By François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former senior French civil servant, notably former International Affairs Officer at the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission (2021–2024). He teaches Competition Law at the Faculty of Law of Nantes University and Geopolitics at Excelia Business School Group (La Rochelle–Paris Cachan).
Introduction
Competition regulation is no longer confined to the realm of economic policy. It has become a strategic, industrial, and geopolitical instrument. In both the United States and Europe, consumer protection, innovation promotion, and oversight of major digital platforms rank among top priorities. Yet these objectives are pursued within markedly different institutional, legal, and political frameworks.
This article provides a comparative analysis of European and U.S. competition policies, with a particular focus on their transatlantic geopolitical dimension. It examines strategic orientations and operational priorities under Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission responsible, inter alia, for competitiveness and competition policy, and under the doctrine of “America First Antitrust” advanced by Abigail Slater (commonly referred to in the U.S. as Gail Slater), Chief of the Antitrust Division heading the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, alongside Andrew N. Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.
The objective is to highlight points of convergence and divergence, as well as their implications for competitiveness and technological sovereignty on both sides of the Atlantic.
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I. The Evolution of European Competition Policy under Teresa Ribera
European competition policy was deeply shaped by Margrethe Vestager, European Commissioner for Competition from 2014 to 2024, and is now evolving under Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition since December 2024. Under Vestager, the European Union asserted a strong normative approach, characterized by robust digital enforcement. Antitrust actions against Google, Apple, Meta, and Amazon, together with the adoption of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), illustrated a clear determination to ensure fair competition in digital markets.
Since taking office, Teresa Ribera has continued and reshaped European competition policy. Notably, the very term “competition policy” no longer appears explicitly in the title of her portfolio, signaling a shift toward a broader industrial strategy influenced by sustainability and ecological transition, combining strategic vision with operational implementation. Her speeches at the CRA Brussels Conference in December 2024 and early 2025 allow four main pillars to be identified.
First, competition policy is conceived as a central tool for strengthening European competitiveness and anticipating innovation in critical sectors. Ribera emphasizes alignment with energy transition, digitalization, and the Single Market, in order to foster investment and innovation.
Second, digital enforcement remains a priority. The DMA is actively applied to regulate dominant platforms and ensure fair access for new market entrants. Ribera stresses the importance of transparency and legal predictability to protect both innovation and consumers.
Third, merger control and oversight of foreign public subsidies through the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)—also designed and adopted under Vestager—are used to prevent market distortions and safeguard innovation. Scrutiny extends to essential markets directly affecting daily life, such as energy, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods.
Finally, Ribera integrates societal and environmental objectives into competition regulation, ensuring that competition policy supports ecological transition and social fairness. Operational implementation thus reflects a proactive competition policy combining enforcement, competitiveness, and sustainability.
Key Differences between the Vestager and Ribera Approaches to Competition Policy
| Criteria | Vestager (2014–2024) | Ribera (2025– ) |
|---|---|---|
| Overall orientation | Strict, independent, and normative legal enforcement | Competition policy integrated with industrial and green objectives |
| Antitrust enforcement (Articles 101–102 TFEU) | Very firm, numerous sanctions | Still active, sometimes more flexible (“soft enforcement”) |
| Digital regulation | DMA as a central pillar, strong focus on Big Tech | Continued focus, integrated into a broader strategic framework |
| State aid | Strict application, even during transitions | Possible adaptation to support “strategic” objectives |
| Merger control | Strict, focused on market integrity | Slight opening to allow growth of European players; possible Draghi-inspired reform by 2026 |
| Links with other policies | Largely autonomous | Strongly linked to competitiveness, ecological and industrial transition |
Recent high-profile cases illustrate this approach: Google Shopping, Apple App Store, Amazon Marketplace, DMA compliance by Microsoft and Meta, as well as several cases under the FSR. This combination of strategy and concrete action reflects the determination of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to assert Europe’s central role in digital and industrial regulation. It remains too early to fully assess the long-term impact of the environmental and green-transition objectives promoted during her first mandate, during which Vestager largely preserved the traditional foundations of European competition policy while strengthening its focus on the digital economy and globalization.
II. The Signaled Shift in U.S. Doctrine in 2025: “America First Antitrust”
In the United States, the “America First Antitrust” doctrine advanced by Abigail Slater and Andrew N. emphasizes consumer protection and national competitiveness. It rests on strict application of existing law and targeted enforcement against anticompetitive conduct.
This doctrine is articulated most clearly in Abigail Slater’s inaugural speech delivered on April 28, 2025, at the University of Notre Dame (Chicago), shortly after her appointment as Chief of the Antitrust Division in charge of the DOJ Antitrust Division. Entitled “The Conservative Roots of America First Antitrust Enforcement,” this major speech—largely overlooked in Europe—outlined the ideological foundations, priorities, and guiding principles of the antitrust doctrine she intends to pursue during the second Trump administration.
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A. Ideological Reframing: Antitrust as an Instrument of Conservative Values
Drawing extensively on American historical culture, Slater anchors antitrust in the U.S. conservative tradition, arguing that its role is to defend foundational principles—individual liberty, free enterprise, and protection against tyranny, whether exercised by the state or by private monopolies. She references the Sherman Act of 1890, originally adopted to counter dominant trusts, and connects it to popular movements such as the 19th-century Midwest “Grangers.”
According to Slater, these historical values legitimize an antitrust approach that is not merely economic but deeply rooted in the defense of individual liberty against excessive economic concentration. She identifies three guiding principles:
- Protection of individual liberty
Antitrust must safeguard economic freedoms by preventing abusive monopolies from restricting choices available to consumers, workers, and small businesses. This principle is grounded in a conservative reading of natural rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. - Respect for original texts and jurisprudence
Slater emphasizes interpretation anchored in the original text and historical context of antitrust statutes (Sherman Act, Clayton Act). She rejects antitrust as a purely normative or technocratic instrument detached from firm legal grounding. - Distrust of regulatory inflation
She argues that broad ex ante regulation risks stifling innovation and entrenching dominant firms. Antitrust, in her view, must remain a targeted judicial tool, not a generalized administrative framework applied indiscriminately.
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B. Antitrust in Service of the “American Dream” and the Real Economy
Slater links antitrust enforcement to the realization of the American Dream, defined as the ability for individuals to prosper through fair competition. She contends that genuinely competitive markets enable entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers to achieve economic security and upward mobility.
Significantly—and often misunderstood or ignored in Europe—she criticizes decades of U.S. neoliberal policy associated with the Washington Consensus, arguing that excessive globalization, trade liberalization (including with Asian and European partners), and under-enforcement of antitrust laws contributed to industrial decline in regions such as the Midwest.
Regarding regulation, Slater draws a sharp distinction between judicial enforcement and generalized regulation, stating plainly: “Antitrust is not regulation; it is law enforcement.” She describes antitrust as a “scalpel rather than a sledgehammer,” capable of targeting specific anticompetitive conduct rather than imposing uniform rules that risk freezing markets. She also warns against corporate capture, whereby overly broad regulation ends up benefiting the largest incumbents and suffocating new entrants.
C. Operational Priorities and the “America First Antitrust” Turn
Slater calls for vigorous enforcement of existing antitrust laws to dismantle what she terms “ill-gotten monopolies,” in defense of consumers, workers, and small businesses—the core mission of “America First Antitrust.” She announces the creation of an Anticompetitive Regulations Task Force tasked with identifying and eliminating regulations deemed anticompetitive, echoing long-standing work at the OECD’s Competition Committee.
She also stresses the importance of citizen and business engagement in reporting anticompetitive practices. This speech thus carries a clear political dimension: it frames antitrust as part of a conservative vision of federal authority, rejecting technocratic governance and advocating active civic participation in defending competitive markets.
In practice, U.S. priorities focus on ensuring free and fair competition, particularly in digital sectors, with close scrutiny of Amazon, Google, and Meta. Merger policy targets specific transactions (e.g., Microsoft, Nvidia) to limit concentration and preserve innovation. Strategic sectors such as cloud services and app stores receive particular attention. Compared to Europe, U.S. antitrust remains far less prescriptive regarding social or environmental objectives, favoring targeted judicial enforcement and national competitiveness, with an implicit geopolitical dimension vis-à-vis both global tech competition and the European Union.
III. Convergences, Divergences, and Transatlantic Implications
A comparison of the two approaches reveals several convergences: the protection of innovation, the regulation of digital platforms, and the concrete implementation of enforcement mechanisms. By contrast, divergences lie primarily in methods and objectives. Europe has adopted a proactive and normative approach, integrating industrial policy and the ecological transition, whereas the United States favors a more targeted antitrust enforcement focused on economic efficiency and the fight against monopolies or abusive dominant positions, with an emphasis on consumer welfare and national competitiveness.
Geopolitical considerations have also become central. The European Union seeks, through a reprofiled competition policy, to protect its digital and industrial sovereignty, while the United States aims to secure technological value chains and maintain its global leadership. Even partial transatlantic coordination could influence the standardization of digital rules and the governance of global markets, with direct repercussions on innovation and global competitiveness. Although a transatlantic working group between the United States and the European Union exists, it has not produced tangible results since the beginning of 2025. Nevertheless, this remains an issue to monitor, as the Draghi Report on European competitiveness has explicitly highlighted the need to adapt European competition policy, particularly in the field of merger control.
a. Convergences in Competition Policy
A comparative analysis of competition policies in Europe and the United States reveals significant areas of convergence. Both approaches seek to protect innovation, ensure fair access to markets, and regulate large digital platforms in order to prevent anti-competitive behavior with private monopolistic tendencies (referred to as “abusive” practices in the European context). In both jurisdictions, strong emphasis is placed on operational enforcement. Recent cases against Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and Meta demonstrate that both the European Commission and U.S. authorities—namely the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—are willing to pursue, sanction, and impose corrective measures on dominant market players.
b. Divergences in Method and Philosophy
However, significant divergences emerge in terms of methodology and underlying philosophy. Europe, under the leadership of Ribera and Vestager, has embraced a preventive and normative approach that integrates industrial policy, ecological transition, and the protection of strategic markets within a coherent regulatory framework. Instruments such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) illustrate this ambition to regulate long-term market behavior and preserve European economic and technological sovereignty.
By contrast, the American doctrine often referred to as “America First Antitrust” focuses on a more reactive and targeted enforcement strategy, centered on consumer protection and national competitiveness, with less direct concern for coordination with industrial or environmental objectives. This approach is more legalistic and case-driven, privileging action against specific anti-competitive conduct and concrete transactions rather than pursuing a systemic regulatory framework.
c. Geopolitical Lessons and Transatlantic Implications
A comparison of the two approaches reveals several convergences: the protection of innovation, the regulation of digital platforms, and the concrete implementation of enforcement mechanisms. By contrast, divergences lie primarily in methods and objectives. Europe has adopted a proactive and normative approach, integrating industrial policy and the ecological transition, whereas the United States favors a more targeted antitrust enforcement focused on economic efficiency and the fight against monopolies or abusive dominant positions, with an emphasis on consumer welfare and national competitiveness.
Geopolitical considerations have also become central. The European Union seeks, through a reprofiled competition policy, to protect its digital and industrial sovereignty, while the United States aims to secure technological value chains and maintain its global leadership. Even partial transatlantic coordination could influence the standardization of digital rules and the governance of global markets, with direct repercussions on innovation and global competitiveness. Although a transatlantic working group between the United States and the European Union exists, it has not produced tangible results since the beginning of 2025. Nevertheless, this remains an issue to monitor, as the Draghi Report on European competitiveness has explicitly highlighted the need to adapt European competition policy, particularly in the field of merger control.
From a geopolitical perspective, this comparison yields several key transatlantic lessons:
- 1. Complementarity of approaches: Europe’s proactive regulatory model can serve as a benchmark for anticipating structural risks and protecting strategic markets, while the U.S. approach offers an effective model of swift and targeted sanctions. These approaches can be mutually reinforcing: Europe could draw inspiration from more focused judicial enforcement in certain cases, while the United States could incorporate broader industrial and strategic considerations.
- 2. Implications for global digital governance: Methodological differences influence the international standardization of digital rules. Europe tends to impose structural obligations—such as interoperability and ranking neutrality—whereas the United States prioritizes the correction of proven abuses. This duality creates a complex regulatory environment for firms operating across jurisdictions, but it also opens the door to the development of harmonized global standards, for example through the OECD, UNCTAD, the International Competition Network (ICN), or the G7/G20. Each of these international organizations or state groupings possesses expert committees capable of developing, or likely to develop, normative international activities in the field of competition policy.
- 3. Competition policy as a tool of sovereignty: Antitrust policy is no longer merely an economic instrument; it has become a lever of technological and industrial sovereignty. The European Union seeks to use its extensive competition policy to protect and enable the growth of its technological and industrial champions in the face of “gatekeepers” identified through new instruments such as the DMA, while also limiting the influence of subsidized foreign actors. The United States, for its part, aims to secure its global leadership in strategic sectors. Even partial transatlantic coordination could strengthen the position of Western democracies in the face of global—particularly Asian—competition.
- 4. Innovation and sustainable ecological transition: European competition policy explicitly integrates environmental and social objectives, potentially serving as a model for broader antitrust approaches. Meanwhile, the U.S. system demonstrates the effectiveness of targeted enforcement capable of rapidly sanctioning abusive behavior. A combination of these two logics could maximize innovation, sustainability, and economic fairness.
In summary, the comparative analysis shows that despite differing priorities and methods, the European Union and the United States share common objectives in protecting competition and fostering innovation, while developing distinct instruments adapted to their respective institutional and strategic contexts. This duality represents an opportunity for mutual learning and underscores the importance of transatlantic coordination in an increasingly interconnected digital and industrial world, even though the American model continues to favor greater market autonomy than the more interventionist approach prevailing within the European Union.
IV. Conclusion
Despite differing methods, European and U.S. competition policies converge on core objectives: protecting innovation and regulating dominant digital platforms.
Under Teresa Ribera, Europe is redeploying competition policy—without amending primary EU law (Articles 101–106 TFEU)—by strengthening secondary legislation (FSR, revised Regulation 1/2003, DMA, DSA) toward an integrated policy combining enforcement, industrial competitiveness, and social and environmental goals. In contrast, “America First Antitrust” prioritizes targeted enforcement, consumer protection, and national competitiveness.
Beyond these differences, antitrust has clearly emerged as a geopolitical lever and a tool of industrial and technological sovereignty. Transatlantic coordination—or at least mutual understanding—has become essential in an increasingly interconnected digital and industrial world, even as U.S. doctrine deliberately leaves greater room for market-driven evolution than the more interventionist European model.
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[1] See in particular our two works: F. Souty, Competition Policy in the United States, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, “Que sais-je?” series, 128 pp.; and EU Competition Law and Policy, Paris, Montchrestien, 4th ed., 2013, “Clefs” series, 160 pp.
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François Souty est Président exécutif du Cabinet LRACG Conseil en stratégies européennes et droit de la concurrence, enseignant à Excelia Business School (La Rochelle-Tours-Cachan), à l’Université Catholique de l’Ouest (Niort) et chargé d’enseignements à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Nantes. Auparavant Expert National Détaché auprès de la Commission Européenne (rapporteur antitrust sur les marchés financier de 2018 à 2021 et chargé d’affaires internationales de concurrence à la DG Concurrence de 2021 à 2024), il a été conseiller économique européen pour la politique de la concurrence auprès du gouvernement de Géorgie à Tbilisi en 2017-2018. Longtemps Directeur départemental de la DGCCRF au ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (1982 à 2024), il a été également professeur-associé à l’Université de La Rochelle (1996-2018). Membre des comités d’experts de la concurrence de l’OCDE et de la CNUCED de 1992 à 2018, il a participé aux travaux de l’OMC sur le commerce international et la politique de la concurrence de 1997 à 2004. Un des fondateurs du Cercle Jefferson, du Cercle K2, de la revue Concurrences en 2004, il est auteur d’une douzaine de livres ou rapports internationaux et de plus d’une centaine d’articles académiques en droit et politique de la concurrence et en histoire économique. Il prépare actuellement la 5e édition de «Droit et politique de la concurrence de l’Union Européenne » chez LGDJ-Montchrestien (coll. Clefs). Il est auteur d’une thèse de doctorat en histoire économique à l’Université de Paris III sur les monopoles des Compagnies des Indes néerlandaises au XVIIIe siècle. François Souty est Officier de l’Ordre National du Mérite.