Cuba Faces the American Ultimatum: Between Sovereign Defiance and Energy Asphyxiation

By Angélique Bouchard
In a context of accelerated geopolitical reconfiguration in the Western Hemisphere, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel reaffirmed on January 12, 2026, Havana’s unyielding stance in the face of pressure from the Trump administration.
“There are no conversations with the U.S. government, except for technical contacts in the migration field,” he declared on X, adding that any progress in bilateral relations must rest on “international law rather than on hostility, threats, and economic coercion.”
He insisted: “As history demonstrates, relations between the United States and Cuba, in order to advance, must be based on international law rather than on hostility, threats, and economic coercion.”
This statement came the day after a thunderous message from Donald Trump on Truth Social: “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA – ZERO! I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.”
Trump added: “Cuba lived, for many years, on large amounts of OIL and MONEY from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided ‘security services’ to the last two Venezuelan dictators, BUT NOT ANYMORE! Most of those Cubans are DEAD from last week’s U.S.A. attack, and Venezuela doesn’t need protection anymore from the thugs and extortionists who held them hostage for so many years.”
The standoff follows Operation Absolute Resolve, launched on January 3, 2026, by U.S. special forces (notably Delta Force and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment). Meticulously planned over months with CIA support, the operation involved more than 150 aircraft, precision strikes on Venezuelan military infrastructure (including at Fort Tiuna) to neutralize anti-air defenses, and a rapid nighttime extraction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores from their fortified residence in Caracas. U.S. forces used low-altitude helicopters, stealth drones for surveillance, and a torch to breach armored doors. Lasting less than 30 minutes, the raid resulted in the deaths of at least 32 Cuban personnel (according to some sources) and dozens of Venezuelans (up to over 100 according to Caracas, including civilians and military), while seven American servicemen were wounded with no fatalities. Maduro was transferred aboard the USS Iwo Jima and then to New York, where he pleaded not guilty on January 5 to charges of narcoterrorism and arms trafficking.
Trump claimed a total tactical success, stating that the United States would temporarily assume control of Venezuela “until a safe, appropriate and judicious transition,” with emphasis on restoring the oil industry through American companies. He promised: “We’ll bring in the biggest oil companies in the world to invest billions and billions of dollars and take out money. That money will be used in Venezuela. And the biggest beneficiary will be the people of Venezuela.”
À lire aussi : ANALYSIS – Marco Rubio: The Cuban-American Pivot of Trumpian America Facing an Agonizing Castroism
Cuba Under Maximum Pressure from Trump: Rubio’s Dark Humor as “President” and Energy Asphyxiation as Strategic Weapon
In a sequence blending media provocation and ruthless geopolitical strategy, President Donald Trump responded on January 11, 2026, to a humorous Truth Social post suggesting that Secretary of State Marco Rubio become “President of Cuba.”
“Sounds good to me,” he replied bluntly, amplifying a viral meme that ridicules Rubio’s accumulation of roles—Secretary of State, acting National Security Advisor, acting Archivist of the United States—while sending an unmistakable signal to Havana: Washington is seriously contemplating regime change in Cuba, even if delivered as a quip.
The remark is far from trivial. It fits into a broader offensive against leftist regimes in Latin America following the January 3 capture of Nicolás Maduro during Operation Absolute Resolve.
Marco Rubio, son of Cuban immigrants and architect of the hardline anti-Castro stance in Congress and now at the State Department, embodies this ambition. Social media turned a White House photo of him into the “realizing” meme: Rubio “realizing” he must take on improbable roles—president of Venezuela, shah of Iran, governor of Cuba, manager of Manchester United.
Rubio himself leaned into the humor on X: “While you never know what the future may bring right now my focus must remain on global events and also the precious archives of the United States of America,” ruling out—for now—any candidacy for head coach of the Miami Dolphins.
The Oil Lever: A Historical Dependence Turned Critical Vulnerability
Cuba’s dependence on Venezuelan oil lies at the heart of the current dispute. Before the U.S. intervention, Havana received approximately 35,000 barrels per day from Caracas—nearly half its energy deficit—in exchange for medical services, military advisors, and security forces.
Supplementary deliveries came from Russia (about 7,500 barrels/day) and Mexico (5,500 barrels/day). But since January 3, no tanker has left Venezuelan ports for Cuba, according to maritime tracking data. Washington has intensified seizures of sanctioned crude-carrying vessels, redirecting flows to U.S. refineries under an agreement valued between $1.8 and $3 billion.
This abrupt cutoff exacerbates a deep-seated energy crisis. Cuba’s aging and poorly maintained power grid suffers daily deficits often exceeding 1,700 MW, causing outages that can last up to 20 hours per day in some regions.
As of January 1, 2026, the system started with a critical deficit over 1,400 MW; on January 9, the Unión Eléctrica (UNE) announced a peak impact of 1,830 MW—the worst recorded since the beginning of the year. On January 11, the impact reached 1,736 MW, with further worsening expected to 1,760 MW. Jorge Piñón, expert at the Energy Institute of the University of Texas, warns that without the 30,000 to 35,000 daily Venezuelan barrels, “the country could really collapse: it’s no longer just the blackouts, but also the lack of fuel for transportation and industry.” Fuel reserves are estimated at approximately 360,000 barrels (four days of consumption), forcing extreme rationing of diesel and gasoline.
In post-Maduro Venezuela, the transition remains uncertain. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as interim president, but the Chavista government remains in place under American pressure. Trump promised a massive return of U.S. oil majors to restart production, with massive investments to repair degraded infrastructure. Experts, however, estimate that restoring significant output would take years and billions of dollars, with risks of internal chaos if the transition is mismanaged. The stated goal is to deprive Cuba and other allies (such as Nicaragua) of this leverage while securing American access to Venezuela’s reserves.
À lire aussi : ANALYSIS – Trump Reasserts American Hegemony: The Birth of the “Don-Roe Doctrine” Following Maduro’s Fall
The Wright Plan – American Control of Venezuelan Oil Sales
On January 7, 2026, during the Goldman Sachs energy conference in Miami, Energy Secretary Chris Wright outlined the radical mechanism implemented by the Trump administration.
“Yes, we are trying something radically different,” he declared. “Instead of the oil being blockaded as it is right now, we are going to let the oil flow, selling it to U.S. refineries and markets around the world to improve oil supplies.”
Wright specified that sales would be fully supervised by the U.S. government, with proceeds deposited into Washington-controlled accounts: “From there, those funds can flow back to Venezuela and benefit the Venezuelan people.” He added: “We have need to have that leverage and that control of those oil sales to drive the changes that simply must happen in Venezuela.”
The plan begins with stranded crude in storage and offshore floating facilities (up to 50 million barrels, valued at approximately $2.8 billion at current market prices), with the U.S. supplying diluent to thin Venezuela’s heavy crude, authorizing imports of parts, equipment and services to prevent industry collapse. In the long run: “In the long run, we want to create the conditions for major American companies, that were there before […] will go in again. The resources are immense. This should be a wealthy, prosperous, peaceful energy powerhouse, that’s the plan.”
This plan already draws criticism: Democratic lawmakers see it as an “insane takeover” of a sovereign country’s resources, while analysts highlight the legal and political risks of such energy tutelage.
Recent Developments: Tightening the Blockade and Internal Resistance
On January 7, U.S. forces seized two Venezuelan tankers, including the Marinera (re-flagged Russian), after a multi-week Atlantic pursuit, escalating tensions with Moscow.
On January 9, Trump met with oil majors at the White House to push $100 billion in investments, but CEOs (Exxon, Chevron) remain cautious, describing the country as “uninvestable” without solid guarantees.
In Congress, a bipartisan resolution is advancing to limit future hostilities without approval, illustrating internal divisions over the operation’s legitimacy.
Cuba’s Response – Mourning, Solidarity, and Denunciation
Miguel Díaz-Canel insisted on the principle of sovereign equality:
“We have always been willing to engage in a serious and responsible dialogue with the various governments of the United States, including the current one, on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respect, principles of International Law, reciprocal benefit without interference in internal affairs and with full respect for our independence.”
He added: “Cuba is a free, independent, and sovereign nation. No one tells us what to do. Cuba does not attack; it has been attacked by the United States for 66 years, and it does not threaten; it prepares, ready to defend the homeland to the last drop of blood.” And: “Those who turn everything into business, even human lives, have no moral authority to point the finger at Cuba in any way, absolutely in any way.”
Havana reacted firmly to Operation Absolute Resolve. On January 3, Miguel Díaz-Canel described the American action as a “criminal attack” and “state terrorism,” calling for urgent international condemnation of this “aggression against Our America.”
The government declared two days of national mourning on January 5 and 6 for the 32 Cubans killed (military and intelligence agents) during the assault on Caracas—a rare admission of Cuba’s protective presence around Maduro.
On January 3, thousands demonstrated in Havana in solidarity with Venezuela, in front of the U.S. embassy, where Díaz-Canel declared: “For Venezuela, and of course for Cuba too, we are ready to give even our own blood.” This rhetoric aims to consolidate the internal front amid the crisis while mobilizing traditional allies against what Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla calls an “existential dilemma critical to our survival as sovereign nation-states.”
Paradoxically, Washington appears to calibrate its pressure: despite Trump’s statements, the Department of Energy authorizes Mexico to continue deliveries to Cuba, labeled “humanitarian aid” by Mexico City. A Mexican tanker (Ocean Mariner) delivered 85,000–90,000 barrels to Havana on January 10, maintaining flows despite U.S.-Mexico tensions.
Geostrategic Perspectives: Between Escalation and Regional Realpolitik
The intervention in Venezuela marks a turning point in Trump’s Latin American policy: it reaffirms a revised Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing energy dominance and the marginalization of extra-hemispheric rivals. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has long argued that Maduro’s fall would open the way for change in Havana. Trump himself has shared speculation about an expanded role for Rubio in Cuba.
Paradoxically, the risks are high. Prolonged energy asphyxiation could trigger massive social protests, like those of July 2021, amplified by an economy already in “free fall” (according to analysts).
Experts from the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Florida International University warn of accelerated collapse: without Venezuelan oil, indefinite blackouts are no longer unimaginable, potentially provoking widespread unrest and a new massive migration wave toward Florida. Observers note that a population exhausted by chronic shortages could shift toward spontaneous protests if blackouts persist. Center for Economic and Policy Research analysts believe Havana could buy time for discreet negotiations, but public refusal of immediate concessions preserves the regime’s ideological legitimacy.
In the short term, Cuba relies on resilience and limited alternatives (Russia, Mexico). In the medium term, the outcome will depend on Washington’s ability to consolidate its grip on Venezuelan oil without triggering regional chaos. In this asymmetric standoff, Cuban sovereignty remains a brandished shield, but energy, more than ever, dictates the terms of the confrontation.
Looking toward 2026-2028, Cuba stands at an existential crossroads where energy determines fate. If the Venezuelan cutoff persists—and U.S. tanker seizures (including the re-flagged Russian Marinera) offer little hope of quick relief—the island risks sliding into a fatal spiral: permanent blackouts, industrial paralysis, aggravated food and medical shortages, mass exodus toward Florida (already anticipated by Washington as an uncontrollable migration risk).
Experts diverge: for some (such as Marco Rubio and Republican hawks), the loss of the “Venezuelan parachute” will precipitate the end of the post-Castro regime without direct intervention—an “organic” collapse under maximum pressure.
For others (analysts at the Center for Economic and Policy Research or Latin American observers), Cuban resilience, forged over six decades of embargo and the “Special Period,” could still surprise: increased internal mobilization, reinforced recourse to Russia and China (even if limited), or discreet negotiations with a pragmatic and humanitarian Mexico to maintain a minimal supply lifeline.
Four main trajectories emerge, ranked by decreasing probability:
À lire aussi : ÉNERGIE – Trump : Énergie et stratégie du f(l)ou éclairé
- Accelerated Collapse and Chaotic Transition (high probability, 45-55% by end-2026)
Prolonged energy asphyxiation (permanent blackouts >20 h/day nationwide) paralyzes transportation, agriculture, and industry, triggering critical food and medical shortages. The population, exhausted by chronic shortages and massive exodus (over 2.7 million departures since 2020), could tip into large-scale spontaneous protests—amplified compared to July 2021. Heightened repression risks fracturing the security apparatus, fostering gradual loss of territorial control (especially in Oriente). In the end, the regime could collapse under its own weight, opening the door to chaotic transition, potentially accompanied by international humanitarian intervention (United States/Mexico) conditioned on political concessions. Washington, aware of the massive migration risk toward Florida, might then favor framed “humanitarian aid” rather than direct confrontation.
- Precarious Survival and Forced or Discreet Negotiations (medium to high probability, 30-40%)
The Trump administration, wary of uncontrollable migration chaos (Florida as a swing state), calibrates its pressure: partial authorizations for Mexican and Russian deliveries while maintaining the Venezuelan blockade. Cuba endures deep recession (-1 to +1% GDP in 2026), with chronic but manageable blackouts (10-15 h/day). The regime consolidates internal control through ideological mobilization (“defense of the homeland”) and targeted repression. Discreet talks (via Mexican or Canadian intermediaries) could emerge: migration and energy relief in exchange for release of political prisoners and limited economic openings. This minimal survival would preserve core ideological legitimacy, but at the cost of accelerated erosion of economic sovereignty and continued exodus.
- Pragmatic Regional Reconfiguration (low probability, 10-20%)
A U.S.-influenced stabilized Venezuela (Delcy Rodríguez transition or pro-U.S.) could redirect a symbolic fraction of its oil to Havana (5-10,000 barrels/day) in exchange for anti-China/Russia alignment. Increased aid from Beijing or Moscow (credits, oil) would counter American encirclement. This would open the way to compromise: Cuba yields on certain ideological points (reduced military cooperation with Iran), Washington partially eases sanctions and embargo. The island would evolve toward a “Vietnamese” model (mixed economy under stable authoritarian regime), with low growth (+1-2%) and attenuated blackouts. This outcome, however, assumes rare pragmatism on both sides—Trump/Rubio aiming more for “fall” than normalization.
- Prolonged Historical Resilience (marginal probability, 5-10%)
Massive internal mobilization (“Special Period 2.0”) and a surge of Russian/Chinese aid could enable endurance in the manner of the 1990s. The regime would survive through extreme rationing and reinforced repression, but at the price of prolonged stagnation and continued exodus. This trajectory appears unlikely, however, absent a patron equivalent to the former USSR.
*
* *
Looking toward 2026-2028, Cuba stands at an existential crossroads where energy dictates fate. If the Venezuelan cutoff persists—and U.S. tanker seizures (including the re-flagged Russian Marinera) offer little hope of quick relief—the island risks sliding into a fatal spiral: permanent blackouts, industrial paralysis, aggravated food and medical shortages, mass exodus toward Florida (already anticipated by Washington as an uncontrollable migration risk).
Experts diverge: for some (such as Marco Rubio and Republican hawks), the loss of the “Venezuelan parachute” will precipitate the end of the post-Castro regime without direct intervention—an “organic” collapse under maximum pressure.
For others (analysts at the Center for Economic and Policy Research or Latin American observers), Cuban resilience, forged over six decades of embargo and the “Special Period,” could still surprise: increased internal mobilization, reinforced recourse to Russia and China (even if limited), or discreet negotiations with a pragmatic and humanitarian Mexico to maintain a minimal supply lifeline.
In all cases, 2026 could mark the end of an era: the one in which Cuba could still present itself as the last viable anti-imperialist bastion in the hemisphere. Energy, now the decisive weapon of asymmetric confrontation, has supplanted invasions; sovereignty is no longer measured in speeches, but in megawatts available at dawn.
The outcome will ultimately depend on Washington’s ability to avoid the “breaking point” (blackouts >22 h/day + widespread food shortages) while maintaining sufficient pressure to force change—without triggering regional chaos whose migration and security fallout could turn against its own interests.
À lire aussi : DÉCRYPTAGE – Cuba face à l’ultimatum américain : Entre défiance souveraine et asphyxie énergétique
#Cuba, #USCuba, #TrumpUltimatum, #MarcoRubio, #CubaCrisis, #EnergyCrisis, #OilEmbargo, #VenezuelaCrisis, #MaduroCaptured, #OperationAbsoluteResolve, #RegimeChange, #MonroeDoctrine, #LatinAmerica, #CaribbeanGeopolitics, #Sanctions, #EconomicWarfare, #EnergyWeapon, #Blackouts, #PowerGridCollapse, #MigrationCrisis, #FloridaPolitics, #CubanSovereignty, #DíazCanel, #Havana, #BolivarianAxis, #PostMaduro, #OilGeopolitics, #USSpecialForces, #CIA, #HybridWarfare, #EconomicBlockade, #HumanitarianRisk, #RussiaLatinAmerica, #ChinaLatinAmerica, #MexicoCuba, #EnergySecurity, #GeopoliticalShock, #WesternHemisphere, #StrategicPressure, #2026Outlook

Diplômée de la Business School de La Rochelle (Excelia – Bachelor Communication et Stratégies Digitales) et du CELSA – Sorbonne Université, Angélique Bouchard, 25 ans, est titulaire d’un Master 2 de recherche, spécialisation « Géopolitique des médias ». Elle est journaliste indépendante et travaille pour de nombreux médias. Elle est en charge des grands entretiens pour Le Dialogue.
