ECONOMY – LESSONS FROM A GEOPOLITICS OF PENSIONS AND OPTIONS FOR 2027 IN France – Work, ageing, career length and industrial strategy: Adaptation of Major Economies
Par François Souty
Executive Summary
Over the past three or four decades, population ageing has become one of the major determinants of the economic transformation of developed countries. Longer life expectancy is simultaneously changing the relationship between active and retired people, the length of careers, the financing of pensions and production conditions. This demographic change raises serious concerns, particularly with regard to the economic and strategic consequences linked to the consequences of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
The problem of pensions cannot therefore be reduced to that of the financial equilibrium of the schemes. It also depends on the volume of available work, the employment rate of seniors, the productivity of nations, investment and the ability to accumulate capital. In this respect, ageing economies are following different trajectories: some are extending careers more, others are diversifying the financing of pensions, while Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have also made automation and technology responses to the relative scarcity of labour.
France presents a particular paradox: it maintains a high hourly productivity, but with a relatively low annual volume of work and an employment rate of seniors, while pension spending represents a significant part of national wealth. The partial suspension of the 2023 reform and the savings sought on pensions in 2027 illustrate two different forms of adjustment: one affects the future length of careers, the other affects the level of expenditure.
A long-term strategy could therefore go beyond the opposition between the legal age and the level of pensions. It should articulate the length of careers, the employment of seniors, the volume of work, productivity, robotisation, artificial intelligence, industrial policy and long-term savings. Pay-as-you-go would remain the basis of intergenerational solidarity, while insurance and capitalisation could complete its financing.
The real question thus becomes that of a life-cycle economic policy: how to organize an economy capable of financing a society that lives longer, by producing more with a proportionately smaller working population?
Introduction — Is the problem of pensions primarily a problem of financing or of productive capacity?
The French debate on pensions remains largely too essentially formulated in budgetary terms: deficit of the schemes, legal age, level of contributions, de-indexation of pensions or the search for savings. These questions are obviously essential. But they are not enough to account for the profound transformation that developed economies have undergone since the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Ageing is not only a problem of financing pensions. It changes the relationship between the working population and the retired population, the length of careers, the volume of work available, savings and health needs, but also the very conditions of production. The real issue then becomes to know how much work an economy can mobilize, with what productivity, what capital and what technologies, to finance a population that lives longer.
The year 2001 is a particularly enlightening starting point in this respect. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization ushered in a new phase of industrial and trade globalization, at the very moment when developed economies were beginning to suffer more clearly from the effects of demographic aging. Since then, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have combined aging, industrial transformation and automation; the United States and Canada have further diversified the sources of financing for retirement; some European countries have experimented with different forms of career extension and adaptation to life expectancy.¹ Not France for three decades.
Above all, international comparison shows that there is no single answer. Countries arbitrate differently between the length of working life, the level of pensions, the employment of seniors, taxes, savings and productivity. The French question must therefore be placed in the context of this general transformation.
France has high hourly productivity, but an annual volume of work significantly lower than that of several comparable major economies and a still relatively low employment rate for older people. At the same time, public spending on pensions in France represents about 13.4% of GDP, compared to 10.8% in Germany and 8.1% on average in the OECD, according to comparable OECD data.²
The problem is therefore not only how to finance existing pensions. It is to determine how to articulate careers, employment, quantity of work, productivity, industry, technology and savings in an ageing society.How, then, can we organize an economy capable of financing a society that lives longer, while preserving its social cohesion, its industrial capacity and its strategic autonomy?
I. Since 2001, ageing has transformed both work and productive capacity
Ageing is the starting point for any reflection on pensions. But its economic effect is not limited to increasing the relative number of pensioners. It is gradually transforming the quantity of work available and forcing economies to look for new sources of productivity.
A. The demographic shock: live longer, work longer?
The phenomenon is now massive. In the OECD, the number of people aged 65 and over per 100 people aged 20 to 64 rose from 22 in 2000 to 33 in 2025 and is expected to reach 52 in 2050. The working-age population is expected to decline by an average of 13% over the next four decades. In several countries, including Korea, Italy, Japan, Poland and Spain, the contraction will be much stronger.³
The essential economic question is therefore not only that of life expectancy, but that of the relationship between the length of working life and the duration of retirement. A population can live twenty or thirty years after leaving the labour market; the question then is to know how much of the extension of life should be devoted to employment, how much to retirement and how to finance the whole.
The employment of older people is a determining variable here. In 2024, the employment rate of 60-64 year-olds reached around 56.5% on average in the OECD, while it exceeded 70% in Japan and remained below 45% in France. At 65-69 year olds, the gaps become even wider.⁴
The length of the career should therefore no longer be considered solely as a legal rule. It depends on the real capacity of companies to employ older employees, on the state of health, on training, on the organization of work and on the existence of suitable activities. An increase in the legal age that would not be accompanied by an increase in the effective employment of older people would shift part of the problem without necessarily resolving the productive constraint.
B. From Aging to Industrial Transformation: Robotization, AI, and Productivity
However, ageing can have a different effect: when an economy is progressively short of workers, it may be incentivised to substitute more capital and technology for human labour.
Japan is the most visible example of this evolution. The development of robotics is not only a response to a classic industrial strategy; it accompanies a society in which the available workforce is decreasing and where the need for health, logistics and personal services is increasing. South Korea is following a similar trajectory in terms of the intensity of its industrial automation and technological investments.
The phenomenon can be described as a form of "industrializing demography": demographic constraints push the economy to invest in technologies that make it possible to produce with less work. Artificial intelligence is now considerably expanding the scope of this substitution or complementarity, which is possible but not automatic or naturally self-evident without any effort at strategic and political conceptualization.
This development has a double interest. It can make it possible to compensate for a quantitative decrease in human work; it can also make ageing an industrial market: assistive robotics, digital health, medical devices, mobility, adapted housing, logistics or personal services.
Ageing then ceases to be a mere budgetary burden. It can become a factor of demand, innovation and exports, provided that firms and research systems have the capital and skills to transform this demand into productive capacity and that policymakers facilitate rather than hinder this match.
C. The quantity of work and the French paradox
France illustrates another combination. It has high hourly productivity, but a lower annual volume of work than many comparable economies. In 2024, the average annual number of hours worked was about 1,509 hours in France, compared to 1,334 in Germany, 1,617 in Japan, 1,865 in South Korea, and 1,796 in the United States.⁵
This comparison must be interpreted with caution: part-time structures, holidays, working hours and statistical methods differ from country to country. However, it reveals an essential fact: hourly productivity and the quantity of work are two distinct variables.
The reduction in working hours in France in the early 2000s (socialist Jospin government, 2001) is an important step in this history. INSEE estimates that between 2000 and 2003, when the 35-hour week was introduced, the working hours of full-time employees decreased by about 125 hours per year.⁶ But this evolution alone cannot explain French deindustrialization, which is the result of a set of factors: globalization, sectoral specialization, changes in demand, productivity gains, investment choices and international competition.
The relevant question is rather that of compensation: has France sufficiently increased its productivity, its productive capital and its technological intensity to compensate for a relatively low volume of work in the long term?
It is this question that directly links the problem of pensions to that of industrial capacity. And its answer even more so.
II. Comparative answers: prolonging work, diversifying financing, automating production
Ageing economies have not chosen a single response. Three main directions are emerging: extending working life, diversifying the financing of pensions, and increasing productivity through investment and technology.
A. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan: Extending activity and automating the economy
Japan combines two responses: a very high employment rate for older people and a long-standing effort at automation. South Korea also has a high activity rate at older ages, but its experience shows the limits of such an indicator: a significant proportion of workers leave their main job relatively early and then return to activities that are sometimes less skilled or less paid.
Korea thus illustrates an essential distinction between the age of exit from the main labour market and the effective age of cessation of activity. The employment of older people can contribute to the financing of pensions, but its effectiveness depends on its quality and productivity.
Taiwan offers another dimension of the same problem: a high-tech economy can maintain high productive capacity despite ageing by investing in capital-intensive, skill-intensive and innovation-intensive sectors.
These three experiments show that there is a possible relationship between ageing and industrial transformation. They do not constitute social models that can be directly transposed to France. But they do show how a demographic constraint can become a factor in technological investment.
B. United States and Canada: Employment, Flexibility and Diversification of Financing
The United States and Canada are based on more diversified architectures. In addition to public schemes, occupational schemes and individual savings play an important role in the financing of retirement income. Capitalization does not, of course, remove the demographic constraint. Tomorrow’s retirees will still have to consume goods and services produced tomorrow. But it makes it possible to add to current financing a stock of assets built up over the previous decades.
This distinction is fundamental: distribution acts mainly on an intergenerational flow; capitalization adds a stock of assets likely to produce future income while smoothing out certain temporal hazards or fluctuations. When this capital is invested in the productive economy, it can also contribute to the financing of companies, innovation and infrastructure. The challenge is therefore not to choose abstractly between distribution and capitalization, but to determine how the different mechanisms can be articulated in an aging economy.
C. Europe on the move: from legal age to life expectancy
European countries are experimenting with different forms of adaptation. In 2024, the OECD set the normal retirement age at 66.2 in Germany, 67 in the Netherlands, 67 in Italy and 64.3 in France; it also reached 67 in Denmark, Iceland and Norway.⁷ In France, against the tide, a so-called "budgetary" political compromise in October 2024 reduced this legal age from 64 to 62, with the strong influence of left-wing parties.
At the same time, several countries have provided mechanisms that directly or indirectly link the future retirement age to changes in life expectancy. The OECD notes that future normal ages may reach or exceed 70 years in some countries.⁸
Germany offers a particularly interesting case. The OECD stresses that longer working lives will be essential to finance German pensions and envisages, in the long term, a link between the legal age and life expectancy when the normal age reaches 67. The employment of older workers has already risen sharply since 2000.⁹
These experiences lead to a clear conclusion: changing the legal age is only effective if this change results in more real activity. The reform of pensions is therefore necessarily in line with that of the labour market, training and the organisation of companies.
III. France faces its own paradox: less work, more pensioners, more spending
France is approaching ageing with a particular combination, as we have observed: high hourly productivity, relatively low annual volume of work, employment of older people still lower than that of several partners and a particularly high level of public pension spending. According to the OECD, public expenditure on pensions represents about 13.4% of GDP in France, compared with 10.8% in Germany and 8.1% on average in the OECD.¹⁰ The French problem is therefore not only that of the level of pensions. More broadly, it is due to the balance between the number of years worked, the annual volume of work, the number of retirees and productivity.
A. The retirement age: demographic adjustment suspended?
The 2023 reform had committed France to a path of extending working life, by gradually raising the legal age from 62 to 64 and accelerating the required insurance period.
This trajectory was "suspended" (we insist) as part of the parliamentary negotiations in the autumn of 2025. To avoid the censorship envisaged by the left, the centrist government (Macronist or "Central Bloc") of Sébastien Lecornu proposed to suspend the increase in the legal age and the length of insurance until 2028; this concession was one of the main conditions set by the Socialists not to censure the government. The minimum announced cost of the suspension had been estimated at €400 million in 2026 and €1.8 billion in 2027.¹¹
However, the legal reality is more nuanced than a simple return to 62 years. Since September 2026, the legal age has been gradually increased from 62 years and 9 months to 63 years and 9 months for the generations concerned, before reaching 64 years for the generations born from 1969 onwards.¹² The economic question remains: how much of the increase in life expectancy should be devoted to employment and how much to retirement?
If the duration of employment stops increasing while the duration of retirement continues to increase, the balance must be sought elsewhere: contributions, relative level of pensions, taxation, employment, productivity or savings. There is no free demographic variable.
B. From suspension to de-indexation: two adjustments of a different nature
The 2026 budget debate adds a second dimension. In September 2026, the government announced its objective of achieving around €6 billion in savings on pensions in 2027, including the assumption of a change in indexation and the 10% tax allowance for pensioners.¹³
This amount must be clearly distinguished from the cost of suspending the reform: the €1.8 billion corresponds to the initial estimate of the cost of the suspension in 2027, while the approximately €6 billion is a savings target for pensions in the 2027 budget.¹⁴
This juxtaposition reveals two different conceptions of adjustment. The suspension of the age and the contribution period has an effect on the future flow of work and contributions. The de-indexation or the modification of the level of pensions has an effect on the level of expenditure and the disposable income of the pensioners present.
These instruments are therefore not economically equivalent. A saving on pensions can improve the public accounts in the short term; however, it does not increase the number of working people, the number of hours worked, or productivity. Finally, it marks a clear regression compared to the contributions already paid in full by pensioners when they were employees, often for weekly working hours of more than 40 hours in addition. This consideration leads precisely to the volume of work.
C. The French deficit in the quantity of work: towards another equation?
The French paradox is therefore perhaps less in a lack of hourly productivity than in the combination of the length of careers, the employment of older people and the overall volume of work.
Longer working lives have an impact on the flow of work and contributions. The employment of older people makes it possible to transform part of the ageing population into an economic resource. The increase in the annual volume of work acts in the same direction, when economic and social conditions allow it.
Productivity acts on another dimension. When the working population grows more slowly, investment in productive capital, automation, robotics and artificial intelligence can make it possible to produce more with less human labour. This is the industrial and de facto financial strategy that has been adopted with great success by Japan.
Finally, the diversification of financing has an impact on the stock of wealth. Distribution can remain the basis of solidarity between generations, while insurance, long-term savings and capitalization can constitute complementary resources. The equation thus becomes: longer careers + employment of seniors + volume of work + productivity + automation + long-term savings.
The question of pensions then ceased to be exclusively a question of social parameters. It became a question of life-cycle economic policy.
IV. Pension reform as a life-cycle economic policy
Demographic ageing means that we need to go beyond a concept of pensions that is reduced to the annual balance of a scheme. When the working population grows less quickly than the number of pensioners, sustainability depends simultaneously on the length of careers, the employment rate, the volume of work, productivity and the ability to accumulate financial assets.
A. Artificial intelligence, robotization and productivity: producing more with fewer workers
The first response does not necessarily consist in increasing the quantity of human work indefinitely. It can also lie in a transformation of its productivity. Ageing can become a factor in technological investment. Japan provides the most visible example, but South Korea and, in another configuration, Taiwan also show how a demographic constraint can accompany a technological upgrading.
Artificial intelligence now considerably broadens this perspective. It can complement human work in administrative, medical, industrial or service activities and make it possible to absorb part of the effects of ageing without proportionately reducing productive capacity. Ageing can thus simultaneously become a demographic constraint and an industrial market: assistive robotics, digital health, medical devices, mobility, adapted housing or personal services. However, technology only compensates for the reduction in work if investment, skills and productive organisation make it possible to transform potential productivity gains into real production.
B. Pay-as-you-go, insurance and capitalization: the paradox of French savings
Capitalization alone is not an answer to ageing. Tomorrow’s retirees will still have to consume goods and services produced tomorrow. However, it makes it possible to add to the current financing of pensions a stock of assets built up over the previous decades.
Distribution mainly organizes a transfer of resources between generations at the same time; capitalization organizes an accumulation of wealth intended to produce future income. In an ageing economy, the two mechanisms can therefore be seen as complementary.
France has significant savings. The question is not so much about saving more as about how to direct part of these savings towards long-term capital, particularly for the benefit of companies, innovation and infrastructure.
Pension policy then joins industrial policy : long-term savings can help finance the technologies that the ageing economy will need precisely to maintain its level of production.
C. From pension reform to a life-cycle economic policy
A long-term French policy could thus articulate several dimensions: extending careers where possible; increasing the employment of seniors; increasing the volume of work when economic and social conditions allow it; accelerating investment in robotics and artificial intelligence; transforming ageing into an innovation and export market; and finally, developing long-term savings and capitalisation mechanisms in addition to pay-as-you-go.
The German experience shows the importance of effectively extending the careers and employment of older people; the Japanese and South Korean experiences show how demographic constraints can stimulate automation and create new technological markets. These experiences do not constitute models that can be transposed as such to France. Rather, they make it possible to identify mechanisms that can be combined.
Box 1
What are the possible axes for a new French pension policy after 2027?
A French strategy could seek a new balance between six dimensions: working longer where possible; keeping older people in employment; increasing the overall volume of work; investing more in robotics and artificial intelligence; transforming ageing into an industrial and technological market; and developing long-term savings in addition to pay-as-you-go.
The challenge would not be to substitute a foreign model for the French model, but to adapt the French economy to a now sustainable situation: a population that is living longer and whose proportion of elderly people is increasing. Retirement then ceases to be only the culmination of a career; it becomes one of the parameters of a life-cycle economic policy, linking work, capital, technology, industry and solidarity between generations.
Longer working lives affect the flow of work and contributions; capitalization affects the stock of wealth; robotization and artificial intelligence affect labor productivity; industrial policy affects the economy’s ability to transform these factors into production and income.
Conclusion
Population ageing is not only a problem of pensions. It is transforming the conditions in which societies produce, work, save and organise solidarity between generations.
Since 2001, the major economies have adopted different responses. Some are extending the careers and employment of older people more; others are diversifying the sources of pension financing; Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have also made robotisation and technological innovation instruments for adapting to the relative scarcity of labour. Germany, for its part, illustrates the growing importance attached to the effective extension of careers.¹⁵
France is faced with a particular equation. Its hourly productivity remains high, but its volume of work and its employment of older people are relatively low, while public pension spending is among the highest in the OECD. The question cannot therefore be resolved in the long term by a single variable: neither the legal age, nor the level of pensions, nor contributions, nor even capitalization can, in isolation, absorb the entire demographic shock.
Three levers appear to be complementary. The first is that of the duration and quantity of work, by extending careers where possible and by making better use of the potential of seniors. The second is that of productivity, thanks to capital, innovation, robotisation and artificial intelligence. The third is that of diversification of financing, with distribution being supplemented by insurance and long-term savings.
Pension policy cannot therefore be permanently dissociated from a policy of work, productivity and national productive capacity. The ultimate challenge is not only to know how to distribute a given wealth between active and retired people in the future. It is to determine which economy to build in order to be able to produce and accumulate enough in a society that lives longer.
It is in this sense that the question of pensions becomes a geopolitical question: behind the retirement age and the financing of pensions lies the ability of the major economies to adapt their production model to the new relationship between demography, labour, capital and technology.
APPENDICES
Annex 1 — Ageing, employment of older workers and the normal retirement age: key international benchmarks
| Country / Area | 65+/20-64 Report, 2025 | Employment 60-64 years, 2024 | Normal retirement age, 2024 |
| France | ~34% | < 45% | 64.3 years |
| Germany | ~36% | ~65% | 66.2 years |
| Italy | ~41% | ~45% | 67 years old |
| Spain | ~33% | ~55% | 65 years old |
| Netherlands | ~33% | ~70% | 67 years old |
| Poland | ~32% | ~40% | 65 years old M / 60 years old F |
| United States | ~28% | ~60% | 66.7 years |
| Canada | ~31% | ~55% | 65 years old |
| Japan | ~52% | > 70% | 65 years old |
| South Korea | ~30% | ~70% | 63 years old |
| OECD | 33 % | 56,5 % | 64.7 years M / 63.9 years F |
Sources: OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2025; OECD, Employment Outlook; national statistics where necessary. Employment data should be read as comparative orders of magnitude, taking into account the differences in the definition and structure of labour markets.
Appendix 2 — Annual volume of work and productivity: the French paradox
| Country | Hours Worked Per Person per Year (2024) | Synthetic reading |
| France | 1,509 h | High hourly productivity, relatively low volume of work |
| Germany | 1,334 h | Low annual duration, but more developed employment of seniors |
| Netherlands | ~1,430 h | Very important part-time work |
| Japan | 1,617 hrs | Higher volume of work than France and Germany |
| United States | 1,796 h | High volume of work much higher than in France and Germany and high capital accumulation |
| South Korea | 1,865 h | Very high annual volume, much higher than in France and Germany, and high automation |
| OECD | ~1,742 h | International reference |
Sources: OECD, Hours worked and GDP per hour worked, 2024 data.
NOTES
1. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025: OECD and G20 Indicators, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2025, 248 p., chap. 1, « Recent pension reforms », section « Population ageing ». The OECD notes that the ratio of people aged 65 and over to the population aged 20 to 64 has increased from 22 per cent in 2000 to 33 per cent in 2025 and is expected to reach 52 per cent in 2050.
2. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 8, « Finances of retirement-income systems », section « Public expenditure on pensions ». Public expenditure on pensions is given at 13.4% of GDP for France and 10.8% for Germany, compared with 8.1% for the OECD average according to the comparable series used.
3. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 1, « Recent pension reforms », section « Population ageing ». In particular, the OECD projects a decline in the working-age population over the next few decades, with contractions particularly large in several ageing economies.
4. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., indicateurs relatifs à l’emploi des travailleurs âgés ; OCDE, OECD Employment Outlook 2025, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2025, 274 p., in particular chapter 2, devoted to demographic transformations, the work of older people and productivity issues.
5. OCDE, Hours worked et GDP per hour worked, statistiques comparatives, données 2024. For international comparisons of hours of work and hourly productivity, see the corresponding statistical series and the OECD methodological notes. Differences should be interpreted with caution because of differences in statistical methods and employment structures.
6. Charles Raffin et Hatice Yildiz, « Depuis 1975, le temps de travail annuel a baissé de 350 heures, mais avec des horaires moins réguliers et plus contrôlés », Insee Première, n° 1749, 19 novembre 2019, 4 p., spéc. pp. 1-2. The authors estimate that between 2000 and 2003, when the 35-hour week was implemented, the reduction in the working hours of full-time employees represented about 125 hours per year on average.
7. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 3, « Current retirement ages », section « Normal retirement age ». The OECD defines the normal retirement age as the age at which a person can retire without penalty on the basis of a full career starting at 22 years old; this definition explains some discrepancies with the legal age commonly used in national debates.
8. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 3, « Future retirement ages », section « Key results ». L’OCDE relève que plusieurs pays ont prévu des mécanismes d’évolution de l’âge de retraite et que les âges futurs peuvent atteindre ou dépasser 70 ans dans certaines configurations.
99. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025: Germany, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2025, National factsheet "Germany", spec. section on the outlook for retirement age and changes in life expectancy.
10. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 8, « Finances of retirement-income systems », sections « Public expenditure on pensions » and « Long-term projections of public pension expenditure ».
11. Olivier Pérou et Nathalie Segaunes, « Réforme des retraites : comment Sébastien Lecornu s’est converti à la suspension pour obtenir la bienveillance des socialistes », Le Monde, 15 octobre 2025 ; Financial Times, « French PM to freeze Emmanuel Macron’s pension reform until 2027 », 14 octobre 2025. The Financial Times confirms the announced cost of €400 million in 2026 and €1.8 billion in 2027 and explicitly links the suspension to parliamentary negotiations on the 2026 budget.
12. « Âge légal, carrières longues… Ce qu’implique concrètement la suspension de la réforme des retraites », Le Figaro, 8 octobre 2025 ; Bertrand Bissel et Thibaud Métais, « Âge de départ, durée de cotisation, budget… Ce que change la suspension de la réforme des retraites », Le Monde, 15 octobre 2025 ; Service-Public.fr, « Suspension de la réforme des retraites : qui est concerné ? », Update 2026. These sources make it possible to distinguish the delay in the ramp-up of the 2023 reform from a general and immediate return to the legal age of 62.
13. Bertrand Bissel, « Le gouvernement veut économiser 6 milliards d’euros sur les retraites en 2027 », Le Monde, 11 septembre 2026 ; Sébastien Lecornu, entretien au Figaro, 17 septembre 2026 ; Financial Times, « France seeks to rein in pensions and state salaries in 2027 », 1er octobre 2026. The government has announced an effort required of pensioners of less than €6 billion in 2027, the terms of which were to include the partial de-indexation of pensions (above a floor of around €2000 per month) or the 10% tax allowance; the Financial Times places this measure in the overall programme to reduce the public deficit.
14. « Retraites : ce que contient la lettre rectificative, qui prévoit la suspension de la réforme », Le Monde, 23 octobre 2025. The burden of the suspension, initially estimated at €1.8 billion in 2027, was then reassessed at €1.4 billion in the letter of amendment to the Social Security financing bill.
15. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 3, « Current retirement ages » et « Future retirement ages », as well as the national fact sheets for Germany, Japan, Korea and the United States. The comparative study highlights the diversity of combinations between retirement age, employment of seniors, occupational schemes and savings.
16. OCDE, Pensions at a Glance 2025, op. cit., 248 p., chap. 2, « Pension systems and pension financing ». The distinction between pay-as-you-go and funded schemes does not remove the fundamental economic constraint: the goods and services consumed by pensioners must be produced at the time of consumption.
17. OCDE, OECD Employment Outlook 2025, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2025, including the section on artificial intelligence, productivity and ageing. The OECD points out that AI can help extend careers by reducing some physical constraints and improving the working conditions of older workers, but that productivity gains depend on the effective diffusion of technology, investment, skills and the organisation of companies.
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