ECONOMY – Reengineering of the French Aeronautics Ecosystem and Franco-German Strategic Rivalry (2001-2026)
Strategic State, Sovereign Industrial Partnerships and New Technological Sovereignty
Par François Souty
François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former International Affairs Officer at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD Committee of Experts on Competition Policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches European institutions and geopolitics at the Excelia Business School group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan) as well as European competition law and policy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Nantes. He is in charge of the economics section at Le Diplomate Media.
« Defence! This is the first reason for State’s existence. It cannot fail to care about it without destroying himself. »
Charles de Gaulle, press conference of 31 January 1964.
Executive Summary
The aeronautics industry is one of the sectors where the relationship between political power, technological sovereignty and industrial capacity is most intensely manifested. Designing and producing a new-generation combat aircraft, an aircraft engine, a space system or a civilian aircraft is not just a matter of economic logic: these capabilities condition the strategic autonomy of states, their diplomatic influence and their ability to master critical technologies.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and more particularly since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the international environment has changed profoundly. Industrial globalization has not led to a convergence of economic models; on the contrary, it has fostered increased competition between powers, in which the United States, China and several Asian powers are mobilizing their industrial policies in order to consolidate their positions in the technologies of the future. In this new context, mastery of the aeronautics and space sectors appears to be an essential attribute of power.
The European Union and its Member States have considerable assets, with leading industrial groups such as Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Safran and MBDA. However, the experience of major bilateral cooperation programmes between States or « communitarised » countries, carried out over several decades, reveals the limits of a cooperation model based mainly on political balances between partner States. Franco-German cooperation, long considered the natural engine of European industrial integration, is a particularly revealing case study in this respect. While it has led to major successes, it has also shown its difficulties when industrial governance, the distribution of responsibilities and technological choices are subordinated to political considerations that are far removed from the imperatives of industrial performance.
An analysis of the main European aeronautical programmes since 2001 thus leads to a distinction between two conceptions of cooperation. The first is based on an institutional logic in which the distribution of tasks between partners responds first and foremost to the objectives of political balance. The second is based on an industrial logic based on the complementarity of skills, the responsibility of a clearly identified project management and the search for maximum technological and economic efficiency. Dassault Aviation’s experience with the Rafale, Airbus’ experience in civil aeronautics, but also the difficulties encountered by certain multinational programs illustrate this opposition between two models.
This evolution leads to a rethinking of the role of the State in strategic industries. The strategic state of the twenty-first century is not a state that intends to produce or control everything; it is a state that identifies critical sectors, guarantees the conditions for technological sovereignty, supports innovation ecosystems and leaves it to manufacturers to organize the most effective cooperation. This approach is in line with the need, underlined in particular by Mario Draghi, to reduce the regulatory and administrative obstacles that prevent Europe from transforming its scientific skills into an industrial powerhouse.
The article thus proposes the concept of sovereign industrial partnerships. These refer to cooperation based not on a predetermined political distribution of responsibilities, but on the recognition of industrial skills, the preservation of critical technologies and the designation of a project manager capable of ensuring the overall coherence of the programme. When critical mass requires it, these partnerships can be transformed into sovereign industrial coalitions, associating several states around common capabilities while respecting the specific competences of each actor.
The study of the European aeronautics industry since 2001 shows that it is not a question of opposing national sovereignty and European cooperation. The real question is that of the conditions under which cooperation can produce power. Recent experience suggests that effective cooperation does not arise from the dilution of responsibilities, but from the pooling of partners, each with recognized skills.
At a time when China is developing an ambitious aeronautics industry, when the United States is consolidating its technological lead and when Europe is seeking to preserve or recreate its strategic autonomy, the future of the European aeronautics industry will depend less on the multiplication of institutional agreements than on the ability to build industrial partnerships based on excellence, responsibility and the mastery of critical know-how.
Introduction
The aviation industry is one of the most accomplished expressions of state power. It mobilizes some of the most complex technologies ever developed, irrigates the entire industrial fabric through its knock-on effects and participates directly in military autonomy, economic competitiveness, scientific innovation and the diplomatic influence of nations that master its main know-how. Designing a combat aircraft, developing a new-generation engine, producing military satellites or mastering the most advanced composite materials is not only an industrial ambition; It is a strategic choice that conditions, to a large extent, the effective exercise of national sovereignty.
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001 marked a major break in this respect once again.[1] In less than a quarter of a century, the world economy has entered a new phase of systemic competition in which industrial policies, long relegated to the background by the principles of liberal globalization, are once again taking center stage. The United States has embarked on a vast reindustrialization movement around its critical industries; China has built a methodical strategy of technological upgrading; Several Asian powers have consolidated their industrial ecosystems in resistance to the rise of China and American dominance. In this new environment, mastery of the aeronautics and space sectors appears more than ever to be a determining factor in power.
Europe undoubtedly has considerable assets. It is home to several of the world’s leading manufacturers in the sector and maintains first-class scientific, technological and operational skills. However, this industrial base remains confronted with a fundamental question: do the cooperation methods that have accompanied its development for several decades still meet the requirements of a profoundly transformed strategic environment? The difficulties encountered by several major European aeronautics programmes, the persistent divergences between major partners on industrial governance, arms exports, intellectual property and the distribution of responsibilities invite us to go beyond institutional approaches to assess the concrete results of these cooperations.
The Franco-German case occupies a special place in this respect. Long presented as the natural engine of European industrial integration, it now offers a privileged field of observation to measure the strengths but also the limits of a model based on the permanent search for political balances between partners with sometimes divergent strategic, industrial and operational traditions. The debates sparked by the Future Combat Air System(FCAS), the experience accumulated on several cooperation programmes as well as the contrasting trajectories of manufacturers such as Dassault Aviation or Airbus leads us to question the relevance of this approach in sectors where technological mastery is itself an attribute of sovereignty.
This article thus proposes to examine, from a historical, industrial and geoeconomic perspective, the evolution (and consequences) of the Franco-German strategic rivalry within the European aeronautics industry since 2001. It will show that the essential question is no longer whether to cooperate more, but to identify the forms of cooperation that are most likely to strengthen European technological sovereignty in the long termand, in the absence of a resolute common will, French sovereignty. Based on the analysis of the main civil and military programs, the evolution of major industrial groups and the emergence of more flexible innovation ecosystems, he will defend the idea that the preservation of critical skills and the constitution of industrial coalitions based on the excellence of know-how are now essential conditions for French and European aeronautical power.
I. From the age of national champions to world industrial competition: the reengineering of European aeronautical power
The aeronautics industry occupies a unique place among the strategic industries. Unlike many industrial sectors, it concentrates several dimensions of contemporary power: technological mastery, military autonomy, capacity for innovation, diplomatic influence and economic influence. Since the first aeronautical programs of the twentieth century, states have considered the ability to design and produce advanced aircraft as an essential attribute of their sovereignty.
Without going back to the period before 1945, France has long embodied this particular conception of aeronautical power. From the creation of the major national design offices to the emergence of Dassault Aviation, then to the gradual creation of a defence industrial and technological base (BITD), it has developed a model based on the close association between the State, major industrialists and scientific skills. This historical continuity largely explains France’s ability to preserve, until today, complete control of certain critical segments, particularly in combat aviation.
However, the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of industrial globalization have profoundly transformed this environment. The increasing costs of developing new aeronautical systems, the rise of European budgetary constraints, the shortage of poorly allocated, unproductive or even counterproductive budgetary resources, the search for economies of scale or new external markets and the emergence of new competitors have led European States to seek new forms of cooperation. The construction of Airbus is the most successful example of this successful pooling of competences at the level of a few Member States (and not of the European Commission); it also illustrates the permanent tensions between industrial logic, national interests and European political ambitions.
Since 2001, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization has marked a major break. Aeronautical competition is no longer played out only between Western companies, but between industrial ecosystems supported by national strategies. The United States has consolidated its leadership in aeronautical and digital technologies[2] ; China has undertaken to build a complete aeronautics industry; the European Union and its Member States, despite exceptional skills, are still looking for the model to articulate industrial efficiency and strategic ambition!
This first part therefore examines the transformation of the cooperative framework in which Franco-German rivalry took place. It will first show how France has built an original tradition of aeronautical sovereignty based on the continuity between political decision-making, industrial competence and technological autonomy (A). It will then analyse the constitution of the European industrial model around Airbus and the ambiguities of a cooperation that has gradually become a political as well as an industrial instrument (B). Finally, it will study the upheaval introduced by the new global competition, marked by the return of industrial policies and the need to rethink the conditions of aeronautical power (C).
A. The French tradition of aeronautical sovereignty: from the Gaullist industrial state to the technological mastery of Dassault
French aeronautical history is inseparable from a particular conception of national power. From the first decades of the twentieth century, military aviation appeared as a field where technological autonomy directly conditioned freedom of political action. After the Second World War, this conviction acquired a new dimension: in the context of the Cold War, the mastery of aeronautical technologies gradually became one of the foundations of strategic independence.
The ability to design, develop and produce advanced aircraft is not just one industrial skill among others. It directly engages the sovereignty of a state, because it combines the mastery of critical technologies, the availability of armed forces, export capacity and diplomatic influence. Military aeronautics thus became one of the privileged fields where political strategy, scientific excellence and industrial power met.
General de Gaulle included this requirement in a broader doctrine of national autonomy. For him, the power of a state is based not only on its immediate diplomatic or military capabilities, but also on its ability to master the technical instruments essential to its action. The creation of the French deterrent force, the development of an autonomous aeronautics industry and the creation of major industrial players are based on the same logic: to give France the means to freely decide its strategic destiny without depending on foreign capabilities.[3]
However, this ambition was not born ex nihilo with the Fifth Republic. It extends the orientations initiated since the Fourth Republic, in the context of post-war reconstruction and economic modernization. In several sectors considered essential — aeronautics, energy, electronics, transport — the state had already sought to preserve the scientific skills, design offices and industrial capacities necessary to restore national technological autonomy, after the industrial plundering by Germany from 1941 to 1944. The Gaullist period after 1958 did not therefore create an entirely new industrial policy; it gives it greater strategic coherence by placing it in a global vision of national independence.[4]
However, the Fifth Republic made a major shift. Without renouncing the central role of the State in the definition of strategic orientations, it gradually replaced a logic of direct control with a function of industrial architecture, inspired by liberalism. The creation of the Délégation générale pour l’armement (DGA) in 1961 illustrates this evolution: the objective is no longer just to manage military resources, but to organize a permanent capacity for expertise, design, programming and management of major technological programs.[5]
The state thus becomes less a direct producer than an organizer of sovereign capacities. It sets priorities, funds upstream research, ensures program coherence, supports critical skills, and creates the conditions for industry to develop competitive technology solutions. This original articulation between public authorities and strategic companies corresponds to what Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset have analysed as a major characteristic of high-tech industries since 1945: in sectors where technical mastery conditions sovereignty, the State and companies maintain a structuring cooperative relationship, without one being able to replace the other in the long term.[6]
The French originality thus lies less in the existence of a « military-industrial complex » comparable to the American model than in a particular institutional relationship between the state, technical bodies and companies capable of assuming real industrial responsibility.[7] The State guarantees strategic continuity; manufacturers ensure design, innovation, production and international competitiveness.
This combination largely explains the success of French aeronautics in the second half of the twentieth century. However, it is based on an essential condition: the long-term preservation of human, scientific and industrial capital. As the great historian François Caron has shown, technical innovation never proceeds from an isolated rupture; It is the result of a cumulative process combining learning, the accumulation of knowledge, the organization of skills and the ability of companies to transform research into industrial achievements.[8] Technological sovereignty is therefore less a permanent state than a continuously maintained capability.
This doctrine finds its most successful expression in the relationship between the French State and Dassault Aviation. Heir to the design offices created by Marcel Dassault, the company has retained an original industrial culture based on complete mastery of aeronautical design. From the Mirage to the Rafale, this continuity illustrates the ability of a national manufacturer to maintain global prime management in a sector where the increase in technological complexity is nevertheless leading many States to gradually abandon certain critical skills.[9]
Dassault Aviation‘s success is thus a European singularity, not to mention an exception. While most industrial powers have gradually sought increasing forms of international mutualisation, France has maintained an autonomous capability in combat aviation. This situation does not reflect a rejection of all cooperation, but a particular conception of cooperation: partnerships can only be effective when each actor retains its own skills and an identifiable industrial capacity.
Box 1 – Rafale exports: an atypical industrial success
The international success of the Rafale is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the European aeronautics industry at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Long considered an exclusively national program, the aircraft has become, since 2015, one of the most exported combat aircraft in the world.
This success is based on several complementary factors. The first is the coherence of the project management entrusted to Dassault Aviation, surrounded by a stable industrial ecosystem combining Safran, Thales and MBDA. This unified governance has made it possible to maintain a continuous evolution of the device without calling into question its general architecture.
The second factor lies in national mastery of critical technologies. EASA radar, electronic warfare (SPECTRA), engines, armaments integration, software architecture and operational qualification remain largely under French control, which facilitates the successive evolutions of the aircraft and reduces external dependencies.
The third factor is political. French export authorisation procedures remain centralised, which avoids the blockages that may arise when several States simultaneously have a right of veto on sales.
Finally, the Rafale benefits from exceptional operational feedback, acquired during numerous external engagements. This experience reinforces its technical credibility while fuelling a continuous process of improvement.
By 2026, more than 500 Rafale had been ordered by France and several foreign customers, making the program one of the main European industrial successes in the field of combat aircraft since the end of the Cold War. It illustrates that clearly identified project management, combined with effective national industrial cooperation, can also be a decisive advantage for exports.
This conception is in line with the analyses of General André Beaufre, for whom modern strategy is not based solely on the quantitative accumulation of military means, but on the ability of a state to articulate its political, economic, scientific, industrial and military resources in a single vision.[10] It is also in line with the thinking of Pierre Messmer, former Minister of the Armed Forces under President Charles de Gaulle and then Prime Minister, for whom military independence necessarily presupposed the existence of an industrial base capable of providing the equipment essential to national freedom of action.[11]
However, this French model was gradually to be confronted with a double evolution. On the one hand, the considerable increase in the costs of developing modern aeronautical systems made it necessary to seek cooperation that would make it possible to achieve a critical mass. On the other hand, the construction of Europe favoured the emergence of major multinational programmes intended in principle to compete with American groups. It was in this tension between the preservation of national industrial sovereignty and the search for a collective European power that the construction of Airbus took place, and then the great debates around Franco-German cooperation in military aeronautics.
B. Airbus: from Franco-German industrial complementarity to the emergence of new strategic rivalries
The European construction of the aeronautics industry cannot be understood without returning to the distinct historical trajectories followed by France and Germany after 1945. While France chose to preserve a full national capability in sectors deemed essential to its strategic autonomy, notably combat aviation, the Federal Republic of Germany gradually rebuilt its aeronautical power according to a different logic, favouring manufacturing excellence, technological specialisation and integration into major European programmes.[12]
Franco-German cooperation is therefore not the result of a spontaneous convergence between two identical industrial models. It is the result of the meeting of two national traditions that pursue a common objective – to rebuild a European aeronautical power – but according to different approaches to industrial sovereignty. While France remains committed to the complete project management of aeronautical systems, Germany is gradually developing a particularly efficient industry in terms of structures, equipment, manufacturing processes and industrial organization.[13]
This evolution can be analysed around four aspects: the revival of the German aeronautical tradition after 1945, the birth of Airbus as a European industrial compromise, the rise of German industry within the consortium, and the limits of cooperation when political logic tends to replace industrial rationality. It is part of a long-term historical trajectory that goes far beyond the succession of aeronautical programs or political alternations. Since the Liberation, France has gradually rebuilt a complete industrial apparatus combining research, training, civil industry, the defence industry and project management capabilities. The different stages of this construction show a remarkable strategic continuity, despite the profound transformations of the national and international political environment. Appendix 1 traces the main stages of this evolution between 1945 and 2026. It shows that the periods of greatest success almost always correspond to the existence of a long-term strategic vision that makes it possible to articulate public investment, industrial initiative and technological innovation. This historical continuity sheds light on the contemporary challenges analysed in the following developments.
1. The revival of the German aviation tradition. Germany has a long-standing aviation tradition that dates back to the first decades of the twentieth century. The Second World War abruptly interrupted this trajectory. The prohibitions imposed after 1945 because of the country’s historical responsibilities from the beginning of the Great War led to the temporary disappearance of an autonomous military aviation industry and led the Federal Republic to gradually rebuild its competences in an entirely new context.
Unlike France, which is continuing to rebuild and reorganise an integrated national sector around the State, research organisations and industrialists, the Federal Republic of Germany is developing a model based more on manufacturing competitiveness, the quality of production, technological specialisation and European integration. This orientation is part of the more general ordoliberal model of its social market economy, where industrial performance is the main vector of economic power.[14]
Thus two possibly complementary, but different, conceptions of aeronautical power emerge. France favours the mastery of all critical skills in order to preserve its strategic autonomy; Germany is mainly seeking to build a competitive industry occupying major positions in European industrial value chains, often in the midst of a cooperation agreement or even American subcontracting.
2. Airbus: a success based on the complementarity of skills The creation of Airbus, at the initiative of EU Member States and not of the EU itself,is one of the most important European industrial successes of the second half of the twentieth century. It responds to an economic as well as a strategic necessity: no European manufacturer then has, in isolation, the critical size to sustainably confront Boeing on the world market for civil aircraft (moreover while Boeing is developing its large civilian aircraft from federal funds supplemented by military budgets, largely distorting competition and international trade at the origin of long battles in the context of the WTO).[15]
Airbus‘ success is based precisely on the complementarity of national industrial traditions. France brings its experience as a prime contractor, inherited from Sud Aviation and then Aérospatiale, as well as a strong capacity for integrating complex systems. Germany is gradually developing recognised skills in aerostructures, industrial processes, equipment and production capacities. This division of responsibilities allows the consortium to gradually build up a true European champion.
Airbus thus demonstrates that industrial cooperation can become a factor of sovereignty when it is based on clearly identified skills, balanced governance and a permanent search for technological excellence.
3. The rise of Germany. Airbus’ commercial success gradually transformed the initial balances. German industry benefits from the strength of its production system, the density of its network of subcontractors and its remarkable capacity for industrial organization. Over the decades, his influence within the consortium naturally grew.
This development corresponds to the general transformation of the European economy. Globalization, the fragmentation of value chains and the increasing sophistication of technologies are increasing the importance of companies capable of mastering industrial processes, production costs and supplier networks. In this area, German companies have widely recognised structural advantages.[16]
This increase in power gradually changed the initial balance of cooperation. Without calling into question Airbus’ overall success, it leads the two French and German partners to defend their national industrial interests more firmly, particularly when it comes to preserving skills considered strategic.
4. The limits of cooperation when political logic supplants industrial logic. Airbus’ experience shows that European cooperation produces the best results when it remains guided by an industrial logic. Difficulties arise when the search for political balances between States tends to replace the criteria of competence, efficiency and industrial responsibility.
This distinction is of particular importance in the military field. A combat aircraft is not only an industrial product; it involves technological sovereignty, the freedom of use of forces, the control of exports and the ability of a State to maintain its strategic autonomy. As General André Beaufre recalled, modern strategy presupposes the coherent articulation of political, industrial, scientific and military resources.[17] Cooperation can therefore only produce sustainable results if it effectively strengthens this coherence rather than dilutes it.
The history of Airbus thus leads to a distinction between two models. The first is based on the complementarity of skills and the search for industrial efficiency. The second favours the political balance between partners, at the risk of weakening the coherence of industrial responsibilities. This distinction will be one of the keys to understanding the debates that will surround the major Franco-German aeronautical defence programmes in the twenty-first century.
C. The 2001 rupture: globalization, China and the return of strategic states
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 was one of the major geo-economic and geopolitical turning points of the early twenty-first century. In many industrial sectors, it is accelerating the internationalisation of value chains, intensifying global competition and profoundly changing the relationship between states and companies. The aeronautics industry is no exception to this transformation. Long structured around a transatlantic duopoly dominated by Boeing and Airbus, it is gradually seeing the emergence of new state players with unprecedented industrial, technological and strategic ambitions.[18]
This development also marks the return of public authorities to the heart of industrial policies. After several decades during which Western economies had favoured trade liberalisation, the reduction of the economic role of the state and the search for efficiency through the market, the great powers are gradually reinvesting in sectors considered essential to their strategic autonomy. Aeronautics, like space, energy or semiconductors, is once again becoming a field of sovereignty.[19]
In order to understand the transformations affecting Franco-German relations in the aeronautics industry, four developments deserve to be distinguished: the accelerated globalization of value chains; the emergence of China as an aeronautical power; the return of strategic states; the rediscovery of industrial sovereignty as a condition of power.
1. Globalization is transforming the political economy of the aviation industry. At the beginning of the 2000s, globalization seemed likely to lead to an ever greater integration of economies. The international fragmentation of value chains, the increase in trade and the outsourcing of certain productions are becoming central elements of industrial strategies.
The aeronautics industry is fully involved in this dynamic. Civil programs now involve suppliers on multiple continents, while companies seek the efficiencies that come with international specialization. This development helps to reduce costs, increase production volumes and accelerate certain innovations.
However, it has a less immediately visible consequence: the growing dependence on globalized supply chains. As interdependencies increase, so do industrial vulnerabilities. National mastery of certain critical technologies is gradually tending to appear no longer as a relic of the past, but as an element of strategic resilience.[20]
2. China: from the world’s workshop to aeronautical power. China’s entry into the WTO is not only a trade shock. It marks the beginning of a particularly ambitious industrial upmarket strategy. Initially, Beijing is seeking to attract foreign investment, develop its production capacity and acquire technological skills.[21] In a second phase, the objective becomes much broader: to achieve increasing autonomy in sectors deemed essential to national power, or even to conquer international markets.
This strategy quickly resulted in the emergence of major national aeronautical groups benefiting from massive financial, technological and political support from the State. The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) gradually became one of the world’s leading aeronautical conglomerates, while the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) was responsible for developing a civil aviation industry capable of competing with Airbus and Boeing after numerous Western technology transfers in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The ARJ21 and then C919 airliner programs, to which are now added the work on the long-haul C929, illustrate this gradual move upmarket in the civil industry. At the same time, the military industry is experiencing a remarkable acceleration with the development of the fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 fighters, the Shenyang J-35 carrier-based fighter, the Xi’an Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, the YY-20 tanker aircraft, the KJ-500 air surveillance aircraft as well as a new generation of combat drones and unmanned systems. This development reflects a coherent strategy in which progress in civil aeronautics feeds dual industrial skills, while military investments in turn support national technological innovation.[22] The objective pursued thus goes beyond the conquest of international markets: it is a question of building a complete industrial and technological defence base, capable of sustainably supporting the assertion of Chinese power in the air, space and military fields.
Aeronautics therefore occupies a central place in this Chinese strategy. The Chinese state mobilizes considerable funding, supports its state-owned companies, develops its research capacities and promotes the emergence of large national groups capable of competing with Western manufacturers in the long term. This policy is part of a long-term logic in which technological sovereignty is one of the foundations of economic and military power.[23]
As a result, the rise of China is profoundly changing the strategic environment of European players. Competition is no longer just about markets, but also about mastery of technologies, industrial skills, supply chains and innovation capabilities.
3. The return of strategic states. In parallel with China’s assertiveness, the United States is also reinvesting in industrial policies. Technological competition with China, national security concerns and the consequences of various international crises are leading Washington to strengthen its support for sectors considered strategic.[24]
This development is not unique to the two great powers. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India are also developing public policies aimed at preserving or strengthening their industrial capacities in areas deemed essential.[25] The strategic state is gradually becoming one of the central players in global economic competition again.
This transformation calls into question certain assumptions that had dominated previous decades. Industrial power is once again emerging as a major attribute of national sovereignty, while the mastery of critical technologies is becoming a determining element of strategic autonomy, as General André Beaufre pointed out.[26]
4. Industrial sovereignty is once again becoming a condition of power. In this new context, international cooperation is not disappearing. It is often essential given the increasing technological complexity of aeronautical programs. However, its nature is changing profoundly.
Cooperation no longer appears to be an end in itself. It becomes an instrument in the service of sovereignty. The most effective partnerships are now those that build national expertise, strengthen existing industrial capabilities and preserve critical technologies.
This evolution is gradually leading to a distinction between cooperation and dependence. Not all interdependencies necessarily produce power; on the contrary, some can increase strategic vulnerabilities. In an environment marked by the return of rivalries between great powers, the preservation of national prime contractors, design offices and critical industrial skills is once again becoming a major issue.[27]
The aeronautics industry thus illustrates a more general evolution of the international system: the return of strategic states does not mean the end of cooperation, but the search for cooperation compatible with the preservation of industrial sovereignty. It is in this new context that it is now appropriate to analyse Franco-German relations and the debates sparked by the major European aeronautical programmes of the twenty-first century.
II. The limits of the Franco-German model in the face of the return of strategic competition (2001-2026)
China’s entry into the world economy, the acceleration of technological competition and the return of industrial power policies are profoundly changing the conditions in which European defence cooperation is taking place. The balances inherited from previous decades appear to be progressively less adapted to a strategic environment marked by the multiplication of actors, the explosion of development costs and the reaffirmation of national sovereignty.
In this context, Franco-German relations occupy a unique place. For several decades, they have been the main political driver of European industrial construction in the field of defence. However, behind the display of a common ambition, the respective conceptions of sovereignty, industrial governance, the mastery of critical technologies and export policies remain profoundly different. Long attenuated by the dynamics of European cooperation, these divergences are gradually becoming more visible as the programmes become more complex and the industrial and geopolitical stakes become more pronounced.
The experience acquired since the early 2000s thus invites us to distinguish between two realities. On the one hand, certain forms of cooperation have made it possible to strengthen European industrial capacities in the long term when they are based on clearly identified skills, stable governance and converging strategic interests. On the other hand, several recent programmes highlight the difficulties that cooperation entails when industrial responsibilities, export rules, intellectual property or project management themselves become objects of permanent political negotiation.
It is in no way a question of calling into question the very principle of European cooperation, which is often still essential in sectors characterised by considerable investment and increasingly long technological cycles. Rather, the challenge is to determine the conditions under which cooperation effectively strengthens the industrial sovereignty of the partners, instead of weakening or diluting them. It is in this light that the main Franco-German experiences of the first quarter of the twenty-first century must be assessed.
This analysis will be conducted around three complementary questions: the structural divergences between the French and German industrial models (A); the revealer of the major common programmes: FCAS, MGCS and governance tensions (B); the strategic lessons of a quarter of a century of Franco-German cooperation (C).
A. Two industrial models, two conceptions of sovereignty
The difficulties encountered by several Franco-German programmes over the last two decades cannot be reduced to occasional disagreements over the distribution of tasks or the financing of projects. They reflect more deeply the coexistence of two industrial and strategic traditions which, while pursuing a common objective of strengthening European capacities, are based on significantly different conceptions of sovereignty, industrial governance and the role of the State.[28]
France remains the heir to a tradition in which the defence industries are a direct attribute of national sovereignty. Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the State has assumed a strategic orientation function, defined the capability needs of the armed forces, organized the continuity of critical skills and ensured the maintenance of a defence industrial and technological base covering all the functions deemed essential. This approach has long favoured the retention of national prime contractors in the most sensitive areas, including nuclear deterrence, combat aeronautics, missiles, nuclear submarines, military space systems and electronic warfare capabilities.[29]
This conception does not stem from a desire for industrial autarky. It is based on the idea that certain competences cannot be delegated without directly affecting the State’s political and military freedom of decision. International cooperation is thus sought after when it makes it possible to increase industrial capacities, share development costs or gain access to new markets. But they should not lead to the abandonment of project management considered to be decisive for national strategic autonomy.
Germany is on a clearly different trajectory. The constraints inherited from the post-war period, its integration into the Atlantic Alliance and the structure of its economy have led to a model based on industrial competitiveness, manufacturing excellence and European integration. Its defence industry has gradually been organised around companies that are very successful in their fields of excellence, often specialising in systems, equipment, engines, structures or production technologies, without systematically seeking national control of all the design chains of major weapons systems.[30]
This difference in trajectory explains the sometimes diverging approaches to cooperation. For France, project management is first and foremost a technical and strategic responsibility: it guarantees the coherence of the programme, the mastery of the general architecture, the integration of sensitive technologies and the ability to drive future developments without external dependence. For Germany, the governance of the programmes is more likely to be part of a logic of balanced sharing of responsibilities between partners, in order to reflect the industrial and financial participation of each, with industrial spin-offs on its soil.
These conceptions are also reflected in export policies. The French defence industry relies largely on its ability to export in order to amortize development costs, maintain production chains and finance innovation. This reality has fostered the development of a relatively stable doctrine, in which exports are a natural extension of industrial and foreign policy, under state control.
Germany has traditionally adopted a more restrictive approach, influenced more by parliamentary debates, domestic political considerations and the evolution of government coalitions, but also by the relationship with the United States and NATO. The conditions for authorizing exports can thus vary significantly according to the period and the political orientations, introducing a factor of uncertainty likely to affect the programmes carried out in cooperation.[31]
Another divergence concerns intellectual property and industrial know-how. French manufacturers, particularly in the sectors of combat aeronautics, engines, missiles and defence electronics, consider that mastering critical technologies is the main long-term strategic asset. Negotiations on the sharing of technical data, software, source codes or intellectual property rights are therefore of decisive importance, as they condition the future ability of systems to evolve and their export competitiveness.
The experience of the programmes conducted since the beginning of the twenty-first century thus shows that Franco-German divergences are not mainly the result of personal or circumstantial disagreements. They have their origins in different conceptions of industrial sovereignty, the role of the State, corporate governance and the very aims of European cooperation. This reality in no way prohibits partnerships; On the other hand, it leads to questions about the institutional and industrial conditions that make it possible to effectively reconcile strategic autonomy, economic competitiveness and international cooperation.
These differences have not prevented many joint successes. Rather, they call for recognition that sustainable cooperation presupposes prior convergence on strategic objectives, the distribution of industrial responsibilities and governance rules. When these conditions are met, European partnerships can be a powerful lever for innovation. When they are lacking, divergences tend to reappear as the programmes progress, to the point of calling into question their schedule, their cost or their industrial architecture. This is precisely what the main Franco-German programmes of the first quarter of the twenty-first century will reveal.
Table 1 – Comparison of French and German models of governance of the aeronautics and defence industries (2001-2026)[32]
| Criteria | France | Germany |
| Purpose of industrial policy | Preserve complete strategic autonomy in sectors deemed critical. | Consolidate a competitive industry integrated into European and Atlantic value chains. |
| Concept of sovereignty | Sovereignty presupposes national mastery of essential skills (project management, critical technologies, exports). | Sovereignty is more conceived as a collective European and allied capability, based on an efficient industry. |
| Role of the State | Strategic State: definition of needs, programming, financing of R&T, support for the DTIB, arbitration of major programmes. | Regulatory State and industrial partner; important role of Parliament, the Länder and the coalition balances. |
| Industrial organization | A few integrator prime contractors (Dassault Aviation, Safran, Thales, MBDA, Airbus Helicopters, etc.) surrounded by a vast network of mid-caps and specialized SMEs. | Industry strongly structured around large industrial groups, equipment manufacturers and a dense network of exporting SMEs (Mittelstand). |
| Project management | Central element of technological sovereignty; preference for a clearly identified responsibility. | Governance more oriented towards the sharing of responsibilities between industrial partners. |
| Intellectual property | Strong protection of critical technologies, software, source codes and national know-how. | Approach more open to sharing in multinational programmes, subject to German industrial interests. |
| Export Policy | Exports are seen as essential to the economic viability of programs and the maintenance of industrial skills. | Policy more variable according to government majorities; sometimes more restrictive authorisations, likely to affect joint programmes. |
| Vision of cooperation | Cooperation sought when it strengthens national capacities without calling into question sovereign competences. | Cooperation conceived as a privileged instrument of European industrial consolidation. |
| Relationship with NATO | Seeking a balance between national strategic autonomy, European integration and allied commitment. | Strong integration into NATO structures, complementing European industrial policy. |
| Strategic Culture | Primacy of national freedom of decision and continuity of capabilities. | Primacy of consensus, consultation and the search for industrial balances between partners. |
| Main Teaching | Cooperation must preserve national sovereign competences. | Cooperation must ensure a balanced distribution of industrial profits. |
B. The major Franco-German programmes put to the test of facts: between common ambitions and structural divergences
The differences in strategic culture and industrial governance analysed above find their most concrete expression in the major cooperation programmes launched since the beginning of the twenty-first century. These all pursue a legitimate objective: to pool investments that have become considerable, to preserve European industrial skills and to maintain a capacity for innovation in the face of American competition and the rise of China. However, their implementation also reveals persistent divergences in terms of the sharing of project management, intellectual property, exports and the governance of the programmes.[33]
These difficulties are not the result of isolated incidents. They highlight a deeper tension between a logic of political cooperation, aimed at preserving a balance between partners, and an industrial logic, based on the skills actually held by the companies concerned. As programs become more technologically complex, this tension tends to become more visible.
The analysis can be conducted around four particularly significant examples: the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), revealing the divergences in governance; the MGCS, illustrating the difficulties of industrial sharing; other recent cooperations, between limited successes and postponed projects; and the lessons learned by the manufacturers themselves.
1. The FCAS: a programme emblematic of contemporary tensions. Officially launched in 2017, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) has been one of the most ambitious European industrial projects ever envisaged in the field of defence. It is not only a question of developing a new combat aircraft to succeed the Rafale and the Eurofighter, but of designing a real system of systems integrating a new generation aircraft (New Generation Fighter or NGF), accompanying drones (Remote Carriers), a digital combat environment (Combat Cloud), advanced connectivity capabilities as well as new motors and sensors.
From the outset, France considered that the prime contractor for the NGF should naturally fall to Dassault Aviation, the only European company with complete and continuous experience in the design of national combat aircraft from the Mirage families to the Rafale. This position was not based on a political claim, but on a classic principle of industrial governance: responsibility for such a complex programme presupposes a clearly identified authority, capable of ensuring the technical coherence of the whole.[34]
Germany, for its part, has favoured an approach based more on a balanced sharing of responsibilities between industrial partners. Negotiations on the distribution of work packages, the governance of the programme and intellectual property have gradually become one of the main points of friction between manufacturers and States. Several phases of the programme have thus experienced delays linked less to technological difficulties than to the search for agreements on the modalities of cooperation.
Table 2 – The FCAS: chronology of the negotiations and main sticking points
| Date | Event | Main issue |
| July 2017 | Franco-German decision to launch the FCAS | Build the successor to the Rafale and the Eurofighter. |
| 2018 | Definition of the first industrial pillars | Distribution of responsibilities between manufacturers. |
| 2019 | Spain’s entry into the programme | Political and industrial expansion of the project. |
| 2020-2022 | Phase 1B Negotiations | Disagreements over intellectual property, sharing of skills and project management. |
| December 2022 | Agreement on Phase 1B | Unblocking of the first demonstration studies. |
| 2023-2025 | Further development work | Gradual establishment of joint industrial teams. |
| Since 2025 | Preparation of demonstrators | Confirmation or not of the viability of the chosen industrial model. |
These debates highlight a fundamental question: in a very high-tech program, political symmetry between states does not necessarily correspond to the real distribution of industrial skills. When this distinction becomes insufficiently taken into account, there is a risk of transforming the governance of the programme into a permanent negotiation, to the detriment of its effectiveness.
2. The MGCS: cooperation confronted with the same questions. The difficulties encountered by the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) have several analogies with those of the FCAS, although this time the program concerns land capabilities. Intended to prepare for the long-term replacement of the Leclerc tank and the Leopard 2, the project brings together industrialists with histories, technical cultures and sometimes divergent economic interests.
The arrival of new industrial players, debates on the distribution of responsibilities and discussions on critical technologies illustrate the difficulty of reconciling strict political parity with an industrial logic based on available skills. Again, the negotiations focus as much on the governance of the program as on its technological aspects.
The MGCS thus confirms that the difficulties observed are not only in the aeronautical sector. They reflect a more general question about the methods of conducting major European defence programmes when several States wish to simultaneously preserve their sovereign competences.
3. Cooperation with contrasting results. Other recent projects show a more nuanced situation. Certain forms of cooperation, particularly in the fields of missiles, helicopters, electronic equipment and certain space programmes, have made it possible to consolidate European skills while respecting the industrial responsibilities of each.
Conversely, several projects have experienced slowdowns, redefinitions or partial abandonment when political balances have proved more difficult to maintain than the industrial objectives themselves. The experience acquired over the past twenty years shows that the success of cooperation depends less on the number of partners than on the clarity of its governance, the stability of responsibilities and the lasting convergence of strategic interests.
4. The lessons learned by the industrialists. The leaders of the main companies concerned have gradually stressed the need to preserve clearly identified responsibilities in the major defence programmes. Without calling into question the principle of European cooperation, several of them insisted on the fact that industrial efficiency presupposes an organisation that makes it possible to take decisions quickly, to protect critical technologies and to guarantee long-term technical coherence.
The parliamentary hearings of Éric Trappier, Chairman and CEO of Dassault Aviation, are a particular illustration of this approach. On several occasions, he recalls that cooperation can only produce lasting results if it respects the skills acquired by each manufacturer and if the project management remains clearly assigned.
This position is in line with the concerns expressed by several officials of the Directorate General of Armaments, for whom the preservation of critical skills is one of the essential conditions for French strategic autonomy.[35]
The experience of the main Franco-German programmes thus leads to a nuanced conclusion. Cooperation remains essential in many areas, but its effectiveness depends less on the search for strict formal equality between partners than on the ability to organise a distribution of responsibilities in accordance with the competences actually held. This observation opens the way to a renewed reflection on the forms of cooperation likely to meet the requirements of European industrial sovereignty.
Table 3 – Three European models of industrial cooperation
| Model | Dominant logic | Illustrations | Main limitation or asset |
| Political cooperation | Balance between partner states | A400M, NH90, Tiger Mk III | Complex governance, numerous political arbitrations |
| Industrial integration | Distribution of skills according to know-how | Airbus, ArianeGroup | Strong competitiveness when governance is stabilized |
| Sovereign industrial partnership | Clearly identified project management, partners selected for their skills | MBDA, Naval Group, open prospects around Dassault Aviation | Preservation of critical skills and flexibility of cooperation |
C. The lessons of a quarter century of European cooperation: successes, limits and prospects
The analysis of the major Franco-German programmes cannot be limited to the FCAS or the MGCS alone. Other cooperation carried out since the beginning of the twenty-first century offers particularly rich feedback. While some of them have made it possible to provide the European forces with remarkable capabilities, they also highlight recurrent difficulties in terms of governance, industrial organisation and programme management. These experiences do not call into question the very principle of European cooperation; rather, they invite us to better distinguish the factors of success from the causes of failure or slowdown.[36]
Four programmes appear to be particularly revealing: the A400M, the Eurodrone, the Tiger Mk III and the NH90. Each one illustrates, in different ways, the difficulties but also the potential of European industrial cooperation.
1. The A400M: a technological success achieved at the cost of complex governance. The A400M programme is one of the most ambitious industrial achievements ever undertaken in Europe in the field of military air transport. It has provided several air forces with an aircraft with operational capabilities that are unmatched in its class.[37]
However, its development has revealed the difficulties inherent in a programme involving many States, sometimes divergent operational requirements and particularly complex governance. Successive changes in specifications, industrial delays, additional costs and lengthy negotiations on the sharing of responsibilities had a profound impact on the first years of the programme.
The A400M nevertheless demonstrates that European cooperation can lead to industrial success when the initial difficulties are gradually resolved through a clarification of governance and a stabilisation of technical responsibilities.
2. The Eurodrone: the search for a balance between sovereignty and cooperation. The Eurodrone programme responds to a concern widely shared by European states: to reduce their dependence on non-European MALE drones while developing an autonomous industrial capacity.[38]
The technological ambition of the programme is real. However, it is accompanied by a particularly demanding governance due to the number of partners involved, the diversity of operational needs and the need to distribute industrial responsibilities fairly.
The Eurodrone thus illustrates a now classic difficulty: the more governance seeks to simultaneously satisfy the industrial interests of all the partners, the more complex the management of the programme tends to become. The challenge then was to preserve the political balance without weakening industrial efficiency.
3. The Tiger Mk III: the limits of an incomplete strategic convergence. The modernization of the Tiger helicopter highlights another difficulty in defense cooperation: the persistence of doctrinal divergences between partners.[39]
Changes in capability needs, national budgetary decisions and differences of opinion on the future of combat helicopters are gradually leading some partners to reconsider their participation in the programme. This situation is a reminder that industrial cooperation can only prosper in the long term if it is based on a lasting convergence of national military strategies.
The Tiger Mk III thus underlines that the difficulties of a programme are not always the result of industrial considerations; they can also reflect the evolution of the strategic priorities of the participating States.
4. The NH90: industrial excellence confronted with organizational complexity. The NH90 programme is undoubtedly one of the best examples of the paradoxes of European cooperation. The aircraft has widely recognized technical qualities and is now used by many armed forces.[40]
However, its development and in-service support have been affected by a particularly complex industrial organization, involving several national prime contractors, a multiplicity of standards and operational requirements that sometimes differ depending on the user.
The NH90 illustrates the impact that insufficiently simplified governance can have on readiness, support costs and modernization times. He points out that technological success does not necessarily guarantee comparable organizational effectiveness.
5. First lessons. Taken in isolation, each of these programmes has its own characteristics. Taken together, they reveal several constants. The most effective cooperation is generally those based on a clear definition of industrial responsibilities, undisputed project management, specifications stabilized from the outset and governance that is simple enough to allow rapid decisions.
Conversely, difficulties arise when the search for a political balance leads to more levels of decision-making, to the fragmentation of technical responsibilities or to the maintenance of negotiations on intellectual property, exports or industrial burden-sharing on a long-term basis. These observations are in line with the analyses developed previously with regard to the FCAS and the MGCS: cooperation remains essential, but it can only produce its full effects if it is based on a logic of industrial efficiency rather than on strict institutional symmetry.[41]
6. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). In addition to these now well-known experiments, there is a programme whose scope goes far beyond the continental European framework: the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), launched jointly by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. Unlike the cooperation of previous decades, the GCAP was based from the outset on an explicit definition of industrial responsibilities, a tighter governance and a distribution of competences based on the respective know-how of the partners. Although the programme is still at an early stage, its institutional architecture already shows a significant evolution in the modes of cooperation in the defence aeronautics industries.[42]
Without prejudging its future success, the GCAP illustrates a more general trend: international cooperation now tends to favour the complementarity of competences rather than strict political symmetry between partners. This development is in line with the lessons learned from the European programmes of the first quarter of the twenty-first century and confirms that the stability of governance, the recognition of prime contractors and the protection of critical technologies are now essential factors for success.
The experience acquired over the past quarter of a century thus leads to a more general conclusion. European cooperation is not an end in itself; it represents an instrument at the service of the industrial sovereignty of the States that participate in it. Its success therefore presupposes a balanced articulation between political ambition, economic rationality and industrial responsibility. It is precisely this evolution that is now leading to the emergence of a new model, no longer based on systematic cooperation, but on sovereign industrial partnerships, associating States and companies around clearly identified skills, stable governance and converging strategic objectives. This approach will be the subject of the third part of this study.
In addition to these now well-known experiments, there is a programme whose scope goes far beyond the continental European framework: the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), launched jointly by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. Unlike the cooperation of previous decades, the GCAP was based from the outset on an explicit definition of industrial responsibilities, a tighter governance and a distribution of competences based on the respective know-how of the partners. Although the programme is still at an early stage, its institutional architecture already shows a significant evolution in the modes of cooperation in the defence aeronautics industries.[43]
An international comparison of the main aeronautics and defence groups (2024-2025) has been placed in Annex 3, drawing on the analysis methods applied in competition law. This comparison highlights several lessons. American groups remain largely dominant thanks to the size of the American domestic market and the world’s largest military budget. Chinese companies enjoy massive public support and increasing integration between the civilian and military sectors. European groups maintain a very high level of technology but remain more fragmented, which explains the search for new forms of industrial cooperation. Finally, French companies occupy a unique position: none of them competes individually with the major American or Chinese groups in terms of size, but their complementarity (Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Safran, Thales, MBDA) constitutes a particularly efficient industrial ecosystem covering the entire aeronautics and defense value chain.
Without prejudging its future success, the GCAP illustrates a more general trend: international cooperation now tends to favour the complementarity of competences rather than strict political symmetry between partners. This development is in line with the lessons learned from the European programmes of the first quarter of the twenty-first century and confirms that the stability of governance, the recognition of prime contractors and the protection of critical technologies are now essential factors for success.
Previous developments also show that European industrial cooperation has produced mixed results. Some achievements, such as Airbus or MBDA, are now international references and demonstrate that cooperation organized around clearly identified responsibilities can lead to the emergence of true industrial champions. Other programmes, however, have revealed the difficulties associated with the multiplication of partners, the dispersion of industrial responsibilities or the divergence of national priorities. Annex 2 presents a comparative summary of the main European aeronautical programmes, their state of progress, the difficulties encountered and their industrial results. It shows that the success of cooperation depends less on the number of partners than on the clarity of governance, the stability of industrial responsibilities and the maintenance of real project management. This observation leads to a preference for future programmes in the logic of sovereign industrial partnerships based on clearly identified skills rather than on institutional compromises.
III. Towards a new French aeronautics policy? From political cooperation to sovereign industrial partnerships
The lessons learned over the past twenty-five years invite us to overcome a now sterile opposition between European cooperation and national sovereignty. Experience shows that these two requirements are by no means incompatible. On the other hand, they presuppose a clarification of the objectives pursued and the instruments mobilized. At a time when global industrial competition is intensifying under the effect of American, Chinese and now Indo-Pacific strategies, the question is no longer whether to cooperate, but how.
This development marks a significant break with the conceptions that largely dominated the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, Franco-German cooperation was often considered, in France, as a political goal in itself, sometimes independently of the analysis of industrial or technological realities. The difficulties encountered by several major programmes today show the limits of an approach in which the search for an institutional balance sometimes tends to prevail over industrial coherence.
Conversely, successes in several strategic sectors point to a different pattern. The most successful French companies have never refused international cooperation; On the contrary, they have widely practised it, but on a basis based on skills, technological complementarity, the clearly identified responsibility of prime contractors and the protection of critical know-how. The experience of Dassault Aviation, Safran, Thales, MBDAand Naval Group illustrates this ability to combine international openness and the preservation of sovereign interests.[44]
This development is also in line with the most recent orientations of European thinking on competitiveness. The report presented by Mario Draghi in 2024 stresses that the multiplication of regulatory constraints cannot be a substitute for a real industrial strategy based on investment, innovation, the simplification of procedures and the emergence of champions capable of facing global competition. The aeronautics industry is probably one of the areas where this requirement is most acute.[45]
It therefore becomes possible to outline a new analytical framework that could be described as sovereign industrial partnerships. This notion does not mean a return to industrial autarky or the abandonment of European cooperation. On the contrary, it reflects a renewed conception of cooperation, in which each partner contributes the skills that it effectively masters, retains responsibility for the critical technologies at its disposal and participates in a common project according to governance rules clearly defined from the outset. Cooperation then ceased to be an autonomous political objective and became once again an instrument of competitiveness and sovereignty.
Such a development also requires renewed attention to the entire French aeronautics ecosystem. In addition to large groups, it is based on several hundred intermediate-sized companies, innovative SMEs, research laboratories and engineering centres, which are one of the main factors in the resilience of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base. The innovations currently being developed in the fields of composite materials, drones, artificial intelligence, engines and specialised aircraft bear witness to this industrial vitality, which must now be better exploited.
The following reflection is organized around three complementary orientations. The first examines the conditions for a renewed governance of European industrial cooperation, based on competences rather than on political balances. The second focuses on the role that French companies can play in the recomposition of global aeronautical value chains, thanks to more diversified and flexible alliances. Finally, the third shows that the future of French aeronautical power also depends on its ability to support the innovation of intermediary companies, to encourage the emergence of new programs and to rebuild a real national ecosystem of technological excellence.
A. Rethinking European cooperation: from political logic to sovereign industrial partnerships
The experience acquired since the beginning of the twenty-first century leads us to re-examine the very foundations of European industrial cooperation in the field of aeronautics. The difficulties encountered by several major programmes do not reflect a failure of cooperation as such; rather, they reveal the limits of a model in which political considerations have sometimes taken precedence over the requirements of industrial coherence, technical responsibility and economic efficiency.[46]
In a context marked by unprecedented global technological competition, States can no longer dissociate the objectives of sovereignty from industrial realities. On the contrary, the policies pursued by the United States, China, Japan and South Korea show that industrial power is now based on a close link between public strategy, technological excellence and international competitiveness. Europe cannot free itself from this development in the long term.
The respective trajectories of several European aeronautical companies appear particularly enlightening. While Dassault Aviation has retained complete control of the design of the Rafale fighter jet, from its general architecture to its combat system, Saab has pursued a similar approach with the Gripen in Sweden. Conversely, Airbus Defence and Space, whose skills are widely recognised in military air transport with the A400M or the A330 MRTT tanker aircraft, is more in line with a logic of multinational integration. These various examples show that there is no single aeronautical industrial model in Europe, but several possible configurations, provided that the governance of each programme remains consistent with the skills actually held by the manufacturers concerned.[47]
It therefore seems necessary to distinguish between two conceptions of cooperation:
– The first, which largely dominated the 1990s and 2000s, tends to consider cooperation as an autonomous political objective, intended to promote European integration or to preserve an institutional balance between partners. This approach often leads to a symmetrical distribution of industrial responsibilities, regardless of the skills actually held by each of the actors.
– The second conception proceeds from a different logic. It considers cooperation as an instrument to strengthen the innovation capacity, competitiveness and sovereignty of partners. From this perspective, the distribution of responsibilities is no longer the result of a search for an abstract balance, but of the objective identification of the industrial skills, technological capabilities and experience acquired by each of the participants.[48]
This development leads to the proposal of the notion of sovereign industrial partnership. This can be defined as cooperation between several states and companies based on four complementary principles.
The first is the explicit recognition of existing industrial skills. Project management does not constitute a political counterpart; It corresponds to the responsibility entrusted to the company with the most complete technical experience in the field in question. This rule, widely applied in several major global aeronautical programs, guarantees the architectural coherence of the project while facilitating decision-making.
The recent history of the Rafale illustrates this logic. The program was based on a clearly identified prime contractor entrusted to Dassault Aviation, in association with Safran Aircraft Engines for the M88 engine, Thales for the radars and electronic systems and MBDA for the armaments. This organization has never prevented international cooperation or exports; On the contrary, it has allowed for continuity in technical choices and a great capacity to adapt to operational developments. The recent commercial success of the Rafale — in Egypt, Qatar, India, Greece, Croatia, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Serbia — demonstrates that national prime contractor can be perfectly well accompanied by strong international integration.[49]
This situation contrasts with certain multinational programmes in which the proliferation of industrial and governmental decision-making centres has sometimes complicated technical trade-offs. The difficulties encountered by the NH90 or the Tiger are not the result of a lack of technological skills, but illustrate the possible effects of governance that is too fragmented when industrial responsibilities are not clearly established from the outset.[50]
The second principle lies in the protection of critical technologies. Industrial cooperation in no way implies the abandonment of sovereign know-how. On the contrary, they assume that each partner retains control of the technologies on which its competitiveness and freedom of action are based.
In the contemporary aviation industry, these technologies are no longer limited to the airframe of the aircraft. Engines, mission software, digital architectures, active antenna radars, on-board electronic systems, composite materials and simulation capabilities are now the main strategic differentiators. The successes of Safran in aeronautical engines, Thales in electronic systems and radars, Dassault Systèmes in digital design tools and MBDA in weapons systems show that industrial sovereignty depends as much on the mastery of intangible technologies as on the physical production of equipment.[51]
The third principle concerns the stability of governance. The experience accumulated since the beginning of the century shows that the difficulties of the major European programmes stem less from a lack of technical skills than from an overly complex organisation of decision-making. The proliferation of institutional actors, the overlapping levels of responsibility and the permanent search for a political balance between partners can lead to a slowdown in arbitration, to an increase in costs and to a weakening of the industrial coherence of the programme.
The challenge is therefore not to abolish cooperation, but to better organise it. Technical responsibilities, intellectual property rules, export conditions and arbitration mechanisms must be defined at the start of the programme. Effective cooperation requires a clear architecture: an identified prime contractor, stabilized industrial responsibilities and decision-making procedures that are fast enough to respond to a constantly changing technological environment.
Recent examples illustrate this need. The A400M programme has demonstrated that European cooperation can lead to a major technological success, but also that the complexity of the initial governance can cause significant delays and tensions between partner states. Conversely, the civil programmes developed by Airbus, when they are based on a stabilised industrial distribution and an integrated organisation of project management, show that multinational cooperation can become a real competitive advantage.[52]
The fourth principle is to place each cooperation in the context of global competitiveness. Future aeronautical programmes can only be economically viable if they reach a critical mass sufficient to amortize the considerable development costs of modern systems. Exports should therefore no longer be considered as a secondary objective or as a mere commercial consequence; they are a condition for maintaining industrial skills.
The case of the Rafale is particularly significant in this respect. The preservation in France of an autonomous combat aircraft capability would probably not have been sustainable without the possibility of exporting the aircraft to international markets. The contracts concluded since 2015 have helped to maintain the industrial chain, engineering skills and production capacities necessary to maintain French aeronautical sovereignty. This reality confirms that a strategic industry cannot survive solely thanks to national orders: it must be able to conquer global markets.[53]
This requirement also applies to the major European players in the sector. Airbus Helicopters, with the H225M Caracal, Tiger and H145M families, Safran in civil and military engines, MBDA in complex missiles and Thales in electronic systems, demonstrate that a sovereign industry is necessarily an open industry. Sovereignty does not mean autarky; it refers to the ability to master essential technologies while participating in international industrial exchanges.
Such an approach does not therefore in any way lead to a reduction in the role of the State. On the contrary, it fully regains its function as astrategic state, or more precisely as an architect and guarantor state. It is up to it to define capability priorities, ensure the continuity of the research effort, preserve critical technologies, support long-term investments and create an environment conducive to innovation.
On the other hand, it is not the role of the State to artificially determine the optimal industrial organisation of each programme when this falls primarily within the competence of the companies concerned. The French experience since the second half of the twentieth century shows that the most lasting successes result from a balanced articulation between public orientation and freedom of industrial initiative.
The model developed around Dassault Aviation, Safran, Thales, MBDA and the many SMEs and mid-caps specialising in the defence industrial and technological base (DTIB) is based precisely on this combination. The State sets the main orientations, finances part of the upstream research, guarantees the continuity of the programmes and ensures strategic coherence; Companies design, innovate, export and adapt their technologies to changes in the global market.
This distinction is particularly important in a context where global competition now opposes complete industrial ecosystems. The United States benefits from the power of groups such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defense and General Dynamics, supported by a constant public policy. China, with AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China), COMAC, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group or Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, is gradually building a global aeronautical capability combining civil aviation, military aviation and dual technologies.[54] In the face of these integrated industrial groups, Europe can only maintain its competences by adopting a more efficient organisation.
Recent developments in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) illustrate this new approach. Bringing together the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, this program brings together BAE Systems, Leonardo and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries around an industrial architecture based on the complementarity of skills. The powertrain involves Rolls-Royce, Avio Aero and IHI Corporation, while the electronic systems, sensors and digital architectures involve several specialized players. Without prejudging the final result of the programme, this organisation bears witness to an important evolution: cooperation now tends to be built around the industrial skills that are actually available rather than around a strict political symmetry between partners.[55]
This development is particularly interesting for France. It shows that there is an intermediate path between two models long considered to be opposed: on the one hand, national autonomy that could lead to isolation; on the other, systematic institutional cooperation likely to weaken industrial responsibilities. The path of sovereign industrial partnerships makes it possible to reconcile international openness and the preservation of critical skills.[56]
This logic goes beyond the military aeronautics sector alone. It is found in several strategic areas where France has been able to build alliances based on the complementarity of skills: space with ArianeGroup, armaments with MBDA, civil aeronautics with CFM International, a joint venture between Safran Aircraft Engines and GE Aerospace, and large naval systems with Naval Group. In each of these cases, success depends less on maximum institutional integration than on a clear definition of industrial responsibilities and mutual trust between partners.
The challenge in the coming decades will therefore be less to systematically seek new major multinational programmes than to build industrial coalitions capable of bringing together the best available know-how for each project. Industrial sovereignty in the twenty-first century does not lie in the isolated possession of all capabilities, but in the ability to retain control of decisive technologies, to choose partners and to preserve strategic freedom of action.
Understood in this way, European cooperation is no longer a political end in itself. It became an instrument in the service of a higher ambition: to maintain in Europe an autonomous capacity for innovation, production and export in the sectors where an essential part of economic and military power was now at stake.
Box 2 – Sovereign industrial partnership: towards a new model of strategic cooperation[57]
The period of industrial cooperation based primarily on political balances is reaching its limits. The twenty-first century requires sovereign industrial partnerships, based on complementary skills, mastery of critical technologies and freedom of strategic action.
The notion of a sovereign industrial partnership aims to respond to an apparent contradiction that now structures defence and high-tech industrial policies. On the one hand, no single European power has all the skills, funding and production volumes necessary to develop the complex systems of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, over-dependence on external partners or a dilution of industrial responsibilities can lead to a gradual loss of technological and strategic control.
The sovereign industrial partnership thus offers an intermediate path between two models that are equally insufficient. The first would be that of complete autonomy, inherited from a classical conception of industrial sovereignty but which has become difficult to reconcile with the complexity and increasing cost of contemporary technologies. The second would be that of systematic political cooperation, in which the search for a balance between partner states would take precedence over industrial realities, available skills and operational efficiency. This new model is based on four principles.
First principle: sovereignty through the mastery of critical skills. A state retains its freedom of action not because it necessarily produces all its equipment on its own, but because it masters the technologies that condition its strategic autonomy: system design, digital architectures, critical software, engines, sensors, advanced materials or integration capacities. Cooperation then becomes a strategic choice and not a necessity endured.
The second principle is cooperation based on competences rather than political symmetry. Major industrial programmes cannot be sustainably effective if the division of responsibilities is mainly based on diplomatic considerations. Governance must derive from the skills actually held by the industrialists concerned. The project manager is the responsibility of the person who has the necessary experience, integration skills and technical responsibility.
Third principle: a chosen and organized interdependence. Contemporary sovereignty is no longer synonymous with absolute independence. It is based on the ability to choose its dependencies, secure its value chains and establish balanced partnerships. The CFM International engine developed by Safran Aircraft Engines and GE Aerospace, the MBDA consortium bringing together French, British, Italian and German manufacturers, and ArianeGroup illustrate this logic: cooperation strengthens sovereign capabilities because each partner retains an identifiable strategic competence.
Fourth principle: a global industrial and commercial purpose. A strategic industry cannot survive sustainably without international competitiveness. Exports are not just an economic benefit; They make it possible to amortize investments, maintain skills and finance future technological generations. The success of the Rafale, Airbus Helicopters’ exports, Safran’s international performance and Thales’s global position demonstrate that a sovereign industry is necessarily an industry capable of conquering markets.
This conception also leads to a redefinition of the role of the State. The strategic state of the twenty-first century is no longer primarily a producer or a direct manager of industrial companies. It is an architect, guarantor and catalyst State: it sets directions, supports long-term research, protects sensitive technologies, facilitates investments and ensures the coherence of industrial ecosystems.
From this perspective, the sovereign industrial partnership does not constitute a withdrawal of public power, but its adaptation to contemporary economic and technological realities. It reflects the transition from a logic of direct intervention to a logic of structuring national and European capacities.
The objective is therefore not to choose between sovereignty and cooperation. The real strategic question now is to organise cooperation that strengthens sovereignty rather than reducing it.
B. Diversifying Strategic Alliances: Towards Industrial Coalitions with Variable Geometry
The redefinition of European aeronautical cooperation does not mean that France withdraws from the European framework. On the contrary, it implies rethinking the very modalities of this cooperation. The main lesson of the last twenty-five years is that industrial efficiency does not necessarily result from the association of as many partners as possible. In high-tech sectors, the proliferation of players can sometimes weaken overall coherence when it responds more to institutional objectives than to industrial logic.
The model that now seems to be imposing itself is that of industrial coalitions with variable geometry, bringing together, for each programme, the partners with the most relevant skills. This approach does not call into question European ambitions; on the contrary, it seeks to make it more credible by substituting a logic of complementarity for a logic of political representation.
The aviation industry offers several examples of this evolution.
1. From systematic bilateral partnership to skills-based cooperation. For several decades, Franco-German cooperation has been the main reference framework for major European programmes. This orientation was based on a strong political conviction: the association of the two main industrial powers of the continent should constitute the natural engine of European integration in strategic sectors.
This approach has produced major successes, particularly in civil aeronautics with the creation of Airbus, which has become one of the two major global players in commercial aviation alongside Boeing. However, the programme illustrates an important reality: its success is based not only on Franco-German political cooperation, but on a progressive industrial organisation, based on the specialisation of sites, the rise of integrated project management and a global commercial capacity.[58]
Conversely, some military programmes have shown the limits of cooperation when industrial distribution responds more to a search for balance between states than to a logic of technical efficiency. The experience of the A400M, the NH90 or the Tiger demonstrates that multinational cooperation requires appropriate governance, clearly identified responsibilities and an industrial distribution compatible with the real skills of the partners.[59]
The question is therefore no longer whether cooperation should be European, but how it should be organised. An effective industrial coalition can involve several European states, but it must build on existing capabilities rather than seek to artificially create symmetry between partners.
2. Targeted industrial alliances: the example of Franco-British, Franco-Italian and European cooperation. France already has a long experience of cooperation based on this logic.
The field of missiles is probably the most successful example with MBDA. Created gradually from the mergers between British, French, Italian, German and Spanish manufacturers, the group has become one of the few global players capable of designing a complete range of complex systems, from air-to-air missiles to cruise missiles. This success is due less to general political integration than to a precise industrial organization around complementary skills.[60]
The same reasoning can be applied to space with ArianeGroup, the result of Franco-German but also European cooperation, or in civil aeronautics with CFM International, an industrial partnership between Safran Aircraft Engines and GE Aerospace. In both cases, cooperation works because it is based on a clear sharing of responsibilities, stable governance and a common industrial objective.
These examples show that the central issue is not the nationality of the partners, but the nature of the industrial link established. Successful cooperation requires that each actor brings an indispensable skill and retains an identifiable responsibility.
3. The GCAP model: a possible evolution of aeronautical defence cooperation. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), involving the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, is an interesting development in this respect. Without prejudging its final result, the programme seems to seek a different organisation from some previous European programmes.
The stated logic is based more on industrial complementarity than on a strict political distribution. BAE Systems, Leonardo and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are major manufacturers, while Rolls-Royce, Avio Aero, IHI Corporation and other players contribute to the specialized fields: powertrains, electronic systems, sensors, digital architectures or collaborative combat technologies.[61]
This model is of particular interest for European thinking. It shows that a strategic program can involve several nations without necessarily seeking to reproduce a complex institutional organization. The essential question becomes that of the ability to integrate the best available skills around a common goal.
This approach could also have inspired the evolution of the future European combat air system. The success of a programme such as the now abandoned FCAS could have depended less on the number of partners involved than on the ability to clearly define industrial responsibilities, project management, intellectual property rules and export prospects.[62] Not having realistically taken into account the considerable lead of the Rafale designer , particularly successful compared to his European competitors, to appoint a prime contractor, led to the logical outcome of the abandonment.
4. International diversification: a condition for industrial resilience. The transformation of the global strategic environment also requires us to go beyond an exclusively European vision of industrial cooperation. Contemporary aviation technologies require considerable investment, long innovation cycles and globalized value chains. In several areas, France and Europe must now be able to bring together external partners when they have complementary skills or represent essential markets.
This international openness does not constitute a contradiction with industrial sovereignty. On the contrary, it is one of the conditions for cooperation when cooperation is chosen, balanced and organised around clearly identified competences.
Safran‘s experience provides a particularly significant example. The creation of CFM International with the American General Electric made it possible to develop the CFM56 family of engines, then LEAP, which has become one of the world references in commercial aviation. This cooperation, which brings together a French manufacturer with a major American player, has not resulted in the disappearance of French skills; on the contrary, it has helped to strengthen Safran’s global position in aircraft propulsion.[63]
The same logic can be observed in relations between France and certain Asian or emerging partners. The aeronautics industrial partnership must no longer be thought of solely as a relationship between European powers, but as an ability to set up innovation and production networks adapted to the new global balances.
Japan offers an interesting example in this regard. After having long developed its aeronautical industry in a close relationship with the United States, particularly in the military field, Tokyo is now seeking to strengthen its national capabilities in critical sectors. Japan’s choice to participate in the GCAP with the United Kingdom and Italy illustrates this desire to build cooperation based on technological mastery and the capacity for autonomous action, freeing itself from American dependence.
India is also a major potential partner. Its desire to develop a national aeronautical industrial base, illustrated by the HAL Tejas programs, the ambitions around the future AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) combat aircraft or the development of capabilities in drones and autonomous systems, opens up new perspectives for targeted cooperation. France already has a long-standing aeronautical and defence relationship with New Delhi, particularly around the Rafale. But the future could lie in cooperation more oriented towards emerging technologies, advanced maintenance, autonomous systems or industrial training.[64]
However, this logic requires particular vigilance. International cooperation becomes a sovereign partnership only if it effectively strengthens national capacities and does not lead to the gradual transfer of critical skills without any guarantee of a sustainable industrial return.
5. Towards a French doctrine of controlled industrial coalitions? France therefore has a specific advantage: it still retains a relatively complete set of aeronautical, civil and military skills, ranging from aircraft design to propulsion, from electronic systems to advanced materials. The challenge in the coming years will be less to preserve full autonomy, which has become difficult to sustain, than to intelligently organize these skills in a network of controlled partnerships.
This approach presupposes a break with the old vision according to which European industrial power automatically results from the multiplication of institutional cooperation. On the contrary, experience shows that certain forms of cooperation can weaken the actors when they lead to the dispersion of responsibilities, the slowing down of decisions or the dilution of critical skills.
The new doctrine could be based on a simple rule: cooperate when cooperation increases the capacity for action; preserve autonomy when cooperation risks creating strategic dependence.
This distinction makes it possible to reconcile two requirements that are often presented as contradictory: international openness, which is essential for competitiveness; national mastery of capacities is a condition for freedom of decision-making. It is directly in line with the logic of sovereign industrial partnerships developed above. They are not looking for isolation or maximum integration, but for the creation of ecosystems capable of associating several levels: large groups with global project management; specialized intermediary companies; innovative SMEs; research centres; foreign partners selected for their own skills.
In this perspective, French aeronautics industrial policy could gradually move from a logic of « major programmes to be shared » to a logic of strategic capabilities to be organised.
This evolution is all the more necessary as international competitors are already reasoning according to this logic. The United States relies on vast industrial ecosystems involving large groups, universities, laboratories and technological SMEs. China is gradually building a similar architecture around players such as AVIC, COMAC, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group or Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, combining civil aviation, military aviation and dual technologies. Faced with these integrated models, Europe must avoid dispersing its competences in insufficiently structured cooperation.[65]
As a result, the diversification of industrial alliances does not therefore constitute a challenge to European ambition. On the contrary, it reflects a necessary adaptation to the realities of the twenty-first century. The European Union and its Member States will only be able to maintain a competitive aviation industry by abandoning the idea that each major programme must necessarily reproduce a political balance between States.
The most effective cooperation will now be those that bring together the best competitive partners around clearly defined objectives, stable governance and industrial distribution based on real skills. Another imperative to be taken into account is that it will probably be necessary to review the untimely application of European competition law to the defence industries of EU Member States on the principles in force in the United States, which are much more favourable to national defence manufacturers.[66] We must return to the original vision that allowed the defence industries to escape the control of the Commission with regard to competition law and policy, for strategic reasons and respect for sovereignty.
The central question is no longer how many nations participate in a program? It becomes: what strategic capabilities does this program allow to preserve, develop and project? It is in this evolution that the real logic of sovereign industrial partnerships lies: to make cooperation no longer an institutional compromise, but a power multiplier.
The foregoing developments show that aeronautical competitiveness does not depend solely on the organization of companies or the quality of industrial cooperation. It also requires a sustainable investment effort, capable of supporting the long research, development and production cycles that characterize the aeronautics and defense industries. Thus, the table in Annex 4 compares the main national defence budgets in homogenised value and highlights the considerable differences in resources between the major powers. It shows that the performance of American groups is based on a domestic market fuelled by the world’s largest military budget, while Chinese manufacturers benefit from large-scale public support. In this context, French and European companies can only preserve their technological autonomy by compensating for their smaller size by making more efficient use of available resources, better industrial coordination and sovereign industrial partnerships that make it possible to concentrate investments on critical technologies. Strategic efficiency thus appears to be at least as decisive as the absolute volume of expenditure. For this reason too, European competition rules should take into account the global comparative disadvantage and at least be streamlined on the same model as US antitrust law to allow European defence manufacturers to be on a level playing field on both sides of the Atlantic, not to mention the situation of Chinese industry, which has been completely exempt from competition rules since the entry into force of China’s antitrust law. competition in 2008.[67]
C. Reconstituting an innovative aeronautics ecosystem: mid-caps, strategic SMEs and new technological frontiers
French aeronautical power is not only based on a few large world-famous groups. It depends on a much broader set of industrial, scientific and technological players whose interaction constitutes a real ecosystem of sovereignty. The gradual disappearance or weakening of certain intermediate skills would have strategic consequences as important as the loss of a large industrialist, because critical know-how often relies on intermediate-sized companies, specialized design offices and technological SMEs that are difficult to replace.
This reality is particularly visible in the aerospace industry, where the added value lies not only in the final assembly of an aircraft, but in the mastery of a multitude of complex technologies: advanced materials, precision machining, embedded electronics, critical software, navigation systems, artificial intelligence, numerical simulation or additive manufacturing.
The French model retains considerable advantages in this respect. Around major operators such as Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Safran, Thales and MBDA, a dense network of specialized companies has developed, often not very visible to the general public but essential to national competitiveness. The French Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DTIB) thus brings together several thousand companies, the majority of which are SMEs and mid-caps that contribute directly or indirectly to sovereign capabilities.[68]
This industrial depth largely explains the resilience of the French aeronautics industry. The success of the Rafale, for example, is not based solely on Dassault Aviation, but on a set of skills divided between engines (Safran Aircraft Engines), electronics and radars (Thales), missiles (MBDA), on-board equipment and a particularly dense network of specialized subcontractors. The project management of a major programme therefore presupposes the prior existence of an industrial fabric capable of absorbing, improving and transmitting critical technologies.
This observation is in line with a more general historical lesson: the great industrial powers never rely solely on a few national champions. They are based on complete ecosystems, capable of ensuring the circulation of skills, the training of engineers, incremental innovation and the emergence of technological breakthroughs.
1. Aeronautical sovereignty depends first and foremost on the density of the industrial ecosystem. One of the major risks facing the European aeronautics industries is an excessive concentration of attention paid only to major programmes. An aircraft such as the Rafale, the A400M or the FCAS/FCAS is the visible or potential culmination of a much longer industrial chain. However, this chain is based on intermediary actors whose disappearance can weaken national capacities in the long term.
This question is all the more important as international competition intensifies. The United States has a particularly deep industrial ecosystem around groups such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defense and RTX, but also a vast network of technology SMEs supported by public orders and research programs from the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense). China is following a similar logic by gradually structuring a group of large public groups, universities, research institutes and specialized companies around its civil and military aeronautical ambitions.[69]
France can therefore only preserve its aeronautical sovereignty by protecting this industrial depth. This implies considering SMEs and mid-caps not as simple suppliers subject to competitive pressure from major contractors, but as real holders of strategic skills. The notion of sovereign industrial partnership takes on a new dimension here. It does not only concern relations between States or between major groups; It also presupposes the ability to structure a national and European ecosystem in which each actor retains an essential function in the creation of value and in the preservation of critical skills.
2. Strategic mid-caps and SMEs: the essential depth of large operators. Medium-sized companies are often the real reservoirs of industrial innovation. Their size allows them to combine a high degree of specialisation, a strong proximity to the needs of major project managers and a particularly rapid ability to adapt.
In the French aeronautics industry, many companies illustrate this reality: specialists in composite materials, manufacturers of embedded equipment, players in numerical simulation, additive manufacturing companies or designers of advanced electronic solutions.
The case of Multiplast appears to be particularly revealing. Initially specialising in very high-performance composite materials for nautical competition, this company has gradually developed skills that are now in demand in aeronautics, space and defence. Its know-how in lightweight structures, advanced materials and composite processes illustrates a fundamental reality: strategic innovations do not always arise within traditional industrial sectors; They frequently appear at the intersection of several technological universes. The FF72-X1 water bomber project or the Frégate project is precisely in line with this logic.[70] Beyond its own characteristics, it demonstrates the ability to bring out new solutions from a meeting between skills from different sectors. This ability to build bridges between civilian industries and strategic applications is one of the essential elements of a modern sovereign ecosystem.[71]
This dynamic is in line with contemporary analyses devoted to innovation ecosystems. Technological breakthroughs rarely appear only within large established groups; They frequently emerge in specialized companies capable of exploring new solutions, before being integrated into larger industrial programs.[72]
3. Dual technologies: the new engine of aeronautical power. The current transformation of the aeronautics industry is no longer limited to competition between manufacturers or between new-generation platforms. It is the result of a much more profound change: competitive advantages are gradually shifting towards transversal technologies that simultaneously irrigate civil and military applications. Artificial intelligence, digital architectures, advanced materials, intelligent sensors, autonomous systems, new propulsion technologies and high-performance computing are now all areas in which tomorrow’s aeronautical superiority is at stake.[73]
This evolution profoundly modifies the very notion of industrial sovereignty. For several decades, this was mainly based on the ability to design and produce complete platforms: combat aircraft, helicopters, transport aircraft, satellites or missile systems. These skills are of course still essential, but they are no longer enough on their own. Contemporary competition now depends on mastering the technologies that make it possible to continuously improve these systems, to connect them to each other, to shorten their evolution cycles and to adapt them quickly to constantly changing operational environments.
The example of drones illustrates this transformation particularly well. Long considered as a simple complement to traditional aeronautical systems, they have become a major field of industrial and military innovation. Recent conflicts have confirmed the growing importance of unmanned aerial systems, their integration into intelligence, command and operational management architectures, as well as the ability to quickly produce high-performance systems at controlled costs. Technological superiority is now less about the performance of an isolated device than from the integration of a combination of electronics, artificial intelligence, critical software, sensors, secure communications and flexible industrial processes.[74]
This evolution concerns combat aviation just as much. Future systems will probably no longer be defined solely by the intrinsic performance of an aircraft, but by their ability to operate within a global architecture combining manned platforms, remote carriers, satellites, secure communication systems, distributed sensors and decision support tools based on artificial intelligence. The concept of the combat air system of the future thus corresponds less to an additional aircraft than to a new architecture of air, information and decision-making superiority.
The transformation in question explains the importance now given to dual technologies. An innovation developed in the civilian sector can quickly become a decisive military advantage; Conversely, a technology initially designed for defence needs can find major industrial or commercial applications. The trajectories of Safran, Thales and Airbus are a perfect illustration of this permanent circulation between several technological universes. Their competitiveness is based precisely on their ability to organize this cross-fertilization between civil research, industrial innovation and strategic needs.
The question is therefore no longer just to support a defence industry in the traditional sense. It now consists of preserving a national capacity for innovation in all areas likely to produce strategic effects. It is in this perspective that the boundary between industrial policy, research policy, innovation policy and defence policy is gradually becoming less watertight. Investments in dual technologies, digital infrastructure, advanced materials or artificial intelligence are now directly part of national sovereignty.[75]
4. Towards a new generation of players: disruptive innovation and sovereign industrial partnerships This technological transformation also opens up a new space for industrial organizations that no longer necessarily correspond to the classic model of the major aircraft manufacturers of the twentieth century. The industrial power of tomorrow will depend less on the mere existence of a few large integrated groups than on their ability to organize ecosystems capable of quickly absorbing technological breakthroughs, bringing out new players and transforming innovation into a strategic advantage in the long term.
Industrial history shows that the great technological powers never rely solely on their historical companies. They also depend on their ability to renew their skills, attract new players and build bridges between different industrial sectors. The United States has thus built part of its recent dominance in digital, space and military technologies around new companies that have come to complement or compete with established operators. China is pursuing a similar approach by gradually organizing ecosystems bringing together major public groups, universities, research institutes and innovative companies around its civil and military aeronautical ambitions.[76]
France has considerable assets, but it still needs to improve its ability to transform innovation into industrial power. Maintaining a sovereign aeronautics industry therefore presupposes better coordination between the major incumbent operators and smaller-sized innovative companies capable of exploring new technologies, emerging markets or areas that are still insufficiently structured.
This development could lead to a preference for a model that has already been tried and tested in several strategic French sectors. The case of MBDA is a particularly enlightening reference in this respect. The company was not born from the integration of a single national sector, but from a gradual consolidation of complementary European skills around a common industrial objective: to preserve an autonomous capability in complex missile systems. Its success demonstrates that a sovereign industrial partnership can involve several nations and several companies, as long as industrial responsibilities are clearly distributed and the control of critical technologies remains preserved.
A similar logic is emerging in the naval field with Naval Group. The company illustrates the possibility of maintaining national prime management in the most sensitive areas — building architecture, integration of combat systems, propulsion and overall design — while developing targeted international cooperation when it strengthens industrial and commercial capacities. This model shows that a strategic operator can remain fully sovereign in its essential competences while developing an alliance policy adapted to the evolution of markets and technologies.[77]
In the aeronautics field, Dassault Aviation is undoubtedly the most successful example of this logic of strategic operator capable of articulating technological sovereignty and controlled openness. From the Mirage programs to the Rafale, the company has consistently prioritized complete control of the design, integration and evolution of its aircraft. This industrial continuity, inherited from Marcel Dassault, largely explains its current ability to approach technological change in a particularly solid position.
The orientations expressed by Chairman Éric Trappier and by Dassault Aviation managers are precisely in line with this continuity. They aim to preserve national project management capacity while developing international cooperation when it reinforces industrial efficiency without calling into question sovereign competences. Dassault Aviation‘s strategy is therefore based less on a logic of systematic integration than on the constitution of a network of specialized partners around an industrial architect who retains responsibility for overall coherence. This approach corresponds directly to the logic of sovereign industrial partnerships.[78]
The prospects opened up by artificial intelligence, collaborative systems, accompanying drones, digital architectures or new materials do not in any way call into question this model; on the contrary, they can broaden it. Dassault Aviation could thus play a role in the future comparable to that gradually acquired by MBDA in missile systems or by Naval Group in complex naval systems: that of a strategic integrator capable of federating an ecosystem of innovative companies around it, while retaining control of the technologies that are decisive for decision-making autonomy.
The challenge is therefore not to transform Dassault Aviation into a different group, but to allow a model that has already demonstrated its robustness to find new extensions in the emerging fields of aeronautical power.
Box 3 – Sovereign Industrial Partnerships: A Third Way Between National Sovereignty and European Integration
European debates on the defence industry have long opposed two conceptions. The first favours the preservation of comprehensive national capacities in order to preserve the freedom of strategic decision-making. The second considers that European industrial integration is the only possible response to the continuous increase in research, development and production costs.
The experience of the last twenty-five years, however, shows that this opposition has become largely artificial. Industrial sovereignty no longer necessarily presupposes full autonomy, any more than cooperation imposes a dilution of responsibilities between partners.
A third way now seems to be emerging: that of sovereign industrial partnerships. These are based on a few simple principles. Critical skills remain mastered by each partner nation. The project management is clearly identified. Cooperation is determined by industrial skills rather than by political balances. Technical responsibilities, intellectual property and export prospects are defined at the outset of the programmes. Finally, large groups, mid-caps, innovative SMEs and research organisations are integrated into the same industrial ecosystem.
In this perspective, cooperation is no longer an end in itself. It became an instrument in the service of industrial power and strategic autonomy.
The case of Multiplast is a perfect illustration of this dynamic. This company, which comes from the sector of very high performance composite materials applied to nautical competition, has gradually developed skills that are now in demand in aeronautics, space and defence. Its know-how in lightweight structures, advanced materials and composite processes confirms that strategic innovations are often born at the intersection of several industrial worlds. The FF72-X1 water bomber project is fully in line with this logic. Beyond its specific characteristics, it demonstrates that an innovation developed in a civil field can open up important prospects on international markets while strengthening national industrial capacities. This ability to create bridges between civil and strategic applications is one of the foundations of a modern sovereign ecosystem.[79]
This approach is directly in line with the logic of sovereign industrial partnerships developed throughout this study. These do not only concern major agreements between states or between international groups; they also require an industrial organization that allows innovative companies, mid-caps and specialized SMEs to fully find their place in strategic value chains. Sustainable industrial sovereignty cannot be based solely on the preservation of achievements; it must organize the conditions for the appearance of the skills of the future.
In this perspective, the role of the State is changing profoundly. It is no longer a matter of administratively selecting winning technologies or replacing entrepreneurs, but of creating the conditions favourable to their emergence: funding of upstream research, stability of strategic orientations, support for long-term investments, access to the first markets, protection of critical skills and securing supply chains.[80]
The new strategic state thus appears less as an industrial producer than as an architect or a stimulator of innovation ecosystems. It does not replace companies; It allows them to cooperate, invest and develop in an environment where global competition requires considerable resources, long-term investments and ever faster technological cycles.
The future of French aeronautical power will therefore depend less on the ability to maintain a few major emblematic programs than on the ability to preserve a complete ecosystem bringing together large groups, mid-caps, innovative SMEs, public research and new technological players.
France still retains a singular position in Europe. Few countries have comparable industrial continuity, from aircraft design to propulsion, electronics, embedded systems, advanced materials and digital technologies. But this historical advantage can only be preserved at the cost of a profound adaptation of the modes of industrial organization.
The aeronautical sovereignty of the twenty-first century will therefore no longer be just a question of platforms; It will first and foremost be a question of ecosystems. It will be based on the ability to combine the power of large operators, the creativity of intermediary companies and the controlled openness to external partners.
It is precisely in this articulation that the notion of sovereign industrial partnership takes on its full meaning: cooperation that does not dilute responsibilities but strengthens capacities; an openness that does not create dependency but increases freedom of action; an industrial organization in which the strategic state no longer imposes initiatives, but creates the conditions for their emergence.
Box 4 – What European industrial coalitions for the future?
The experience acquired over the past thirty years shows that not all industrial cooperation produces the same results. The systematic search for political balance between partners does not guarantee either industrial efficiency or international competitiveness.
Conversely, several recent examples suggest that another approach is possible. MBDA has demonstrated that a European company can preserve the essential skills of each of its partners while developing a sufficiently integrated governance to remain competitive. Naval Group combines, according to a similar logic, strong national project management and targeted international cooperation. Finally, the GCAP seems to favour a distribution of responsibilities based more on industrial skills than on a strict logic of geographical return.
These experiences could inspire a new generation of European aeronautical cooperation. Rather than seeking institutional uniformity, they would favour an organisation based on a few simple principles: a clearly identified prime contractor, stable technical responsibilities, explicit protection of intellectual property, partners selected for their skills and a close integration of mid-caps, innovative SMEs, research centres and large groups.
Such an approach would make it possible to build sovereign industrial coalitions, capable of varying according to the programmes and technologies concerned. Not all States would necessarily be called upon to participate in every project; On the other hand, each coalition would bring together the most relevant skills around a clearly defined industrial objective.
This development would reflect less a retreat in European cooperation than a form of new maturity. The challenge would no longer be to share programmes equally, but to build partnerships where the complementarity of competences would simultaneously strengthen national sovereignty, industrial competitiveness and Europe’s strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
Beyond the aeronautics sector alone, this reflection leads to a broader question about the foundations of the strategic state in the twenty-first century. Industrial power is not the result of the sheer amount of public funding or the proliferation of institutional cooperation. It is based first and foremost on the ability of a State to preserve its critical skills, to organise coherent industrial sectors, to support innovation and to designate, when technological complexity requires it, a clearly identified project manager. It is only on this solid basis that sustainable European cooperation can be built.
The experience acquired over the past twenty years thus invites us to reverse a widely accepted idea: it is not cooperation that creates industrial sovereignty; it is the existence of fully sovereign partners in their fields of excellence that makes effective cooperation possible. The European programmes which have achieved the best results are precisely those where industrial responsibilities were clearly defined, where competences were distributed according to the excellence of know-how and where considerations of efficiency prevailed over the sole search for political balances.
In this perspective, this article proposes to refer to European cooperation based on three principles under the term sovereign industrial coalitions: the preservation of critical technologies, the designation of an indisputable project management and the association, depending on the project, of the best available industrialists and centres of expertise. Such an approach would make it possible to overcome the now sterile opposition between institutional integration and national withdrawal, by favouring a Europe of technological excellence rather than a Europe of permanent compromise.
This reflection is in line with the observations made by Éric Trappier on the subject of major European aeronautical programmes. Before the National Assembly’s Defence Committee, he recalled that the most effective cooperation was those where the work was distributed « under the leadership of an industrial prime contractor who did not sacrifice […] the effectiveness of the product to be developed« , regretting that this logic no longer prevails in the NGF programme, where « we are not able to distribute the work according to what we consider to be the most effective in the interest of the project« .[81]
At a time when global technological competition is intensifying, when China is asserting its aeronautical ambitions and when the United States is consolidating its industrial lead, the European Union and some of its Member States will only be able to preserve their place in the long term by ensuring that excellence in skills prevails over the logic of political distribution, by putting forward the doctrine of circumstances dear to Charles de Gaulle. It is on this condition that the European aviation industry will continue to be not only a factor of economic competitiveness, but also one of the foundations of its strategic sovereignty.
The future of French and European aeronautical power therefore lies neither in the illusion of a solitary autonomy that has become unrealistic, nor in institutional cooperation whose political balance would take precedence over industrial efficiency. It is based on a new generation of sovereign industrial partnerships: alliances based on the complementarity of skills, the mastery of critical technologies and the collective ability to freely decide on its strategic future, supported by a new strategic State that no longer directly imposes its industrial choices, but creates the conditions for their emergence, supports entrepreneurial initiatives, secures long-term investments and ensures that essential skills are preserved.[82] The new strategic state is therefore neither an entrepreneurial state replacing industrialists, nor a regulatory state limiting its action to normative production. It is an architect state: it defines ambitions, secures long-term conditions, federates ecosystems and leaves industrial players the responsibility of designing, innovating and conquering markets.
Appendix 1
The major stages in the construction of the French aeronautical ecosystem (1945-2026)
| Date | Event | Strategic Scope |
| 1945 | Reorganization of the French aeronautics industry after the Liberation | Reconstruction of national industrial capacities. |
| 1945 | Creation of ONERA | Establishment of a national aeronautics and space research organization. |
| 1945-1946 | Maintenance and reorganization of national aeronautical companies (SNCASO, SNCASE, SNCAN, SNCAC, ETC.) | Preservation of strategic industrial skills. |
| 1946 | Creation of SNECMA | Reconstitution of a national aeronautical engine sector. |
| 1956 | First flight of the Mirage III | Beginning of French autonomy in supersonic combat aviation. |
| 1958 | Advent of the Fifth Republic | Consolidation of the strategic state in the sectors of sovereignty. |
| 1960 | First French nuclear explosion | Strengthening the link between the aeronautical industry and deterrence. |
| 1961 | Creation of the Ministerial Delegation for Armaments (future DGA) | Centralised management of major armaments programmes. |
| 1964 | Entry into service of the Mirage IV | Implementation of the airborne component of nuclear deterrence. |
| 1967 | Creation of Airbus (preparatory cooperation) | First structuring European industrial cooperation. |
| 1970 | Official launch of the Airbus A300 programme | Birth of the European champion of civil aviation. |
| 1973 | First flight of the Mirage F1 | Confirmation of French excellence in combat aviation. |
| 1978 | First flight of the Mirage 2000 | Modernisation of French hunting. |
| 1986 | Launch of the Rafale programme | Maintaining full national project management. |
| 1988 | First flight of the Rafale A | Validation of French technological choices. |
| 1997 | Creation of an integrated Airbus | Strengthening European industrial integration. |
| 2000 | Creation of EADS | Consolidation of the European aeronautics industry. |
| 2001 | Launch of the A400M programme | Large-scale European cooperation. |
| 2001 | Creation of MBDA | First European integrated champion of missile systems. |
| 2004 | Entry into service of the Rafale in the French Navy | Beginning of the operational career of the Rafale. |
| 2006 | First flight of the A380 | Technological pinnacle of European civil aviation. |
| 2015 | First major Rafale export contracts (Egypt, Qatar) | Change of scale in exports. |
| 2016 | Initial Rafale contract with India | Confirmation of the international success of the programme. |
| 2017 | Political launch of the FCAS | New Franco-German-Spanish ambition. |
| 2021 | Signature of the Rafale contract with the United Arab Emirates | The largest export contract in the history of Dassault Aviation. |
| 2022 | War in Ukraine | European reassessment of defence industrial sovereignty. |
| 2023 | Acceleration of reflections on the European DTIB | Return of strategic industrial policies. |
| 2024 | Further development of the FCAS and ramp-up of the GCAP | Competition between two European models of cooperation. |
| 2025-2026 | Reflections on sovereign industrial partnerships | Emergence of a new paradigm reconciling sovereignty, innovation and cooperation. |
Appendix 2
European aeronautical cooperation: comparative assessment and strategic lessons learned
Costs expressed in billions of constant euros (base 2025). The numbers of aircraft correspond to aircraft built or delivered by mid-2026 according to publicly available information.
| Program | Launch | Participating States | Leading industrial company | Estimated cost (€ billion 2025) | Aircraft delivered / in service | Progress | Main difficulties encountered |
| Transall C-160 | 1963 | France, Germany | Nord Aviation / VFW | ≈ 3 | 214 | Completed Program | Harmonization of Franco-German needs, industrial organization still experimental. |
| Jaguar | 1965 | France, United Kingdom | SEPECAT | ≈ 5 | ≈,570 | Completed Program | Bilateral coordination of specifications and production chains, without calling into question governance. |
| Airbus A300 | 1969 | France, Germany | Airbus | ≈ 6 | 561 | Completed Program | Establishment of an innovative European industrial governance, initial difficulties of financing and commercial credibility quickly overcome. |
| Alpha Jet | 1969 | France, Germany | Dassault-Breguet / Dornier | ≈ 2 | ≈,500 | Completed Program | Adaptation to different doctrines of use, industrial cooperation generally mastered. |
| Tiger | 1984 | France, Germany, Spain | Airbus Helicopters | ≈ 8-10 | ≈ 180 | Modernization in progress | Multiplication of national versions, high maintenance costs in operational condition, low export volumes. |
| Eurofighter Typhoon | 1986 | Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain | Eurofighter GmbH | ≈ 75-85 | ≈,610 | In production | Complex four-national governance, permanent industrial arbitrations, divergent national timetables. |
| NH90 | 1992 | France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands | NH Industries | ≈ 20-25 | ≈,600 | In production | Multiplicity of standards, insufficient technical availability during the first years, complex logistical support. |
| A400M Atlas | 2001 | Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg | Airbus Defence and Space | ≈ 35-40 | ≈ 130 | In production | Operational requirements that are sometimes contradictory, the simultaneous development of numerous innovations, industrial delays, significant additional costs. |
| nEUROn | 2003 | France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Greece | Dassault Aviation | ≈ 2 | 1 demonstrator | Demonstration programme completed | Technological coordination between partners, without major difficulties thanks to a clearly identified project management. |
| Eurodrone | 2016 | Germany, France, Italy, Spain | Airbus Defence and Space | ≈ 8 | 0 | Development | Long negotiations on industrial sharing, definition of common needs, cost control. |
| SCAF / FCAS | 2017 | France, Germany, Spain | Dassault Aviation / Airbus Defence and Space | > 100 | 0 | Retirement 2026 | Distribution of project management, intellectual property, governance of the program, sharing of industrial tasks and convergence of operational needs. |
| GCAP | 2022 | United Kingdom, Italy, Japan | BAE Systems | ≈ 45-60 | 0 | Development | Harmonization of requirements between partners from different industrial cultures; Integration of next-generation technologies into an ambitious timetable. |
Appendix 3
International comparison of the main aeronautics and defence groups (2024-2025)
(R&D turnover and expenditure expressed in billions of euros; most recent consolidated data available; rounded amounts. National defence budgets are expressed in billions of current euros to allow for international comparisons.)
| Company | Country | Turnover (€bn) | Workforce | R&D budget (€bn) | Main programmes | Associated national defence budget (€bn) |
| Dassault Aviation | France | ≈ 6.2 | ≈ 14,600 | ≈ 0.5 | Rafale, Falcon, nEUROn, NGF (FCAS) | ≈ 59 |
| Airbus | France / Germany / Spain | ≈ 69 | ≈ 158,000 | ≈ 3.6 | A320neo, A350, A400M, Eurodrone, satellites | ≈ 59 / 90 / 24 |
| Saffron | France | ≈ 27 | ≈ 96,000 | ≈ 2.0 | M88, LEAP, space engines, optronics | ≈ 59 |
| Thales | France | ≈ 20 | ≈ 81,000 | ≈ 4.0 | Radar, electronic warfare, cybersecurity, avionics | ≈ 59 |
| MBDA | France / United Kingdom / Italy / Germany | ≈ 5 | ≈ 18,000 | ≈ 0.5 | Meteor, Aster, MICA NG, Exocet, SCALP | ≈ 59 / 67 / 35 / 90 |
| Leonardo | Italy | ≈ 17.8 | ≈ 53,000 | ≈ 2.5 | AW139, AW249, Eurofighter, GCAP | ≈ 35 |
| BAE Systems | United Kingdom | ≈ 34 | ≈ 107,000 | ≈ 2.3 | Tempest (GCAP), Typhoon, SSN-AUKUS submarines | ≈ 67 |
| Rheinmetall | Germany | ≈ 9.8 | ≈ 31,000 | ≈ 0.8 | Panther KF51, Lynx, ammunition, electronics | ≈ 90 |
| Lockheed Martin | United States | ≈ 67 | ≈ 122,000 | ≈ 1.6 | F-35, F-22, C-130J, missiles, satellites | ≈,880 |
| Boeing Defense, Space & Security | United States | ≈ 24 | ≈ 95,000 | ≈ 1.5 | F-15EX, KC-46, P-8, Apache, Chinook | ≈,880 |
| Northrop Grumman | United States | ≈ 38 | ≈ 97,000 | ≈ 1.2 | B-21 Raider, Global Hawk, Sentinel, satellites | ≈,880 |
| RTX (Raytheon Technologies) | United States | ≈ 75 | ≈ 185,000 | ≈ 3.5 | Patriot, AMRAAM, Pratt & Whitney F135, engines | ≈,880 |
| AVIC | China | ≈ 105 | ≈ 500,000 | n.a. | J-20, J-35, Y-20, Z-20, KJ-500 | ≈,230 |
| COMAC | China | ≈ 8 (est.) | ≈ 20,000 | n.a. | C909 (ARJ21), C919, C929 | ≈,230 |
| Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) | India | ≈ 3.8 | ≈ 29,000 | ≈ 0.3 | Tejas Mk1A, Dhruv, HTT-40, AMCA | ≈ 79 |
| Mitsubishi Heavy Industries | Japan | ≈ 27 | ≈ 78,000 | ≈ 1.0 | F-X (GCAP), H3, missiles, space | ≈ 55 |
Interpretation: This comparison highlights several lessons. American groups remain largely dominant thanks to the size of the American domestic market and the world’s largest military budget. Chinese companies enjoy massive public support and increasing integration between the civilian and military sectors. European groups maintain a very high level of technology but remain more fragmented, which explains the search for new forms of industrial cooperation. Finally, French companies occupy a unique position: none of them competes individually with the major American or Chinese groups in terms of size, but their complementarity (Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Safran, Thales, MBDA) constitutes a particularly efficient industrial ecosystem covering the entire aeronautics and defense value chain.
Appendix 4
Defence budgets and sustainability of sovereign industrial ecosystems
Indicative amounts expressed in constant billion euros (base 2025), based on the main available public estimates. They constitute orders of magnitude intended to allow comparisons between programmes.
| Program | Lead Contractor | Key partners | Estimated cost (€ billion 2025) | Export performance | Main Teaching |
| Burst | Dassault Aviation | France | ≈ 55-60 | Very high: Egypt, Qatar, India, Greece, Croatia, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Serbia… | Complete national prime contract, unified governance, continuous evolution of the weapons system. |
| Eurofighter Typhoon | Consortium Eurofighter GmbH | Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain | ≈ 75-85 | High: Austria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar… | Excellent operational performance, but more complex multinational governance. |
| A400M | Airbus Defence and Space | Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg | ≈ 35-40 | Limited: mainly European customers, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Indonesia | Multiple national requirements have had a significant impact on costs, timelines and programme management. |
| NH90 | NHIndustries | France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands | ≈ 20-25 | Good, mainly with NATO and partner countries | Difficulties of standardization and multiplicity of national versions. |
| Tiger | Airbus Helicopters | France, Germany, Spain | ≈ 8-10 | Low: Australia (discontinued), Spain | Recognized performance but low international distribution and high maintenance costs in operational condition. |
| Eurodrone | Airbus Defence and Space | Germany, France, Italy, Spain | ≈ 8 | TBD | Attempt to simplify governance after lessons learned from previous programs. |
| SCAF / FCAS | Dassault Aviation (NGF) / Airbus Defence and Space | France, Germany, Spain | > 100 (future estimate) | Discontinued | The problems encountered depended on the clarity of the project management, industrial governance and intellectual property rules. |
| GCAP | BAE Systems | United Kingdom, Italy, Japan | ≈ 45-60(estimate) | TBD | Tight, competency-based industry coalition, with simplified governance and a clearly defined division of responsibilities. |
Appendix 5
Analysis grid for sovereign industrial partnerships
This grid can be used to assess any strategic industrial program, whether it is in aeronautics, naval, space or other critical sectors.
| Criterion of analysis | Essential question |
| Technological mastery | Do critical technologies remain under national or European control? |
| Project management | Does a clearly identified industrial manager ensure the coherence of the program? |
| Governance | Are the technical and financial responsibilities clearly divided? |
| Cooperation | Were the partners chosen for their expertise rather than for political considerations? |
| Innovation | Are mid-caps, SMEs and laboratories fully involved in the programme? |
| Intellectual property | Are industrial property rights clearly defined? |
| Export | Do export rules preserve the trade freedom of partners? |
| Resilience | Will critical competencies be able to be maintained throughout the life cycle of the program? |
Appendix 6
Evolution of European models of industrial organization (1945-2026)
| Period | Dominant model | Industrial logic | Emblematic example |
| 1945-1960 | National reconstruction | Direct State intervention | SNCASO, SNECMA, ONERA |
| 1960-1980 | Gaullist strategic state | Mastery of sovereign technologies | Mirage III, Mirage F1, Jaguar, Deterrent Force |
| 1980-2000 | European consolidation | Pooling of capacities | Airbus, Ariane |
| 2000-2020 | Complex multinational cooperation | Political distribution of industrial burdens | A400M, NH90, Tiger |
| Since 2020 | Sovereign Industrial Partnerships | Skills-based cooperation, identified project management and innovation ecosystems | MBDA, Naval Group, Rafale, GCAP, FCAS outlook |
[1] See the series of our articles published in the Diplomate Média for the study cycle of the transformations of the industrial policies of the world’s main strategic states since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. These articles were produced during the period November 2025 – July 2026 and published in June-July 2026: François Souty, « Industrial policy and competition policy in China since 2001: a strategic convergence at the antipodes of the European model? », Le Diplomate Média, 3 June 2026, 43 p.; id., « The return of the strategic state: the industrial policy of the United States between powers, national security and technological competition (2001-2025) », Le Diplomate Média, 11 June 2026, 45 p.; id., « The transformation of Japanese industrial policy in the face of the Chinese challenge and American digital domination (2001-2025): from the Developmental State to the Economic Security State« , Le Diplomate Média, 17 June 2026, 53 p. ; id., « The transformation of South Korean industrial policy (1997-2025): From the Asian crisis to economic security », Le Diplomate Média, 24 June 2026, 40 p.; id., « The recomposition of the Taiwanese industrial state since China’s accession to the WTO (2001-2026): From globalisation to economic security », Le Diplomate Média, 1 July 2026, 33 p.; id., « The recomposition of India’s industrial state since China’s accession to the WTO (2001-2026): From manufacturing emergence to geoeconomic power », Le Diplomate Média, 9 July 2026, 38 p.; id., « The strategic state in Europe and France since China’s accession to the WTO (2001-2026) – Reindustrialisation, competitiveness, economic sovereignty and efficiency of public action », Le Diplomate Média, 23 July 2026, 63 p. All of these studies are avaible in French and English and are accessible on the Diplomate Média website or, failing that, from each title, by the main search engines: Le Diplomate Média.
[2] François Souty, « The Return of the Strategic State: The Industrial Policy of the United States Between Power, National Security and Technological Competition (2001-2025) », op. cit. at note 1; id., « La politique aéronautique de l’administration Clinton« , Chroniques de la Sédéis, vol. XLIII, No. 6, 15 June 1994, pp. 207-214.
[3] Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, t. I, Le Renouveau (1958-1962), Paris, Plon, 1970, 266 p.; Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, t. III, Avec l’effort (1962-1965), Paris, Plon, 1970.
[4] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), Entreprises de haute technologie, État et souverainité depuis 1945, Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (CHEFF), 2013, 392 p.
[5] Directorate General of Armaments, Presentation of the Directorate General of Armaments, Ministry of the Armed Forces, institutional document available on the official website: Presentation of the Directorate General of Armaments
[6] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.
[7] Jean-Paul Hébert and Loïc Rapin, Les industries de défense en France, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, coll. « Académique », 2011, 358 p., in particular p. 181-272.
[8] On the cumulative nature of innovation and the historical constitution of industrial skills, François Caron, La dynamique de l’innovation. Changement technique et changement social (XVIe-XXe siècle), Paris, Gallimard, coll. « Bibliothèque des histoires », 2010, 480 p.
[9] Claude Carlier, Dassault: de Marcel à Serge. Cent ans d’une incroyable aventure humaine, industrielle et politique, Paris, Perrin, 2017, 464 p.; Emmanuel Chadeau, De Blériot à Dassault. Histoire de l’industrie aéronautique en France (1900-1950), Paris, Fayard, 1987, 552 p.
[10] André Beaufre, Introduction à la stratégie, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1963; re-ed., Paris, Hachette Littératures, coll. « Pluriel », 2012, 192 p., especially pp. 13-37; André Beaufre, Dissuasion et stratégie, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1964, 208 p., especially pp. 19-64. Let us not forget, however, that the high-performance engines of all the Luftwaffe aircraft during the war were those developed and produced by Mercedes or BMW…
[11] Pierre Messmer, After So Many Battles. Mémoires, Paris, Albin Michel, 1992, 458 p.
[12] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.
[13] François Caron, op.cit.
[14] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op. cit.
[15] Emmanuel Chadeau, op.cit. ; Claude Carlier, op.cit.
[16] François Caron, op.cit.
[17] André Beaufre, op.cit.
[18] Nicolas Mazzucchi, La Guerre des Énergies. Géopolitique de la transition énergétique, Paris, Passé composés, 2024, in particular p. 17-39 and p. 299-327.
[19] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.
[20] Christian Harbulot, Manuel d’intelligence économique, 3rd ed., Paris, PUF, 2023, in particular pp. 39-68 and pp. 195-224. In 1997, Christian Harbulot was the founder of the School of Economic Warfare, which he directed until 2026. He will be cited many times in this article.
[21] F. Souty, « Industrial Policy and Competition Policy in China since 2001 », op.cit. to note 1.
[22] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Made in China 2025, Beijing, 2015; Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) – Company Profile and presentation of the ARJ21, C919 and C929 programs . There are also some very interesting documents from the United States on China’s accelerated aeronautical industrial development: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025 (PDF). See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2025 Annual Report to Congress, including Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation Engine, which focuses on China’s industrial rise.
[23] Christian Harbulot, op. cit., in particular pp. 225-262; Nicolas Mazzucchi, op.cit., p. 255-327.
[24] F. Souty, « The Return of the Strategic State: The Industrial Policy of the United States », op. cit. at note 1.
[25] F. Souty, see four articles on each of these countries industrial policies, at note 1.
[26] André Beaufre, op.cit., in particular pp. 13-37; Pierre Messmer, op.cit..
[27] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit., especially pp. 263-320.
[28] André Beaufre, op.cit., especially pp. 13-37; Pierre Messmer, op.cit. in particular the developments devoted to national independence and the organisation of defence.
[29] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit. ; François Caron, op.cit.
[30] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.; Emmanuel Chadeau, op.cit.
[31] See in particular the parliamentary hearings of Éric Trappier before the Defence Committees of the National Assembly and the Senate (2021-2025), the hearings of Joël Barre (2018-2022) and Emmanuel Chiva (since 2023), as well as the annual reports of the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), which highlight the importance of exports for the sustainability of the French Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DTIB) and the challenges related to European cooperation.
[32] Note to Table 1: The differences observed do not reflect an opposition between two incompatible models, but the existence of two industrial and strategic traditions built in different historical contexts. However, they explain why cooperation can only produce sustainable results if policy objectives, industrial responsibilities and governance rules are clearly defined from the outset
[33] André Beaufre, op.cit, especially pp. 13-37; Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.
[34] See in particular the hearings of Mr. Éric Trappier, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, before the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces and before the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces, devoted in particular to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, arms exports, the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DTIB) and European cooperation (2021-2025). Detailed references and institutional links will be specified in the final version.
[35] See the hearings of Mr. Joël Barre, Delegate General for Armaments (DGA) from July 2017 to August 2022, before the parliamentary committees on the occasion of the examination of the appropriations for the « Defence » mission, as well as the hearings of Mr. Emmanuel Chiva, Delegate General for Armaments since August 2022, before the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces and the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces, devoted to armaments policy, the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DTIB), European cooperation, the FCAS and the MGCS. See also Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), Activity Report (latest edition available).
[36] André Beaufre, op.cit. pp. 13-37; Christian Harbulot, op.cit., in particular the developments on economic sovereignty and industrial strategies.
[37] Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), A400M – A Tactical and Strategic Airlifter, official programme documentation (https://www.occar.int); Directorate General of Armaments, « The A400M Transport Aircraft » (https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga).
[38] OCCAR, MALE RPAS (Eurodrone), official documentation (https://www.occar.int); Airbus Defence and Space, Eurodrone (https://www.airbus.com); Leonardo S.p.A., Eurodrone (https://www.leonardo.com).
[39] OCCAR, Tiger Mk III, official documentation (https://www.occar.int); Airbus Helicopters, Tiger Attack Helicopter(https://www.airbus.com); hearings of Mr Emmanuel Chiva, General Delegate for Armaments since August 2022, before the Defence Committees of the National Assembly (https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr) and the Senate (https://www.senat.fr).
[40] NATO Helicopter Management Agency (NAHEMA), NH90 Programme (https://www.nahema.org); NHIndustries, NH90 (https://www.nhindustries.com); OCCAR, official documentation (https://www.occar.int).
[41] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.; Christian Harbulot, op.cit
[42] UK Ministry of Defence, Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), official documentation; BAE Systems, Global Combat Air Programme; Leonardo S.p.A., GCAP; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, institutional documentation relating to the programme (documents available on official websites).
[43] Government of the United Kingdom, Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) (https://www.gov.uk); BAE Systems, Global Combat Air Programme (https://www.baesystems.com); Leonardo S.p.A., GCAP (https://www.leonardo.com); Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Defence & Space (https://www.mhi.com); hearings of Mr. Éric Trappier, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, Mr. Joël Barre, General Delegate for Armaments (2017-2022), and Mr. Emmanuel Chiva, General Delegate for Armaments (since 2022), before the Defence Committees of the National Assembly (https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr) and the Senate (https://www.senat.fr).
[44] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.; François Caron, op.cit., in particular the developments devoted to technical systems and innovation policies.
[45] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, Brussels, European Commission, September 2024; Part B: In-depth Analysis and Recommendations, Brussels, European Commission, September 2024. See also the report on the European Commission’s website. For an analysis of the French version of the recommendations of the Draghi report: François Souty, « The European Union, the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness: what inspiring strategic consequences for France? », Le Diplomate Média, 9 December 2025, 14 p.
[46] André Beaufre, op.cit., pp. 13-37; Christian Harbulot, op.cit.
[47] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.; François Caron, op.cit.
[48] Mario Draghi, op.cit. at note 41.
[49] Dassault Aviation, Rafale : un avion de combat multirôle de dernière génération, official documentation; Safran Aircraft Engines, M88 engine, official documentation; Thales, Rafale: Systèmes électroniques embarqués, official documentation; MBDA, Solutions d’armement Rafale, official documentation.(https://www.dassault-aviation.com ; https://www.safran-group.com ; https://www.thalesgroup.com ; https://www.mbda-systems.com).
[50] Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), NH90 Programme and Tiger Programme, official documentation; NHIndustries, NH90; Airbus Helicopters, Tiger and HAD/Tiger Mk III.(https://www.occar.int ; https://www.nhindustries.com ; https://www.airbus.com).
[51] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit ; François Caron, op.cit.
[52] Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), A400M – A Tactical and Strategic Airlifter, official documentation; Airbus Defence and Space, A400M Military Transport Aircraft, official documentation.https://www.occar.int/our-work/programmes/a400m-a-tactical-and-strategic-airlifter ; https://www.airbus.com).
[53] Dassault Aviation, Rafale International – Export successes, official documentation; Court of Auditors, public reports on French arms policy and arms exports; Directorate General of Armaments, Activity Report, latest editions available.https://www.dassault-aviation.com ; https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga)
[54] Richard Aboulafia, analysis of the global aviation industry, Aerodynamic Advisory, publications 2019-2025; Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), institutional documentation; Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), official documentation; Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, institutional documentation. (https://www.aerodynamicadvisory.com ; https://www.avic.com ; https://english.comac.cc)
[55] UK Ministry of Defence, Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), official documentation; BAE Systems, Global Combat Air Programme; Leonardo S.p.A., Global Combat Air Programme; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, institutional documentation relating to the programme; Convention establishing the international organization GCAP (2023). (https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-combat-air-programmegcap; https://www.baesystems.com ; https://www.leonardo.com ; https://www.mhi.com)
[56] Christian Harbulot, op.cit., in particular the developments devoted to economic sovereignty.
[57] Sources for Box 2: On the notions of open strategic autonomy, industrial sovereignty and contemporary industrial policies: Mario Draghi, op.cit. (Part A). ; Mariana Mazzucato, op. cit.. ; Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.. ; European Commission, European Economic Security Strategy, Brussels, June 2023.
[58] Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit. p.; François Caron, op.cit.. ; Airbus, Our history, institutional documentation, available at: https://www.airbus.com/en/who-we-are/our-history.
[59] European Court of Auditors, special reports on European defence cooperation and multinational programmes; Court of Auditors, The Conduct of Armament Programs, Public Reports; OCCAR, official documentation relating to the A400M, NH90 and Tiger programmes, available at: https://www.occar.int.
[60] Jean-Paul Hébert and Loïc Rapin, op. cit. at note 7, especially pp. 181-272; MBDA, MBDA Group – History and organisation, institutional documentation, available at: https://www.mbda-systems.com.
[61] UK Ministry of Defence, Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), official documentation; BAE Systems, Global Combat Air Programme; Leonardo S.p.A., GCAP Programme; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, institutional documentation relating to the programme, available respectively at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-combat-air-programme-gcap; https://www.baesystems.com ; https://www.leonardo.com ; https://www.mhi.com.
[62] Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), Activity Report, latest editions available; Airbus Defence and Space, Future Combat Air System (FCAS),institutional documentation; Dassault Aviation, official documentation relating to the New Generation Fighter (NGF), available at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga ; https://www.airbus.com; https://www.dassault-aviation.com.
[63] Safran, CFM International: history and technologies of CFM56 and LEAP engines, institutional documentation; General Electric Aerospace, CFM International, official documentation, available at: https://www.safran-group.com ; https://www.geaerospace.com.
[64] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense Buildup Program, 2022; Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Defence Production Policy; Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), official documentation relating to the Tejas and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programmes, available at: https://www.mod.go.jp/en ; https://www.hal-india.co.in.
[65] Richard Aboulafia, Aerodynamic Advisory publications dedicated to the global aviation industry (2019-2025), available at: https://www.aerodynamicadvisory.com ; Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), institutional documentation; Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China(COMAC), official documentation on: https://www.avic.com ; https://english.comac.cc; U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Industrial Base reports, respectively; https://www.defense.gov.
[66] V. Francois Souty, « Defense Industries, European Union Competition Policy and United States Antitrust: Legal Asymmetries, Industrial Issues and Strategic Autonomy » Le Diplomate Média, June 14, 2026, 24 p. Very important article with a strategic impact for all defense industries, particularly French ones.
[67] F. Souty, ibid. On Chinese competition law, see F. F. Souty « Industrial policy and competition policy in China since 2001: a strategic convergence at the antipodes of the European model? », Le Diplomate Média, 03 June 2026, 40 p. From the very beginning of competition law in China, we have drawn attention to its variable geometry application adjusted to Chinese national strategic interests: F. Souty, « China: The Anti-Monopoly Law of 30 August 2007« , Concurrences, No. 4-2007, 1 Dec. 2007, Art. No. 14266, p. 158-164. This article presents the Chinese anti-monopoly law adopted on 30 August 2007 before its entry into force on 1 August 2008 and analyses its main objectives: merger control, the fight against anti-competitive practices, the supervision of administrative monopolies, the control of foreign investments and the articulation between competition policy and industrial strategy, with many sectors exempted. Chinese law can be applied extraterritorially, but experience has shown a measured application limited only to cases that have a direct effect on Chinese territory, following the European Union’s model of application and case law.
[68] Directorate General of Armaments, Annual Report (latest edition available); Council of French Defence Industries (CIDEF), institutional documentation relating to the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (BITD); French Aeronautics and Space Industries Association (GIFAS), institutional documentation. Available on the official websites of the DGA, CIDEF and GIFAS.
[69] Jean-Paul Hébert and Loïc Rapin, op.cit., in particular pp. 181-272; Richard Aboulafia, Aerodynamic Advisory publications dedicated to the global aviation industry (2019-2025), available at: https://www.aerodynamicadvisory.com ; U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Industrial Strategy, Washington, Department of Defense, 2024, available at: https://www.defense.gov.
[70] On the emergence of a new generation of sovereign industrial partnerships in the field of water bombers, see Positive Aviation‘s FF72-X1 program, derived from the ATR 72-600 and developed around a French industrial ecosystem including Multiplast (composite materials and amphibious floats), Airbus Atlantic (assembly) and several specialized partners; see also Hynaero‘s Frégate-F100 program, a new high-capacity amphibious aircraft designed with the help of French and European industrial partners in a logic of technological sovereignty. These two projects illustrate the emergence of sovereign industrial ecosystems based on cooperation between large industrialists, innovative SMEs and high-tech companies. See also Information Report No. 1660 of the National Assembly, Aimed at better defining the strategy for the renewal of the civil security air fleet, registered on 2 July 2025; as well as the institutional documentation of Positive Aviation, Hynaero, Multiplast and GIFAS. The parliamentary report and the recent debates in the National Assembly also underline the interest shown by the public authorities in the development of French and European industrial solutions in addition to the devices currently available.
[71] Multiplast, institutional documentation relating to high-performance composite materials and industrial applications; GIFAS, presentation of companies in the French aeronautics sector. Documents can be consulted on the official websites of Multiplast and GIFAS.
[72] François Caron, op.cit.. ; Christian Harbulot, op.cit., in particular the developments on innovation ecosystems and economic sovereignty.
[73] Mario Draghi, op.cit. (Part A and Part B) ; Mariana Mazzucato, op.cit.
[74] Ministry of the Armed Forces, Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), documentation relating to autonomous systems, drones and emerging technologies; NATO, Science and Technology Trends 2023-2043, Brussels, NATO Science and Technology Organization, 2023. Documents can be consulted on the official websites of the DGA and NATO.
[75] Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), institutional documentation; Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), official documentation available at: https://www.avic.com ; https://english.comac.cc; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, latest editions; Christian Harbulot, op.cit., in particular the developments devoted to technological sovereignty and dual technologies.
[76] Pierre Massé, Le Plan ou l’anti-hasard, Paris, Gallimard, 1965; François Bloch-Lainé, Pour une réforme de l’entreprise, Paris, Seuil, 1963; Mario Draghi, op.cit.
[77] Jean-Paul Hébert and Loïc Rapin, op.cit., in particular pp. 273-343; Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), op.cit.
[78] Dassault Aviation, 2024 Annual Report, including developments on industrial strategy, program prime contractor and the outlook for the Rafale; Éric Trappier, hearings before the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces on the DTIB, the FCAS programme and aeronautical industrial sovereignty; Dassault Aviation’s institutional documentation, available on the official website: https://www.dassault-aviation.com.
[79] Multiplast, institutional documentation relating to high-performance composite materials and industrial applications; Groupement des industries françaises aéronautiques et spatiales (GIFAS), presentation of companies in the French aeronautics sector. Documents available at: https://www.multiplast.eu ; https://www.gifas.fr.
[80] Christian Harbulot, op.cit.. ; Mario Draghi, op.cit. ; Directorate General of Armaments, institutional documentation relating to defence innovation and support for the Defence Industrial and Technological Base.
[81] National Assembly, Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces, hearing of Mr Éric Trappier, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, on European Defence and European Cooperation, meeting of 9 April 2025, minutes n° 58, XVIIth legislature, Paris; see in particular the developments devoted to the industrial governance of the NGF, the principle of project management, the distribution of industrial responsibilities and the limits of georeturnmechanisms. The official file of the committee, the full report, the official PDF and the video recording are available on the website of the National Assembly: Defence Committee – hearing of Éric Trappier (9 April 2025). See also Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces, hearing of Mr Éric Trappier, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, 25 June 2025, devoted to the outlook for the defence aeronautics industry, the Rafale, the FCAS and the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (BITD); official file, minutes and video available on the Senate website: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces – hearing of Éric Trappier (25 June 2025 ); see also Joint hearing of the Senate committees (25 June 2025). Compl. Ministry of the Armed Forces, National Strategic Review 2022, Paris, General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, 2022, esp. p. 44-58; Directorate General of Armaments, 2023 Activity Report, Paris, DGA, 2024, spec. p. 8-23.
[82] This conception is in line with contemporary thinking on the renewal of the strategic state: no longer a producer state replacing companies, nor a state limited to the sole normative function, but a state that is an architect and guarantor of strategic capacities, capable of defining priorities, supporting long-term investments, preserving critical skills and creating conditions favourable to industrial initiative. See in particular Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, Brussels, European Commission, September 2024, 69 p.; François Bloch-Lainé, Pour une réforme de l’entreprise, Paris, Seuil, 1963; Pierre Massé, Le Plan ou l’anti-hasard, Paris, Gallimard, 1965; Patrick Fridenson and Pascal Griset (eds.), Entreprises de haute technologie, État et souverainité depuis 1945, Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (CHEFF), 2013, 392 p.
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