first is the deeply asymmetric nature of these markets. Market data simultaneously presents the features of an information asset, a critical infrastructure and a service with very strong network effects. This threefold dimension explains the formation of exceptionally high barriers to entry: considerable fixed costs, concentration of primary flows, vertical integration of trading infrastructures, control of technical standards, intellectual property rights and contractual foreclosures. This results in markets in which competitive contestability remains structurally limited, even in the theoretical presence of several suppliers.

The second characteristic lies in the gradual transformation of data providers into integrated information platforms. The major contemporary operators — notably Bloomberg L.P., London Stock Exchange Group via Refinitiv, and S&P Global — no longer sell only raw data feeds. They organize comprehensive work, communication, analytics, and compliance environments, within which users develop increasing functional dependencies. Market power then no longer stems solely from the possession of scarce data, but from the mastery of the informational architecture in which the financial players themselves are inserted.

The third characteristic is geo-economic in nature. European markets appear to be marked by institutional and technical fragmentation that contrasts with the relative integration of the American model. This fragmentation reduces the effective substitutability of flows, increases compliance costs and reinforces the phenomena of contractual captivity. Conversely, American infrastructures have historically favoured greater interoperability of uses and more effective contestability of financial information services. The transatlantic comparison thus reveals a structural divergence of models: on the one hand, an ecosystem more disciplined by competition and the regular intervention of the federal authorities; on the other, a more compartmentalised European market, characterised by high concentration and less competitive fluidity.

The fourth characteristic concerns the distributive consequences of this economic organization. The costs associated with market data are not limited to specialized financial intermediaries. They are gradually being disseminated to the entire investment chain, including institutional investors, pension funds, savers and policyholders. The problems of pricing financial data thus cease to be a purely sectoral subject and become a question of systemic competitiveness and, more broadly, of economic justice in the allocation of the costs of financial intermediation.

These different elements ultimately lead to a shift in the analytical gaze. The central question is no longer just that of the price of financial data, but that of the control of cognitive market infrastructures. The major market data providers now occupy a hybrid position, halfway between essential infrastructures, professional digital platforms and systemic operators of information coordination. This hybridization partially renders the traditional instruments of competition law, built around a more traditional conception of goods and services markets, insufficient.

In this perspective, several developments now appear difficult to avoid: strengthening of price transparency obligations, development of interoperability mechanisms, limitation of artificial segmentation of licenses, supervision of contractual foreclosure practices and explicit consideration of informational dependencies in competitive analysis. In the long term, the emergence of a specific sectoral framework applicable to financial data infrastructures – analogous, in some respects, to the logic of the Digital Markets Act for digital platforms – could be one of the main developments in European economic law on financial markets.

Beyond the sole questions of competition, the issue now appears institutional. In financialized economies where information directly conditions liquidity, the valuation of assets and the circulation of capital, the control of data infrastructures becomes an attribute of economic power. The strategic autonomy of financial systems thus increasingly depends on the ability of States and regional groups to preserve open, interoperable and economically sustainable access to the information flows that structure world markets.

Appendix 1 – Summary of relevant market data  markets observable in Europe

Relevant markets	Definition criteria (products)	Geographical criteria	Barriers to entry	Dominant operators by relevant markets	Negative effects of concentration	Victims / main users
Pre-negotiation	Order books, liquidity indicators, real-time flows, granularity by instrument	Tradingand  financial hubs: NY, London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam	Structural: high fixed costs, exclusive licenses; Behavioral: price increases, complex models	Refinitiv / LSEG, Bloomberg	Extra costs and high rates, user lock-in, lack of substitutability	Banks, asset managers, hedge funds
Post-trade	Executed transaction data, volumes and prices, regulatory reporting	National and multilateral markets, European and American platforms	Structural: aggregation and consolidation of flows; Strategic: restrictive contracts on redistribution	Refinitiv / LSEG, Bloomberg, SIX	High rates, limited alternatives, contractual complexity	Banks, asset managers, institutional funds
Indices & reference data	Stock market indices, sector indices,performance benchmarks	Global: NYSE, LSE, Euronext, MSCI, FTSE	Structural: intellectual property on indices; Behavioral: multiple licenses based on usage	MSCI, FTSE Russell, Solactive	Extra costs, multiplication of licenses, partial lock-in	Index funds, ETFs, asset managers
Derived and calculated data	Calculated pricing, implied volatility, spreads, synthetic derivatives	Global, with major hubs in NY, London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong	Structural: complex infrastructures, proprietary computed data; Strategic: aggregation limitations and redistribution	Bloomberg, Refinitiv, FactSet	Technical barriers, dependence on the operator, additional costs	Hedge funds, high-frequency traders, asset managers
Historical data	Time series of prices, volumes, performance indicators	Historical Main Markets and Archives	Structural: archiving, storage costs; Strategic: multiple licenses according to period and granularity	Bloomberg, Refinitiv, Datastream	High access costs, complexity of combining sources	Asset managers, financial researchers, banks
Aggregation Services	Platforms consolidating multiple flows, standardization, and enrichment	Multi-regional: Europe, America, Asia	Structural: infrastructure, multiple licenses; Strategic: exclusivities, restrictions on use	Bloomberg, Refinitiv, FactSet	Dependency, additional costs, lockdown	Banks, institutional funds, trading companies
Emerging add-on services	Alternative Analytics, ESG, Sentiment Data, AI Applied to Financial Flows	Global / Advanced Financial Data Hubs	Structural: technological costs; Strategic: Data control and proprietary algorithms	MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, Bloomberg	Additional costs, barriers to innovation, restricted access	Responsible investors, asset managers, specialized funds

Sources: Copenhagen Economics, BVI, COSSIOM, EFAMA, Finans Denmark

Appendix 2 – Europe vs. United States comparative table of market data markets  :

Structure, concentration and competitive mechanisms

Criterion	Europe	United States
Number of major suppliers	2 significant EU member players covering multiple segments + about 8-10 significant non-European vendors (mainly US and UK, some niche Asian players)	About 12 to 15 major domestic providers, strong multiplicity of platforms and flow providers
Market concentration	Very high; dominance of 2–3 players in the majority of segments (pre-trade, post-trade, indices, derivatives) despite the formal presence of non-European providers	Moderate to high depending on the segment; Several players share the flows, effective inter-platform competition
Average Stream Prices	Real-time feeds 1.5 to 2 times more expensive than in the US; annual licenses €2 to €5 million for an average institutional fund; MSCI/FTSE  indices€100,000 – €300,000 / year	Equivalent flows that are significantly cheaper; regulated and transparent prices; annual licenses for an average fund 40–50% lower than in Europe
Additional costs attributable to the merger	30–40% of the effective cost for critical flows; High structural additional costs on indices and benchmarks	One-off additional costs limited by competition and transparency; rarely greater than 10–15%
Barriers to entry	Very high: fixed costs, intellectual property rights, exclusive licenses, restrictive covenants, contractual foreclosure	Moderate: flow substitutability, interoperability, proactive regulation, transparency obligations
Contractual lock-in	Frequent: prohibition of combining or redistributing feeds, artificial segmentation of licenses, restrictions on use	Rarer and more regulated: covenants monitored by the SEC and DOJ, high competitive pressure
Mechanisms to limit high prices	Low: structural dependence of European users on a small number of dominant providers, low substitutability	Multiplicity of suppliers, price transparency, interoperability of flows, active antitrust regulation, collective bargaining power
Regulation and antitrust	Ad hoc interventions by the European Commission, often limited by cross-border complexity and IPRs	SEC and DOJ impose structural and behavioral commitments, continuous monitoring of clauses and prices

Sources: SEC and DOJ – Enforcement actions on market data practices, 2010-2022, BVI, Copenhagen Economics, COSSIOM, Finans Denmark

Appendix 3 – Market Data Providers  in Europe – Primary and Secondary

Supplier	Origin / Main Base	Dominant segments	Notes / Particularities
Bloomberg	USA (New York)	Real-time feeds, historical, terminals, indices	Dominance over devices and combined flows, frequent restrictive covenants
Thomson Reuters / Refinitiv	UK / USA	Pre/post-trade, histories, aggregation services	Flow fragmentation, multiple licenses per segment
S&P Global / IHS Markit	USA	ISIN, Derivatives, Indices	Partial divestiture of CUSIP following 2021 merger; European user lock-in
MSCI / FTSE Russell	USA / UK	Benchmarks, related data	European additional costs for index flows; Multiple licenses required
ICE Data Services	USA	Derivatives, commodities	Specialized flows, restrictive contracts on redistribution
London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG)	UK	FTSE indices, selected historical series	Presence on European and historical indices, often combined
Nomura Research Institute	Japan	Asian derivatives, aggregation services	Niche feeds, integrated with European platforms via licenses
Reuters Japan / Nikkei	Japan	Japanese / Asian Equities	Flows specific to Asian markets, rarely global coverage
HKEX / Singapore Exchange	Hong Kong / Singapore	Asian Derivatives and Indices	Limited distribution in Europe
Significant European players	EU (2 main operators)	Pre/post-trade, indices, aggregation	Only two European players cover several segments; the EU’s dependence on them limited but crucial
Total non-European suppliers in Europe	USA, UK, Japan, Asia-Pacific	All segments except certain indices and aggregation	Identified Primary Suppliers

Sources: Copenhagen Economics, Market Data Pricing and Competition, 2021, pp. 12-15; BVI, Market Data Costs for European Users, 2020, pp. 4-7; COSSIOM, Annual Report 2022, p. 18-22; Finans Danmark, Market Data Concentration Analysis, 2021, pp. 9-12; European Commission, Case S&P/IHS 2021, CUSIP divestiture decision, OJEU C 2021/14, pp. 7-10; BVI, communications 2020-2021; AMF, Report on the Concentration of Financial Data Providers, 2021, p. 11-13.; BVI, Impact of Japanese Data Providers on European Market, 2020, pp. 9-11; Finans Danmark, Asia-Pacific Data in Europe, 2021, pp. 14-16.

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[1] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Economics A/S, 28 November 2018, 77 p., spec. p. 7-15. Market data must now be understood no longer as a mere derivative of the trading activity, but as an essential infrastructure in the functional sense of competition law. Their indispensable nature for accessing markets, shaping prices and ensuring regulatory compliance brings them closer to the essential facilities traditionally identified in network sectors. This classification, although rarely explicitly formulated by the competition authorities, derives in a converging manner from economic analyses and European decision-making practice. On the one hand, the specialized literature underlines the indispensability of market data for any effective participation in the market « access to market data is indispensable for trading » (Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, 2018, p. 10); « market data contains fundamental knowledge that is indispensable when participating in the market » (Copenhagen Economics, A guideline to a cost benchmark of market data, 2021, p. 6).  on the other hand, EU case-law recognises that an input the access to which is a condition for the exercise of a competitive activity may fall within the logic of essential facilities. This indispensability is in line with the classic criteria of the doctrine of essential facilities, defined as an infrastructure « without access to which competitors cannot provide services« , as set out in the case-law of the Court of Justice (in particular Commercial Solvents) and mobilized in the decision-making practice of the European Commission. In these circumstances, access to financial data appears to be a structural condition of competition, the control of which confers market power that can be apprehended as an abuse of a dominant position. See ECJ, 6 March 1974, Commercial Solvents, joined cases 6/73 and 7/73, [1974] ECR 223, paragraph 25, according to which an undertaking in a dominant position may not refuse to supply a customer where such refusal is likely to eliminate all competition on the downstream market, a founding principle of the doctrine of essential facilities.

[2] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, op. cit., pp. 3-6; Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, report requested by AFME, BVI, EFAMA, FIA EPTA, Plato Partnership, 4 February 2025, approx. 100 p., spec. p.10-18.

[3] The MiFID I (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), adopted in 2004 and entered into force in 2007, is the first European framework structuring the competitive organisation of financial markets. In particular, it aimed to put an end to the monopoly of national exchanges by promoting competition between trading platforms (regulated markets, MTFs, « systematic internalisers« ) and by strengthening pre- and post-trade transparency. While MiFID I did not directly regulate the pricing of market data, it profoundly transformed its economic status by increasing the number of places where prices are formed, making it necessary to aggregate and disseminate data from fragmented sources. This fragmentation has increased the dependence of players on specialized providers and contributed to the emergence of oligopolistic financial data markets, laying the foundations for the competition and regulatory issues subsequently explored by MiFID II.

[4]  Systematic internalisers (SIs), defined by MiFID I and MiFID II, are investment firms that execute, in an organised, frequent and substantial manner, orders from proprietary investor clients outside a regulated market or multilateral platform. In the market data ecosystem, IS play an ambivalent function: they contribute to the fragmentation of pre- and post-trade information flows, but also constitute an alternative competitive source to the data produced by traditional exchanges, thus participating in the European debates on access, price and consolidation of market data.

[5] The MiFID II directive, adopted in 2014 and entered into force in 2018, sought to remedy these imbalances by introducing an explicit framework for market data. In particular, it requires that data be provided on a « reasonable » commercial basis, transparent and non-discriminatory, and provides for obligations to publish pricing policies. MiFID II also reinforces the requirements for pre- and post-trade transparency, which mechanically increases the volume of data produced, while enshrining the principle of « unbundling » between research and execution. However, despite these advances, many empirical analyses point out that these provisions have only partially contained the increase in prices and have not significantly reduced the market power of the main suppliers, in particular because of the persistence of structural barriers to entry and the complexity of pricing mechanisms.

[6] OECD, Addressing Competition Challenges in Financial Markets, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017, 92 p.

[7] Søren Næss-Schmidt, Mikkel L. Buhr, Jens B. Jensen, A Guideline to a Cost Benchmark of Market Data – How to Obtain Reasonable Prices of Market Data, report for the Danish Securities Dealers Association, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Economics A/S, 11 July 2019, approx. 50 p., spec. pp. 18-30.

[8] Fondsverband der Deutschen Investmentgesellschaften (BVI), Financial Market Data – Position Paper, Germany, updated 15 April 2025, approx. 10 p., see the sections  » Competition concerns  » and  » Abuse of dominance « .

[9] COSSIOM is the « Committee in charge of Services and Information Systems for Market Operators ».  It is a French professional association that mainly brings together institutional users of market data — banks, management companies, market infrastructures, brokers and post-trade players — in order to monitor technological, contractual and economic developments related to financial data and market information services. In particular, COSSIOM plays an important role in the market work relating to market data costs, suppliers’ pricing policies, licensing issues and financial data governance issues in Europe.

[10] Nicolas Monnerie, « The challenges of data commercialization after the GDPR: competitive aspects of a developing market », International Journal of Economic Law, vol. XXXII, no 4, 2018, p. 431-452.

[11] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, op. cit., pp. 16-24.

[12] Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR), Art. 13; Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II).

[13] V. by analogy, the European Commission’s decision-making practice in relation to abuses of dominant positions based on the control of infrastructure or intangible assets since 2010. However, the majority of observers tend to ignore the extremely high standard of proof required to challenge abuses of dominant position since the 1990s and the triumph of the Chicago School in limiting the conditions for the implementation of competition law with regard to abusive practices.

[14] Fondsverband BVI, Financial Market Data – Position Paper, op. cit., introduction and conclusions.

[15] Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, op. cit., pp. 6-9 and 61-72; Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, op. cit., pp. 7-15 and 42-48; OECD, Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2015, 188 p

[16] Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, report commissioned by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, BVI, EFAMA and the FIA European Principal Traders Association, 2025. The report concludes that there is no single market for market data and that there is a plurality of fragmented markets differentiated by type of data (pre-trade, post-trade, indices, derived data), by uses and by licensing structures. It points out that this fragmentation masks significant market positions in specific segments, due to the low substitutability of financial data and its indispensability for trading, risk management and compliance activities. The report also highlights high barriers to entry, linked to high fixed costs, network effects, control of market infrastructures and the strategic use of intellectual property rights and contractual licensing, which can generate lock-in effects and limit effective competition. These elements lead the authors to recommend a competitive analysis conducted at the level of specific relevant markets rather than at the aggregate level of the « market data market  « .

[17] Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, op. cit., pp. 20-35; BVI, Financial Market Data – Position Paper, op. cit., sections « Market concentration » and « Abuse of dominance »; see also Nicolas Monnerie, « Les défis de la commercialisation des données après le RGPD », Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, vol. XXXII, no. 4, 2018, pp. 431-452

[18] Ibid. This range is generally the combined revenue of financial data providers, exchanges marketing their feeds, embedded terminals, index providers, and associated analytical services.

The major components of the market are dominated by: Bloomberg L.P., London Stock Exchange Group / Refinitiv, S&P Global, Moody’s Corporation, Intercontinental Exchange as well as major international stock exchange infrastructures.

[19] From a quantitative point of view, the orders of magnitude relating to the costs of market data and their inflationary dynamics are documented in a convergent manner by several institutional and professional studies, which, without always being identical on a single estimate, highlight substantial and structural increases in prices. See in particular: Copenhagen Economics, study for the European Commission, « Review of the MiFID II/MiFIR framework – Data and Market Structure Analysis », Copenhagen, 2021–2023, pp. 112–180, which highlights the differences in the cost of access to market data between the European Union and the United States as well as the effects of fragmentation and low price transparency; BVI – Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management, « Market Data Costs in the EU Asset Management Industry », Frankfurt am Main, 2022–2024, pp. 35–67 (successive reports), which documents the continuous increase  in market data  costs borne by asset managers and their impact on management costs; EFAMA – European Fund and Asset Management Association (Eds. Gen. T. Taverne et al.), « Market Data Fees and Investment Costs in Europe », Brussels, 2023, pp. 18–52, which highlights the role of data costs in the fee structure of European funds and their upward trend; Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM), « Data Access, Transparency and Market Structure under MiFID II Review », Amsterdam, 2022, pp. 41–73, which analyses asymmetries in access to market data and the competitive challenges related to the pricing of data infrastructures. See also, the market work from COSSIOM (French organization equivalent to the German BVI), Market Data Conference 2023–2024, Paris, Banque de France, in particular the Proceedings and Presentations – Market Data Pricing & Vendor Policies, COSSIOM Executive Committee, Paris, 2023 and 2024 (internal summary documents, unpublished, distributed only to participants), which highlight the trends increase in data license fees, the increasing complexity of billing models (per user / per device / per redistribution rights) and the perception of structural inflation in the costs borne by European users of market data. Finally, see also COSSIOM, European Market Data Conference – Proceedings and Presentations (Market Data Pricing & Vendor Policies), Paris, Banque de France, 2023–2024, COSSIOM Executive Committee field work, unpublished conference papers, distributed to participants and members and used by regulatory authorities, in collaboration with the UK IPUG (Information Providers User Group). See in particular the presentations on data providers’ pricing policies, licensing structures and market data billing models. Restricted documents that empirically document, based on feedback from European banks and asset managers, the explosive rise  in market data costs  and negotiation difficulties with large market infrastructure providers via the IPUG, Cossiom 2023 – List of all documents presented at the event, https://www.ipug.org/cossiom-2023-list-of-all-documents-presented-at-the-event-2/ ; European Market Data Conference 2024 – Draft Agenda and Presentations, https://www.ipug.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Cossiom-ParisConfNov2024ENAgendaDRAFTPresNov24B.pdf. Finally, various contributions from the MiFIR consultations  and European market work (in particular consolidated responses from associations of professional users of financial data, 2023–2024) converge towards the observation of a lasting inflation of market data  costs and a persistent differential with the standards observed in more competitive market environments, particularly in the United States.

[20] On the international comparison of price levels and market structures of market data, several American and Anglo-Saxon studies provide empirical and analytical elements to document, if not a single numerical differential, at least a strong institutional divergence between the European and American models. See in particular SIFMA, one of the essential American references on the prices of financial data: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) / Expand Research (Boston Consulting Group), An Analysis of Market Data Fees, New York / Washington D.C., SIFMA, 2018, 60 p., which analyzes the revenue structure of the main American stock exchanges and highlights the central place of market data fees in their business model, while highlighting the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)  supervisory framework in framing the « fair and reasonable pricing » standard provided for by the Securities Exchange Act; SIFMA, An Economic Study of Securities Market Data Pricing by the Exchanges, New York, SIFMA, 2010, 85 p. (doctrinal revisions and additions up to 2016), which examines the market power of the main US trading infrastructures (notably the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq) and concludes that there are pricing structures that can be classified as quasi-monopolistic at the level of each platform, while being disciplined by the regulatory intervention of the SEC; Sean Foley, What’s in a Price? Measuring the Value of Exchange Data Fees, Montreal / Sydney, McGill University / Macquarie University, Working Paper presented at the Financial Management Association Conference, 2012, 34 p., which proposes an empirical assessment of the economic value of market data by comparing the prices charged by stock exchange infrastructures to their contribution to price formation, and discusses the possibility of situations of overpricing with regard to the informational value produced; Yong Chao, Chen Yao and Mao Ye, Why Discrete Price Fragments U.S. Stock Exchanges and Disperses Their Fee Structures, Review of Financial Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 1068–1101, which analyzes the fragmentation of US stock markets and shows that competition between platforms is imperfect but nevertheless significant,  in particular through the differentiated structuring of data and associated service costs; finally, this work must be compared with the analyses of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in particular the Concept Releases on Market Data and Market Access (Washington D.C., SEC, 2010–2019, non-paginated consultation documents), which frame the principle of « fairness and reasonableness » of market data tariffs and constitute the institutional foundation of price controls in the United States. For extremely interesting SIFMA documents,
https://www.sifma.org/research/white-papers/an-analysis-of-market-data-fees/; full PDF version (doc. 2018, 60 pp.)
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Expand-and-SIFMA-An-Analysis-of-Market-Data-Fees-08-2018.pdf

[21] Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, report commissioned by AFME, BVI, EFAMA, FIA EPTA and Plato Partnership, London, 4 February 2025, approx. 100 p., spec. p. 50-60, this is a major recent document on market data and its exploding costs; Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data, op. cit., pp. 42-48; Burton-Taylor International Consulting, Global Market Data 2024 Report, Boston, Burton-Taylor International Consulting, 2024, approx. 110 p., chap. 3-5. Burton Taylor’s publications are essential for market data analysis  ; they present data by continent and by type of service; WatersTechnology, Market Data Industry Overview, London, Waters Technology Reports, 2025 edition, « Regional Market Share » and « Growth Trends » sections.

[22] Copenhagen Economics, Market Data: Economic Overview, 2020, pp. 5-8.

[23] BVI, European Market Data Study, 2020, pp. 12-16.

[24] Finans Danmark, Global Memo, Market Data costs, Copenhagen, 2020, 31 p. doc. online https://finansdanmark.dk/media/e4vbzyhf/global-memo-on-market-data-costs.pdf.

[25] These factors have been confirmed by several recent French studies on the economic and contractual conditions of access to financial data. See in particular: Autorité des marchés financiers, Summary of SPOT controls relating to the provision of market data, Paris, AMF, 27 Apr. 2023, spec. p. 5-13, noting significant shortcomings relating to price transparency, data disaggregation practices and discriminatory conditions for the provision of market data ; France Post-Marché, Annual Report 2022 – « Market Data & Market Data Supplier Relations » Working Group, Paris, France Post-Marché, 2023, spec. sections « Monitoring offers from data providers » and « Data use », which document the difficulties related to suppliers’ contractual policies, usage audits, intellectual property restrictions and the increasing complexity of data access models; COSSIOM, Market Data Conference Proceedings and work of the « Market Data Supplier Relations » groups, Paris, Banque de France, 2023-2024, market documents distributed to participants, devoted in particular to the increase in licensing costs, the multiplication of pricing models and the operational obstacles encountered by European financial institutions. See also: Jean-Philippe Carbonnier, « Cossiom Survey: Exchange Data Too Costly, » WatersTechnology, London, 22 Oct. 2010, [online]: https://www.waterstechnology.com/data-management/1810142/cossiom-survey-exchange-data-too-costly (accessed 14 May 2026). Specialized press article reporting on the results of a survey conducted among COSSIOM members on the costs of market data and the pricing policies of the main market infrastructure providers; The study highlights the perception, by the players surveyed, of a continuous increase in the costs of market data, an increase in the complexity of licensing structures and an imbalance of bargaining power between institutional users and dominant suppliers. The study highlights the criticism of European institutions regarding the level of market data costs and the opacity of the contractual conditions imposed by some suppliers.

[26] BVI, Market Data Licensing and Barriers to Entry, 2020, pp. 14-18.

[27] Copenhagen Economics, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

[28] Finans Danmark, op. cit..

[29] Copenhagen Economics, op. cit., pp. 15-18.

[30] See note 25.

[31] See note 25.

[32] Op. cit.

[33] The European Union currently has only a very limited number of operators that can be considered as partial continental equivalents of American groups such as Bloomberg, S&P Global or FactSet. The two main European players are mainly Euronext and Deutsche Börse, which concentrate most of the integrated European capacities in terms of market infrastructures, market data distribution, post-trade services, indices and financial data marketing. This position is less the result of an initial strategy of setting up global financial information groups than of a progressive sui generis  movement of vertical integration around the stock exchange infrastructures themselves. Unlike large American groups, whose core business is largely based on information, analytics and integrated terminal services, European operators have historically remained structured around the management of regulated markets and primary data from trading platforms.

This difference in industrial trajectory partly explains the persistent asymmetry between the European and North American market data markets. At Deutsche Börse, the ramp-up in data activities is based in particular on the integration of STOXX for indices, Qontigo for analytical services and Eurex for derived data and associated infrastructure. Euronext has gradually built up a pan-European platform integrating several major European financial centres, including Paris, Amsterdam, Milan, Brussels, Dublin, Lisbon and Oslo, in order to consolidate the dissemination of European flows and indices. Despite this consolidation dynamic, the European Union still does not have a player fully comparable to Bloomberg in terms of global integrated terminals, multi-asset hedging and global financial information infrastructure, which contributes to strengthening the structural dependence of European players on large US data and analytics providers.

[34] See note 25.

[35] Finans Danmark, op. cit..

[36] Ibid.

[37] See note 25.

[38] See note 25.

[39] European Commission, Case AT.39992 – Standard & Poor’s, Commitments Decision of 15 November 2011 on the licensing  of CUSIP codes  used for ISIN identifiers, specs pts 12–35 and 61–78; Press Release IP/11/1376, « Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments from Standard and Poor’s to end abusive licensing of US ISINs« , Brussels, 15 Nov. 2011.

[40] BVI, Financial Market Data – Position Paper, Frankfurt am Main, 2020–2021, sections « Market concentration » and « Abuse of dominance », esp. pp. 8–15; see also Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, op.cit., 2025, pp. 20–35.

[41] European Commission, Case COMP/M.10123 – S&P Global / IHS Markit, Merger Decision, 2021, Analysis of the Market Effects of Indices and Benchmarks, Sections on Structural Commitments and Partial Divestment of CUSIP Assets.

[42] See also European Commission, Case AT.40024 – S&P ISIN/CUSIP, 2010–2011, decisions and communications relating to the pricing of ISIN/CUSIP identifiers, already cited.

[43] BVI, Observations on S&P Global / IHS Markit Merger and Market Data Integration Effects, Frankfurt, 2021, pp. 6–14 (analysis of the limits of structural remedies and the effects of recomposition of data offerings).

[44] European Commission, Case M.9564 – London Stock Exchange Group / Refinitiv Holdings, decision of 13 January 2021, spec. sections relating to financial data infrastructures and market data services; see also London Stock Exchange Group, Completion of Refinitiv Acquisition, press release, London, 29 Jan. 2021.

[45] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing of Market Data Copenhagen, 2021, pp. 42–48; BVI, Financial Market Data – Position Paper, Frankfurt am Main, 2020–2021, sections  » Licensing structures  » and  » Market concentration « .

[46] Market Structure Partners, There’s No Market in Market Data, op.cit, pp. 61–72; see also Nicolas Monnerie, op.cit.

[47] COSSIOM, Market Data Conference Proceedings 2023–2024, Paris, Banque de France, « Market Data Pricing & Vendor Policies » presentations, working papers distributed to participants, not distributed to the public; BVI, European Market Data Study, 2021, pp. 18–27.

[48] Sean Foley, What’s in a Price? Measuring the Value of Exchange Data Fees, McGill University / Macquarie University, Working Paper, 2012, pp. 12–18 (analysis of the informational value of market infrastructures and discussion of the effects of dependency on integrated platforms).

[49] Op. cit.

[50] European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation amending MiFIR, SWD(2021) 339 final, Brussels, 25 Nov. 2021, esp. pp. 33-48; see also ESMA, Final Report on the Market Data Industry, ESMA70-156-275, 2020, pp. 18-41.

[51] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of CUSIP Global Services, documentation and consultations on CUSIP/ISIN licenses, 2010–2011; see also ANNA (Association of National Numbering Agencies), Observations on ISIN/CUSIP Licenses.

[52] Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 446 p., esp. pp. 253-301.

[53] Michael A Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives, Basic Books, New York, 2008, 304 p., esp. pp. 23-61; see also James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008, 315 p.

[54] Copenhagen Economics, The Cost of Market Data – Evidence from Europe, op. cit., Copenhagen, 2021, 84 p., spec. p. 21-39.

[55] ESMA, Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities, No. 1, 2021, section on market data costs and licensing practices; BVI, op. cit. and also UK Financial Conduct Authority, Market Data Study – Interim Report, London, 2020.

[56] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Release No. 34-61358, Washington D.C., 2010; see also SEC, Market Data Infrastructure Rule, Release No. 34-90610, 2020; Evangelos Benos, Richard Payne, The Cost of Trading Equity Across Markets, Bank of England Working Paper, 2016.

[57] Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (MiFID I); see also Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3rd ed., 2014, esp. pp. 429-482

[58] Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, esp. chap. 5, « The Regulation of Market Abuse », pp. 156-236; Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Saguato, « Governance and Organization of Trading Venues: The Role of Financial Market Infrastructure Groups », in D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (eds.), Regulation of the EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.

[59] European Commission, Proposal for amending MiFIR regarding market data transparency, COM(2021) 727 final, Brussels, 25 Nov. 2021; ESMA, Final Report on Consolidated Tape Providers, Paris, 2022

[60] European Commission, Decision COMP/M.6166, Standard & Poor’s / Capital IQ, 15 Apr. 2011, Spec. pts 24-58; available at: European Commission – S&P/Capital IQ. See also European Commission, Case AT.40024 – S&P ISIN/CUSIP, 2010–2011, Decisions and Communications Relating to ISIN/CUSIP Pricing Requirements.

[61] Ibid., pts 45-58; v. also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

[62] European Commission, Decision M.10107, S&P Global / IHS Markit, 22 Sept. 2021, spec. pts 312-487; press release IP/21/4513, Brussels, 1 Oct. 2021; available at: European Commission – S&P Global/IHS Markit.

[63] Lina M. Khan, « Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, » Yale Law Journal, vol. 126, 2017, pp. 710-805, esp. pp. 783-794; Crémer Jacques, de Montjoye Yves-Alexandre, Schweitzer Heike, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report for the European Commission, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, spec. p. 63-71

[64] Copenhagen Economics, The Cost of Market Data – Evidence from Europe, op.cit., esp. p. 21-39

[65] European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Final Report – ESMA Market Data Industry Report, ESMA70-156-275, Paris, 2020, spec. p. 35-61; available at: ESMA Market Data Report 2020

[66] Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), Market Data Cost and Usage Survey, Brussels, 2021; European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), Response to ESMA Consultation on Market Data, Brussels, 2020, esp. p. 7-19

[67] COSSIOM, Contribution on the costs of market data and the effects of contractual foreclosure, op.cit.; BVI, Position Paper on Market Data Costs and Licensing Structures, op. cit.; Finans Danmark, Market Data and Competition Concerns in European Financial Markets, op.cit. 

[68] Ariel Ezrachi, Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2016, 360 p., spec. p. p. 167-214

[69] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Release No. 34-61358, Washington D.C., Jan. 14, 2010; SEC, Market Data Infrastructure Rule, Release No. 34-90610, Dec. 9, 2020; available at: SEC Market Structure Releases.

[70] Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on markets in financial instruments (MiFID I), OJ L 145, 30 Apr. 2004, pp. 1-44.

[71] Niamh Moloney, op.cit; Guido Ferrarini Guido and Paolo Saguato, op.cit.

[72] European Commission, Proposal for amending MiFIR regarding market data transparency, COM(2021) 727 final, Brussels, 25 Nov. 2021; ESMA, Final Report on Consolidated Tape Providers, Paris, 2022; available at: Commission proposal MiFIR market data transparency.

[73] See the studies already cited published in 2021: Copenhagen Economics, The Cost of Market Data – Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment, op. cit. spec. pp. 12-28; BVI, Position Paper on Market Data and Consolidated Tape, op.cit., pp. 4-11; Finans Danmark, Market Data and Competition in European Financial Markets, op.cit., pp. 7-19.

[74] European Commission, Case AT.40024 – Standard & Poor’s Financial Services (ISIN), decision of 15 Nov. 2011; BVI, Market Data Fees and Licensing Practices, Frankfurt, 2021, pp. 15-21.

[75] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing Analysis of Financial Market Data in Europe, Copenhagen, 2021, p. 33-41.

[76] Copenhagen Economics, The Cost of Market Data – Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment, supra, pp. 42-57; BVI, Response to ESMA Market Data Consultation, Frankfurt, 2020, pp. 8-14.

[77] COSSIOM, Proceedings – Market Data Pricing & Vendor Policies, Paris, Banque de France, 2023, p. 18-27; Finans Danmark, Access to Market Data and Licensing Restrictions, Copenhagen, 2021, pp. 11-16.

[78] European Commission, Case COMP/M.10123 – S&P Global / IHS Markit, decision of 22 Sept. 2021, pts 612-684.

[79] BVI, Comments on S&P Global / IHS Markit Remedies, Frankfurt, 2021, pp. 5-13.

[80] The consolidated tape is a system that aims to bring together, in a single flow, all the market information on transactions carried out in shares or other financial instruments. In concrete terms, today in Europe, market data is dispersed: each exchange (Euronext, Deutsche Börse, etc.) and each trading platform publishes its own data (prices, volumes, hours). To get a complete view of the market, a bank or investor must therefore buy and assemble several different data streams — which is expensive and complex.

The consolidated tape consists of centralizing this information in a single, standardized and continuous flow, which would show in near real time all the transactions carried out on a financial instrument, regardless of the platform where they took place. The objective is twofold: to improve the transparency of markets (everyone sees the same prices and consolidated volumes) and to reduce the costs of access to information, by avoiding the need to buy multiple sources of private data.

In Europe, this project is supported by the reform of the MiFIR  regime and is still being implemented. In the United States, a form of consolidated tape has already existed for a long time via Securities Information Processors (SIPs), although the latter is sometimes criticized by American operators for its quality and speed limitations compared to private flows.

[81] European Securities and Markets Authority, MiFID II/MiFIR Review Report on Market Data, Paris, 2020, pp. 23-49; Autorité des marchés financiers, Study on market data and their pricing, Paris, 2021, p. 9-18

[82] BVI, Position Paper on Market Data, supra, pp. 6-17; COSSIOM, Market Data Conference Proceedings, Paris, Banque de France, 2024, p. 22-35; Finans Danmark, Competition and Data Access, op. cit., pp. 9-15.

[83] Copenhagen Economics, The Cost of Market Data, op.cit., pp. 58-64.

[84] BVI, Market Data Fees and Vendor Dependence, Frankfurt, 2021, p. 12-19.

[85] Finans Danmark & Nordic Investment Fund Association, Strategic Dependence on Financial Data Providers, Copenhagen, 2021, pp. 14-22.

[86] BVI, Observations on Post-Merger Market Data Concentration, Frankfurt, 2021, pp. 7-12.

[87] Thomas Richter, « Financial Market Data – Massive price increases burden fund industry and investors, » interview with Christiane Lang, BVI – Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management, ASKED section, Feb. 5, 2025, online: BVI Financial Market Data Interview  (accessed May 17, 2026). This action was accompanied by the publication of a completely updated dossier on the problems raised by monopolistic practices in the distribution of market data denounced by BVI and the main professional associations of European asset managers (representing more than ten billion euros of assets under management): BVI – Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management, « Financial market data « , thematic file, 2025, available at: BVI Financial Market Data Position Paper

[88] BVI, Market Data Developments 2024-2025, Frankfurt, 2025, pp. 10-18.

[89] Copenhagen Economics, Competition in European Market Data Markets, Copenhagen, 2024, p. 31-47.

[90] V. François Souty, « The Draghi Report and European competitiveness: how the Draghi report calls for a modernisation of EU competition law », Le Diplomate Média, 9 Dec. 2025, online article (commentary on Mario Draghi’s report, The future of European competitiveness, Brussels, September 2024, proposing an overhaul of competition law, particularly in the area of merger control, to meet the challenges of competitiveness and strategic autonomy in the European Union.

[91] See, in particular, François Souty,

[92] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Market Data Infrastructure Release, Washington D.C., 2020, pp. 12-29; U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Financial Data Markets Review, Washington D.C., 2021, pp. 6-18.

[93] U.S. Department of Justice, Statement on S&P Global / IHS Markit Merger Review, Washington D.C., 2021, pp. 3-11.

[94] BVI, Comments on S&P Global / IHS Markit and Market Data Concentration, Frankfurt, 2021, pp. 9-15.

[95] Copenhagen Economics, Competition in Financial Market Data Markets, Copenhagen, 2021, pp. 28-39.

[96] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Review of Proprietary Market Data Fees, Washington D.C., 2019, pp. 17-26.

[97] Expand Research / Boston Consulting Group, Global Market Data Pricing Study, London/New York, 2020, p. 33-44.

[98] U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Review of Financial Data Concentration, Washington D.C., 2021, pp. 14-23.

[99] SIFMA / Expand Research, An Analysis of Market Data Fees, New York/Washington D.C., SIFMA, 2018, esp. p. 18-41.

[100] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Market Data Transparency Framework, Washington D.C., 2020, pp. 21-35.

[101] Copenhagen Economics, Comparative Assessment of EU and US Market Data Structures, Copenhagen, 2021, pp. 44-53.

[102] U.S. Department of Justice, Competition Policy in Financial Information Markets, Washington D.C., 2021, pp. 9-17.

[103] SIFMA / Expand Research, An Analysis of Market Data Fees, op. cit., pp. 42-55.

[104] Dinosaur Financial Group LLC et al. v. S&P Global Inc., American Bankers Association and FactSet Research Systems Inc., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:22-cv-01625, 2022–2024.

[105] On the growing difficulty of competition law in understanding contemporary forms of informational and infrastructural power, see in particular Mark A. Lemley, « A New Balance between IP and Antitrust », Swedish Competition Authority Yearbook, 2007, pp. 109-133; Lina M. Khan, « Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, » Yale Law Journal, vol. 126, 2017, pp. 710-805. See also H. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2021, pp. 12-34.

[106] Dinosaur Financial Group LLC v. S&P Global, US District Court SDNY, July 14, 2019 2023.

[107] Copenhagen Economics, Pricing Analysis of Market Data in Financial Markets, 2021; BVI, Market Data Fee Communications, 2020–2024; Finans Danmark, Market Data Cost Reports, 2021–2023.

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