ECONOMY – The transformation of Japanese industrial policy in the face of the Chinese challenge and American digital domination (2001-2025): from the Developmental State to the Economic Security or Strategic State

By François Souty

François Souty, PhD in Economic History, former International Affairs Officer at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (2021-2024), was a member of the OECD Committee of Experts on Competition Policy from 1996 to 2024. He teaches European institutions and geopolitics at the Excelia Business School group (La Rochelle-Paris Cachan) as well as European competition law and policy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Nantes. He is in charge of the economics section at Le Diplomate Media.

« Japan succeeded not by copying the West, but by adapting Western technology to its own institutional and social ethos. »

Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan « Succeeded »? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Executive Summary

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 profoundly transformed Japan’s economic and strategic environment. Japan, Asia’s leading major developed industrial power, was confronted, before the United States and the European Union, with the emergence of a considerable Chinese competitor benefiting from an unprecedented combination of manufacturing and demographic capacities, public support, technological upgrading and integration into global value chains. At the same time, the rise of large U.S. digital platforms has shifted an increasing portion of value creation to data, software, digital infrastructure, and artificial intelligence. Japan has thus found itself at the heart of a double constraint: to preserve its industrial competitiveness in the face of China while limiting its technological dependence on the United States.

Contrary to a reading that often focuses on the relative decline of the Japanese economy since the 1990s, it is argued that Japan has gradually developed an original response to these transformations. Without renouncing its insertion into the world economy or adopting the methods of Chinese state capitalism, it has reoriented its industrial policy towards critical technologies, advanced equipment, advanced materials, robotics, semiconductors and digital infrastructure. This evolution has led to a gradual redefinition of the role of the state, oriented more towards the preservation of strategic technological capabilities than towards supporting traditional industries.

The article also shows that this transformation does not only concern industrial policy in the traditional sense. It is accompanied by changes in competition policy, data governance and the regulation of the digital economy. Faced with the dominance of major American platforms and the rise of Chinese players, Japan has sought to develop an intermediate approach that reconciles economic openness, innovation, data protection and technological sovereignty. The concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), promoted by the Japanese government, illustrates this desire to build a path distinct from both the American and Chinese models. Then the gradual emergence of a real doctrine of economic security is then highlighted. Sino-U.S. tensions, supply chain disruptions, the Covid-19 pandemic, and accelerating global technological competition have led Japan to integrate industrial, digital, and security issues more closely. The adoption of the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, investments in semiconductors, support for the colossal Rapidus project, the development of industrial artificial intelligence and the strengthening of cybersecurity systems testify to this evolution towards a model in which economic security becomes a central objective of public action.

This leads us to consider Japan as one of the first laboratories of contemporary « strategic capitalism ». Located between Chinese state capitalism and American digital capitalism, the Japanese model is based on an original articulation between competition, industrial policy, technological innovation and economic security. This trajectory sheds light on several debates that are now at the heart of Western public policies, particularly those relating to the resilience of value chains, technological sovereignty, the regulation of digital platforms and the mastery of critical technologies.

Finally, the Japanese experience offers particularly valuable lessons for the European Union. At a time when the European institutions are seeking to reconcile competitiveness, strategic autonomy, digital transition and respect for competition principles, the Japanese example shows that it is possible to integrate these objectives into the same long-term strategy. In this sense, Japan appears less as a declining power than as a precursor of the responses that the major developed economies are now trying to provide to the geoeconomic rivalries of the twenty-first century.

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Introduction

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 is undoubtedly one of the most structuring events in contemporary economic history.[1] More than just a stage in the process of globalization that began at the end of the twentieth century, it inaugurates a new sequence in the world economy marked by the gradual integration of several hundred million workers into international value chains, the acceleration of trade, the intensification of industrial competition and the gradual shift of the center of gravity of the world economy towards Asia.

In previous decades, Japan occupied a singular position in this geography of power. The leading developed economy on the Asian continent, the second largest economy in the world until 2010, a major exporting power and an essential reference in terms of industrial policy, it appeared to be the most successful example of what Chalmers Johnson had described as a « Developmental State« .[2] Based on close cooperation between the economic administration, financial institutions and major industrial groups, this model enabled Japan to rebuild its economy after 1945 and then to become one of the world’s leading technological powers.

However, it is precisely this industrial power that is confronted before any other developed economy with the emergence of China as a systemic economic player. From the 2000s, Japanese companies had to face the appearance of a competitor whose advantages were no longer based solely on wage costs but also on industrial, technological, financial and organizational capacities supported by a long-term public strategy.[3] In several emblematic sectors – consumer electronics, telecommunications, shipbuilding, photovoltaic panels, batteries and industrial equipment – Japanese groups are gradually seeing the emergence of Chinese competitors capable of challenging positions that are sometimes built over several decades.

However, China’s rise is not the only challenge facing Japan. At the same time, a second major transformation is affecting the global economy: the emergence of a digital capitalism dominated by the major American platforms.[4] As China gradually becomes one of the world’s leading manufacturing hubs, the U.S. is consolidating its position in digital infrastructure, software, operating systems, cloud computing, digital platforms, data, and, most recently, artificial intelligence.

This situation gives the Japanese case a particular interest. While many studies have separately analysed the rise of China, the evolution of Japanese industrial policy or the dominance of the major American platforms, few studies have sought to understand how these phenomena have combined to profoundly transform the instruments of Japanese public action. Moreover, many analyses continue to approach Japan from the perspective of economic slowdown or relative decline, even though some of the responses developed by Tokyo today foreshadow debates that have become central in Western economies: technological sovereignty, economic security, resilience of value chains, control of foreign investments, data governance, regulation of digital platforms and cybersecurity.[5]

In many respects, Japan thus appears to be the first major developed economy to face the major geoeconomic challenges of the twenty-first century. The questions that Tokyo had to answer in the early 2000s now occupy a central place in the strategies deployed in both Washington and Brussels. They also join the debates on digital sovereignty, international data governance and new forms of technological power.[6]

This study is an extension of a cycle of research devoted to contemporary transformations in the politics of economic power.[7] Several of our recent publications have focused on the evolution of Chinese industrial policy, the transformation of Chinese competition policy, the new orientations of American competition policy in the context of America First Economics, and the regulation of digital markets through the Digital Markets Act as well as on issues related to artificial intelligence, cyberspace governance and European competitiveness in the light of the Draghi report.[8]

Despite the apparent diversity of these subjects, the same question runs through all these analyses: how are the major economic powers today trying to reconcile the opening of markets, technological innovation, competition, economic security and the preservation of their strategic autonomy? This question is now at the heart of debates on the articulation between industrial and competition policy,[9] as well as on the emergence of new forms of strategic capitalism in developed economies.[10]

From this point of view, Japan is a particularly fertile observatory. Long before the United States and the European Union, it was confronted with the need to simultaneously rethink its industrial policy, its competition policy, its digital strategy and its economic security mechanisms. His experience thus sheds light on several of the questions that now structure Western debates: should competition rules be adapted to geo-economic imperatives? How can we preserve innovation without sacrificing technological sovereignty? How can critical infrastructure, data and sensitive technologies be protected while maintaining a high degree of economic openness? Finally, how can we avoid over-dependence on Chinese value chains and American digital infrastructure?

The central question of this study can therefore be formulated as follows: how has Japan transformed its industrial policy, its competition policy and its economic security strategy in order to preserve its technological autonomy in the face of the double pressure exerted by the industrial rise of China and the digital dominance of the United States?

The hypothesis defended here is that Japan has neither adopted the model of Chinese state capitalism nor sought to reproduce the model of the major American platforms. It has gradually developed an original path based on the preservation of critical technologies, the resilience of value chains, the increasing integration of industrial and digital policies and the emergence of a true economic security doctrine.

To understand the scope of this change, we must start from the geo-economic shock caused by the rise of China and the fragilities it revealed within the Japanese model inherited from the post-war period (I). We will then analyze the responses developed by Tokyo through the gradual transformation of its industrial policy, its competition policy and its digital strategy, in a context marked by the simultaneous rise of manufacturing China and American platforms (II). It will be shown that these developments have gradually led to the construction of a real state of economic security, within which the mastery of critical technologies, the resilience of value chains, artificial intelligence, semiconductors and cybersecurity become central instruments of national power (III). This will highlight the emergence of the Japanese economic security state combining semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity (IV) and underline that Japan has in fact become the precursor of a new strategic capitalism from which it would be appropriate to draw the balance sheet and the main strategic lessons (V). The Japanese case thus appears to be one of the first attempts at a systemic response to the new geo-economic rivalries of the twenty-first century, without American military power and which Europeans would more deserve to recognize.

I. The Chinese shock and the questioning of the Japanese model (2001-2010)

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 opened a new phase in Asian economic history. For Japan, this is not just the emergence of an additional competitor in the world economy, but a much more profound transformation of the environment in which its industrial power has been deployed since the post-war period. In the space of a few years, China’s accelerated integration into global value chains is changing regional economic balances, redistributing comparative advantages within East Asia, and challenging several long-standing positions held by Japanese companies.

This shock comes in a context already marked by the internal fragilities of the Japanese economy. After the bursting of the financial and real estate bubble in the early 1990s, the country struggled to return to the growth rates that had characterized previous decades. The slowdown in productivity, the ageing of the population, the persistence of deflationary tendencies and certain institutional rigidities are gradually weakening the driving forces of the development model built during the period of high growth.

Far from being the result of a single event, the questioning of the Japanese model thus stems from the encounter between external transformations and internal vulnerabilities. On the one hand, the rise of China is shaking up the industrial organization of Asia and giving rise to a competitor of unprecedented magnitude; on the other, the limits of the economic framework inherited from the post-war period are becoming increasingly clear. Understanding the responses subsequently developed by Tokyo therefore requires first analysing the nature of this double challenge.

In this perspective, it is appropriate to examine successively how China’s entry into the WTO contributed to the recomposition of the Asian political economy (A), how this evolution resulted in a relative erosion of several Japanese industrial positions (B), before studying the growing limits of the economic model inherited from MITI and the period of high growth (C).

A. China’s entry into the WTO and the recomposition of the Asian political economy

It is now clear that China’s accession to the World Trade Organization on 11 December 2001 is one of the major turning points in contemporary economic history.[11] Rarely in economic history since the Industrial Revolution has an international institutional decision produced, in such a short period of time, such profound effects on global industrial balances, trade flows, investment strategies and the organization of value chains. While economic globalization has already been well underway since the 1980s, China’s integration into the multilateral trading system has given it a new dimension by providing the world economy with a reservoir of labour, industrial capacity and domestic markets that has no real historical equivalent.[12]

China’s accession to the WTO is not just a trade event, however. It marks the culmination of a process initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from 1978 and accelerated during the 1990s under the impetus of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji.[13] Beijing’s objective was to use international openness as a lever for industrial modernization, technology transfer and upgrading. Unlike the trajectories previously followed by Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, China is undertaking this integration even though it already has a population of more than 1.2 billion inhabitants and considerable manufacturing potential.[14]

The effects of this integration quickly appeared spectacular. Between 2001 and 2010, Chinese exports increased more than fivefold, while China successively became the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods and then the world’s second largest economy.[15] At the same time, foreign direct investment is pouring massively into China, attracted by an exceptional combination of low production costs, rapidly modernizing infrastructure, relative political stability and privileged access to international markets.[16]

This dynamic is profoundly transforming the economic organization of East Asia. While the regional model has traditionally been based on a relatively hierarchical division of labor, often described through the paradigm of the « flying geese pattern« , China is gradually becoming the continent’s main manufacturing assembly center.[17] Asian economies continue to provide components, equipment, technology or capital, but China is emerging as the central node around which regional value chains are now organized, which is being strategically watched closely by Japan.[18]

For Japan, this development is of particular importance. Initially, many Japanese companies are benefiting directly from the Chinese boom. Productive investments are multiplying, exports of intermediate goods are growing, and Japanese industrial groups are actively participating in the construction of new Asian value chains.[19] A form of complementarity then seemed to be established between Japanese technological power and Chinese manufacturing capacities, from which European companies unfortunately completely escaped.

However, this relationship is gradually becoming more complex. As China’s industrial policies promote the acquisition of technology, the development of local innovation capacities, and the emergence of national champions, the initial complementarity gives way to increasing forms of competition.[20] What appeared in the early 2000s as a simple geographical shift in production capacity is gradually turning into a strategic challenge for Japanese industry itself.

China’s entry into the WTO thus ushers in a new phase in the Asian political economy. It is not limited to strengthening regional interdependence; it changed the balance of power within East Asia and called into question the dominant position that Japan had occupied for several decades. The shock facing the Japanese economy is therefore not only the result of increased international competition. More fundamentally, it stems from the emergence of a player whose size, speed of development and technological ambition are gradually leading to a redefinition of the entire regional economic hierarchy.

B. The relative erosion of Japanese industrial power

The transformations brought about by China’s integration into the world economy do not immediately translate into a general weakening of Japanese industry. On the contrary, in the first instance, many companies are directly benefiting from the expansion of regional value chains and the rapid growth of the Chinese market.[21] However, during the 2000s, several converging developments gradually revealed that China’s rise was not only an economic opportunity but also a structural challenge for some of the foundations of Japanese industrial power.

The first sector concerned is consumer electronics. For several decades, Japanese companies had held a dominant position in televisions, audio equipment, cameras, electronic components, and many consumer products.[22] Groups such as Sony, Panasonic, Sharp, Toshiba and NEC had largely contributed to making Japan one of the world references in technological innovation. From the 2000s onwards, however, this dominance was gradually challenged by the simultaneous emergence of South Korean and then Chinese players capable of combining competitive production costs, technological upgrading and active public support.[23] The crisis encountered by several major Japanese groups in consumer electronics appeared to be one of the first visible signs of the shift in Asian industrial balances.

Telecommunications offer a comparable illustration. While Japanese companies have long been among the pioneers of mobile technologies and network equipment, they are gradually struggling to transform their domestic innovations into global standards.[24] At the same time, Chinese groups, benefiting from a large domestic market and massive investments in research and development, are rapidly strengthening their positions in telecommunications equipment. Huawei’s spectacular rise  from the mid-2000s onwards illustrates this more general evolution of technological power relations in Asia.[25]

The shipbuilding industry is another particularly revealing example. For a long time the world’s leading shipbuilder, Japan saw its position gradually challenged and then overtaken by South Korea before China in turn established itself as a major player in the sector.[26] The expansion of Chinese capacities, supported by ambitious industrial policies and the exceptional growth of world maritime trade, is helping to reduce the relative share of Japanese shipbuilders in several segments of the international market.[27]

Beyond these emblematic sectors, the 2000s were marked by increasing pressure on all standardised manufacturing activities. The comparative advantages that had largely supported Japan’s industrial expansion in previous decades are gradually eroding as a result of productive globalization, the rise of emerging economies, and the accelerated diffusion of industrial technologies.[28] While Japanese companies maintain strong positions in many areas, they can no longer rely on the same technological gaps as in the past to maintain their market share.

However, this development does not mean that Japan is disappearing from industry. Several studies have highlighted that the Japanese economy retains considerable advantages in production equipment, machine tools, advanced materials, specialized electronic components, industrial robotics and fine chemicals.[29] China’s rise affects segments exposed to cost competition or technological standardization more than areas with a high intensity of knowledge, accumulated know-how and incremental innovation capabilities.

It is precisely this distinction that gradually emerged during the 2000s. While some emblematic industries are losing their dominant position, others remain remarkably competitive. The challenge facing Japan therefore lies not in the disappearance of its industrial capacities, but in the need to redefine the foundations of its comparative advantage. The question is no longer how to preserve general manufacturing supremacy, but how to focus domestic resources on the most strategic and hardest-to-replicate technology segments.

Thus, far from heralding an irreversible decline, the relative erosion observed in several sectors acts as a revealer. It highlights the need to adapt the Japanese economic model to an environment where competition is no longer only about production volumes, but about mastering technologies, value chains and innovation capacities. This awareness paved the way for the industrial reorientations that would develop over the next decade.

C. The limits of the model inherited from the MITI

The rise of China alone cannot explain the questions that ran through the Japanese economy during the 2000s. While the external competitive shock plays a decisive role, it comes in a context marked by the gradual weakening of several of the drivers that had supported Japan’s exceptional growth during the second half of the twentieth century.[30] The emergence of China thus acts less as the sole cause of Japan’s difficulties than as the revelation of structural changes that have already been underway for more than a decade.

The starting point for this questioning is generally the bursting of the real estate and financial bubble in the early 1990s. After several decades of rapid growth, the Japanese economy is entering a long period of slowdown characterized by persistently weak domestic demand, sustained deflation, hesitant investment, and growth significantly lower than that seen during the boom period.[31] The notion of « lost decade », in the singular, then imposed itself in economic analyses before being gradually replaced by that of « lost decades », in the plural, as the difficulties appeared to be prolonged.[32]

Beyond cyclical fluctuations, this situation reveals the partial exhaustion of certain mechanisms that had ensured the success of the post-war Japanese model. The system built around the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), its attached NEDO,[33] the major banks, integrated industrial groups and strong coordination between public and private actors had demonstrated remarkable efficiency in a context of technological catch-up and accelerated industrialization.[34] On the other hand, its adaptation to a globalized, financialized economy dominated by digital technologies is proving more complex.

Changes in the international environment are gradually reducing the effectiveness of some traditional industrial policy instruments. Financial liberalization, multilateral disciplines stemming from the international trading system, the internationalization of value chains, and the rise of transnational investment limit the policy space available to the Japanese authorities during decades of strong growth.[35] The  » Developmental State  » model, designed to promote industrial catch-up, is facing different challenges than those it has historically overcome.

In addition to these institutional difficulties, there is a demographic challenge of exceptional proportions. By the 1990s, Japan had become one of the first major developed countries to simultaneously face a rapid ageing population, a declining birth rate and a gradual decline in the working population.[36] While Japanese growth had long been based on a continuous increase in available human resources, the economy is now facing a gradual contraction in its demographic potential.

The economic consequences of this development are multiple. The slowdown in the labour force automatically reduces some growth prospects, accentuates tensions on the labour market and reinforces the constraints weighing on public finances through the increase in social and health spending.[37] This situation is gradually leading Japanese decision-makers to look for new engines of competitiveness based more on innovation, automation, robotization and technological upgrading than on the quantitative expansion of factors of production.

The question of productivity also occupied a central place in the economic debates of the time. Despite the excellence of several industrial sectors, the diffusion of productivity gains remained uneven throughout the Japanese economy.[38] Services, in particular, often appear to be less efficient than their American equivalents. Several studies also highlight the potentially negative effects of persistent labour market segmentation, low occupational mobility and certain organisational rigidities inherited from the period of high growth.[39]

At the same time, the digital revolution is exposing new vulnerabilities. While Japan remains a world leader in many industrial fields, it is struggling more to bring out players capable of competing with the American digital giants or with future Chinese platforms.[40] This mismatch between manufacturing excellence and relative weakness in certain segments of the digital economy is one of the major characteristics of the period.

However, it would be wrong to interpret these developments as signs of a general and irreversible decline. Several recent studies have shown that the 2000s also correspond to a phase of profound recomposition of Japanese capitalism.[41] Behind the visible difficulties of certain sectors, transformations have developed that are often less spectacular but potentially decisive: refocusing companies on their core competencies, increasing the internationalization of industrial strategies, the rise of niche technologies, strengthening research and development capacities, as well as a gradual repositioning on the most sophisticated segments of global value chains. [42]

It is precisely in this tension between continuity and adaptation that the real significance of the period 2001-2010 lies. The model inherited from the MITI has not been abandoned or fully preserved. It is entering a phase of gradual transformation in which the traditional instruments of Japanese economic power are being re-evaluated in the light of a profoundly changed environment. The challenge is no longer that of industrial catch-up that marked the post-war period, but that of preserving a technological advantage in a world now structured by Chinese competition, American digital domination and the acceleration of technological innovations.

Thus, at the end of this first decade of the twenty-first century, the Japanese industrial and economic authorities are gradually becoming aware that a simple marginal adaptation will not be enough. The preservation of national economic power requires a more profound redefinition of public policies, industrial priorities and instruments of State action. It is this strategic reorientation that will gradually assert itself from the 2010s onwards and which constitutes the heart of contemporary Japanese industrial policy, which is rapidly and strongly reactive, which Europe will not do until 2025 or even 2026.

II. The reinvention of Japanese industrial policy: from competitiveness to technological sovereignty

At the turn of the 2010s, the Japanese authorities gradually became aware that the difficulties encountered over the past two decades were neither a simple cyclical slowdown nor a temporary adaptation to the effects of globalization. The rise of China, the acceleration of technological transformations, the rise of American digital platforms as well as the fragilities revealed by the long economic stagnation require a deeper reflection on the foundations of national competitiveness.[43]

However, this awareness does not lead to a radical questioning of the country’s economic opening. Contrary to some interpretations sometimes put forward, Japan chooses neither the path of protectionism nor that of state interventionism comparable to Chinese state capitalism. Rather, it is undertaking a gradual transformation of its economic policy instruments in order to preserve its technological advantages in an environment that has become more competitive and uncertain.[44] The objective is no longer just to support growth or exports, but to secure the industrial capacities considered essential to the country’s future prosperity.

This evolution is accompanied by a redefinition of the role of the State. Heir to the MITI, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) no longer seeks to guide the entire national industrial development as during the period of high growth. Its action is more focused on identifying critical technologies, strengthening innovation ecosystems, fostering public-private cooperation and preserving strategic segments of global value chains.[45] The very notion of industrial policy is thus evolving towards an approach that is more focused on technological resilience, innovation and economic security.

At the same time, Japan is gradually becoming aware that the economic competition of the twenty-first century is no longer played out only in traditional industrial sectors. Data, digital infrastructure, platforms, artificial intelligence and communication networks are in turn becoming essential factors of economic power. Faced with the growing dominance of American players and the rapid emergence of Chinese technology giants, Tokyo is seeking to develop an original strategy that reconciles openness, innovation and digital sovereignty.[46]

This reorientation also leads to renewed reflection on the role of competition policy. For a long time, it was conceived mainly as an instrument to guarantee the proper functioning of markets, but it is gradually being mobilised in a broader perspective integrating the imperatives of innovation, competitiveness and economic resilience. Without abandoning the fundamental principles of the market economy, the Japanese authorities are trying to adapt their regulatory framework to an environment marked by technological concentration, network effects and the rise of geo-economic rivalries.[47]

The evolution observed in Japan thus appears to be one of the first attempts to reconcile the traditional principles of the open economy with the new requirements of technological sovereignty. Long before these debates were imposed on the United States or the European Union, Tokyo was already experimenting with the instruments that would later characterize the economic security policies implemented in the main developed economies.

In this perspective, it is necessary to examine successively the return of a strategic state focused on innovation, critical technologies and strategic value chains (A), then the gradual construction of a digital policy aimed at preserving Japan’s place in the data, platform and artificial intelligence economy (B), before studying the way in which competition policy is gradually adapted to the imperatives of competitiveness,  innovation and industrial resilience (C).

A. The return of the strategic state: METI, innovation and critical technologies

The 2010s marked a major inflection point in Japan’s contemporary economic history. After several years dominated by macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural reforms designed to respond to the consequences of the bursting of the bubble of the 1990s, the Japanese authorities are gradually embarking on a more ambitious reflection on the foundations of national competitiveness.[48] This evolution does not reflect a return to the industrial dirigisme characteristic of certain post-war phases, but the emergence of a new conception of public action focused on innovation, critical technologies and the resilience of value chains.

This transformation is part of a profoundly renewed international context. China’s rise is no longer limited to expanding manufacturing capacity. Through successive industrial modernization plans, massive investments in research and development, and the emergence of national champions in strategic sectors, Beijing now has the explicit ambition to become one of the world’s leading technological powers. At the [49] same time, the growing dominance of American companies in digital infrastructure, software, platforms, and data confirms that competition The global economy is gradually moving towards mastering the most advanced technologies.[50]

Faced with these dual developments, Japan undertook to redefine its industrial priorities. The objective is no longer to support the entire national productive apparatus but to concentrate public resources on sectors considered decisive for the country’s future competitiveness. This reorientation marks a significant break with some previous approaches. Where traditional industrial policy sought to promote the general development of entire industrial sectors, Japan’s new strategy focuses on the most sophisticated segments of global value chains, those in which technological barriers remain high and competitive advantages more sustainable.[51]

The Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), heir to the famous MITI, plays a central role in this transformation. However, its function has changed profoundly. It is no longer primarily a question of directing private investment or protecting national sectors from international competition. Its action is more focused on identifying critical technologies, coordinating innovation ecosystems, supporting long-term investments and strengthening Japan’s position in areas considered strategic for the future.[52]

This approach is evident in the various national strategies adopted during the 2010s. The Japanese authorities are gradually focusing on advanced robotics, next-generation materials, precision equipment, biotechnology, quantum technologies, digital infrastructure and semiconductors.[53] In each of these areas, the objective pursued is not only economic. It is also a question of preserving technological capabilities deemed essential to the country’s strategic autonomy.

The case of semiconductors is a particular illustration of this evolution. After dominating the global sector in the 1980s, Japan had gradually lost several positions in the most visible segments of the chip industry. Yet, Japanese companies remain major players in many critical links in the value chain: ultra-specialized materials, production equipment, high-purity chemicals, and components essential to the manufacture of advanced semiconductors.[54] The growing awareness of the strategic nature of these technologies is gradually leading the authorities to strengthen their support for this industrial ecosystem.

This logic is also reflected in the development of robotics and industrial automation. Faced with an ageing population and a shrinking labour force, Japan sees these technologies as a way to maintain its competitiveness while meeting the structural constraints of its economy.[55] Robotics is therefore not only seen as a promising industrial sector; it is becoming a central instrument for adapting to the demographic transition.

One of the most original aspects of this new industrial policy, however, lies in its desire to articulate technological innovation and social transformation. Launched under the Abe government, the so-called « Society 5.0 » strategy illustrates this ambition.[56] Presented as a new stage in economic and social development, it aims to integrate digital technologies, artificial intelligence, big data and connected objects into all economic and social activities. In contrast to some purely technological visions of digital transformation, the Japanese approach explicitly seeks to make innovation a lever for solving the demographic, territorial and social challenges facing the country.[57]

Gradually, Japanese industrial policy is thus ceasing to be solely a competitiveness policy and is also becoming a policy of resilience and technological sovereignty. The notions of critical technologies, strategic dependencies and economic security occupy an increasing place in the reflections of public decision-makers. Long before these concepts became the focus of European and American debates, the Japanese authorities began to consider that certain industrial capacities should be preserved not only for their contribution to growth, but also for their importance in preserving national autonomy.[58]

This development does not represent a return to the ITI model  as it existed during the decades of high growth. Rather, it reflects the emergence of a strategic state adapted to the realities of the twenty-first century: less directive, more based on coordination, innovation and public-private partnerships, but just as aware of the importance of technology as instruments of power. It was this logic that would later pave the way for the emergence of a true Japanese doctrine of economic security.

B. The rise of digital policy: data, platforms, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity

The reorientation of Japanese industrial policy cannot be understood without taking into account the profound transformation of the world economy under the effect of the digital revolution. During the 2010s, data, software, communication infrastructure, digital platforms and artificial intelligence technologies are gradually becoming essential factors for value creation, innovation and economic power.[59] For Japan, this development presents a particular challenge. While the country remains one of the world’s leading industrial powers, it appears to be relatively less well positioned in several strategic segments of the digital economy dominated by large American groups or, increasingly, by Chinese technology companies.[60]

This situation gradually led the Japanese authorities to broaden their conception of industrial policy. Long focused on manufacturing capabilities and physical technologies, it now includes digital infrastructure, data flows and information technologies among the strategic resources essential to national competitiveness. The question is no longer just to preserve production capacities, but also to guarantee access to the digital resources that condition contemporary innovation.[61]

One of the most remarkable features of the Japanese approach is its refusal to adopt the extreme models represented by the United States and China, respectively. On the one hand, the dominance of the major American platforms illustrates the exceptional capacity for innovation of digital capitalism but also raises growing questions about economic concentration, technological dependence and data control. On the other hand, the Chinese model combines digital development, state intervention and tight political control of information infrastructures.[62] Japan is gradually seeking to build a third way that reconciles economic openness, the protection of individual freedoms, technological innovation and national security.

This orientation appears with particular clarity in the promotion of the concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT). First presented by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2019, this initiative aims to foster the international free flow of data while ensuring a high level of trust, security and legal protection.[63] In a context marked by the increasing fragmentation of global cyberspace, Japan is thus trying to promote a digital governance framework capable of preserving the benefits of openness while addressing concerns related to digital sovereignty.

This reflects a broader belief that, contrary to some views of globalization and sovereignty, Japanese authorities believe that the country’s future competitiveness depends on its ability to remain fully integrated into international flows of knowledge, innovation, and data.[64] The objective is therefore not digital closure but the construction of an environment of trust that allows Japan to actively participate in the global data economy.

At the same time, the Japanese authorities are paying increasing attention to the development of artificial intelligence. As early as the second half of the 2010s, several national strategies identified AI as a general technology that has the potential to transform all economic sectors, public services and industrial activities.[65] This orientation is directly in line with the vision of Society 5.0, which envisions the integration of advanced digital technologies into all economic and social activities.

The Japanese approach to artificial intelligence nevertheless has several specificities. Unlike the United States, where the development of AI is mainly based on the initiative of large private technology companies, or China, where the state plays a particularly structuring role, Japan favours a logic of cooperation between public authorities, industry, universities and research centres.[66] The objective is not so much to bring out a few dominant platforms as to ensure a wide dissemination of artificial intelligence capabilities throughout the productive fabric.

This orientation also reflects the specific characteristics of the Japanese economy. Ageing populations, tight labour markets and the need to improve productivity in many sectors are increasing interest in automation, robotisation and applied artificial intelligence technologies. AI thus appears not only as a technological challenge, but also as an instrument for responding to several long-term structural constraints.[67]

Finally, cybersecurity occupies an increasing place in Japanese strategy. As digital infrastructure becomes essential to the functioning of the economy, its protection is gradually being integrated into national security concerns.[68] The Japanese authorities are developing a set of measures designed to strengthen the resilience of networks, the protection of critical infrastructure and the security of technological supply chains.

This is reinforced by rising geopolitical tensions in East Asia and the increasing risks associated with cyberattacks, industrial espionage and technological dependencies. Gradually, the boundaries between industrial policy, digital policy and national security are becoming more porous. Data, software, communications infrastructure, and artificial intelligence capabilities are now considered strategic assets on par with traditional industrial resources.[69]

Thus, during the 2010s, Japan considerably broadened its conception of economic competitiveness. Industrial power is no longer based solely on the mastery of factories, equipment or physical technologies; It also depends on the ability to participate in the global data economy, develop advanced digital technologies and protect the information infrastructures that are essential for the functioning of society. This transformation directly paved the way for the emergence of a true doctrine of economic security that would be fully deployed over the following decade.

C. The Emergence of an Economic Security Doctrine: Towards the Reconciliation of Efficiency and Sovereignty

During the 2010s, Japanese thinking on industrial policy gradually shifted towards a broader approach that explicitly integrated the geopolitical dimensions of the global economy. Globalization is still seen as a powerful driver of prosperity, but it is now also emerging as a potential source of vulnerabilities. The Japanese authorities are becoming aware that certain technological, industrial or digital dependencies can be exploited for economic or strategic pressure. This awareness gradually led to the emergence of a real doctrine of economic security, which constitutes one of the most important intellectual developments in contemporary Japanese industrial policy.[70]

Several factors contribute to this transformation. The first is the rise of China, which has become not only a major trading partner but also a leading technological competitor. As Chinese companies make progress in the telecommunications, artificial intelligence, electric batteries or advanced industrial equipment sectors, the Japanese authorities are increasingly questioning the strategic implications of certain economic dependencies.[71] The Sino-American rivalry, which intensified from the second half of the 2010s, further reinforced this concern by making critical technologies appear as potential instruments of power and coercion.

The second factor is the increasing disruption of global supply chains. Long before the Covid-19 pandemic, several episodes had already revealed the fragilities of a productive organization based on extremely extensive and highly specialized networks. The natural disasters that struck Japan, including the Fukushima earthquake and nuclear accident in 2011, had themselves highlighted the risks associated with certain industrial concentrations and insufficient diversification of production capacity.[72] These experiences are gradually leading public authorities to integrate resilience among the legitimate objectives of industrial policy.

In this context, the very notion of economic efficiency is being re-evaluated. For several decades, the dominant logic had favoured cost optimisation, international specialisation and globalised production chains. Without calling into question the fundamental benefits of economic opening, the Japanese authorities are nevertheless beginning to consider that the exclusive search for efficiency can generate excessive vulnerabilities. Resilience, redundancy of certain capacities and the securing of strategic supplies are gradually becoming complementary criteria of economic performance.[73]

One of the reasons for this is the growing focus on critical or emerging technologies. Semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, digital infrastructure, advanced materials, batteries, quantum technologies and artificial intelligence are increasingly perceived as strategic assets whose control conditions both economic competitiveness and national autonomy.[74] Japan already has significant strengths in several of these areas, including high-performance chemical materials, some semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and advanced industrial technologies. The objective is therefore not to build new capabilities from scratch, but to preserve and strengthen positions deemed essential in the long term.

At the same time, Japanese authorities are gradually developing mechanisms to better protect sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure. Controls on foreign investment, the protection of intellectual property, the monitoring of technology transfers and the security of digital networks are becoming increasingly visible components of public action.[75] This brings Japan closer to a broader trend in many advanced economies, where the traditional boundaries between industrial policy, trade policy, and national security policy are blurring.

However, the Japanese approach retains an important distinguishing feature. Unlike some more explicitly protectionist strategies, it does not aim to substitute a logic of autarky for that of interdependence. Japanese officials, on the other hand, believe that the country’s prosperity remains closely linked to its integration into the world economy. Economic security is therefore conceived less as a policy of closure than as a policy of reducing excessive vulnerabilities and diversifying dependencies.[76] The aim is to strike a balance between openness and protection, between international integration and the preservation of national strategic interests.

This approach appears particularly consistent with the broader vision of the international economic order defended by Japan since the 2010s. Faced with the simultaneous rise of geopolitical tensions and protectionist temptations, Tokyo is seeking to promote an economic system based on common rules, trade transparency and cooperation between open economies. Initiatives such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and international data governance illustrate this desire to reconcile economic openness and strategic security.[77]

Thus, on the eve of the 2020s, the nature of Japanese industrial policy has profoundly changed. Without abandoning the traditional objectives of competitiveness and innovation, it is now increasingly integrating the issues of resilience, technological sovereignty and national security. This evolution gradually led to an original synthesis between the imperatives of the open economy and those of power, directly preparing the more ambitious reforms that would be undertaken under the governments of the following decade, in particular with the adoption of the Economic Security Law of 2022. Japanese industrial policy then entered a new phase in which economic competitiveness, technological autonomy and national security were now thought of as closely interdependent objectives.

D. Society 5.0 and the integration of industry with digital

From the mid-2010s, Japanese industrial policy underwent a new inflection with the emergence of the concept of Society 5.0, which is undoubtedly one of the most ambitious formulations of the national strategy for economic transformation. Officially presented as part of the Fifth Basic Plan for Science and Technology adopted in 2016, this vision aims to go beyond the simple digitization of productive activities to organize a deep integration between the physical and digital worlds.[78]

The reference to a « fifth society » refers to a historical reading of human evolution. After hunting societies, agrarian societies, industrial societies and information societies, Japan is proposing the advent of a new phase of development characterized by the widespread interconnection of individuals, enterprises, infrastructures and objects through advanced digital technologies.[79] The objective is not only to improve economic competitiveness but also to respond to several major structural challenges facing the country, including the ageing population, the contraction of the working population, the growing need for health services and the development gaps between territories.

This approach differs from the digital strategies developed in other major powers. In the United States, the digital revolution has largely been structured around the rise of private platforms and large technology companies. In China, it is more in line with a framework combining industrial development, state power and control of digital infrastructure. Japan, for its part, is seeking to put digital technologies at the service of modernizing the entire productive fabric and solving concrete economic and social problems.[80]

The concept of Society 5.0 is based on the convergence of several technologies considered strategic: artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, the Internet of Things, big data, cloud computing, cyber-physical systems and high-speed communication networks.[81] The ambition is to enable a continuous flow of information between equipment, infrastructure and economic actors in order to improve decision-making, productive efficiency and value creation.

This orientation naturally extends the historical comparative advantages of Japanese industry. For several decades, the country’s companies have held leading positions in industrial robotics, sensors, automation equipment, precision machine tools, and advanced electronic components. The digital transformation thus appears as a way to enhance the value of these accumulated skills rather than as a break with the existing industrial model.[82] Contrary to some analyses predicting the decline of the manufacturing industry, the Japanese authorities consider that the digital revolution offers an opportunity to strengthen the competitiveness of industrial production.

This logic is reflected in particular in the promotion of « smart manufacturing ». Inspired by some European initiatives such as Germany’s Industry 4.0, the Japanese authorities are encouraging the integration of digital technologies into all production processes: predictive maintenance, advanced automation, logistics optimization, real-time quality control and production customization.[83] The aim is to simultaneously increase the productivity, flexibility and innovative capacity of companies.

 METI plays a central role in this transformation. Rather than favouring a policy of targeted support for a few major national champions, it seeks to disseminate digital technologies throughout the productive fabric, including among small and medium-sized enterprises, which constitute an essential component of Japanese capitalism.[84] This reflects the belief that national competitiveness depends less on a few isolated successes than on the ability of the economy as a whole to adopt new technologies.

Digital transformation is also seen as a response to the structural challenges that the Japanese economy has been facing for several decades. The shrinking labour force limits the scope for extensive growth and reinforces the importance of productivity gains. In this context, automation, robotization and the exploitation of data appear to be essential instruments to maintain the level of production and support the country’s potential growth.[85] Digital technology is thus becoming a lever for competitiveness but also a tool for demographic adaptation.

Beyond the industrial sector, Society 5.0 aims to promote a more global transformation of the economy and society. The fields of health, transport, energy, education and public services are gradually being integrated into this overall vision. Industrial policy is no longer aimed solely at supporting certain productive sectors; It aims to organize a complete innovation ecosystem in which digital infrastructure becomes a central factor in economic development.[86]

Thus, during the 2010s, Japan profoundly broadened its conception of industrial policy. The challenge is no longer just to preserve manufacturing capacities or support strategic sectors, but to build an integrated economy where digital technologies strengthen the entire production system. With Society 5.0, the country seeks to transform its historical industrial strengths into competitive advantages adapted to the digital age. This ambition directly prepares the subsequent debates on data, digital platforms and technological sovereignty that will occupy an increasing place in the following decade.

III – Competition, digital technology and data: the adaptation of Japanese capitalism

The transformation of Japanese industrial policy cannot be fully understood without analysing the changes that simultaneously affect the functioning of markets, the circulation of data and the organisation of the global digital economy. As digital platforms become central players in value creation, the issues of competition, regulation and economic sovereignty are becoming increasingly important. Economic power is no longer based solely on the mastery of industrial capacities or production technologies; It also depends on the control of data, digital infrastructures and technological ecosystems that structure contemporary exchanges.

For Japan, this development poses a particular challenge. While the country remains a major industrial and technological power, it does not have players comparable to the major American digital groups or Chinese platforms that now dominate a growing part of the global economy. This situation forces it to seek original solutions in order to preserve its economic autonomy while remaining deeply integrated into international flows of innovation and trade.

This reflection first leads the Japanese authorities to re-examine the role of competition policy in a context marked by the rise of large global companies and the rise of China. The aim is to understand how the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) tries to articulate market opening, national competitiveness and protection of the domestic economic fabric. The first section will analyse the adaptation of Japanese competition policy to the new realities of globalisation.

The second section will then look at the specific challenges posed by the digital economy. The dominance of American platforms in the fields of cloud, search engines, operating systems and digital services places Japan in a situation of relative technological dependence that feeds new questions about the control of strategic infrastructures and data.

Finally, the third section will examine the original response developed by the Japanese authorities to this dual American and Chinese influence. Through the concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), data governance initiatives, and debates on digital sovereignty, Japan is gradually seeking to build a middle way that reconciles economic openness, technological innovation, and strategic autonomy.

The central question then becomes the following: how to preserve the economic and technological autonomy of a major industrial power that does not have the main digital giants in the world but remains closely integrated into the global data economy?

Thus, the analysis will be carried out in three stages. It will first examine the way in which Japanese competition policy has adapted to globalization and the rise of China, revealing the first tensions between market logic and strategic considerations (A). We will then show how this competitive architecture is profoundly destabilized by the rise of digital markets dominated by large American platforms, which introduce new forms of concentration and technological dependence (B). Finally, we will analyze the Japanese response to this double American and Chinese constraint, through the search for a « third way » based on data governance and the principle of Data Free Flow with Trust, outlining the contours of economic autonomy without dominant digital power (C).

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A. Japan’s competition policy put to the test by globalisation and China

The transformation of Japanese capitalism during the 2000s and 2010s is not only about industrial policy or technological adaptation. It also affects the way in which the authorities understand the functioning of markets and the conditions of competition. In a context marked by the globalization of trade, the rise of China and the emergence of new digital players, competition policy is gradually becoming an increasingly important instrument of national economic strategy. The challenge is no longer just to guarantee the proper functioning of domestic markets; it is also about preserving Japan’s ability to remain competitive in a profoundly changed international environment.[87]

This development is taking place in a country whose economic tradition differs significantly from that of the United States. During the period of strong post-war growth, the Japanese authorities had often favoured industrial coordination, sectoral cooperation and the stability of large groups rather than a strictly competitive vision of the markets. Without calling into question the fundamental principles of the market economy, the Japanese model had long given an important place to consultation mechanisms between administrations, companies and financial institutions.[88] Competition policy was therefore in a relatively secondary position in relation to the objectives of industrial development.

From the 1990s onwards and more clearly in the following decades, this hierarchy of priorities nevertheless began to evolve. Prolonged economic stagnation, the increasing openness of the Japanese economy and the reforms undertaken in the context of market liberalization are leading to a gradual reassessment of the role of competition as a factor of economic efficiency and innovation.[89] Increasingly, the authorities believe that more contestable markets can foster the emergence of new players, accelerate the diffusion of technology, and improve overall productivity.

This development is reflected in particular in the strengthening of the role of the JFTC, the independent authority responsible for the enforcement of the anti-monopoly law. Created in 1947 in the context of post-war reforms, the JFTC gradually saw its means of action strengthened during the 2000s and 2010s. Its powers in the areas of investigation, sanctions and merger control are being expanded in order to bring the Japanese system closer to the standards observed in other major developed economies.[90] This rise reflects the growing conviction that long-term competitiveness depends not only on supporting businesses, but also on the existence of dynamic and innovative markets.

Japanese competition doctrine is also evolving under the influence of technological transformations. The authorities are gradually becoming aware that productivity gains and innovation are based less and less on large traditional manufacturing companies alone and more on the entry capacity of new players, often carriers of disruptive technologies. From this perspective, competition no longer appears only as a mechanism for price control or the prevention of cartels, but also as a condition for the renewal of the productive fabric, the diffusion of innovations and the permanent adaptation of the economy to technological change.[91] This development partially brought Japan closer to the debates at the OECD and the International Competition Network (ICN) that were developing in the United States and Europe at the time around the links between economic concentration, innovation and entrepreneurial dynamism.[92]

However, Japan’s approach to competition remains marked by a constant concern for international competitiveness. Contrary to some conceptions that privilege exclusively consumer welfare or allocative efficiency, the Japanese authorities generally seek to articulate competitive objectives with the imperatives of national economic development.[93] This feature partially brings Japan closer to certain European approaches, in which competition policy is part of a broader reflection on market structure, productive capacities and long-term competitiveness.

This specificity is also due to the place occupied by exports and high-tech industries in the Japanese economic model. Policymakers remain aware that the country’s prosperity depends largely on the ability of its companies to compete internationally in technology-intensive sectors. Therefore, competition is not seen as an end in itself but as an instrument designed to promote economic efficiency while preserving the investment, innovation and upmarket capacities of national companies.[94]

The increasing internationalization of companies is another factor of transformation. Major M&A transactions now involve groups with a presence on several continents and often involve competition authorities in different jurisdictions. The JFTC is thus developing closer cooperation with its American, European and Asian counterparts in order to deal with cases with a transnational dimension.[95] This reflects Japan’s growing integration into a global economy where decisions made by a few large companies can affect several domestic markets simultaneously.

However, the rise of China introduces a new dimension to the competition debates. The rapid emergence of Chinese companies, sometimes benefiting from direct or indirect state support, raises growing questions about the conditions of competition in international markets. In several industrial sectors, Japanese firms face competitors whose financing structures, policy objectives or relations with the government differ significantly from those observed in traditional market economies.[96]

Beyond the sole question of market share, the rise of Chinese groups is helping to call into question certain assumptions that have accompanied the expansion of globalization since the 1990s. The idea that international economic integration would gradually lead to a convergence of capitalist models appears to be increasingly contested. The Japanese authorities are observing the emergence of a system in which powerful industrial and technological groups can benefit from various forms of public support while participating fully in global competition.[97] This situation is fuelling a growing reflection on the relationship between competition, industrial policy and economic power.

This development gradually led to a broadening of the Japanese authorities’ field of reflection. While competition policy had long been conceived mainly as a mechanism to ensure the proper functioning of markets, it is now confronted with challenges that also relate to geoeconomics and technological power. The question is no longer just whether markets remain competitive, but also whether certain economic structures are likely to affect the country’s strategic autonomy or capacity for innovation.

This concern is particularly visible in the area of foreign investment control. Without calling into question the general opening of the Japanese economy, several reforms introduced at the end of the 2010s strengthen the monitoring of equity investments in sectors considered strategic. Advanced technologies, critical infrastructure, telecommunications and certain defence-related activities are now the subject of increased attention from the public authorities.[98] The aim is not to limit international investment as such, but to take better account of its potential implications in terms of economic and technological security.

These developments reflect the gradual emergence of an overlapping zone between competition policy and strategic concerns. For a long time, the two areas were based on largely different logics: competition aimed to improve the functioning of markets, while national security was a matter of foreign policy or defence. However, technological globalization is gradually blurring this separation. The acquisition of innovative companies, the control of certain digital infrastructures, access to data and the mastery of critical technologies now have both an economic and a strategic dimension.[99]

Without yet talking about a real doctrine of economic security, the 2010s saw the emergence of the first intellectual elements of what would become one of the major axes of Japanese policy over the following decade. Debates on competition are no longer only about the efficiency of markets but also about the conditions for preserving economic power in an international environment increasingly marked by technological rivalries.

Thus, during the 2010s, Japanese competition policy underwent a significant transformation. For a long time subordinated to the objectives of industrial development, it gradually became one of the instruments of Japanese capitalism’s adaptation to globalization. However, this development does not lead to the adoption of a purely liberal view of markets. On the contrary, the Japanese authorities are seeking to reconcile competition, innovation, competitiveness and the preservation of national productive capacities. As the global economy becomes more digitized and data becomes a strategic resource, this balancing act will face even more complex challenges posed by digital platforms, network effects, and the increasing concentration of economic power in the digital world.

B. Digital markets in the face of American domination

The contemporary evolution of global capitalism is characterized by a profound transformation of the structure of markets as a result of the digitalization of the economy. While traditional competition policy is largely based on the assumption of fragmented markets, characterised by a plurality of relatively comparable players, digital markets on the contrary present strongly centripetal dynamics. Network effects, data-driven economies of scale, and high switching costs lead to winner-takes-most structures  , in which a few companies concentrate a very large share of the value and control of critical infrastructure.[100] In addition to these mechanisms, there is a new dimension: data becomes a cumulative factor of production, which mechanically reinforces the positions acquired, making markets more difficult to contest than in traditional industrial industries.[101]

In this context, the major American platforms occupy a central position. They are no longer limited to specific sectors of the digital economy, but now structure entire ecosystems integrating online search, e-commerce, targeted advertising, operating systems, cloud services and data processing infrastructures. This vertical and horizontal integration gives these companies an intermediation capacity that is unparalleled in history, allowing them to control both access to markets and the conditions of economic visibility of the actors who participate in them.[102] Their power lies not only in their size, but in their role as architects of the digital markets themselves.

For Japan, this situation is a structural challenge. Unlike the traditional manufacturing industry, in which Japanese companies maintain strong, even dominant positions in certain segments, the digital economy is largely structured around foreign standards, technological architectures and platforms. Japanese companies often appear as users or integrators of technologies developed elsewhere rather than as producers of global standards. This situation creates a form of technological dependence that is not only related to economic performance, but also to the very organization of markets and digital infrastructures.[103] Dependence here is less commercial than systemic.

Japanese competition policy, as analysed in the previous section, is therefore confronted with conceptual and operational limitations. The traditional tools of antimonopoly law have been designed to deal with situations of dominance based on price, market share or collusive behaviour. However, in the platform economy, dominance is based less on price than on the control of data, interfaces and network effects. The apparent free nature of many digital services masks value-capture mechanisms based on the collection, analysis and monetization of user data, as Lina Khan pointed out before becoming Chair of the  US Federal Trade Commission under the Biden administration.[104] The market is no longer just a space for exchange, but a system for capturing and processing information.

This transformation also makes it more complex to identify dominant positions. A company can offer free services while exercising considerable market power thanks to its ability to organize access to information, to guide user behavior or to structure economic interactions. The traditional boundaries between competition, sectoral regulation and industrial policy are thus becoming increasingly porous. The question of market power can no longer be dissociated from that of the technical architecture of digital systems.

In this context, Japan is faced with a double difficulty. On the one hand, it has to deal with an increasing dependence on US digital infrastructure, particularly in the areas  of cloud computing, operating systems and platform services. On the other hand, it must ensure that this dependence does not result in a lasting loss of innovation capacity or control over digital value chains.[105] This infrastructural dependence is all the more sensitive because it concerns critical layers of the contemporary economy, where productivity gains are now concentrated.

This situation raises a more general question: how can we ensure the proper competitive functioning of markets structured by powerful network effects and by the centrality of data? The answer can no longer be limited to a strict application of classic antitrust rules. It involves a broader reflection on the architecture of digital ecosystems, data portability, interoperability of services and the conditions of entry of new players. Several recent studies thus underline the shift from a logic of competition in the market to a logic of competition for the market, where the central issue becomes that of access to essential digital infrastructures.[106]

It is in this context that Japanese thinking on data governance and the conditions for fair digital competition is gradually taking shape. Far from seeking to replicate American or Chinese models, Japan is beginning to explore a specific approach aimed at preserving the benefits of digital innovation while limiting the effects of excessive concentration. This balancing act will directly prepare the diplomatic and regulatory initiatives related to the DFFT, which will be the focus of the next section. The debate is therefore no longer just about the regulation of digital markets, but about the very rules for the circulation and organization of data on a global scale.

Thus, the digital economy is not only a new growth sector; it profoundly transforms the very conditions of competition, forcing the Japanese authorities to rethink the instruments inherited from traditional economic law.

C. Japan in search of a third way between Washington and Beijing

The rise of American digital platforms and the consolidation of a Chinese model based on the close integration between the state, industry and digital infrastructure place Japan in a unique situation. Caught between two dominant poles, each with a specific conception of the relationship between the economy, data and sovereignty, Japan is faced with a structural difficulty: preserving its integration into the global economy while avoiding excessive dependence on digital architectures that are largely beyond its control. This tension is gradually leading to the emergence of an original reflection on data governance and on the conditions for a more balanced international digital order.[107]

In this context, the Japanese authorities are developing the idea that it is no longer enough to regulate digital markets on a national scale. Data circulates on a global scale, while technical infrastructures are concentrated between a small number of actors and jurisdictions. The issue of regulation thus becomes inseparable from that of cross-border data flows, technical standards and interoperability standards. Economic competition can no longer be thought of independently of the international organization of information systems.[108]

It is in this perspective that the concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) emerged, proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2019. This initiative aims to promote the free flow of data on a global scale, while guaranteeing trust mechanisms based on the protection of privacy, the security of infrastructures and the transparency of uses.[109] Japan is thus seeking to avoid two symmetrical pitfalls: on the one hand, the fragmentation of cyberspace into competing digital blocks; on the other, a total liberalization of data flows without sufficient legal framework.

The DFFT must therefore be understood as an attempt to build an intermediate normative framework. Unlike the American model, which is largely based on the self-regulation of platforms and the primacy of private innovation, and unlike the Chinese model, which is characterized by extensive state control of digital infrastructure, the Japanese approach is based on multilateral data governance involving states, international organizations, and private actors.[110] The aim is not to restrict digital flows but to make them compatible with minimum requirements of trust and legal certainty.

This position reflects a specific constraint of Japan. The country is highly integrated into global value chains and relies heavily on access to data flows for its industrial, logistics and service activities. At the same time, it does not have digital players capable of imposing their own standards on a global scale. This structural asymmetry explains the search for a multilateral framework in which the rules of the game would be defined collectively rather than dictated by a few dominant technological powers.[111]

The DFFT is also part of a broader evolution of Japanese economic diplomacy. Japan is gradually trying to promote international rules that promote the flow of data and the interoperability of digital systems, including through the G7, the OECD and regional trade agreements. This strategy aims to place data governance within a framework based on the principles of transparency, protection of rights and continuity of economic exchanges.[112]

However, the practical implementation of this principle faces several difficulties. The concept of « trust » remains difficult to define legally and varies according to political systems and regulatory traditions. Divergences between the American, European and Chinese approaches to data protection, cybersecurity or digital sovereignty limit the possibility of a truly universal framework. The DFFT thus appears less as a fully stabilized regime than as a normative horizon under construction.[113]

Despite these limitations, this initiative occupies a central place in the Japanese strategy. It allows Japan to position itself as an intermediary normative actor, capable of dialoguing with the two major poles of digital power while defending an open but regulated conception of data flows. This stance reflects a constant in contemporary Japanese economic policy: seeking institutional balances that preserve international integration while reducing power asymmetries.

Thus, Japanese thinking on data and its governance is a direct extension of the transformations observed in the previous sections. The limits of competition law in relation to platforms, the technological dependence on American infrastructures and the rise of Chinese models of digital capitalism converge on the same question: how to organize a global economic space whose foundations are now based on data flows? The DFFT is Japan’s most elaborate response to this question, pending the more radical changes that will emerge with the institutionalization of economic security in the following decade.

At the end of this analysis, the transformation of Japanese capitalism appears in a new light. Far from being limited to a technical adaptation to digital transformations, it reveals a more profound reconfiguration of the conditions of competition and economic sovereignty. The rise of American platforms, the structuring of a Chinese model based on the integration between the state and digital infrastructures, and the growing centrality of data have gradually shifted the center of gravity of global economic policy.

Faced with these developments, Japan has tried to build an original response, combining adaptation of competition law, reflection on the governance of digital markets and promotion of an international framework based on the principle of DFFT. This strategy testifies to a real effort to preserve a form of normative autonomy in an economic universe dominated by global players with powerful capacities for technological and infrastructural influence.

However, this approach also highlights its own limitations. The DFFT, as ambitious as it is, is based on the assumption of a cooperative digital order between great powers, even as the geopolitical fragmentation of cyberspace and the Sino-American technological rivalry tend to intensify. In an environment where digital infrastructures are becoming instruments of power as well as vectors of exchange, the mere production of standards is no longer enough to guarantee the control of strategic dependencies.

It is precisely this tension that opens the next phase of Japanese transformation. As digital interdependencies become potential vulnerabilities, the issue is no longer limited to organizing competition or governing data, but to protecting critical capabilities themselves. The transition from a logic of regulation to a logic of security thus marks the beginning of a new stage: that of the emergence of a true state of economic security, where semiconductors, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity become the pivots of a renewed power strategy.

IV – The Emergence of the Economic Security State: Semiconductors, AI and Cybersecurity

The 2020s marked a decisive shift in the trajectory of Japanese industrial policy. After gradually integrating the challenges of digital technology, competition and data governance, Japan is taking a further step by explicitly placing the notion of economic security at the heart of its public action. It is no longer just a question of adapting traditional industrial policy instruments to globalisation or regulating digital markets, but of actively protecting the technological capacities deemed essential to the country’s economic sovereignty.

This development is the product of a combination of factors: the intensification of Sino-American tensions, the weakening of global supply chains revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the increased awareness of technological vulnerabilities in critical areas. In this new context, economic interdependencies are no longer only perceived as vectors of efficiency, but also as potential sources of strategic dependence and systemic vulnerability.

Japanese economic policy was then organized around a new architecture whose central objective was the resilience of critical infrastructure and the security of strategic technologies. Three main dimensions structure this transformation. First, the gradual institutionalization of economic security through new legislative and administrative frameworks (A). Secondly, the return of technological policies targeted around semiconductors and high-tech industries, marking a reaffirmation of the strategic state (B). Finally, the integration of issues related to artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and the robustness of value chains in a global logic of economic resilience (C).

This recomposition reflects the emergence of a new paradigm: that of a capitalism where economic power is no longer measured only by the competitiveness of companies, but also by the state’s ability to secure the technological foundations of production.

A. The Institutionalization of Economic Security in Japan

Japan’s entry into an explicit logic of economic security is one of the most significant developments in its industrial policy since the post-war period. For a long time, the Japanese authorities had favoured a relatively flexible conception of economic security, understood as the stability of energy supplies and the general resilience of the open economy. From the early 2020s, this notion is gradually expanding and structuring itself into a real institutional framework covering critical technologies, strategic supply chains and critical infrastructure.

This shift is formalized by the adoption of the Economic Security Promotion Act in 2022, which marks a decisive step in the integration of security considerations into Japanese economic policy. This text introduces a set of measures aimed at strengthening the resilience of supply chains, securing sensitive technologies, protecting critical infrastructure and regulating dependence on certain foreign suppliers in strategic sectors.[114]

The underlying logic of this reform is based on a profound transformation of the perception of economic interdependencies. Where globalization was traditionally conceived as a vector of efficiency and growth, it is now also analyzed from the perspective of the potential vulnerabilities it can generate. Component shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions over semiconductors and technological restrictions imposed in the context of the Sino-American rivalry have played a catalytic role in this strategic rereading of economic dependence.[115]

In this context, economic security is not limited to protection against exogenous shocks. It also includes a proactive dimension to identify, anticipate and reduce critical dependencies in the most sensitive technology sectors. The Japanese government is thus equipping itself with new instruments for analysis, administrative coordination and intervention that make it possible to act upstream of disruptions in the value chain or restrictions on access to essential technologies.[116]

This institutionalization also reflects a change in the role of the state in the Japanese economy. Without returning to the dirigiste model of post-war development, public authorities reaffirm their ability to guide technological and industrial choices when sovereignty or resilience issues are identified. Economic security thus becomes a space of articulation between industrial policy, trade policy and economic defence policy, further blurring the traditional boundaries between these areas.[117]

Finally, this development places Japan in a broader movement observable in the main advanced economies, where the rise of geopolitical considerations is leading to a reconfiguration of economic policies. However, Japan’s specificity lies in the search for a balance between international openness and securing critical capabilities, avoiding both protectionist closure and uncontrolled dependence.

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B. The return of strategic technology policies

The establishment of an institutional framework for economic security in the early 2020s quickly resulted in an assumed reactivation of targeted industrial policies, particularly in sectors considered critical for technological sovereignty. Among these, semiconductors occupy a central place. Their structuring role in the entire digital economy — from artificial intelligence to communication infrastructures, from the automotive industry to industrial systems — makes them a nerve center of global technological competition.[118]

Japan has historically had significant strengths in this industry, including manufacturing equipment, advanced materials, and some high-precision technology niches. However, from the 2000s onwards, its relative position eroded in the face of the rise of South Korea and especially Taiwan, which had become a central player in global manufacturing with TSMC. This recomposition of value chains is leading the Japanese authorities to reconsider their strategic positioning, not only in terms of industrial competitiveness, but in terms of structural dependence on foreign advanced production capacities.[119]

In this context, the Japanese strategy is based on a double logic. On the one hand, it is a question of securing access to the most advanced production capacities through international partnerships, in particular with TSMC, whose establishment of factories in Japan marks an important step in the regional reconfiguration of semiconductor value chains.[120] These investments are not solely based on the logic of economic attractiveness, but are explicitly part of a resilience strategy aimed at diversifying production points within allied economies.

On the other hand, Japan is seeking to rebuild autonomous production capacity in the most advanced technology segments, especially in the next-generation semiconductor range. It is in this perspective that the Rapidus project is part of this perspective, launched with the direct support of the Japanese government and in cooperation with several major national industrial groups.[121] The stated objective is ambitious: to enable Japan to regain state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing capacity by the second half of the 2020s, relying in particular on technological partnerships with American players.[122]

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This strategy illustrates a significant evolution in the role of the state in the Japanese economy. In contrast to the liberalisation period of the 1990s and 2000s, when public intervention was more indirect and horizontal, here we see a return to explicitly targeted forms of industrial policy, based on massive investments, public subsidies and close coordination between public and private actors. METI plays a central role in this orchestration, identifying critical technologies and structuring the industrial coalitions needed for their development.[123]

However, the issue goes beyond the question of industrial production. In a context marked by the intensification of Sino-American tensions over advanced technologies, semiconductors are becoming a central instrument of global geoeconomic rivalry. U.S. restrictions on exports of advanced technologies to China, controls on lithography equipment, and industrial relocation policies are contributing to fragmenting the global semiconductor market into partially interdependent but strategically differentiated blocks.[124]

Japan thus finds itself in a delicate but strategic intermediate position. On the one hand, it is closely integrated into the US technology alliance, particularly in the areas of critical equipment and export restrictions to China. On the other hand, it remains dependent on Taiwanese and Korean production capacities for a large part of its industrial needs. This situation leads to a strategy of diversification of dependencies rather than to a logic of complete autonomy.

In this context, Japan’s semiconductor policy can be read as an attempt to rebuild a « pivotal capacity » in global value chains. It is not a question of regaining global industrial dominance, but of ensuring that Japan maintains an indispensable role in the most critical segments of technological production. This logic of strategic positioning, rather than domination, is an essential characteristic of Japan’s new industrial policy.[125]

Finally, this recomposition is part of a broader movement of partial reterritorialization of technological value chains. The Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and the risks of supply disruptions have accelerated an awareness shared by the major advanced economies: certain industrial dependencies can become strategic vulnerabilities. In this context, semiconductors appear to be the paradigmatic sector where the convergence between industrial policy, economic security and global technological rivalry crystallizes.

Thus, far from constituting a simple return to industrial dirigisme, Japan’s semiconductor policy illustrates the emergence of a new form of public intervention, selective, targeted and deeply inserted into international technological alliances. It directly prepares the challenges of the next part, dedicated to artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and the global resilience of value chains.

C. Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity and Value Chain Resilience

The rise of Japan’s economic security policies cannot be fully understood without integrating the now central dimension of advanced digital technologies, foremost among which are artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. These technologies are no longer autonomous sectors, but transversal infrastructures that structure the entire contemporary economy. They condition industrial productivity, the performance of services, the logistics management of value chains and the ability of governments to protect their strategic assets.[126]

In this context, artificial intelligence occupies a special position. It is at the same time a technology for optimizing industrial processes, a lever for automation in the face of Japan’s aging population, and an instrument for the organizational transformation of companies. As early as the late 2010s, the Japanese authorities identified AI as a general purpose technology capable of profoundly changing all production structures, which led to its gradual integration into national industrial strategies, in particular through the framework of Society 5.0.[127]

However, the development of artificial intelligence also poses new problems in terms of technological dependence. The most advanced models, HPC capabilities, and cloud computing infrastructure  are largely concentrated among a few U.S. players, limiting the scope for autonomy of advanced economies, including Japan. Access to computing capacity, big data and software ecosystems is thus becoming a strategic issue in the same way as access to raw materials or traditional industrial technologies.[128]

At the same time, cybersecurity is emerging as an essential dimension of contemporary economic security. The digitization of critical infrastructures — energy, transport, finance, telecommunications — mechanically increases the surface area of exposure to the risks of attacks, espionage and systemic disruption. Japan, as an economy highly dependent on its digital infrastructure, is gradually developing a resilience doctrine based on the proactive protection of networks and the security of connected industrial systems.[129]

This development is reinforced by the increase in geopolitical tensions in the digital space. State cyberattacks, industrial espionage operations and informational destabilization strategies contribute to blurring the boundaries between the economy, internal security and national defense. In this context, cybersecurity is no longer a technical or sectoral issue, but an essential component of economic sovereignty.[130]

One of the most significant aspects of this transformation is the increasing integration between artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and value stream management. Global production chains, already fragmented and interconnected, are becoming complex digital systems, dependent on continuous data flows and algorithmic optimization systems. This development increases both their effectiveness and their vulnerability. A localized disruption, whether technical, cyber or geopolitical, can now have cascading effects on entire sectors of the global economy.[131]

Faced with these risks, Japan is developing an approach focused on the notion of resilience. It is no longer just a question of securing isolated infrastructures, but of guaranteeing the functional continuity of economic systems as a whole. This logic implies increased coordination between public and private actors, a detailed mapping of critical dependencies and an ability to anticipate systemic risks. The Japanese government is thus strengthening its strategic analysis capabilities, while relying on companies for the operational implementation of security systems.[132]

This orientation reflects a more general evolution of the role of the state in advanced economies. The latter no longer intervenes solely to correct market failures, but to structure the conditions for the robustness of economic systems in the face of increasingly frequent technological and geopolitical shocks. The boundary between industrial policy, digital policy and security policy is thus gradually becoming inseparable.

From this perspective, the Japanese case appears particularly revealing. Without the global platforms or hegemonic capabilities of the United States or China, Japan is trying to build a resilience strategy based on mastering critical technologies, integrating value chains and securing digital infrastructure. Artificial intelligence and cybersecurity are therefore not only subjects of technological policy: they are becoming the central instruments of a global strategy to preserve national economic capacities.

Thus, the convergence between AI, cybersecurity and the resilience of value chains marks the logical outcome of the transformation that has been underway since the 2010s. It directly prepares the transition to a security economy, in which power is no longer measured solely by industrial competitiveness or technological innovation, but by the ability of states to guarantee the continuity and robustness of their economic systems in an unstable global environment.

At the end of this fourth part, Japan appears to be engaged in a transformation that goes far beyond the traditional framework of industrial policy. The succession of reforms relating to economic security, the revival of targeted technological policies and the integration of issues related to artificial intelligence and cybersecurity are shaping the emergence of a new order of public intervention, in which the State is no longer content to support market dynamics, but seeks to guarantee their structural robustness.

However, this movement cannot be interpreted as a simple return to the model of directed development or administrative capitalism. Rather, it is a deeper recomposition, in which the very notion of economic power is redefined in terms of technological vulnerabilities, infrastructural dependencies, and systemic risks related to digital globalization. The question is no longer just about the competitiveness of firms, but about the resilience of economic systems as a whole.

From this perspective, the Japanese case occupies a singular position. Neither a hegemonic technological power like the United States, nor a model of integrated state capitalism like China, Japan is gradually developing an intermediate form of strategic capitalism, based on the security of critical technologies, the governance of interdependencies and the search for a balance between openness and protection. Japan could thus show the way to a coalition of interests that is quite close to and at least strongly convergent with the centers of interest of European countries, as a kind of third way between the respective models of the United States and China.

It is this hypothesis that should now be examined more systematically. The fifth part thus proposes a transversal reading of this trajectory, questioning the possibility that Japan is not only a case of successful adaptation, but also an advanced laboratory of emerging forms of strategic capitalism in the twenty-first century.

V. Japan, a precursor of a new strategic capitalism: assessment and lessons learned

All the transformations analyzed in the previous sections lead to an overall rereading of the Japanese trajectory since the 1990s. Long perceived as an economy in relative decline, constrained by stagnation, an aging population and the loss of industrial influence in certain key sectors, Japan now appears in a different light. Far from being simply a case of gradual adjustment to globalization, it constitutes an advanced laboratory for the recomposition of capitalism in an environment marked by the rise of technological rivalries and the fragmentation of the world economic order.

This recomposition is not limited to a succession of sectoral reforms — industrial policy, competition, digital technology or economic security — but reveals a more profound transformation: that of the organizing principles of economic public action. The Japanese government is no longer content to arbitrate between efficiency and redistribution, or even to correct market failures. It now intervenes to structure the very conditions of economic power, by explicitly integrating the technological, geopolitical and systemic dimensions of production.

In this context, three lines of analysis make it possible to synthesize this trajectory. First, the singularity of the Japanese model appears in its intermediate position between the two major contemporary forms of strategic capitalism, American and Chinese (A). Secondly, this evolution can be interpreted as the transition from a traditional developing state to a state of economic security, redefining the aims of industrial policy (B). Finally, these transformations offer broader lessons for Western economies, in particular the United States and the European Union, which are confronted with similar issues of technological sovereignty and industrial competitiveness (C).

This analytical shift thus allows us to ask a central question: is Japan simply an effective adaptor to the constraints of the twenty-first century, or the precursor of a new historical form of strategic capitalism?

A. Between China and the United States: the specificities of the Japanese model

The analysis of the contemporary transformations of Japanese capitalism highlights a structuring characteristic: its intermediate position between the two major models that polarize the world economy today, namely American platform capitalism and Chinese state capitalism. This position is not a simple diplomatic balance or a strategy of geopolitical avoidance, but a deep-rooted institutional configuration, resulting both from the long history of Japanese development and the structural constraints that weigh on its integration into the world economy.

On the one hand, the American model is based on the centrality of large private platforms, innovation driven by capital markets, the fluidity of venture capital and a largely ex-post regulation of competitive dynamics. This system has enabled the emergence of players capable of structuring global digital ecosystems, imposing de facto technological standards and controlling complete information value chains. The result is a form of systemic private power, in which a few companies occupy a position of architecture of global digital capitalism[133]. On the other hand, the Chinese model is based on a much closer articulation between the state, big tech companies and digital infrastructure. Public intervention is not only strategic but structuring, directly orienting innovation trajectories, data flows and industrial priorities in an explicitly geo-economic logic.[134]

Japan is distinguished by a different configuration, which cannot be reduced to either a toned down variant of the American model or a partial form of the Chinese model. It has neither global digital players capable of imposing global standards, nor a state apparatus that fully structures technological innovation. Rather, its model is based on an original combination of public-private coordination, international openness and selective targeting of critical technologies. This hybridization is part of a long-term historical trajectory, ranging from the Developmental State model  embodied by MITI in the post-war period, to its gradual transformation into METI, and then to its contemporary refocusing on the challenges of competitiveness, digital transition and now economic security.[135]

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However, this institutional continuity should not mask a major shift. While the MITI  model was mainly aimed at rapid industrialization, technological upgrading and the structuring of national champions in a still relatively segmented international environment, the contemporary model is part of a much more open and competitive space. The globalization of value chains, the financialization of the economy and the digitization of infrastructure have profoundly changed the conditions of action of the Japanese state. It no longer seeks only to organize industrial growth, but to manage complex interdependencies and reduce systemic vulnerabilities in an unstable environment.

This evolution is reflected in a reconfiguration of the relationship between the state and the market. Unlike the American model, where the innovation dynamic is largely endogenous to the private sector, and the Chinese model, where the state strongly structures technological trajectories, Japan favours a logic of co-determination. The state intervenes to identify critical technologies, guide investments, secure supply chains and support strategic industrial projects, while private companies retain a central role in technological implementation and international competition. This logic of institutional co-production is one of the major specificities of contemporary Japanese capitalism.

It is also manifested in the way in which Japan articulates industrial policy and market regulation. Rather than opposing competition and public intervention, the Japanese authorities are seeking to organise their functional complementarity. Competition is mobilised as an instrument of efficiency and innovation, while public intervention is justified by the need to preserve productive and technological capacities in sectors considered strategic. This differentiated articulation distinguishes the Japanese case from the two dominant models, in which one of the two poles — the market or the state — tends to exercise a clearer primacy.

This specificity is also reflected in Japan’s international strategy. Lacking global platforms or hegemonic capabilities in the digital economy, the country favours an approach based on multilateral governance, stabilising the rules of the international game and actively participating in global economic coordination forums. Japan is therefore less interested in imposing its standards than in shaping an institutional environment compatible with its structural interests, particularly in terms of data circulation, economic security and the stability of value chains.[136]

Finally, this intermediate position reflects a fundamental structural constraint: Japan’s dependence on foreign technologies in the most advanced segments of the digital economy, combined with a high industrial capacity in engineering, equipment, and intermediate technologies. This asymmetry pushes the country to favour a strategy of controlled interdependence rather than a logic of complete autonomy or hegemonic projection.

A table in Appendix 1 summarizes the various institutions of Japanese industrial policy.  This table highlights a profound transformation of the institutional architecture of Japanese industrial policy. Whereas during the period of high growth, the MITI embodied a highly centralized model for managing industrialization, contemporary industrial policy is now based on a set of institutions with complementary skills. The METI naturally retains a central role in defining strategic orientations, but its action is part of a much wider network associating innovation agencies, funding bodies, regulatory authorities, scientific institutions and interministerial coordination bodies. This diversification reflects the gradual broadening of the objectives pursued by the State. Industrial policy is no longer aimed solely at the development of manufacturing capacities; It now encompasses research funding, the attractiveness of international investment, the securing of critical resources, the governance of digital technologies, competition control and, more recently, economic security. The institutional organization thus reflects the growing complexity of contemporary technological policies, which simultaneously mobilize budgetary, regulatory, financial, scientific and diplomatic instruments. Far from illustrating a withdrawal of the State, this evolution testifies on the contrary to its ability to adapt to the new forms of global technological competition. It marks the transition from a strategic ministry exercising vertical coordination to a more reticular governance, in which the coherence of public policies is based more on coordination between institutions than on their concentration within a single administration.

The table in Appendix 2 completes the previous one by highlighting a significant evolution of the Japanese government’s priorities and major budgetary phases in the industrial field since the early 2000s. Beyond the cyclical fluctuations linked to government changes or economic crises, it reveals a fundamental trend: the gradual increase in spending on innovation, critical technologies and economic resilience. The first years of the 2000s were marked by the search for greater effectiveness of public policies and by the structural reforms undertaken under Junichiro Koizumi. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Fukushima disaster in 2011 led to a reorientation of public investment towards energy technologies, research and innovation. From the second Abe administration, appropriations for Society 5.0, artificial intelligence, robotics and digital infrastructure increased significantly, before the Covid-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions led to an unprecedented acceleration in funding for semiconductors, supply chains and economic security. Public budgets thus reflect a gradual shift in the State’s priorities: from a logic mainly oriented towards supporting industrial competitiveness to a more global policy aimed at technological sovereignty, the control of critical dependencies and the resilience of the national economy. The amounts committed reflect Japan’s desire to regain a strategic intervention capacity comparable to that which characterized the major industrial policies of the post-war period, but now adapted to the challenges of the digital economy and geo-economic competition.

Thus, the table in Annex 3 on the evolution of the institutions and financing of Japanese industrial policy shows that the transformation of Japanese industrial policy is not the result of a succession of isolated measures, but of a continuous process of institutional and financial restructuring. Each government brings its own inflections, while being part of a long-term trajectory characterized by the gradual expansion of the missions assigned to the State. Traditional policies to support the manufacturing industry are gradually being replaced by a more integrated approach combining research, innovation, digital technologies, energy transition, economic security and the resilience of value chains. This evolution is reflected in a diversification of intervention instruments – grants, innovation funds, public guarantees, strategic investments, public-private partnerships and support for critical technologies – as well as in the rise of specialised agencies alongside METI. The amounts mobilized increased particularly sharply from 2020 onwards, under the combined effect of the pandemic, the Sino-American technological rivalry and the new industrial sovereignty policies. The creation of funds dedicated to semiconductors, artificial intelligence, the energy transition or digital infrastructure illustrates the shift from an industrial policy focused on sectoral competitiveness to a real strategy of economic security. The table thus highlights a qualitative as well as quantitative transformation of public action: the State is no longer limited to supporting innovation, but now intends to organize the conditions for technological autonomy, industrial resilience and economic power in an international environment that has become more conflictual. 

Thus, the Japanese model appears as a hybrid form of strategic capitalism, characterized by the search for a balance between openness and security, competition and coordination, global integration and the protection of critical capabilities. This hybridity, far from being a weakness, is gradually becoming one of the most structuring distinctive features of its adaptation to twenty-first-century capitalism.

B. From the Developmental State to the Economic Security State

One of the most profound transformations highlighted by recent developments in Japanese economic policy is the reconfiguration of the role of the state. Long analysed through the prism of the Developmental State, contemporary Japan now seems to be embarking on an even more structural change, which is leading to the gradual emergence of an Economic Security State, in which the main function of public action is no longer just to promote industrial growth, but to guarantee the resilience of economic capacities in an unstable geopolitical and technological environment.  Thus, the table in Annex 3 on the evolution of the institutions and financing of Japanese industrial policy shows that the transformation of Japanese industrial policy is not the result of a succession of isolated measures, but of a continuous process of institutional and financial restructuring. Each government brings its own inflections, while being part of a long-term trajectory characterized by the gradual expansion of the missions assigned to the State. Traditional policies to support the manufacturing industry are gradually being replaced by a more integrated approach combining research, innovation, digital technologies, energy transition, economic security and the resilience of value chains. This evolution is reflected in a diversification of intervention instruments — grants, innovation funds, public guarantees, strategic investments, public-private partnerships and support for critical technologies — as well as in the rise of specialized agencies alongside METI. The amounts mobilized increased particularly sharply from 2020 onwards, under the combined effect of the pandemic, the Sino-American technological rivalry and the new industrial sovereignty policies. The creation of funds dedicated to semiconductors, artificial intelligence, the energy transition or digital infrastructure illustrates the shift from an industrial policy focused on sectoral competitiveness to a real strategy of economic security. The table thus highlights a qualitative as well as quantitative transformation of public action: the State is no longer limited to supporting innovation, but now intends to organize the conditions for technological autonomy, industrial resilience and economic power in an international environment that has become more conflictual. 

The Developmental State model, as it was theorized from the Japanese experience in the post-war period, was based on a strong administrative capacity, embodied in particular by the MITI, combined with close coordination with large industrial companies. The central objective was to accelerate industrialization, to promote technological upgrading and to structure national champions capable of supporting international competition in a context that was still relatively stable and hierarchical.[137] This model was particularly effective in manufacturing sectors, where technological learning and economies of scale played a key role.

However, from the 1990s onwards, this model began to transform under the combined effect of economic stagnation, the gradual liberalisation of markets and the globalisation of value chains. The role of the State then evolved towards a more indirect form of steering, focused on regulation, structural reform and the improvement of the competitive environment. This phase corresponds to an institutional transition from MITI to METI, marking a shift in the centre of gravity of industrial policy towards more horizontal and less interventionist instruments.[138]

The contemporary phase, however, marks a clearer break. From the 2010s and especially in the 2020s, issues related to economic security, technological dependencies and the geopolitical fragmentation of the global economy led to a selective but assumed reactivation of public intervention instruments. The Japanese government is no longer content to supervise or support the markets: it is now intervening to secure production capacities deemed critical, particularly in semiconductors, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence and strategic supply chains.[139]

This evolution is not a simple return to the previous model. It differs from it by at least three major characteristics. First, public intervention is now explicitly justified by considerations of economic security and no longer solely by industrial development. Second, it takes place in a much more open and interdependent environment, where value chains are globalized and fragmented. Third, it is based on systemic risk management rather than centralized sector planning.

In this context, the Japanese state is gradually becoming an actor in economic resilience. Its function is no longer just to guide the industrial structure, but to identify critical vulnerabilities, anticipate potential disruptions in value chains and ensure the functional continuity of essential economic infrastructure. This development brings Japan closer to a model in which the boundary between industrial policy, technological policy and security policy is becoming increasingly indistinct.[140]

This conceptual shift is particularly visible in advanced technology sectors. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure are no longer just objects of industrial policy, but central components of national security. Their control, production and security are becoming strategic issues in the same way as energy resources or traditional military capabilities.

Thus, the transition from the Developmental State to the Economic Security State does not mean a simple gradual evolution of economic policy instruments, but a more profound transformation of the rationality of public action. The Japanese government is no longer focused solely on economic performance, but on the systemic robustness of its economy in a world characterized by technological uncertainty and geopolitical rivalry.

C. Lessons for the United States and the European Union

The analysis of the Japanese case is not only of descriptive or regional interest. It also sheds light on more general dynamics affecting advanced economies confronted with the contemporary recomposition of global capitalism. In this respect, Japan is a particularly instructive laboratory, as it combines strong integration into global value chains, partial technological dependence and a persistent capacity for public intervention in strategic sectors.

For the United States, the Japanese trajectory highlights the internal tensions of the platform capitalism model. While the dominance of large US technology companies is a major asset in terms of innovation and normative power, it also raises growing questions about economic concentration, the lock-in effects of digital ecosystems and the systemic risks associated with the centralisation of data infrastructures. Contemporary debates on competition policy, illustrated in particular by the recent work of the Federal Trade Commission and the discussions around the control of large platforms, reflect a growing awareness of these issues.[141]

For the European Union, the Japanese case resonates even more directly with contemporary issues of economic and technological sovereignty. Europe shares with Japan a key structural feature: a high dependence on digital technologies produced outside its territory, combined with significant but fragmented industrial capacity. In this context, recent European debates on industrial policy, platform regulation and digital sovereignty find a direct echo in Japanese transformations.[142]

The Draghi report on European competitiveness is an important analytical point of convergence in this respect. By stressing the need to strengthen the European industrial base, to invest massively in critical technologies and to rethink economic policy instruments in a more conflictual geopolitical environment, this report is in line with several intuitions from the Japanese experience. It highlights, as in the case of Japan, the impossibility of dissociating economic competitiveness, technological autonomy and economic security in the long term.[143]

However, the comparison also highlights an important difference. Japan has gradually developed an integrated approach to these issues, articulating industrial policy, data governance and economic security in a relatively coherent framework. The European Union, on the other hand, remains marked by institutional fragmentation and a clearer separation between competition, industrial and trade policy, which sometimes limits its ability to build a fully unified strategy in the face of the challenges of global technological rivalry.

From this perspective, Japan appears less as a model to be transposed than as a leading indicator of the transformations underway in developed economies. It illustrates the rise of a capitalism in which the boundaries between market, state and security are gradually becoming porous, and in which the ability to structure controlled dependencies is becoming a central element of economic power.

Thus, the Japanese case invites us to reconsider the classic categories of international economic analysis. The distinction between industrial policy, competition policy and security policy is tending to blur in favour of a more integrated approach, centred on the notion of strategic capitalism. It is this overall recomposition that constitutes, in the final analysis, one of the major contributions of the Japanese experience to contemporary debates on the future of advanced economies.

At the end of this comparative analysis, the Japanese case appears to be a particularly fruitful revelation of the contemporary recompositions of advanced capitalism. Neither a dominant model nor a simple case of peripheral adaptation, Japan occupies a unique position that allows it to make visible structural changes that are often more diffuse in other developed economies.

This trajectory highlights a gradual shift in the traditional categories of international economic analysis. The classic distinction between public intervention and market mechanisms, between industrial policy and competition policy, or between economy and security, is tending to blur in favour of a more integrated logic. In this new environment, the ability to organize, secure, and stabilize complex interdependencies becomes a central determinant of economic power. The table below shows the gradual transition from industrial development to economic security, without a sudden break but by successive transformation of the State’s missions. 

The transformation of the Japanese strategic state (1980-2025)

1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	2020s
MITI	METI	Innovation	Society 5.0	Economic Security State
Heavy Industry	Restructuring	Competitiveness	Digital	Resilience
National Champions	Reforms	Partnerships	Data	Semiconductors
Exports	Globalization	Innovation	AI	Economic security
Development	Liberalization	Productivity	Data governance	Technological sovereignty

It is this overall recomposition that opens the way to a more general reading of contemporary capitalism, of which the Japanese case is both an advanced illustration and a conceptual laboratory.

Conclusion

The analysis of the Japanese trajectory since the 1990s highlights a transformation that goes far beyond the classic categories of comparative political economy. Far from being reduced to a sequence of technological catch-up or institutional adaptation to globalization, the Japanese case reveals a gradual recomposition of the very foundations of public economic action in advanced economies.

This movement stems from a discreet but profound shift in the center of gravity of economic policy: from the promotion of industrial growth to the management of critical interdependencies. In this context, the question is no longer just one of allocative efficiency or sectoral competitiveness, but that of the systemic robustness of economies in an environment characterized by geopolitical fragmentation, the rise of technological risks and the growing centrality of digital infrastructures.

The succession of Japanese inflections — from the reconfiguration of the model inherited from MITI to the rise of economic security, including the integration of issues related to data, platforms and artificial intelligence — is not a simple incremental adaptation. It reflects the emergence of a new public rationality in which the boundaries between industrial policy, technological policy and security policy become structurally indeterminate.

In this configuration, the state no longer defines itself primarily as the arbiter of markets or the producer of growth conditions, but as the guarantor of the functional continuity of economic systems. The notion of economic power itself is being redefined: it is no longer based solely on the ability to produce or innovate, but on the ability to organize, secure and stabilize networks of interdependence that have become both constitutive of growth and sources of vulnerability.

The Japanese case occupies a singular analytical position in this respect. It is neither a weakened variant of American platform capitalism nor a partial declination of Chinese state capitalism. Rather, it is part of an intermediary space where the relationships between the market, the state and technology are recomposed in an experimental way. This hybridization should not be interpreted as a form of institutional incompleteness, but as one of the possible expressions of the structural constraints that now weigh on advanced economies.

Thus, Japan appears less as a specific national case than as a revelation of the transformations underway in world capitalism. Through it, the emergence of a strategic capitalism of the twenty-first century is emerging, in which the control of critical dependencies, the securing of technological infrastructures and the management of systemic risks become constitutive dimensions of economic power.

From this perspective, the interest of the Japanese case goes far beyond its empirical framework. It allows us to grasp, with particular acuity, the transition from a capitalism based on competition and accumulation to a capitalism organized around resilience and the securing of interdependencies. This shift, which is still unevenly formulated in the different regions of the developed world, is undoubtedly one of the most structuring fault lines in contemporary political economy.

Appendix 1

The main institutions of Japanese industrial policy (2001-2025)

Institution	Status	Main missions	Instruments	Order of magnitude of resources
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)	Ministry	Designs industrial, energy, digital and economic security policy	Subsidies, regulation, taxation, industrial coordination	Annual budget of about ¥0.6 to ¥1.2 trillion depending on the exercises and extraordinary budgets.
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO)	Agency	R&D funding, industrial demonstrators, hydrogen, AI, batteries, semiconductors	Calls for projects, grants, public-private partnerships	Several hundred billion ¥ per year.
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)	Agency	Attractiveness, FDI, exports, establishment of foreign companies	Promotion, support, studies	A few tens of billions of ¥.
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)	Public bank	International financing, securing supplies, strategic investments	Loans, guarantees, equity investments	Several trillions of ¥ in assets under management.
Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC)	Agency	Securing critical resources (gas, oil, critical metals)	Participations, guarantees, financing	Several hundred billion ¥.
Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)	Agency	Basic research and innovation	Funding of scientific programs	Several hundred billion ¥.
Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI)	Cabinet body	Definition of the main technological orientations	Interdepartmental coordination	Does not directly manage an operational budget.
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)	Independent Authority	Competition policy, mergers, digital platforms	Control, sanctions	A relatively modest budget (a few tens of billions of ¥).

Sources: Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982, XX + 393 p.Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan Inc., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, XXIV + 320 p., especially pp. 55-112 and 213-276. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1994, XVI + 286 p. Saadia M. Pekkanen, « Japan’s Digital Transformation and Economic Security », in Saadia M. Pekkanen et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 587-611. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), White Paper on International Economy and Trade, Annual Editions, Tokyo. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Japan, Paris, OECD Publishing, various editions.

Appendix 2

The major budgetary phases of Japanese industrial policy

Government	Priority	Main features	Order of magnitude of funding
Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006)	Structural reforms	Reorganization of MITI into METI, innovation	METI budgets  stabilized at around ¥600 billion/year.
Shinzo Abe I (2006–2007)	Innovation	First digital policies	Limited Progress
Democratic Party of Japan  Government: Taro Aso, Yoshihiko Noda (2009–2012)	Recovery from the financial crisis	support for SMEs, green innovation	One-time increase
Shinzo Abe II (2012–2020)	Abenomics, Society 5.0, robotics, AI	NEDO, Society 5.0, Digitalization, first semiconductor funds	innovation budgets of several trillions of ¥ cumulatively; significant increase in METI credits.
Yoshihide Suga (2020-2021)	Digital	creation of the Digital Agency, COVID plans	tens of trillions of ¥ in stimulus packages
Fumio Kishida (2021-2024)	Economic security	Economic Security Promotion Act, Rapidus, TSMC, batteries, value chains	More than ¥10 trillion committed through several extraordinary budgets and targeted programs.
Shigeru Ishiba (2024- )	Consolidation	AI, GX, semiconductors, economic defense	continued increase in industrial and technological loans.

Appendix 3

Evolution of Japanese Industrial Policy Institutions and Financing (2001-2025)

Period	Prime Minister	Dominant doctrine	Institutions and reforms	Priority technologies	Main texts	Order of magnitude of public funding*
2001-2006	Junichiro Koizumi	State modernisation, structural reforms	Consolidation of METI; rise of NEDO; reform of independent administrative agencies	Robotics, automotive, electronics, environment	2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan; Industrial Cluster Policy	≈ 18 T¥ on the 2nd Science & Technology Plan; METI ≈ 0.6–0.8 T¥/year; NEDO ≈ 0.1–0.2 T¥/year.
2006-2012	Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, Taro Aso, Yoshihiko Noda	Innovation, emerging from the financial crisis	Strengthening the Council for Science and Technology Policy; developing university-industry partnerships	Green technologies, batteries, robotics, health	3rd Basic Plan; New Growth Strategy	≈ 20 T¥ devoted to science and technology policies over the period; a one-off increase after the 2008 crisis.
2012-2020	Shinzo Abe	Abenomics; Society 5.0; Industrial Renaissance	Strengthening of METI, NEDO, CSTI; Development of public-private partnerships	AI, IoT, robotics, advanced manufacturing, cybersecurity	Integrated Innovation Strategy; Society 5.0; 5th Basic Plan	Innovation credits reach several trillion yen; multiplication of programs led by NEDO and CSTI.
2020-2021	Yoshihide Suga	Digitization of the State; Post-COVID resilience	Creation of the Digital Agency; first supply chain security measures	Digital, Cloud, Digital Transformation	Digital Reform Act ; Digital Strategy	stimulus plans of several tens of trillions of ¥; acceleration of digital investments.
2021-2024	Fumio Kishida	Economic security; technological sovereignty	Economic Security Promotion Act ; mobilization of METI, NEDO, JBIC, JOGMEC; support to Rapidus and TSMC	Semiconductors, AI, batteries, quantum technologies, critical infrastructure	Economic Security Promotion Act (2022); GX Strategy	More than ¥10 T¥ mobilized through dedicated funds, supplementary budgets, and economic security programs; the NEDO portfolio alone now includes several multi-trillion funds (Post-5G, Green Innovation Fund, semiconductors, critical technologies).
2024-2025	Shigeru Ishiba	Consolidation of the Economic Security State	Strengthening of the State’s financial instruments; continued investment in Rapidus, AI and critical infrastructure	Generative AI, 2nm semiconductors, robotics, technology defense	Budget 2025; AI strategy; Semiconductor plans	Public commitments in semiconductors exceed ¥2 T, while the science budget crosses 5 T¥ per year for the first time.

* T¥ = trillion yen (10¹²¥). 1 trillion yen (1 T¥ = 1,000 billion yen) ≈ 5.39 billion euros and ≈ 6.24 billion US dollars.

The amounts aggregate regular budgets, supplementary budgets, extrabudgetary funds (NEDO, Green Innovation Fund, Post-5G Fund, economic security programmes, etc.) and should be understood as consolidated orders of magnitude rather than strictly comparable appropriations from one year to the next.

Sources: Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982, XX + 393 p. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1994, XVI + 286 p. Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan Inc., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, XXIV + 320 p. Richard Katz, The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, XVI + 280 p. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Overview of Industrial Technology Policy, Tokyo.NEDO, Overview and Budget Documents, various editions. Cabinet Office of Japan, Science, Technology and Innovation Basic Plans (2nd to 6th plans).

Appendix 4

The metamorphoses of Japanese industrial policy (1980-2025):

from the developing state to the economically secure state

Period	Prime Minister (coalition)	Dominant economic doctrine	Industrial and technological priorities	Perceived strategic risk	Structuring concept of public action
1980-1993	LDP Governments (Masayoshi Ōhira, Zenkō Suzuki, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita, Sōsuke Uno, Toshiki Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa)	Developmental State	Automotive, electronics, steel, shipbuilding, machine tools	Trade competition with the United States; appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accords	Industrial development, upselling, exports
1993-2001	Transitional coalitions (Morihiro Hosokawa, Tsutomu Hata, Tomiichi Murayama, Ryūtarō Hashimoto, Keizō Obuchi, Yoshirō Mori)	Structural reforms and adaptation to globalisation	Banking restructuring, ICT, deregulation, internationalisation of companies	Bursting of the financial bubble, deflation, globalization	Competitiveness, restructuring, openness
2001-2006	Junichiro Koizumi (LDP–Kōmeitō)	Structural reforms and modernization of the state	Robotics, Automotive, Advanced Electronics, Environment	Ageing population, loss of competitiveness, Chinese industrial emergence	Competitiveness, innovation, efficiency
2006-2012	Shinzo Abe (I), Yasuo Fukuda, Tarō Asō (LDP–Kōmeitō), then Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda (DYP)	Technological innovation, sustainable growth and a way out of the crisis	Green technologies, batteries, health, robotics, ICT	Global financial crisis, Fukushima disaster, energy transition	Innovation, sustainable growth, ecological transition
2012-2020	Shinzo Abe (II) (LDP–Kōmeitō)	Abenomics; Society 5.0	Robotics, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, big data, connected industry	Digital revolution, rise of China, global technological competition	Digital transformation, systemic innovation, smart society
2020-2021	Yoshihide Suga (LDP–Kōmeitō)	Digital Government	Cloud, digital government, cybersecurity, digital infrastructure	Covid-19 pandemic, vulnerability of supply chains	Digital transformation of the state, resilience
2021-2024	Fumio Kishida (LDP–Kōmeitō)	New Capitalism; Economic Security	Semiconductors, AI, batteries, quantum technologies, critical infrastructure, Rapidus	Sino-American rivalry, technological dependencies, economic security	Technological sovereignty, economic security, resilience
2024-2025	Shigeru Ishiba (LDP–Kōmeitō, minority coalition)	Consolidation of the Economic Security State	Generative AI, next-generation semiconductors, advanced robotics, dual technologies, critical infrastructure	Geoeconomic fragmentation, technological warfare, securing value chains	Strategic resilience, technological autonomy, management of critical interdependencies

Sources: Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982, XX + 393 p. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1994, XVI + 286 p. Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan Inc., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, XXIV + 320 p. Richard Katz, The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future: Entrepreneurs vs. Corporate Giants, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, XVI + 280 p. Cabinet Office of Japan, Science and Technology Basic Plans (2nd to 6th Basic Plans), Tokyo, 2001-2025; Integrated Innovation Strategy, Annual Editions.  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), White Paper on International Economy and Trade and New Industrial Structure Vision, Tokyo, annual editions. Carin Holroyd, « Technological Innovation and Building a ‘Super Smart’ Society: Japan’s Vision of Society 5.0, » Journal of Asian Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2022, pp. 18-31.

---

[1] World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Doha, 10 November 2001; Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2002, XVI + 237 p.

[2] Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford (California: Stanford University Press, 1982), XVIII + 393 p.; Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1994, XIII + 289 p.; Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism. Private Business and Public Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance, Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 1993, XV + 337 p

[3] Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy. Adaptation and Growth, Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press, 2nd ed., 2018, XXIII + 605 p.; Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978–2020, Mexico City, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021, 66 p.; Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution. Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, XIV + 343 p.

[4] Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules. A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1999, XI + 352 p.; Jonathan Taplin, Move Fast and Break Things. How Facebook, Google and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy, New York, Little, Brown and Company, 2017, 320 p.; Lina M. Khan, « Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, » Yale Law Journal, Vol. 126, No. 3, January 2017, pp. 710-805.

[5] Glenn Tiffert, Erik Brown, Tim Hwang et al., The New Global Economic Order. Economic Security and Technology Competition, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 2023; Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means. Geoeconomics and Statecraft, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 2016, X + 365 p.

[6] Shinzo Abe, « Data Free Flow with Trust, » speech at the G20 Osaka, June 28, 2019; Deborah Elms, Stephen Ezell, and Robert D. Atkinson (eds.), Data Governance in the Digital Age, Washington D.C., Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2021; Anu Bradford, Digital Empires. The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023, XVIII + 565 p.

[7] See, in particular , François Souty,  » Industrial Policy and Competition Policy in China since 2001: A Strategic Convergence at the Antipodes of the European Model? Le Diplomate Média, June 03, 2026; 43 p.; F. Souty, « Chinese competition law: from the 2007 anti-monopoly law to the strategic regulation of an integrated market economy (2008–2025) », Le Diplomate Média, 29 April 2026. « America First Antitrust »: The conservative renewal of American antitrust by the Trump II Administration, continuities, ruptures and doctrinal recompositions », 35 p., La Diplomate Média, 12 January 2026; F. Souty, « European Digital Markets Act, competition policy and sovereignty: Geopolitical consequences and strategic impact of law on the digital economy », Le Diplomate Média, 04 February 2026, 35 p.; F. Souty, « Artificial Intelligence, Normative Sovereignty and Geopolitics: The Fragmentation of Global Governance Between Technological Powers », Le Diplomate Média, 04 March 2026, 19 p.; F. Souty, « Cyberspace, security, sovereignty, technology and global geopolitical rivalries: Legal issues, regulation and priorities for the European Union and for France », Le Diplomate Média, 11 February 2026, 24 p.

[8] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Brussels, European Commission, September 2024, approximately 400 p. and annexes; François Souty,  » The European Union, the Draghi Report on the Future of European Competitiveness: What Inspiring Strategic Consequences for France? », Le Diplomate Média, 5 December 2025, 14 p.

[9] Robert D. Atkinson and Michael Lind, Big Is Beautiful. Debunking the Myth of Small Business, Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press, 2018, XIII + 248 p.; Thomas Philippon, The Great Reversal. How America Gave Up on Free Markets, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 2019, X + 361 p.

[10] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, Underground Empire. How America Weaponized the World Economy, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2023, 288 p.; Jennifer M. Harris, Thorium. Economic Security in an Era of Great Power Competition, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2024; Adam S. Posen, « The End of Globalization? », Foreign Affairs, Vol. 102, No. 2, March-April 2023, pp. 10-24.

[11] World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Doha, 10 November 2001, 49 pp.; Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade under Fire, 5th ed., Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 2020, XVIII + 352 p., spec. pp. 213-221.

[12] Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2002, XVI + 237 p., pp. 1-27; Nicholas R. Lardy, The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China?, Washington D.C., Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019, XII + 239 p., p. 13-29

[13] Barry Naughton, op.cit.., pp. 87-134; Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011, XX + 876 p., p. 395-474.

[14] Dwight H. Perkins, « China’s Economic Growth: Past, Present and Future, » Asian Economic Policy Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2012, pp. 10-29; Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park and Kwanho Shin, « Growth Slowdowns Redux, » Japan and the World Economy, vol. 32, December 2014, pp. 65-84.

[15] World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington D.C., Annual Editions; Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, XX + 810 p.

[16] Nicholas R. Lardy, Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China, Washington D.C., Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014, XVI + 239 p., p. 49-92.

[17] Kaname Akamatsu, « A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries, » The Developing Economies, Vol. 1, No. 1, March-August 1962, pp. 3-25; Kwan C.H. Chow, The China Boom and Its Discontents, Singapore, Wiley, 2015, pp. 87-101.

[18] Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 2016, XII + 344 p., p. 85-143

[19] Kent E. Calder, Asia in Washington: Exploring the Penumbra of Transnational Power, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2014, XII + 378 p., pp. 131-168; Saadia M. Pekkanen, Steven K. Vogel and Gabriel A. Almond (eds.), Japan and the World, New York, Routledge, 2013, XVI + 354 p.

[20] Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978-2020, Mexico City, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021, 66 p., p. 23-49; Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, XIV + 343 p., p. 89-126.

[21] Kent E. Calder, Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations, New Haven (Connecticut), Yale University Press, 2009, XVI + 304 p., pp. 87-112; Saadia M. Pekkanen and Kellee S. Tsai (eds.), Japan and China in the World Political Economy, London, Routledge, 2015, XVIII + 286 p., p. 41-67.

[22] Richard Katz, Japan: The System That Soured. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle, Armonk (New York), M.E. Sharpe, 1998, XXII + 434 p., p. 215-248; Michael A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, reed., 2012, pp. 301-325.

[23] Daniel I. Okimoto, The Japanese Challenge: The Success and Failure of Economic Success, Stanford, Stanford University Press, reed., 1990; Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 159-183.

[24] Steven K. Vogel, Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry Are Reforming Japanese Capitalism, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2006, XIII + 272 p., p. 143-169.

[25] Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers, London, Allen Lane, 2010, XIV + 302 p.; Eva Dou, House of Huawei: The Secret History of China’s Most Powerful Company, New York, Portfolio/Penguin Random House, 2025, 448 p.

[26] Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics, 3rd ed., London, Routledge, 2009, XXVIII + 840 p., pp. 511-547.

[27] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Shipbuilding Industry in China, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2015, 120 p.; Kent E. Calder, The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First-Century Eurasian Geopolitics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 167-189.

[28] Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, New York, W.W. Norton, 2011, XVIII + 346 p., p. 164-197.

[29] Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2013, XIV + 240 p., pp. 101-118; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, XX + 335 p., p. 37-89.

[30] Steven K. Vogel, op.cit., spec. pp. 1-23.

[31] Richard C. Koo, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, Hoboken, New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2008, XXIII + 320 p., pp. 3-41.

[32] Gary R. Saxonhouse and Robert M. Stern (eds.), Japan’s Lost Decade: Origins, Consequences and Prospects for Recovery, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, XII + 352 p.

[33] The NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), created in 1980, is one of the main operators of Japanese industrial policy. Under the supervision of METI, it finances and coordinates applied research and innovation programmes in strategic sectors – energy, electronics, robotics, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced materials and hydrogen – bringing together universities, public bodies and large companies. Like the American DARPA in the civil field, NEDO ensures the transition of emerging technologies towards their industrialization and plays a central role in the Japanese strategy of technological sovereignty.

[34] Chalmers Johnson, op.cit, pp. 305-384.

[35] Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism: Private Business and Public Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance, Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 1993, XV + 337 p.; Steven K. Vogel, op. cit., p. 87-132.

[36] Andrew Mason and Ronald Lee (eds.), Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global Perspective, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, XXII + 593 p., p. 101-128.

[37] David E. Bloom, Axel Börsch-Supan, Patrick McGee and Atsushi Seike, « Population Aging: Facts, Challenges and Responses », Benefits and Compensation International, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2011, pp. 22-35.

[38] Fumio Hayashi and Edward C. Prescott, « The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, » Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 206-235.

[39] Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose (eds.), The Japanese Economy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, XVI + 420 p., p. 213-276.

[40] Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023, XVIII + 565 p., p. 41-89; Steven K. Vogel, Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 167-196.

[41] Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters, Stanford (California), Stanford University Press, 2020, XX + 335 p., p. 1-34.

[42] Ulrike Schaede, op. cit., pp. 89-167; Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2013, XIV + 240 p., p. 101-134.

[43] Steven K. Vogel, Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, XVI + 289 p., p. 1-24; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters, Stanford (California), Stanford University Press, 2020, XX + 335 p., p. 1-34

[44] Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2013, XIV + 240 p., p. 135-178; Kent E. Calder, Asia in Washington: Exploring the Penumbra of Transnational Power, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2014, XII + 378 p., p. 245-279

[45] Chalmers Johnson, op.cit. ; Ulrike Schaede, op. cit., pp. 89-167; Richard Katz, Japan: The System That Soured, Armonk (New York), M.E. Sharpe, 1998, XXII + 434 p.

[46] Anu Bradford, op.cit., pp. 263-329; Steven K. Vogel, Marketcraft, op.cit., p. 167-214.

[47] Robert D. Atkinson and Michael Lind, Big Is Beautiful: Debunking the Myth of Small Business, Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press, 2018, XIII + 248 p., pp. 81-129; Thomas Philippon, The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 2019, X + 361 p., p. 1-27.

[48] Steven K. Vogel, Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, XVI + 289 p., pp. 167-214; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters, Stanford (California), Stanford University Press, 2020, XX + 335 p., p. 35-89.

[49] Barry Naughton, op.cit., pp. 23-49 ; Elizabeth C. Economy, op.cit.  p. 89-126.

[50] Jonathan Taplin, Move Fast and Break Things, New York, Little, Brown and Company, 2017, 320 p.; Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023, XVIII + 565 p., p. 45-118.

[51] Ulrike Schaede, op. cit., pp. 89-167.

[52] Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2013, XIV + 240 p., p. 135-178; Steven K. Vogel, op.cit.., pp. 201-241.

[53] METI, New Industrial Structure Vision, Tokyo, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, May 2017, 60 p.; Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), Society 5.0: Co-Creating the Future, Tokyo, 2018.

[54] Ulrike Schaede, « The Rise of Japan’s Deep-Tech Economy, » Japan Forum, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2022, pp. 1-24; Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, New York, Scribner, 2022, XII + 464 p., p. 233-287

[55] Ulrike Schaede, Ibid.,  pp. 1-24; Chris Miller, Ibid, pp. 233-287

[56] Cabinet Office of Japan, Society 5.0, Tokyo, Government of Japan, 2016; Shinzo Abe, CeBIT opening speech, Hannover, 20 March 2017.

[57] Shiro Ishikawa, « Society 5.0: The Japanese Vision of a Super-Smart Society, » Japan SPOTLIGHT, Vol. 36, No. 4, July-August 2017, pp. 8-13.

[58] Kent E. Calder, op.cit., pp. 271-298; Jennifer M. Harris, op.cit. p. 247-311.

[59] Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1999, XXII + 352 p.; Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, Capitalism without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy, Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 2018, XVIII + 278 p., p. 1-45

[60] Anu Bradford, op.cit., pp. 45-118 and 263-329.

[61] Steven K. Vogel, op.cit., pp. 167-214.

[62] Anu Bradford, op. cit., pp. 119-262; Elizabeth C. Economy, The World According to China, Cambridge (United Kingdom), Polity Press, 2022, XIV + 320 p., p. 143-201.

[63] Shinzo Abe’s speech at the G20 in Osaka, June 28, 2019; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Data Free Flow with Trust and Emerging Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Paris, OECD Publ., 2023, 78 p.

[64] Susan Ariel Aaronson, Data Is Different: Why the World Needs a New Approach to Governing Cross-Border Data Flows, Washington D.C., CIGI Papers, No. 197, 2018, 32 p.

[65] Cabinet Office of Japan, Integrated Innovation Strategy, Tokyo, annual editions since 2018; OECD, Artificial Intelligence Review of Japan, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2021, 112 p.

[66] Saadia M. Pekkanen, « Japan’s Digital Transformation and Economic Security, » in Saadia M. Pekkanen et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 587-611.

[67] Richard Katz, The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, XVI + 280 p., p. 131-176.

[68] Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver and Manipulate in the Digital Age, New York, PublicAffairs, 2016, XII + 320 p., p. 201-248.

[69] Jennifer M. Harris, op.cit., pp. 247-311; Chris Miller, Chip War, op.cit., pp. 287-365.

[70] Saadia M. Pekkanen, op.cit.. ; Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack (eds.), Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 245-268.

[71] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, New York, Oxford University Press, 2021, XXIV + 424 p., p. 203-276; Evan A. Feigenbaum, The United States, China and the Future of Asia, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019.

[72] Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 2013, XVI + 240 p., p. 95-168.

[73] Dani Rodrik, op.cit., pp. 189-233 ; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Global Value Chains: Efficiency and Risks in the Context of Economic Security, Paris, OECD Publishing, various studies, 2018-2021.

[74] Chris Miller, op.cit., New York, Scribner, 2022, pp. 287-389; Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy (New York: Henry Holt, 2023), pp. 85–167.

[75] OECD, Acquisition- and Ownership-related Policies to Safeguard Essential Security Interests, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2020; METI, White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2020, Tokyo, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, chap. 2.

[76] Mireya Solís, Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2023, XVI + 310 p., pp. 41-108.

[77] The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force on December 30, 2018, following the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)) decided in January 2017. It now brings together twelve economies in the Indo-Pacific region – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United Kingdom – representing about 15% of global GDP. Beyond the elimination of tariffs, the CPTPP is a « new generation » trade agreement covering investment, government procurement, digital trade, state-owned enterprises, intellectual property, competition rules and regional value chains. It is generally analysed as a major instrument of economic governance intended to disseminate high-level trade and regulatory standards in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of the Sino-American rivalry, it is also participating in the competition for the definition of the rules of the world economy, while China’s application for membership, filed in 2021, raises important questions about the compatibility of its economic model with the disciplines of the treaty. See, in particular, Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low (eds.), A Pacific Trade Agreement in a New Era. The CPTPP and Asia’s Future, Tokyo, Asian Trade Centre, 2019, 314 p.; Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 19-8, Washington D.C., 2019, 52 p. ; Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, East Asia Decouples? Supply Chains, China, and a New Trade Bloc, Washington D.C., Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2020, 256 p. Mireya Solís, Dilemmas of a Trading Nation: Japan and the United States in the Evolving Asia-Pacific Order, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2017, XII + 366 p., pp. 267-335; Shujiro Urata, « The CPTPP and Japan’s Leadership in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration, » Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2020, pp. 1-22.

[78] Cabinet Office of Japan, The 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan, Tokyo, Government of Japan, 2016, 72 p.

[79] Cabinet Office of Japan, Society 5.0: A People-Centric Super-Smart Society, Tokyo, Government of Japan, 2018; Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), Toward Realization of the New Economy and Society: Reform of the Economy and Society by the Deepening of Society 5.0, Tokyo, 2018.

[80] Shiro Armstrong, Masahiro Kawai, and Peter J. Morgan (eds.), Asia’s Economic Challenges in an Era of Globalization, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2020, pp. 185-214.

[81] OECD, The Digital Transformation of Japan, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2021, pp. 23-78.

[82] Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), pp. 89-154.

[83] Robert D. Atkinson, Industry 4.0 and the Future of Manufacturing Competitiveness, Washington D.C., Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2018; OECD, Japan 2019 Economic Survey, chapter on digital transformation.

[84] Steven K. Vogel, op.cit., p. 167-214.

[85] Richard Katz, The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 131-176.

[86] Hiroaki Nakanishi, « Society 5.0: Co-Creating the Future, » Japan SPOTLIGHT, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2019, pp. 4-8; Keidanren, Society 5.0 for SDGs, Tokyo, 2021.

[87] Steven K. Vogel, op.cit., p. 87-126.

[88] Chalmers Johnson, op.cit., p. 305-320; Kent E. Calder, op.cit, pp. 21-58.

[89] Takatoshi Ito and Hugh Patrick (eds.), Reviving Japan’s Economy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005, p. 1-42; Ulrike Schaede, Choose and Focus: Japanese Business Strategies for the 21st Century, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 173-209.

[90] Japan Fair Trade Commission, Annual Report (successive editions of the 2000s and 2010s); Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 812-820.

[91] Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. 361-404.

[92] V. F. Souty, « International Governance of Competition, Geopolitics and Normative Convergence », Le Diplomate Média, 18 March 2026, 24 p.

[93] Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy and the New Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 93-118; Frédéric Jenny, « Competition and Industrial Policies in a Globalized Economy », International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2016, pp. 3-28.

[94] Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 71-129; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, pp. 55-112.

[95] OECD, Competition Reviews of Japan, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2014; International Competition Network, Agency Effectiveness Project Report, Bonn, 2019.

[96] Anu Bradford, op.cit, pp. 119-262; Elizabeth C. Economy, op.cit, pp. 143-201

[97] Barry Naughton, op.cit, pp. 15-57; Elizabeth C. Economy, The World According to China, op. cit., pp. 143-201.

[98] OECD, Acquisition- and Ownership-related Policies to Safeguard Essential Security Interests, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2020; METI, White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2020, Tokyo, Chapter 2

[99] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, op.cit, pp. 45-116; Jennifer M. Harris, op.cit., pp. 247-311.

[100] Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business School Press, 1999, pp. 173-210

[101] Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age (New York: Norton, 2014), pp. 91-138.

[102] Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, New York, PublicAffairs, 2019, p. 85-132.

[103] Anu Bradford, op.cit., pp. 45-118.

[104] Lina Khan, « Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, » Yale Law Journal, 2017, pp. 710-805.

[105] OECD, Digital Economy Outlook, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2024.

[106] Jean Tirole, Économie du bien commun, Paris, PUF, 2016, p. 451-498; Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness, New York, Columbia Global Reports, 2018.

[107] Anu Bradford, op.cit, pp. 263-329

[108] Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 112-158; Gregory Shaffer, Emerging Powers and the World Trading System, Cambridge University Press, 2021

[109] G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration, 28–29 June 2019; OECD, Data Free Flow with Trust and Emerging Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2023

[110] Masao Horibe, « Japan’s Vision for Data Governance, » Japan Spotlight, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2022, pp. 12-18; Mireya Solís, Japan’s Quiet Leadership, Brookings Institution Press, 2023, pp. 109-152.

[111] Richard Katz, op.cit., pp. 177-214.

[112] WTO, OECD and IMF joint discussions on digital trade governance, various reports 2019–2024.

[113] Susan Ariel Aaronson, Data Is Different: Why the World Needs a New Approach to Governing Cross-Border Data Flows, Washington D.C., CIGI Papers, No. 197, 2018, 32 p.; Anupam Chander, The Electronic Silk Road: How the Web Binds the World Together in Commerce, New Haven (Connecticut), Yale University Press, 2013, XX + 275 p.; Anu Bradford, Digital Empires, op.cit..

[114] Government of Japan, Economic Security Promotion Act, 2022.

[115] Chris Miller, op.cit., pp. 287-365.

[116] Jennifer M. Harris and Abraham L. Newman, op.cit., pp. 85-167.

[117] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, « Weaponized Interdependence, » op.cit., pp. 42-79.

[118] Chris Miller, op.cit, pp. 1-120.

[119] Dan Breznitz, Innovation in Real Places, Oxford University Press, 2021, p 143-189.

[120] OECD, Semiconductor Value Chains: Emerging Risks and Policy Responses, Paris, OECD Publ., 2024.

[121] Created in 2022 with the support of the Japanese government and a consortium including Toyota, Sony, NTT, SoftBank, NEC and Kioxia, Rapidus  is one of the main instruments of Japan’s strategy to regain national capabilities in advanced semiconductors. The project aims to develop a production capacity for next-generation (2 nm) chips in Japan, in cooperation with IBM, in order to reduce external technological dependencies and strengthen the resilience of supply chains in a context marked by the Sino-American technological rivalry. Rapidus thus illustrates the shift from an industrial policy focused on competitiveness to a logic of economic security integrating technological sovereignty and management of strategic vulnerabilities. See in particular: Chris Miller, op.cit., pp. 287-365 ; Saadia M. Pekkanen, « Economic Security and Japan’s Technology Strategy », in Saadia M. Pekkanen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 587-611.

[122] METI, Rapidus Project and Next-Generation Semiconductor Strategy, Tokyo, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2023

[123] Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan, Stanford University Press, 2020, pp. 155-212

[124] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, op.cit., p. 167-240

[125] Richard Baldwin, The Globotics Upheaval, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 201-245

[126] Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age (New York: Norton, 2014), pp. 91-160.

[127] Cabinet Office of Japan, Society 5.0 Implementation Strategy, Tokyo, 2019–2024 editions.

[128] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 77-130.

[129] Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order, Public Affairs, 2016, p. 201-248.

[130] Joseph S. Nye, « Cyber Power, » Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Report, 2010.

[131] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, op.cit., pp. 241-310.

[132] OECD, Digital Security Risk and Economic Resilience, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2024.

[133] Shoshana Zuboff, op.cit, pp. 75-132 and 463-521

[134] Yuen Yuen Ang, China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 189-245; Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978–2020 (Mexico City: UNAM, 2021), pp. 15–57 and 201–248

[135] Chalmers Johnson, op.cit., pp. 305-320; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan Inc., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, pp. 55-112 and 155-212.

[136] Mireya Solís, Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2023, pp. 109-152 and 233-276.

[137] Chalmers Johnson, op.cit., pp. 19-88 and 305-320; Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 139-178.

[138] Takatoshi Ito and Hugh Patrick (eds.), Reviving Japan’s Economy: Problems and Prescriptions, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005, pp. 1-42; Ulrike Schaede, The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan Inc., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2020, pp. 55-112.

[139] Jennifer M. Harris and Abraham L. Newman, op.cit., pp. 85-167 ; Chris Miller, op.cit., pp. 287-365.

[140] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, « Weaponized Interdependence, » International Security, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2019, pp. 42–79; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Security and Global Value Chains, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2023.

[141] Federal Trade Commission, Big Tech and Competition Policy: Recent Developments, Washington D.C., 2023; Lina Khan, « Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, » Yale Law Journal, vol. 126, 2017, pp. 710-805.

[142] European Commission, A Digital Compass for the EU, Brussels, 2021; European Commission, EU Industrial Policy Strategy Update, Brussels, 2023.

[143] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Report to the European Council, 2024, pp. 1-85 and 120-210.

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