ECONOMY – Franco-German Industrial Rivalry in Naval Industries in the 21st century: Between European Cooperation and Strategic Competition
By François Souty
Executive Summary
The sea constitutes a structuring space for the power of nations, as established by the great admirals and strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Alfred von Tirpitz and, from a contemporary perspective, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and French Admiral Pierre Vandier. They all highlight the same reality: maritime power is not based solely on the use of naval forces, but on a close articulation between strategy, national ambition and industrial base. Mastery of the seas thus presupposes a sustainable capacity for design, production and innovation, making the naval defence industry a central pillar of sovereignty and the international hierarchy.
In this context, the Franco-German rivalry in the naval industries since 2017 appears to be a contemporary expression of this strategic invariant. It is not limited to commercial competition between Naval Group and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, but involves differentiated models of maritime power. This competition extends to the entire naval spectrum — submarines, surface ships, weapons systems, propulsion technologies, digital architectures and autonomous systems — and is deployed mainly in export markets, where relationships of strategic dependence are formed. It thus reveals profound divergences between a French approach based on sovereignty and global projection, and a German approach favouring interoperability, competitiveness and integration in allied frameworks.
This rivalry therefore highlights the contradictions of European integration in terms of defence. While it is an obstacle to the consolidation of an integrated industrial and technological base, it also acts as a driver of innovation and performance. Far from being an anomaly, it is part of a historical logic in which industrial competition is inseparable from maritime power. The challenge for Europe thus lies in its ability to articulate competition and cooperation, in order to transform this rivalry into a lever for strategic structuring, a necessary condition for the emergence of a true European maritime autonomy.
Introduction
Since the emergence of modern states, the sea has been one of the essential foundations of power. As a space for the circulation of wealth, strategic projection and confrontation, it occupies a singular place in the hierarchy of power factors. Unlike the terrestrial territory, it cannot be limited or possessed in the long term: today, as in the eighteenth century, it is controlled by use, presence and the ability to exercise operational superiority. This specificity gives naval strategy a dimension that is both global and structuring nations, at the heart of power dynamics.
The understanding of this centrality is largely based on the work of great practitioners of the sea — often admirals or senior officers engaged in action — whose reflections stem from direct experience of command and naval warfare. But their contribution goes beyond strategic theory alone: it also sheds decisive light on the industrial foundations of maritime power.
Thus, the work of the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan is not limited to affirming the importance of « sea power« ; it has established a structuring link between naval power, maritime trade and national industrial base.[1] For him, mastery of the seas presupposed, not only powerful fleets and support or supply points far from bases, but also a sustained capacity for shipbuilding, technical innovation and logistical support at home. In this sense, Mahan laid the foundations for a true political economy of maritime power, giving it the organic dimension of a real value chain that King Louis XIV’s Principal Minister Colbert[2] had already designed and mastered in a dazzling way in this year of the four-hundredth anniversary of the creation of the French Navy.
In the British tradition, Julian Corbett deepens this articulation by emphasizing that naval strategy cannot be dissociated from the general strategy of the state[3] . Corbett’s control of the sea depended as much on the ability to organize and sustain the naval effort as on the conduct of the operations themselves.
German thought, embodied by Alfred von Tirpitz, makes this interweaving of strategy and industry even more explicit. Its « theory of risk » (Risikoflottentheorie) is based on a naval policy that is inseparable from an ambitious industrial programme, the principles of which are still deeply inspiring and still fully valid in 2026 [4]: the construction of a fleet capable of competing with a dominant power requires a robust production system, long-term planning and a massive commitment from the State. Maritime power thus appears as the product of an integrated political-industrial system.
These approaches find a contemporary extension in the work of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, who insists on the transformation of the maritime fact in the technological age[5]. Naval strategy is no longer based solely on platforms, but on complex systems integrating sensors, weapons, propulsion, information and networks. This evolution is also underlined by Admiral Pierre Vandier, former Chief of Staff of the French Navy in 2023, who highlights the centrality of informational superiority and networked warfare in contemporary naval conflicts.[6] It thus reinforces the decisive role of the defence industrial and technological base, which is now at the heart of operational superiority.
Thus, from Mahan to Coutau-Bégarie and Vandier, via Corbett and Tirpitz, one constant is obvious: naval power is inseparable from its industrial foundations. Fleets are only the visible expression of a deeper whole, made up of infrastructure, know-how, innovations and production capacities. In other words, the naval strategy is always, in the final analysis, an industrial strategy.
In the contemporary era, this articulation has reached an unprecedented level of complexity. The globalization of trade, the sophistication of weapons systems and the emergence of new technologies — particularly in the fields of propulsion, digitization and autonomous systems — are profoundly transforming the conditions of maritime power.[7] The naval defense industries no longer produce only ships, but integrated combat systems, combining submarines, surface ships, carrier-based aircraft, naval drones and digital architectures.
In this context, the competition between powers is partly shifting from the strictly military field to the industrial and technological field. The ability to design, produce and export complex naval systems is becoming a central indicator of power, as is the possession of operational fleets.
In this respect, Europe offers a particularly revealing field of observation. The ambition of European strategic autonomy presupposes the consolidation of a defence industrial and technological base capable of competing with the major international players. However, this ambition comes up against a persistent reality: the fragmentation of national industries and competition between Member States.
At the heart of this tension is the Franco-German industrial and competitive rivalry, which deeply structures the military naval sector. Since 2017, it has intensified, particularly around export markets and technological choices, pitting Naval Group and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS)against each other in a competition that extends, in contemporary forms, the logics highlighted by the great theorists of maritime power.[8]
Therefore, should the Franco-German industrial rivalry in the maritime industries be understood as an obstacle to the construction of European strategic autonomy, or as one of the paradoxical drivers of its consolidation in a framework of dynamic competition?
I. Industrial rivalry structured by export markets and contemporary doctrines of maritime power
The Franco-German rivalry in the naval industries cannot be isolated from its doctrinal and political foundations: it stems from a continuous articulation between strategic thinking, state choices and the structuring of defence industrial bases. As such, it constitutes the contemporary expression of an organic relationship between the conception of maritime power and the industrial organization of European states. Moreover, the Franco-German rivalry cannot be reduced to competition on buildings alone. It is part of a broader transformation: that of moving from a platform logic to a system of systems logic, where each building constitutes a node of an integrated operational network.
A. Export markets as a theatre for the projection of European naval and industrial strategies
Since the early 2000s, and even more so in the period after 2017, international markets for naval systems have established themselves as one of the main spaces for the expression of European industrial and strategic rivalries. The confrontation between Naval Group and TKMS cannot be interpreted as a simple commercial competition: it constitutes the contemporary projection of the logic of maritime power as it has been conceptualized by the great theoreticians and admiral-strategists.
From this perspective, Alfred T. Mahan’s founding analyses remain structuring, in that they establish the inseparability between naval power, industrial base and expansion of national interests.[9] Julian Corbett completes this approach by stressing that mastery of the sea is relative and depends on the ability to integrate naval assets into a general strategy of the State.[10] Finally, Alfred von Tirpitz formalized the industrial dimension of this power, by showing that the strategic credibility of a fleet rests on a structured and sustainable national production base.[11]
This articulation finds a contemporary extension in the analyses of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie or several French admirals including Pierre Vandier, who insist on the transformation of the naval fact into an integrated technological system, where performance is based on the coherence between platforms, sensors, armaments and command networks.[12]
In the European case, this framework sheds light on the export dynamics observed over the past two decades (see Appendix 3, 4, 5). The Norwegian, Polish and Dutch programmes illustrate acquisition logics that go far beyond the technical dimension to be part of architectures of strategic dependence and alliance. The purchase decision thus becomes an instrument for structuring power relations.
This dynamic cannot be understood without reference to national doctrines of industrial sovereignty. In France, this conception is part of a clearly identifiable historical continuity. In his War Memoirs, Charles de Gaulle laid the foundations of a vision in which strategic sovereignty is based on the autonomous mastery of the tools of power.[13] This logic was extended in the industrial policy of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly under the presidency of Georges Pompidou, whose speeches and orientations reinforced France’s strategic industrialization, as well as under the action of Pierre Messmer, for a long time General de Gaulle’s Minister of the Armed Forces and then Georges Pompidou’s Prime Minister, who consolidated an integrated and strongly state-owned defense industrial base.[14]
In the contemporary period, this tradition is reinterpreted in a European context. The policies carried out under the impetus of Emmanuel Macron introduce a major inflection, by articulating – in a more or less forced way – industrial sovereignty and European strategic autonomy. However, this evolution generated doctrinal tensions with the more classical interpretations of industrial Gaullism, which were attached to a strict national autonomy of critical capacities. These political arbitrations directly structure industrial trajectories. The performance and strategies of Naval Group and its European counterparts must therefore be understood as the operational expression of state choices, [15] rather than as simple market dynamics in which an intervention of European competition policy does not bring any progress to strategic efficiency and to the appreciation of geopolitical issues, as we recently explained.[16]
Finally, this structuring must be placed in a broader empirical framework. Analyses by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the European Defence Agency show that the recent period has been marked by both an intensification of European military spending and a persistent fragmentation of defence industrial bases.[17] This tension is one of the structural determinants of contemporary Franco-German rivalry.
Beyond the dynamics of exports and the politico-industrial logics that structure markets, this rivalry is also rooted in deep technological divergences, affecting the very nature of contemporary naval systems. It is now at the level of combat architectures, propulsion choices, the integration of weapons systems and the emergence of autonomous technologies that the recomposition of European industrial and strategic balances is being played out.
B. A technological rivalry structured by the transition from platforms to naval systems
The Franco-German rivalry cannot be reduced to a competition on submarines alone. It is part of a broader transformation: that of moving from a platform logic to a system of systems logic, where each building constitutes a node of an integrated operational network. This mutation constitutes a profound recomposition of contemporary naval power, in which superiority no longer depends on the isolated naval unit but on the ability to produce, connect and exploit distributed military effects in a contested information environment.
This evolution, which is now structuring for all Western navies, is objectified by the quantitative data available. SIPRI’s analyses in its SIPRI Yearbook 2023 show a continuous increase in European military spending, coupled with a persistent fragmentation of defence industrial bases, which limits scale effects and maintains structural capability duplications.[18] Similarly, data from the European Defence Agency in Defence Data 2022 confirms the coexistence of an increase in investment and a lack of real industrial convergence between Member States, particularly in complex naval segments.[19] This tension between budgetary growth and industrial fragmentation constitutes the material basis of the Franco-German rivalry.
Box 1
The construction of contemporary French naval doctrine (2010–2024): strategic continuities and systemic rupture[20]
In this context, the technological transformation of naval systems appears to be the direct extension of this fragmented structure. The intuitions of Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett remain relevant in that they lay the foundations of the relationship between maritime power and the control of communications, but they must now be reread in the light of an environment where superiority depends on the mastery of informational and digital flows as much as of physical platforms.[21]
In this evolution, contemporary French doctrines play a structuring role. Admiral Pierre-François Forissier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy between 2008 and 2011, contributed to the modernization of the Navy’s capability by articulating industrial programs (FREMM,[22] Barracuda) and operational requirements, in a logic of coherence between the industrial base and naval strategy. His hearing on 17 February 2010 before the Defence Committee of the National Assembly underlined the need to maintain a « complete » Navy, capable of covering the entire spectrum of naval operations.[23] His successor, Admiral Bernard Rogel, Chief of Staff of the French Navy from 2011 to 2016 and then Chief of Staff to the President of the Republic until 2020, deepens this logic by insisting on the permanence of ocean deterrence and the control of disputed maritime spaces. In his speeches published in particular in Les Cahiers de la Marine (2015), he highlights the complementarity between nuclear deterrence and conventional superiority, in a context of rising maritime grey zones.[24] Finally, with Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy between 2020 and 2023 and then Deputy Chief of Staff for « Plans and Programmes », the transformation becomes explicitly doctrinal. In his lectures at the École de guerre and his interviews in the Revue Défense Nationale, Admiral Vandier formalized the notion of naval collaborative combat, based on the networking of sensors, effectors and command systems in real time.[25] The platform thus becomes a node of a distributed system, and no longer a stand-alone unit of power.
Box 2
Contemporary German Naval Doctrine (2010–2024): Maritime Security, NATO Interoperability and Systemic Integration[26]
Since the early 2010s, German naval doctrine has been gradually evolving as a result of the return of tensions in the Baltic Sea, the recomposition of the North Atlantic and the rise in global maritime security issues. This trajectory is not a rupture, but a continuous adjustment consistent with Germany’s structural position: a major industrial power, but integrated into collective security architectures, first and foremost NATO. The Inspectors General of the Navy thus structured a doctrine based on three pillars: security of maritime lines of communication, allied interoperability and participation in multinational operations. Naval power is conceived not as an autonomous capacity for projection, but as a contributory function within an integrated naval system. Vice-Admiral Axel Schimpf (2009–2014) placed the Navy in a logic of global maritime security, linking the contribution to NATO operations and the protection of European sea lanes. His successor, Vice-Admiral Andreas Krause (2014–2019), in the context of the Ukraine crisis, reinforced the centrality of interoperability and networked capabilities within multinational surveillance and response architectures. Vice-Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach (2020–2022) broadened this dynamic to the Indo-Pacific while reaffirming NATO’s structuring framework, illustrating a geostrategic opening without calling into question allied integration. This doctrinal evolution is inseparable from the characteristics of the German industrial base. TKMS‘s trajectory favours modularity, standardisation and the export of NATO-compatible systems. The dominant position in conventional anaerobic propulsion submarines (AIP) is thus based on a logic of industrial optimization and technical interoperability, rather than the search for global naval superiority. The German doctrine therefore appears to be a doctrine of integrated but not autonomous power, where the strategic value lies in the ability to insert itself into multinationalized command and combat systems. It contrasts with models based on full capability sovereignty, while being fully in line with the logic of collective security. The German Navy is thus defined less as an instrument of national projection than as a specialized component of an allied naval system, oriented towards the stability of maritime spaces, the protection of communications and the contribution to multinational operations.
This evolution is reinforced by the trends observed within the Royal Navy, where recent doctrines emphasize « network-enabled warfare« , confirming a Western convergence towards naval warfare centred on information and connectivity (see Box 3). It reflects a profound change in the naval fact, in which data is becoming a factor of power in its own right. In this context, the German industrial trajectory, structured around TKMS, is based on a logic of modularity and integration into allied architectures. The specialisation in conventional anaerobic propulsion submarines (AIP) illustrates a strategy focused on interoperability and complementarity within NATO, rather than on the pursuit of overall capability autonomy. All naval segments—submarines, frigates, destroyers, mine warfare ships, and future aircraft carriers—are now part of a unified operational continuum. Autonomous systems (USVs, UUVs, on-board aerial drones)[27] accentuate this transformation by increasing the operational weight while reducing the vulnerability of manned platforms.
From then on, the notion of naval superiority evolved towards systemic and informational superiority, based on the ability to integrate, synchronize and exploit heterogeneous data flows. This evolution confirms the relevance of Julian Corbett’s analyses, while radicalizing their implications in an environment dominated by data and digital architectures.[28] Thus, the Franco-German rivalry is no longer played out solely on the performance of the platforms, but on the respective capacity of the two industrial and doctrinal models to produce integrated, scalable and resilient combat systems. It reflects a structural change in contemporary naval affairs, in which the power no longer resides in the building, but in the architecture.
Box 3
Contemporary British Naval Doctrine (2010–2024/25): Strategic Continuity, Expeditionary Power and Multi-Domain Integration[29]
Since the early 2010s, British naval doctrine has evolved significantly while remaining coherent, under the effect of a strategic environment that has become competitive again, marked by the return of power rivalries, the contestation of maritime spaces and the acceleration of technological transformations linked to digitalization. This evolution continues an ancient intellectual tradition, inherited from Corbett — the primacy of maritime communications and combined operations — and Mahan, whose influence persists in the conception of the sea as a global space of projection and control. The evolution of the Royal Navy can be read as a succession of doctrinal phases driven by the First Sea Lords, reflecting a constant dynamic: preserving a global power capability despite budgetary constraints, restoring naval air credibility and integrating forces into a multi-domain architecture. Under Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope (2009–2013), in the context of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, priority was given to the rationalisation of capabilities without renouncing expeditionary ambition or commitment to high-intensity operations within NATO.
His successor, Admiral Sir George Zambellas (2013–2016), initiated a structural transformation focused on the reconstitution of naval air capacity, with the entry into service of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and the formation of the Carrier Strike Group. This doctrinal turning point reaffirms the capacity for global projection while integrating the logics of networked combat and advanced interarmization.
Under Admiral Sir Philip Jones (2016–2019), the doctrine moved towards greater integration in multi-domain warfare. In a context of inter-state competition, the Royal Navy adopts a systems approach, placing its capabilities in an interconnected environment including the air, cyber and space dimensions. This transition to a « network-enabled » force, capable of operating in contested environments, is highlighted in particular by the Royal United Services Institute.
Finally, under the impetus of Admiral Sir Tony Radakin (First Sea Lord from 2019 and Chief of the Defence Staff from 2021), this evolution is formalized with the concept of « Multi-Domain Integration« . The Royal Navy is now seen as part of an integrated joint system, where the Carrier Strike Group is a pivotal strategic projection and coordination, both nationally and within NATO. This approach enshrines a structured thinking around « systems of systems » and high-intensity informational superiority. This doctrinal dynamic is closely linked to the transformation of the British industrial base, particularly around BAE Systems, a key player in the Type 26 and Type 31 programmes and the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers. It is also confirmed by the analyses of SIPRI and theEuropean Defence Agency (EDA), which highlight the increase in European military spending without real industrial convergence.
All in all, contemporary British naval doctrine combines a persistent ambition for global maritime power and a gradual adaptation to the requirements of modern naval warfare, characterized by digitalization, multi-domain integration, and the rise of autonomous systems. It is part of a remarkable strategic continuity, as the Royal Navy remains one of the few European naval instruments to retain a true global expeditionary capability.
II. Models of cooperation and competition: a European structural dilemma
This second part highlights the ambivalent nature of the dynamics of naval industrial cooperation in Europe, caught between the desire for integration and the persistence of strong national logics. Through the analysis of the structural limits of consolidation (A) and then the fragility of existing cooperation (B), it shows that the Europeanization of the sector remains partial and deeply constrained.
A – The structural limits of European industrial consolidation: the case of Naval Group, Fincantieri, Naviris and the persistence of industrial sovereignty
The consolidation of the European defence industrial and technological base has been a recurring objective of the European Union’s defence policies since the first initiatives to structure the arms industry at the turn of the 2000s. However, in the naval sector, this ambition comes up against particularly strong structural constraints, relating to the very nature of industrial cycles, the capital intensity of the programmes, the strategic sensitivity of the technologies concerned and the persistence of highly institutionalised national industrial sovereignty. Far from a dynamic of gradual integration, the European naval sector remains structured by a logic of competitive coexistence between national champions, whose export, innovation and geopolitical positioning strategies remain fundamentally not very convergent.
The example of the cooperation between Naval Group and Fincantieri through the Naviris structure illustrates this tension in a particularly significant way. Created in 2020 as a joint venture to structure industrial cooperation in the field of surface ships, Naviris has been presented as an instrument for the rationalisation of European naval capabilities, in particular in the context of programmes to modernise and develop new-generation frigates. However, institutional analysis work shows that this structure remains strictly limited to specific technological segments and does not call into question national value chains or the systemic integration capacities specific to each manufacturer.[30]
This limitation reflects a deeper constraint, linked to the divergence of national industrial models. In France, the naval industrial logic is historically structured around an integrated conception of strategic sovereignty, in which complete control of the design, production and integration chain is an essential attribute of state power. This approach, which has been analysed for a long time in the work on the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DTIB), is part of a strategic continuity combining capability autonomy and technological independence.[31]Conversely, Italy, while having a robust naval DTIB, favours an industrial export champion strategy, more flexible in its industrial alliances but structurally dependent on opportunities for European and international cooperation.
In this context, Naviris cooperation appears less as a process of integration than as a mechanism of partial coordination intended to preserve a minimum of industrial convergence between two players whose strategic interests remain distinct. The joint programmes, particularly in the field of frigates and naval modernisation capabilities, reveal a logic of technological juxtaposition rather than systemic integration, with each partner retaining its standards, combat architectures and logistics chains.
This situation is reinforced by the constraints specific to naval programmes, whose technological complexity and development time make any European standardisation particularly difficult. The European Defence Agency‘s analyses highlight the persistence of significant duplication of capabilities in the naval segments, as well as the low level of pooling of investment in research and development, particularly in the fields of combat systems, surface platforms and submarine capabilities.[32] This fragmentation is also highlighted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which insists on the dispersion of European industrial efforts in the face of the growing concentration of capacity in the United States and Asia.[33]
In addition to this structural fragmentation, there is a decisive political dimension. European naval programmes remain deeply conditioned by national budgetary logics, electoral cycles and the imperatives of economic sovereignty, which lead States to give priority to the preservation of their domestic industrial capacities. This dynamic is particularly visible in the arbitrations relating to naval cooperation programmes (see the table in Annex 5 on Franco-German naval cooperation and its very serious limitations), where considerations of industrial return, employment and the location of production chains often weigh more heavily than the imperatives of capability efficiency or European integration.[34]
Last but not least, the attempt to structure an integrated European naval industrial area comes up against a major systemic constraint: the absence of a truly unified European naval doctrine already perceived in the previous part and which will be even more so in the next part due to strongly divergent doctrines between France and Germany; These divergences have highly geopolitical motives, based as much on the geographical position of the maritime coastline as on the historical tradition and exposure to the maritime fact of each country. In the absence of a sufficiently binding common strategic framework, industrial cooperation will therefore remain subordinate to divergent national and geopolitical rationalities, which mechanically limits its ability to produce lasting integration effects.
From this perspective, Naviris cooperation cannot be interpreted as a milestone towards complete industrial consolidation, but rather as a stabilised form of limited cooperation, making it possible to manage the coexistence of two national champions without resolving the fundamental contradiction between European integration and industrial sovereignty. It thus illustrates, in a paradigmatic way, the structural difficulty of building a European naval industrial base integrated into a strategic space still dominated by national logics.
B – Functional but structurally fragile cooperation: between partial Europeanisation, persistent fragmentation and the primacy of national rationalities
Although attempts at European naval industrial consolidation come up against structural limits, they should not be interpreted as a lack of cooperation. Since the early 2000s and even more so from the 2010s onwards, the European Defence Area has seen the development of a series of institutional and industrial mechanisms aimed at organising functional cooperation between Member States, in particular within the framework of the European Defence Agency and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OJAC or OCCAR after the French acronym)[35] and, more recently, the European Defence Fund. However, far from producing real industrial integration, these mechanisms tend to structure a partial, selective and often reversible cooperation, which coexists with the persistence of highly autonomous national logics.[36]
In the naval field, this dynamic appears with particular clarity. The so-called « collaborative » European programmes are based on a logic of aggregation of national skills rather than on a real integration of value chains.[37] Projects funded under the European Defence Fund, such as those related to next-generation surface ships, autonomous systems or maritime surveillance capabilities, illustrate an approach in which cooperation is conceived as a mechanism for co-financing and technological coordination, without calling into question national industrial architectures or design sovereignty.[38] This configuration produces a Europeanization on the surface, but a fragmentation in depth.
OCCAR, created to rationalize the management of multinational armaments programs, is a central but ambivalent instrument in this respect.[39]While it allows for more efficient management of certain naval programmes, particularly in the field of frigates or on-board missile systems, it does not manage to go beyond the logic of national industrial return, with each State seeking to maximise the domestic industrial benefits of its participation around its strategic models and material priorities. This structural tension severely limits the organization’s ability to produce a real standardization of equipment or a convergence of naval architectures.
This fragility of cooperation is further accentuated by the lack of doctrinal alignment between the major European navies. As the European Defence Agency’s analyses have shown, persistent divergences in the definition of operational needs, technological standards and capability priorities constitute a major obstacle to the rationalisation of European naval programmes.[40] This lack of doctrinal harmonization automatically results in a proliferation of national technical specifications, which makes any lasting industrial standardization extremely difficult.
In this context, even the most advanced bilateral or trilateral cooperation remains exposed to recurrent tensions. The programmes involving Naval Group, Fincantieri and TKMS illustrate this logic of competitive cooperation, in which industrial alliances simultaneously serve as vectors for technological pooling and as instruments for positioning themselves on export markets.[41] This duality contributes to weakening the stability of European consortia, which remain subject to fluctuations in national industrial policies and sovereign budgetary arbitrations (see tables in Annexes 3 and 4 on the competition between French and German manufacturers on the major naval industry markets for submarines and surface ships over the past decade).
Moreover, the rise in power of the European defence financing instruments has not fundamentally changed this structure. The European Defence Fund, despite its ambition to structure industry, remains a mechanism for supporting projects that are largely defined upstream by manufacturers and States, rather than a centralised strategic guidance tool.[42] The result is a logic of ex post coordination, which does not make it possible to overcome the initial fragmentation of national industrial systems.
Finally, this dynamic of fragile cooperation is reinforced by the fact that the European naval industries remain part of a logic of global competition. The pressure exerted by major non-European players, particularly the United States and Asia, is helping to strengthen industrial sovereignty reflexes and to limit the propensity of European states to pool their sensitive capacities.[43] In this context, cooperation often appears as an instrument of external competitiveness rather than as a vector of internal integration.[44]
Thus, the European mechanisms of naval industrial cooperation, as numerous and sophisticated as they are, do not succeed in overcoming the fundamental contradiction between the logic of integration and the logic of sovereignty. They produce a hybrid architecture, in which cooperation becomes a way of managing fragmentation rather than a process of overcoming it.[45]
III. Franco-German rivalry, a good indicator of the contradictions of European strategic autonomy
The analysis of the industrial and doctrinal dynamics of the European naval sector highlights that the Franco-German rivalry is not only a bilateral phenomenon of competition between two major industrial powers, but that it crystallizes, in a deeper way, the internal contradictions of the project of European strategic autonomy. In order to clarify the mechanisms, it is necessary to examine, on the one hand, the way in which this rivalry reveals the structural incompatibility between national industrial sovereignty and European capability integration (A), and, on the other hand, the way in which it is part of a systemic dynamic of intra-European competition that goes beyond the naval framework alone to affect the entire defence industrial base (B).
A – The structural incompatibility between industrial sovereignty and European strategic autonomy
The notion of European strategic autonomy, as it has gradually become part of the political and institutional discourse since the early 2010s, is based on the implicit assumption that it would be possible to reconcile the preservation of national industrial sovereignty with the construction of an integrated European defence capability. However, observation of the naval sector reveals that this articulation is structurally problematic, due to the very nature of the weapons systems concerned, the organization of value chains and the political logics underlying investment decisions.
Naval power is based on highly integrated systems, in which propulsion, combat architecture, sensors, armaments and communication systems form an interdependent technological whole. This technical integration makes any logic of industrial fragmentation particularly difficult, unless we accept losses in efficiency or duplication of capacities. In this context, industrial sovereignty, understood as complete control of the design and integration of systems, comes into direct tension with the objectives of European integration, which presuppose, on the contrary, a pooling of skills and a standardization of architectures.
This tension is particularly visible in the structural opposition between France and Germany. The first, in the continuity of a strategic tradition marked by the requirement of complete capability autonomy, considers the control of the entire naval chain as an essential attribute of its state sovereignty and its global strategic posture. The second, on the contrary, places its defence policy in a logic of contributory power, where military capability is conceived as an integrated element in multilateral collective security arrangements, first and foremost NATO. This doctrinal divergence, already highlighted in the comparative analyses of European naval doctrines, mechanically produces incompatible industrial strategies when it comes to defining common system architectures.[46]
In this context, industrial rivalry is not a simple effect of economic competition, but the direct translation of a divergence of strategic rationalities. European naval programmes, whether bilateral or multilateral, are thus structured by unstable compromises between the imperatives of national sovereignty and the requirements of European integration. These compromises result in hybrid architectures, in which industrial cooperation remains partial, segmented and reversible.
The European Defence Agency‘s analyses confirm this reading by highlighting the persistence of duplication of capabilities and the lack of harmonisation of operational needs between Member States, particularly in the technology-intensive naval segments.[47] In a convergent manner, SIPRI highlights the structural fragmentation of European defence industries in the face of the increasing concentration of industrial capacities in the United States and Asia.[48]
B – A systemic dynamic of intra-European competition and its effects of strategic fragmentation
Beyond the Franco-German opposition alone, the dynamics observed in the European naval sector are part of a broader phenomenon of intra-European competition, which affects the entire defence industrial and technological base. This competition is not limited to bilateral rivalries, but takes the form of a systemic structuring of the European industrial area, in which the Member States simultaneously position themselves as institutional partners and industrial competitors on international markets.
This configuration is particularly visible in the naval sectors, where the concentration of export markets, the scarcity of major contracts and the strong politicization of acquisition decisions are leading to an intensification of competition between European manufacturers. Companies such as Naval Group, Fincantieri or TKMS are thus engaged in simultaneous logics of cooperation and competition, in which industrial alliances serve as much to pool certain capacities as to strengthen their respective positions on world markets.
This dynamic is reinforced by the absence of a real European hierarchy of capability priorities. In the absence of a supranational strategic authority capable of arbitrating industrial choices, defence programmes remain largely determined by the States, which leads to a proliferation of competing initiatives and a weak coordination of investments. European financing mechanisms, in particular those from the European Defence Fund, are unable to reverse this trend, insofar as they intervene downstream of the structuring of projects rather than upstream of their strategic definition.[49]
In this context, intra-European competition becomes a structuring factor of industrial fragmentation. It helps to reproduce national logics within cooperation mechanisms, transforming common programmes into spaces for permanent negotiation between divergent interests rather than instruments of effective integration. This situation is all the more marked as the European shipbuilding industries operate in a highly competitive international environment, dominated by non-European players with often greater financing and standardisation capacities.[50]
From then on, the Franco-German rivalry appears to be an exemplary case of a broader phenomenon: that of a Europe of defence that produces structures of cooperation without managing to neutralise the logic of competition that runs through it. It reveals a paradoxical architecture, in which institutional integration coexists durably with industrial and strategic fragmentation.
IV. Competitive rivalry as a paradoxical driver of innovation and European power
Although previous analyses have highlighted the structurally fragmented nature of the European naval industrial base and the limits of cooperation mechanisms, it would be simplistic to deduce that intra-European rivalry produces exclusively the effects of strategic disorganisation. On the contrary, a more detailed reading reveals that this rivalry, particularly in its Franco-German dimension, is also a powerful vector of technological innovation and industrial upgrading, paradoxically contributing to Europe’s overall competitiveness in certain naval segments. In order to grasp this constitutive ambivalence, it is necessary to examine, on the one hand, the effects of technological emulation produced by European industrial competition (A), and, on the other hand, the structural limits of this dynamic when it does not lead to a systemic integration of the innovations produced (B).
A – Industrial rivalry as a driver of technological emulation and capacity upgrading
Competition between European industrial players in the naval sector is part of a classic logic of high-tech industries, in which competition is a factor in accelerating innovation and differentiating performance. In the naval sector, this dynamic is particularly visible because of the complexity of the systems involved and the high capital intensity of the programmes, which require manufacturers to constantly seek technological superiority in order to maintain their competitiveness on international markets.
The rivalry between Naval Group and TKMS in the conventional submarine segment is a paradigmatic case in this respect. The confrontation between French and German architectures has led to an acceleration of innovations in the fields of anaerobic propulsion,[51] acoustic discretion, the integration of combat systems and the ability to strike in depth. This dynamic of emulation has enabled the European industry to maintain a leading position in the world markets for conventional submarines, despite growing competition from Asian and American manufacturers.
More generally, intra-European competition has encouraged a diversification of technological and doctrinal models, between a French approach focused on systemic integration and the ability to project, and a German approach favouring modularity, standardisation and NATO interoperability. This differentiation, far from being solely a source of fragmentation, has also made it possible to multiply innovation trajectories, avoiding a premature homogenisation of European naval architectures.
This dynamic is reinforced by the structuring role of states in directing military demand. By supporting their national manufacturers and defining specific capability requirements, European states contribute indirectly to the stimulation of technological innovation. The EDA’s work thus underlines that European defence industries remain among the most innovative at the global level, particularly in the naval and aerospace segments, despite their institutional fragmentation.[52] In a convergent way, SIPRI highlights the persistent ability of European industry to maintain a high level of technological sophistication despite the dispersion of industrial efforts.[53]
From this perspective, intra-European industrial rivalry can be interpreted as a mechanism of systemic emulation, in which competition between states and industrialists produces technological acceleration effects comparable to those observed in other technologically intensive sectors. It is thus an indirect factor of European power, by allowing the maintenance of a competitive industrial base on a global scale.
B – The structural limits of the innovation dynamic: lack of systemic diffusion and fragmentation of technological gains
However, this dynamic of innovation through competition quickly finds its limits when it is not accompanied by a process of diffusion and integration of innovations on a European scale. In the absence of an integrated defence market and sufficient strategic coordination of investments, innovations produced in the context of national rivalries tend to remain confined to distinct industrial trajectories, without any real pooling of technological achievements: these are the aspects on which future European strategic thinking for the next decade should focus in order to strengthen the competitiveness advocated by Mario Draghi in its 2024 report.[54]
From this point of view, the table in Appendix 3 is very illustrative of these limitations. This table highlights a dual structuring of the international market for conventional submarines, dominated by the rivalry between Naval Group and TKMS, whose respective successes are based on distinct industrial and strategic logics. Where the German offer is based on the dynamics of standardisation, NATO integration and broader industrial coalitions, the French approach favours tailor-made solutions articulated with a logic of technological sovereignty and targeted partnerships. Beyond this opposition, the cases studied show that the awarding of contracts depends less on technical performance alone than on the ability to propose a complete « strategic package » integrating technology transfers, local industrial anchoring and political-military alignment. The rise in litigation, as in the Dutch case, also reflects a growing legalization of competition, revealing the Europeanization of rules but not of strategies. Moreover, the persistence of indecisive or hybrid markets underlines the weight of geopolitical trade-offs, particularly in states located at the interface between NATO logics and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Finally, several cases, in particular Australia, illustrate the structural limits of this intra-European rivalry: in the absence of coordination, it tends to fragment the European supply and open up opportunities for eviction to the benefit of external powers. The result is a paradoxical configuration, in which competition between European players contributes to weakening their collective position, confirming that the stakes go beyond the industrial framework to fully fall within the scope of European strategic sovereignty.
This fragmentation limits Europe’s ability to turn its technological advances into systemic strategic advantages. Innovations developed in a national or bilateral framework are only partially transferred to the European level, which reduces collective learning effects and prevents the creation of common industrial standards. The result is a paradoxical situation in which Europe produces very high-level naval technologies without managing to integrate them into a coherent capability architecture.
The EDA’s institutional analyses underline precisely this contradiction, highlighting the coexistence of a high level of technological innovation and a weak convergence of industrial and capability architectures within the European Union.[55] Similarly, SIPRI insists that the fragmentation of European industries limits their ability to achieve economies of scale comparable to those of the major non-European powers, thus reducing the overall strategic impact of the innovations produced.[56]
This lack of systemic diffusion is aggravated by the persistence of the logic of national industrial sovereignty, which leads States to protect their technological innovations and to favour their development in national or bilateral frameworks. In this context, intra-European rivalry becomes a factor in the local optimisation of industrial performance, but not a vector for the structural integration of capacities.
Thus, the European competitive dynamics in the naval field produce a hybrid configuration in which innovation is strongly stimulated, but insufficiently consolidated. It generates significant technological advances, but without producing strategic or industrial convergence on a continental scale.[57] This dissociation between innovation and integration is one of the major contradictions of the contemporary European defence industrial and technological base.
Conclusion
The Franco-German industrial rivalry in the shipbuilding industries cannot be understood as a simple episode of intra-European economic competition. It is inscribed, more profoundly, in a historical and conceptual continuity that links classical maritime strategic thinking to contemporary industrial dynamics. From Alfred T. Mahan to Julian Corbett, from Alfred von Tirpitz to Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Andreas Krause and Pierre Vandier, the same analytical chain emerges: maritime power is the result of an inseparable articulation between strategic vision, political ambition and industrial capacity.
From this perspective, the sea appears less as a homogeneous space of confrontation than as a system of integrated power, in which the fleets are only the visible manifestation of a deeper infrastructure. Naval superiority is thus based on the coherence between employment doctrines, capability choices, technological innovation and the defence industrial and technological base. This structural continuity explains why contemporary naval rivalries cannot be dissociated from the industrial strategies of states.
It is precisely in this context that the Franco-German rivalry has been taking place since 2017. The opposition between Naval Group and TKMS goes beyond the sole logic of the market to engage competing models of maritime power. It mobilizes the entire naval spectrum — submarines, surface ships, combat systems, propulsion, digitalization and now autonomous systems — and reveals two distinct strategic architectures: one based on sovereignty, deterrence and global projection; the other oriented towards industrial efficiency, interoperability and integration into multinational frameworks.
This rivalry highlights a tension that is constitutive of the European defence project: the search for common strategic autonomy comes up against the persistence of national logics and industrial fragmentation. However, this contradiction is not purely negative. It can also be interpreted as a mechanism for technological stimulation and competitive adjustment, promoting innovation, upscaling and the overall competitiveness of European industries.
From then on, the Franco-German rivalry could not be reduced to an obstacle or a simple driving force: it constituted a structuring form of European maritime power in the making. The central challenge now lies in the ability of European states to transform this uncoordinated competition into a competition that may be regulated according to criteria that are still to be defined, articulated with targeted industrial cooperation, particularly in emerging fields such as autonomous systems, the digitization of naval combat and integrated combat architectures.
Thus, faithful to the teaching of the great admiral-theoreticians, contemporary maritime power appears to be the product of a complex equation in which strategy, national ambition and industrial base remain inseparable. It is on the mastery of this articulation that Europe’s ability to assert itself, or not, as a coherent naval power in the twenty-first century will depend. To do this, it is not necessary and sufficient to merge the French and German naval industries into a single larger whole, given what has just been analysed. The question posed to be resolved is to know whether the Europe of naval defence will be able to resolve the famous and insoluble paradox of the great Condorcet, according to which the sum of individual rationalities is never equal to collective rationality.[58]
Appendix 1
Comparative Table of the Major Theories of Sea Power – United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany
| Author | Alfred T. Mahan | Julian S. Corbett | Alfred von Tirpitz | Raoul Castex |
| Nature of sea power | Power based on mastery of the seas | Power as an instrument for the control of maritime communications | Threat Capability-Based Power (Risk Fleet) | Power integrated into a general strategy of States |
| Central Strategic Objective | Dominating the oceans to dominate the world | Control Sea Lines of Communication | Produce a sufficient deterrent risk against the adversary | Articulating sea, land and air in a global strategy |
| View of the Straits | Lockpoints to control for global dominance | Communication nodes to secure or neutralize depending on the policy | Indirect levers of strategic pressure (via threat of rupture) | Critical points integrated into a global power system |
| Relationship to Naval Warfare | Decisive war between fleets | Limited and contextual warfare | Deterrence by threat of potential all-out war | Warfare as a multi-domain system |
| Dominant logic | Domination | Flexible control | Deterrence / risk | Systemic integration |
| Power Type | Material and territorial | Functional and relational | Psychological and probabilistic | Systemic and Joint |
| Contribution to the geopolitics of the Straits | Basis of the strategic value of chokepoints | Analysis of maritime flows and communications | Introduction of the logic of indirect coercion | Global vision of the straits as systemic strategic nodes |
| Contemporary scope | Basis of classical geostrategy | Widely used in modern naval doctrines | Foreshadows the weaponization of flows | Very close to contemporary analyses of complex systems |
Appendix 2
Comparative Table – Naval Doctrines France / Germany / United Kingdom (2010–2024/25)[59]
| Structuring dimensions | France | Germany | United Kingdom |
| Strategic purpose of the Navy | Complete naval power: deterrence, projection, control of maritime spaces | Contribution to collective security, without autonomy of overall projection | Global Expeditionary Power and Power Demonstration |
| Dominant doctrinal logic | Capability sovereignty and strategic autonomy | NATO integration and collective maritime security | Global projection and multi-domain operational superiority |
| Structuring intellectual references | Mahan / Corbett + Coutau-Bégarie Inheritance¹ | NATO doctrine + post-1945 culture of strategic restraint² | Corbett Reinterpreted + British Imperial Maritime Tradition³ |
| Evolution 2010–2024 | Transition to the Collaborative Combat Navy (Vandier) | Enhanced interoperability and allied contribution | Return of the Carrier Strike Group + multi-domain integration |
| Relationship to deterrence | Structuring oceanic nuclear deterrent (SSBN) | Lack of clean nuclear deterrence, NATO dependence | Nuclear deterrence (Trident) integrated into NATO’s posture |
| Naval Industrial Model | Naval Group : complete system integration (SSBN, frigates, drones) | TKMS: modularity, standardisation, AIP export | BAE Systems : integration of platforms + combat systems |
| Submarines | SSBN + Nuclear SSN + Scorpene export | AIP Conventional Submarines (Type 212/214) | Astute class (SNA), Dreadnought(SSBN) |
| Surface Fighters | FREMM / FDI frigates, depth strike capability | F125 / F124 frigates, NATO role and surveillance | Type 45 destroyers, Type 26/31 frigates |
| Aircraft carriers / carrier-based aviation | Charles de Gaulle + future aircraft carrier Free France | Lack of aircraft carrier capability | Queen Elizabeth class Carrier Strike Group |
| Drones and autonomous systems | Rise of naval drones and collaborative combat | Progressive use, especially in support and monitoring | Advanced integration into multi-domain logic |
| System logic | Integrated, sovereign system of systems | NATO’s Integrated and Contributory System | Global and Joint Multi-Domain System |
| Global strategic positioning | European strategic autonomy | Euro-Atlantic collective security | Global power (Europe + Indo-Pacific) |
| Industrial and structural data | High national industrial concentration | Specialized and segmented export industry | Integrated dual export + global defence industry |
Appendix 3
Comparative table of the major Franco-German naval markets (submarines), 2015 – 2025
| Market / Country | Period | Type of program | French offers (Naval Group) | German offers (TKMS) | Volumes / Amounts | Result | Strategic Observations |
| Norway (212CD program) | 2017–2024 (extension 2026) | Conventional submarines | Offer based on Scorpene / Barracuda derivatives (not selected) | Type 212CD (AIP, NATO interoperability) | 6 SM Norway + 6 Germany (total program 12 units) | German victory | Paradigmatic case: victory by political-industrial integration (joint purchase Germany–Norway) → club effect and R&D pooling |
| Netherlands (Orka programme) | 2019–2024 | Ocean Submarines | Conventional Barracuda (expeditionary) with Dutch industrial partnership | Type 212CD / Derivative Proposal | 4 submarines (multi-billion € contract) | French victory | Success based on tailor-made offer + industrial transfer; legal rejection of TKMS → competition |
| Poland (Orka program) | 2017–2025 (ongoing) | Conventional submarines + cruise missiles | Advanced Scorpene (Li-ion batteries, MdCN) | Type 212/214 (AIP, NATO standard) | 3–4 submarines (contract not awarded) | Open Competition | Emblematic case of prolonged rivalry: NATO vs. strategic autonomy issues; Strong politicization |
| Australia (SEA 1000 program) | 2016–2021 | Ocean Submarines | Shortfin Barracuda(conventional nuclear derivative version) | Type 216 (German offer) | 12 submarines (~€50 billion initially) | FR victory then cancellation (AUKUS) | Germany eliminated early; France wins but loses in the face of unfair action by the United States → shows limited intra-European rivalry in the face of foreign alliances |
| Canada (CPSP – ongoing) | 2022–… | Submarines | Potential offer (not selected at this stage) | Industrial partnerships (TKMS + Seaspan) | Up to 12 submarines (prospective) | Not Assigned | TKMS adopts a strategy of local industrial anchoring; France more discreet → strategic asymmetry |
| Indonesia / export Scorpene vs Type 214 | 2017–2024 | Export submarines | Scorpène (partial success, local cooperation) | Type 209/214 (Massive Technology Transfer) | Multiple series (successive contracts) | Shared | French review: TKMS promotes the emergence of competitors (Korea, Turkey) |
| Greece / Turkey (extended history) | Post-2017 effects | Conventional submarines | Recent limited presence | Type 214 widely exported | Multiple Series | Inherited German domination | German structural advantage in the NATO market thanks to standardization and industrial transfers |
| Philippines (Horizon III) | 2020–… | Submarines | French offer possible | German-Italian offer (TKMS + Fincantieri) | 2–3 submarines (forecast) | Not Assigned | Structuring of competing European industrial blocs (Berlin–Rome axis) |
Appendix 4
Comparative table of the major Franco-German naval markets (surface ships, 2015–2025)
| Market / Country | Period | Type of program | French offer (Naval Group) | German offer (TKMS / partners) | Volumes / Amounts | Result | Strategic Observations |
| France (FDI) | 2017–2026 | Defence and intervention frigates | FDI Program (9 units FR + export Greece) | — | ~9 frigates | French victory (domestic + export) | Sovereign model + targeted export (Greece) |
| Germany (F126 / MKS 180) | 2020–… | Multi-mission frigates | Indirect participation (Thales systems) | TKMS + Damen + Rheinmetall | 4–6 frigates (~€>5 billion) | German victory | European consortium model + partial outsourcing |
| Brazil (Tamandaré) | 2019–2020 | Light frigates | Gowind offer (not accepted) | TKMS + local consortium | 4 frigates | German victory | Success through structured local industrial partnership |
| Greece (FDI HN) | 2021–2024 | Defense frigates | FDI (Naval Group + Thales) | German bid not accepted | 3 (+1 option) | French victory | Political success + capability (NATO interoperability + autonomy) |
| Norway (future frigates) | 2022–2025 | New generation frigates | FDI (not retained) | German participation (not retained) | 5–6 frigates (~€8.5 billion) | British victory | Franco-German failure → European fragmentation |
| European Patrol Corvette (EPC) | 2020–… | European Corvette | Naval Group (via Naviris) | Limited German indirect participation | EU Programme | Cooperation | Partial cooperation without full integration |
| Indonesia / export corvettes | 2015–2025 | Corvettes / Light Frigates | Gowind (partial export success) | MEKO (TKMS) | Multiple Series | Shared | Sustainable competition in emerging markets |
| Middle East (Egypt, UAE) | 2015–2023 | Corvettes / frigates | Gowind (Egypt, Achievement) | MEKO Offers | Multiple units | French advantage | Bilateral logic + controlled transfers |
| NATO / Northern Europe (Various) | 2015–2025 | Frigates / modernization | One-time offers | TKMS + EU partners | Variable | German advantage | NATO standardization and industrial integration |
Appendix 5
Summary table of Franco-German naval industrial cooperation (since 2010)
| Period | Program / Initiative | French actors | German actors | Type of cooperation | Level of integration | Result / Status | Analytical reading |
| 2010–2015 | Exploratory projects for submarine cooperation | Naval Group | TKMS | Informal discussions | Very Low | No follow-up | Implicit refusal to pool → priority to export markets |
| 2015–2018 | European programmes via the European Defence Agency | Naval Group | TKMS, German shipyards | Institutional cooperation | Low | Limited projects | Coordination without real industrial integration |
| 2017–… | PESCO Programme (Naval Capabilities) | Naval Group + EU partners | TKMS + EU partners | Multilateral | Low to medium | Ongoing | Persistent Fragmentation → Aggregation Logic |
| 2019–… | European Defence Fund (EDF) | Naval Group, Thales | TKMS,Rheinmetall, NVL | Technological cooperation | Low | In development | Co-financing without integration of value chains |
| 2020–… | Franco-Italian structuring (Naviris) | Naval Group | (direct German absence) | — | — | FR-IT bilateral cooperation | Bypassing the Franco-German axis |
| 2020–… | Extended German cooperation | — | TKMS + NVL + Rheinmetall | National Coalition/EU | Medium | Structuring in progress | German Industrial Cluster Model |
| 2017–2024 | Competition Norway (212CD) | Naval Group(failed) | TKMS (Success) | Competition | — | German victory | NATO model + effective bilateral coalition |
| 2019–2024 | Competition Netherlands (Orka) | Naval Group(success) | TKMS (failed) | Competition | — | French victory | Custom Model + Sovereignty |
| 2017–… | Competition Poland (Orka) | Naval Group | TKMS | Competition | — | Undecided | Prolonged geopolitical rivalry |
| 2020–… | Export markets (Indo-Pacific, NATO) | Naval Group | TKMS + partners | Indirect competition | — | Shared | Persistent structural duality |
[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 25–89. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), a captain in the United States Navy at the time of the publication of this essential work for the history of the sea, was eventually promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral. A major theorist of sea power, Alfred T. Mayer was the author of a seminal work for French history, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1892). His thinking is the foundation of modern naval geostrategy, articulating world power, mastery of maritime routes and control of strategic crossing points.
[2] Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), Louis XIV’s principal minister of state from 1661 to 1683 and comptroller general of finances from 1665, played a decisive role in structuring French maritime power in the seventeenth century. He embarked on a proactive policy of developing the Royal Navy, based on administrative centralisation, the creation of arsenals (notably Brest and Toulon) and the establishment of a real state naval industry. His strategy was part of a mercantilist logic aimed at supporting maritime trade, protecting colonial interests and asserting French naval power against the United Provinces and England. See in particular: Daniel Dessert, Colbert, Paris, Fayard, 1986, pp. 245–312; Michel Vergé-Franceschi, La marine de Louis XIV, Paris, Sedes, 1996, pp. 89–156.
[3] Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), pp. 13–54. A lawyer by training, Julian S. Corbet was an advisor to the First Lord of the Admiralty during the First World War and a lecturer in the most important British naval institutions.
[4] Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) of the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine), main architect of the German Empire’s rise to naval power under Wilhelm II and thus during the First World War. He held the position of Secretary of State at the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Naval Office) from 1897 to 1916, during which time he designed and implemented the German naval laws (Flottengesetze). The theory developed by Alfred von Tirpitz was based on the idea that a sufficiently powerful German fleet, without necessarily being superior to the Royal Navy, had to be threatening enough to pose an « unacceptable risk » in the event of a naval engagement, thus forcing the United Kingdom to exercise strategic restraint. Tirpitz’s theory of risk is not to be found in a single doctrinal treatise, but is deduced from the combination of the explanatory statements of the German naval laws of 1900, their political preamble, and their subsequent rationalization in the admiral’s memoirs. See Zweites Flottengesetz (German Naval Law of 14 June 1900), preamble and explanatory memorandum of the Reichsmarineamt, Berlin, Reichsdruckerei, 1900, esp. § 1–3 (logic of building a deterrent fleet by strategic risk); see also Jonathan Steinberg, « The Tirpitz Plan », The Historical Journal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16, no. 1, 1973, pp. 113–131: analysis of the formulation of the Risikoflottenstrategie as a German naval deterrence doctrine. On the whole, Alfred von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, Leipzig, K.F. Koehler, 1919, pp. 112–145.
[5] Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de stratégie, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2002, pp. 423–510. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (1956–2012), doctor of history and director of studies at the École pratique des hautes études, specialist in naval strategy and geopolitics, author of the Traité de stratégie, Paris, Economica, 7th ed., 2008, and Le Meilleur des mondes navals, Paris, Economica, 1999. He has contributed to structuring a systemic approach to maritime power in France articulating strategic theory, naval history and contemporary geopolitical reflection. He was also director of research in strategy at the École de guerre, president of the National Commission of Military History, professor at the Cours supérieur d’Etat-Major (CSEM) and professor at the Catholic Institute of Higher Studies..
[6] See below on Admiral Vandier’s contribution to contemporary French maritime strategy.
[7] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245.
[8] Jean-Paul Hébert, « The European military naval industry: between cooperation and competition », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 856, January 2022, p. 67–82.
[9] Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, op.cit., pp. 25–89.
[10] Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), pp. 13–54.
[11] Alfred von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, Leipzig, K.F. Koehler, 1919, pp. 112–145.
[12] Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de stratégie, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2002, pp. 423–510.
[13] Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre, Paris, Plon, 1954–1959.
[14] Pierre Messmer, Écrits militaires et stratégiques, Paris, Economica, 1992.
[15] Georges Pompidou, Discours, discours et messages, 1969–1974, Paris, La Documentation française, 1975; see also National Archives, fonds de la Présidence de la République (1969–1974), series AG/5(3), files relating to industrial policy and regional planning, in particular interventions on industrial modernization and major infrastructure projects.
[16] François Souty, « Defence Industries, European Union Competition Policy and United States Antitrust: Legal Asymmetries, Industrial Issues and Strategic Autonomy », Le Diplomate Média, 14.04.2026 and « Defence Industries, EU Competition Policy and US Antitrust: Legal Asymmetries, Industrial Issues and Strategic Autonomy », Le Diplomate Média, 16.04.2026, 25 p.
[17] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245. See also European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022, Brussels: EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78.
[18] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245
[19] European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022, p. 45–78
[20] Sources: Pierre-François Forissier, hearing before the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defence and Armed Forces, 17 February 2010, Official Journal of the French Republic, full report. Bernard ROGEL, « La dissuasion et la maîtrise des espaces maritimes », Les Cahiers de la Marine, Paris, Marine nationale, 2015, p. 5–18. Pierre Vandier, « Towards a Digital Combat Navy », interview, Revue Défense Nationale, n° 853, Paris, 2022, p. 15–27; and conference École de guerre, Paris, 15 October 2021. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245. European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78.
[21] A.T. Mahan, op.cit.
[22] FREMM stands for “Frégate Européenne Multi-Missions” (European Multi-Mission Frigate). It refers to a class of modern warships developed through a Franco-Italian cooperation program led by France and Italy in the early 21st century. The FREMM frigates are designed as highly versatile naval platforms capable of performing multiple roles, including anti-submarine warfare, air defense, surface combat, and escort missions. They were developed to replace several older, more specialized frigate classes with a single multi-purpose design, reflecting broader trends in European naval modernization and defense industrial cooperation.
[23] Pierre-François Forissier, hearing before the Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces of the National Assembly, 17 February 2010, Official Journal of the French Republic, full report
[24] Bernard Rogel, « Deterrence and control of maritime spaces », Les Cahiers de la Marine, French Navy, 2015, p. 5–18.
[25] Pierre Vandier, « Vers une marine de combat numérique », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 853, 2022, p. 15–27. Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy (2020–2023), formalizes the concept of « collaborative naval combat », based on the real-time networking of sensors (means of detection: radars, sonars, satellites), command systems (C2) and effectors, understood as all the means of action capable of producing a military effect on a target (missiles, torpedoes, carrier-based aviation, artillery, armed drones, electronic or cyber warfare capabilities). This approach decouples detection from engagement while integrating them into a distributed system, allowing coordinated and remote action on maritime flows and spaces.
[26] 1. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Marinekonzept der Deutschen Marine, Berlin, 2011. 2.Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, Berlin, 2016. 3. Kay-Achim Schönbach, speech at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, January 2022. 4. Andreas Krause, Hearing before the Defence Committee of the Bundestag, Berlin, 2016, Deutscher Bundestag, Protokolle. 5. Axel Schimpf, Speeches before the Bundestag (Defence Committee), Berlin, 2011–2013. 6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023. 7 European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022.
[27] USV (Unmanned Surface Vehicle): autonomous or remotely operated vehicle operating on the surface of the water. UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle): robotic vehicle operating underwater, autonomous or remotely controlled.
[28] Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de stratégie, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2002, pp. 423–510.
[29] UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, HMSO, 2010, pp. 21–38; UK House of Commons, Defence Committee – Naval Strategy Evidence Sessions, London, 2011, HC 761, pp. 14–29. UK Ministry of Defence, Future Maritime Combat Capability, London, MoD, 2014, pp. 9–27; Royal Navy, Design for a Secure Future Navy (Portsmouth: Royal Navy Publications, 2015), pp. 3–18. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Naval Perspectives on Future Maritime Warfare (London: RUSI Publications, 2017), pp. 45–62; UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Force 2025 Concept Paper, London, MoD, 2017, pp. 12–33. UK Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, London, MoD, 2020, pp. 5–22; UK Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, London, MoD, 2021, pp. 17–41. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245; European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78.
[30] European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022 – Key Findings and Analysis, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78; European Defence Agency, Cooperative Defence Programmes Overview, Brussels, EDA, 2021, pp. 33–51.
[31] Pierre Dreyfus, La politique industrielle de défense en Europe, Paris, La Documentation française, 2015, pp. 89–118; Ministry of the Armed Forces, Strategic Review of Defence and National Security, Paris, 2017, p. 65–88.
[32] European Defence Agency, Annual Report 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 52–74.
[33] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245.
[34] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 312–340 (theoretical framework of regional security fragmentation logics applied to defence industries).
[35] The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (better know as OCCAR, its French acronym) is a European intergovernmental organisation created in 1996, it is responsible for jointly managing certain armaments programmes between member states (such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the United Kingdom), in order to rationalise costs, improve industrial cooperation and harmonise military capabilities
[36] European Commission, Action Plan on Synergies between Civil, Defence and Space Industries, Brussels, 2021, pp. 14–33
[37] European Commission, European Defence Fund – Implementation Report, Brussels, 2023, pp. 9–28
[38] Ibid.
[39] OCCAR, Annual Report 2022, Bonn/Paris, OCCAR, 2022, pp. 17–34
[40] European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2022 – Key Findings and Analysis, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78; European Defence Agency, Annual Report 2023, Brussels, EDA, 2023, pp. 51–69
[41] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245
[42] European Commission, European Defence Fund – Implementation Report, Brussels, 2023, pp. 9–28
[43] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245.
[44] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 312–340
[45] Ibid.
[46] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 312–340.
[47] European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022 – Key Findings and Analysis, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78; EDA, Annual Report 2023, Brussels, EDA, 2023, pp. 51–69.
[48] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245.
[49] European Commission, European Defence Fund – Implementation Report, Brussels, 2023, pp. 9–28.
[50] Jean-Yves Haine, « European Defence Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy », European Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2021, pp. 155–174.
[51] Air-independent propulsion (anaerobic) submarines offer exceptional acoustic discretion at low speeds, ideal for coastal operations, but remain limited in range and speed. Conversely, naval nuclear-powered submarines have almost unlimited endurance and high performance, at the cost of a slightly higher acoustic signature in certain conditions. The submarines with conventional anaerobic propulsion favoured by German industry correspond well to the needs of « small » coastal navies, France mastering both technologies, conventional anaerobic and nuclear, is more suitable for navies covering long distances or even ocean. The export markets are differentiated and the spectrum of markets covered by Naval Group appears to be wider than that of TKMS for reasons of an open nuclear strategy for the former and not for the latter.
[52] European Defence Agency (EDA), Defence Data 2022 – Key Findings and Analysis, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78.
[53] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245.
[54] On the challenges of European competitiveness and the strategic orientations inspired by Mario Draghi’s report, see François Souty, « Rapport Draghi : Défis futurs pour la compétitivité », Le Diplomate Média, December 2025. In particular, the need for a massive investment shock and an adaptation of European economic policies in order to avoid an industrial and technological stall in the European Union is stressed. In the field of naval defence industries, it is less a question of new investments than of optimising the industrial performance resulting from the dynamic Franco-German competitive process in new alliances which become vectors for the structural integration of capabilities by pooling technological achievements, without any concern other than efficiency without fear of competition rules. on the American model. See our articles cited in note 16.
[55] EDA, Annual Report 2023, Brussels, EDA, 2023, pp. 51–69.
[56] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers, op.cit., pp. 312–340.
[57] Keith Hartley, « The Economics of Defence Industry Competition », Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2018, pp. 367–389.
[58] The Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) was a thinker of the Enlightenment, guillotined during the Terror. He is known for his work in mathematics, political philosophy, and voting theory. He highlighted what is now called the Condorcet paradox: a situation where collective preferences become inconsistent, even though each individual has logical preferences. For example, a group may prefer A to B, B to C, but also C to A, creating a loop without a clear rational choice.
Condorcet expounded this idea in his major work, Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Decisions Rendered at the Plurality of Voices, where he applied mathematics to collective decision-making and laid the foundations of modern social choice theory.
[59] Sources 1. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de stratégie, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2002, pp. 423–510. 2. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, Berlin, 2016, pp. 92–108. 3. Julian S. CORBETT, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, Longmans, 1911. 4. UK Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, London, MoD, 2020, pp. 5–22. 5. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 212–245. 6. EDA, Defence Data 2022, Brussels, EDA, 2022, pp. 45–78.
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